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stubdom/grub: verify vTPM label if requested
This adds an optional argument --vtpm-label=<label> to the pv-grub command line. If specified, a vtpm device must be connected to the pv-grub domain and the backend of this device must have the given XSM label (which may start with a * to indicate a wildcard). Verifying the label of the vTPM before sending measurements prevents a disaggregated control domain that has access to xenstore but not to the guest domains from causing the measurements performed by pv-grub to be discarded, allowing the forgery of arbitrary kernel measurements in the TPM. Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@ struct pcr_extend_cmd {
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unsigned char hash[20];
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} __attribute__((packed));
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struct pcr_extend_rsp {
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uint16_t tag;
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uint32_t size;
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uint32_t status;
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unsigned char hash[20];
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} __attribute__((packed));
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/* Not imported from polarssl's header since the prototype unhelpfully defines
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* the input as unsigned char, which causes pointer type mismatches */
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void sha1(const void *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[20]);
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@@ -135,20 +143,49 @@ int kexec_allocate(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_vaddr_t up_to)
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return 0;
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}
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/* Filled from mini-os command line or left as NULL */
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char *vtpm_label;
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static void tpm_hash2pcr(struct xc_dom_image *dom, char *cmdline)
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{
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struct tpmfront_dev* tpm = init_tpmfront(NULL);
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uint8_t *resp;
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struct pcr_extend_rsp *resp;
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size_t resplen = 0;
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struct pcr_extend_cmd cmd;
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int rv;
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/* If all guests have access to a vTPM, it may be useful to replace this
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* with ASSERT(tpm) to prevent configuration errors from allowing a guest
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* to boot without a TPM (or with a TPM that has not been sent any
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* measurements, which could allow forging the measurements).
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/*
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* If vtpm_label was specified on the command line, require a vTPM to be
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* attached and for the domain providing the vTPM to have the given
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* label.
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*/
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if (!tpm)
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if (vtpm_label) {
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char ctx[128];
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if (!tpm) {
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printf("No TPM found and vtpm_label specified, aborting!\n");
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do_exit();
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}
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rv = evtchn_get_peercontext(tpm->evtchn, ctx, sizeof(ctx) - 1);
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if (rv < 0) {
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printf("Could not verify vtpm_label: %d\n", rv);
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do_exit();
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}
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ctx[127] = 0;
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rv = strcmp(ctx, vtpm_label);
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if (rv && vtpm_label[0] == '*') {
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int match_len = strlen(vtpm_label) - 1;
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int offset = strlen(ctx) - match_len;
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if (offset > 0)
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rv = strcmp(ctx + offset, vtpm_label + 1);
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}
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if (rv) {
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printf("Mismatched vtpm_label: '%s' != '%s'\n", ctx, vtpm_label);
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do_exit();
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}
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} else if (!tpm) {
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return;
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}
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cmd.tag = bswap_16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
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cmd.size = bswap_32(sizeof(cmd));
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@@ -156,15 +193,18 @@ static void tpm_hash2pcr(struct xc_dom_image *dom, char *cmdline)
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cmd.pcr = bswap_32(4); // PCR #4 for kernel
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sha1(dom->kernel_blob, dom->kernel_size, cmd.hash);
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tpmfront_cmd(tpm, (void*)&cmd, sizeof(cmd), &resp, &resplen);
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rv = tpmfront_cmd(tpm, (void*)&cmd, sizeof(cmd), (void*)&resp, &resplen);
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ASSERT(rv == 0 && resp->status == 0);
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cmd.pcr = bswap_32(5); // PCR #5 for cmdline
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sha1(cmdline, strlen(cmdline), cmd.hash);
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tpmfront_cmd(tpm, (void*)&cmd, sizeof(cmd), &resp, &resplen);
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rv = tpmfront_cmd(tpm, (void*)&cmd, sizeof(cmd), (void*)&resp, &resplen);
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ASSERT(rv == 0 && resp->status == 0);
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cmd.pcr = bswap_32(5); // PCR #5 for initrd
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sha1(dom->ramdisk_blob, dom->ramdisk_size, cmd.hash);
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tpmfront_cmd(tpm, (void*)&cmd, sizeof(cmd), &resp, &resplen);
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rv = tpmfront_cmd(tpm, (void*)&cmd, sizeof(cmd), (void*)&resp, &resplen);
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ASSERT(rv == 0 && resp->status == 0);
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shutdown_tpmfront(tpm);
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}
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@@ -735,8 +735,14 @@ void __attribute__ ((noreturn)) grub_reboot (void)
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* for grub's 32bit pointers to work */
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char grub_scratch_mem[SCRATCH_MEMSIZE] __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
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int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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int main(int argc, char **argv)
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{
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if (argc > 1 && memcmp(argv[1], "--vtpm-label=", 13) == 0) {
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vtpm_label = argv[1] + 13;
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argc--;
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argv++;
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}
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if (argc > 1) {
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strncpy(config_file, argv[1], sizeof(config_file) - 1);
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config_file[sizeof(config_file) - 1] = 0;
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@@ -3,3 +3,5 @@ extern struct blkfront_dev **blk_dev;
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extern struct netfront_dev *net_dev;
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extern struct kbdfront_dev *kbd_dev;
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extern struct fbfront_dev *fb_dev;
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extern char* vtpm_label;
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