x86/iommu: add map-reserved dom0-iommu option to map reserved memory ranges

Several people have reported hardware issues (malfunctioning USB
controllers) due to iommu page faults on Intel hardware. Those faults
are caused by missing RMRR (VTd) entries in the ACPI tables. Those can
be worked around on VTd hardware by manually adding RMRR entries on
the command line, this is however limited to Intel hardware and quite
cumbersome to do.

In order to solve those issues add a new dom0-iommu=map-reserved
option that identity maps all regions marked as reserved in the memory
map. Note that regions used by devices emulated by Xen (LAPIC, IO-APIC
or PCIe MCFG regions) are specifically avoided. Note that this option
is available to all Dom0 modes (as opposed to the inclusive option
which only works for PV Dom0).

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
This commit is contained in:
Roger Pau Monné authored and Jan Beulich committed 2018-09-12 16:33:29 +02:00
1 parent 6bf0be5af8
commit 0426787629
9 files changed
+78 -8

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+9
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@@ -704,6 +704,15 @@ This list of booleans controls the iommu usage by Dom0:
option is only applicable to a PV Dom0 and is enabled by default on Intel
hardware.
* `map-reserved`: sets up DMA remapping for all the reserved regions in the
memory map for Dom0. Use this to work around firmware issues providing
incorrect RMRR/IVMD entries. Rather than only mapping RAM pages for IOMMU
accesses for Dom0, all memory regions marked as reserved in the memory map
that don't overlap with any MMIO region from emulated devices will be
identity mapped. This option maps a subset of the memory that would be
mapped when using the `map-inclusive` option. This option is available to all
Dom0 modes and is enabled by default on Intel hardware.
### dom0\_ioports\_disable (x86)
> `= List of <hex>-<hex>`
+5
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@@ -404,6 +404,11 @@ static const struct hvm_mmcfg *vpci_mmcfg_find(const struct domain *d,
return NULL;
}
bool vpci_is_mmcfg_address(const struct domain *d, paddr_t addr)
{
return vpci_mmcfg_find(d, addr);
}
static unsigned int vpci_mmcfg_decode_addr(const struct hvm_mmcfg *mmcfg,
paddr_t addr, pci_sbdf_t *sbdf)
{
@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ static void __hwdom_init amd_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
/* Inclusive IOMMU mappings are disabled by default on AMD hardware. */
if ( iommu_hwdom_inclusive == -1 )
iommu_hwdom_inclusive = 0;
/* Reserved IOMMU mappings are disabled by default on AMD hardware. */
if ( iommu_hwdom_reserved == -1 )
iommu_hwdom_reserved = 0;
if ( allocate_domain_resources(dom_iommu(d)) )
BUG();
+4
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@@ -2732,6 +2732,10 @@ static void __hwdom_init arm_smmu_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
printk(XENLOG_WARNING
"map-inclusive dom0-iommu option is not supported on ARM\n");
iommu_hwdom_inclusive = 0;
if ( iommu_hwdom_reserved == 1 )
printk(XENLOG_WARNING
"map-reserved dom0-iommu option is not supported on ARM\n");
iommu_hwdom_reserved = 0;
}
static void arm_smmu_iommu_domain_teardown(struct domain *d)
+4 -1
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@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ bool_t __read_mostly iommu_intremap = 1;
bool __hwdom_initdata iommu_hwdom_strict;
bool __read_mostly iommu_hwdom_passthrough;
int8_t __hwdom_initdata iommu_hwdom_inclusive = -1;
int8_t __hwdom_initdata iommu_hwdom_reserved = -1;
/*
* In the current implementation of VT-d posted interrupts, in some extreme
@@ -155,6 +156,8 @@ static int __init parse_dom0_iommu_param(const char *s)
iommu_hwdom_strict = val;
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("map-inclusive", s, ss)) >= 0 )
iommu_hwdom_inclusive = val;
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("map-reserved", s, ss)) >= 0 )
iommu_hwdom_inclusive = val;
else
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -236,7 +239,7 @@ void __hwdom_init iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
hd->platform_ops->hwdom_init(d);
ASSERT(iommu_hwdom_inclusive != -1);
ASSERT(iommu_hwdom_inclusive != -1 && iommu_hwdom_inclusive != -1);
if ( iommu_hwdom_inclusive && !is_pv_domain(d) )
{
printk(XENLOG_WARNING
+3
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@@ -1307,6 +1307,9 @@ static void __hwdom_init intel_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
/* Inclusive mappings are enabled by default on Intel hardware for PV. */
if ( iommu_hwdom_inclusive == -1 )
iommu_hwdom_inclusive = is_pv_domain(d);
/* Reserved IOMMU mappings are enabled by default on Intel hardware. */
if ( iommu_hwdom_reserved == -1 )
iommu_hwdom_reserved = 1;
setup_hwdom_pci_devices(d, setup_hwdom_device);
setup_hwdom_rmrr(d);
+46 -6
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <xen/softirq.h>
#include <xsm/xsm.h>
#include <asm/hvm/io.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
void iommu_update_ire_from_apic(
@@ -139,17 +140,23 @@ static bool __hwdom_init hwdom_iommu_map(const struct domain *d,
unsigned long max_pfn)
{
mfn_t mfn = _mfn(pfn);
unsigned int i, type;
/*
* Set up 1:1 mapping for dom0. Default to include only conventional RAM
* areas and let RMRRs include needed reserved regions. When set, the
* inclusive mapping additionally maps in every pfn up to 4GB except those
* that fall in unusable ranges.
* that fall in unusable ranges for PV Dom0.
*/
if ( (pfn > max_pfn && !mfn_valid(mfn)) || xen_in_range(pfn) )
if ( (pfn > max_pfn && !mfn_valid(mfn)) || xen_in_range(pfn) ||
/*
* Ignore any address below 1MB, that's already identity mapped by the
* Dom0 builder for HVM.
*/
(!d->domain_id && is_hvm_domain(d) && pfn < PFN_DOWN(MB(1))) )
return false;
switch ( page_get_ram_type(mfn) )
switch ( type = page_get_ram_type(mfn) )
{
case RAM_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
return false;
@@ -160,10 +167,40 @@ static bool __hwdom_init hwdom_iommu_map(const struct domain *d,
break;
default:
if ( !iommu_hwdom_inclusive || pfn > max_pfn )
if ( type & RAM_TYPE_RESERVED )
{
if ( !iommu_hwdom_inclusive && !iommu_hwdom_reserved )
return false;
}
else if ( is_hvm_domain(d) || !iommu_hwdom_inclusive || pfn > max_pfn )
return false;
}
/*
* Check that it doesn't overlap with the LAPIC
* TODO: if the guest relocates the MMIO area of the LAPIC Xen should make
* sure there's nothing in the new address that would prevent trapping.
*/
if ( has_vlapic(d) )
{
const struct vcpu *v;
for_each_vcpu(d, v)
if ( pfn == PFN_DOWN(vlapic_base_address(vcpu_vlapic(v))) )
return false;
}
/* ... or the IO-APIC */
for ( i = 0; has_vioapic(d) && i < d->arch.hvm.nr_vioapics; i++ )
if ( pfn == PFN_DOWN(domain_vioapic(d, i)->base_address) )
return false;
/*
* ... or the PCIe MCFG regions.
* TODO: runtime added MMCFG regions are not checked to make sure they
* don't overlap with already mapped regions, thus preventing trapping.
*/
if ( has_vpci(d) && vpci_is_mmcfg_address(d, pfn_to_paddr(pfn)) )
return false;
return true;
}
@@ -173,7 +210,7 @@ void __hwdom_init arch_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
BUG_ON(!is_hardware_domain(d));
if ( iommu_hwdom_passthrough || !is_pv_domain(d) )
if ( iommu_hwdom_passthrough )
return;
max_pfn = (GB(4) >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1;
@@ -187,7 +224,10 @@ void __hwdom_init arch_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
if ( !hwdom_iommu_map(d, pfn, max_pfn) )
continue;
rc = iommu_map_page(d, pfn, pfn, IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
rc = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, pfn, p2m_access_rw, 0);
else
rc = iommu_map_page(d, pfn, pfn, IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
if ( rc )
printk(XENLOG_WARNING " d%d: IOMMU mapping failed: %d\n",
d->domain_id, rc);
+3
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@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ int register_vpci_mmcfg_handler(struct domain *d, paddr_t addr,
/* Destroy tracked MMCFG areas. */
void destroy_vpci_mmcfg(struct domain *d);
/* Check if an address is between a MMCFG region for a domain. */
bool vpci_is_mmcfg_address(const struct domain *d, paddr_t addr);
#endif /* __ASM_X86_HVM_IO_H__ */
+1 -1
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@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ extern bool_t iommu_debug;
extern bool_t amd_iommu_perdev_intremap;
extern bool iommu_hwdom_strict, iommu_hwdom_passthrough;
extern int8_t iommu_hwdom_inclusive;
extern int8_t iommu_hwdom_inclusive, iommu_hwdom_reserved;
extern unsigned int iommu_dev_iotlb_timeout;
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