x86/cet: Fix shskt manipulation error with BUGFRAME_{warn,run_fn}

This was a clear oversight in the original CET work.  The BUGFRAME_run_fn and
BUGFRAME_warn paths update regs->rip without an equivalent adjustment to the
shadow stack, causing IRET to suffer #CP because of the mismatch.

One subtle, and therefore fragile, aspect of extable_shstk_fixup() was that it
required regs->rip to have its old value as a cross-check that the right word
in the shadow stack was being edited.

Rework extable_shstk_fixup() into fixup_exception_return() which takes
ownership of the update to both the regular and shadow stacks, ensuring that
the regs->rip update is ordered correctly.

Use the new fixup_exception_return() for BUGFRAME_run_fn and BUGFRAME_warn to
ensure that the shadow stack is updated too.

Fixes: 209fb9919b ("x86/extable: Adjust extable handling to be shadow stack compatible")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Cooper committed 2021-08-16 16:03:20 +01:00
1 parent bc141e8ca5
commit 35727551c0
1 file changed
+14 -9
+14 -9
View File
@@ -777,13 +777,15 @@ static void do_reserved_trap(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
trapnr, vec_name(trapnr), regs->error_code);
}
static void extable_shstk_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, unsigned long fixup)
static void fixup_exception_return(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
unsigned long fixup)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK
unsigned long ssp, *ptr, *base;
asm ( "rdsspq %0" : "=r" (ssp) : "0" (1) );
if ( ssp == 1 )
return;
goto shstk_done;
ptr = _p(ssp);
base = _p(get_shstk_bottom(ssp));
@@ -814,7 +816,7 @@ static void extable_shstk_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, unsigned long fixup)
asm ( "wrssq %[fix], %[stk]"
: [stk] "=m" (ptr[0])
: [fix] "r" (fixup) );
return;
goto shstk_done;
}
}
@@ -824,6 +826,12 @@ static void extable_shstk_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, unsigned long fixup)
* executing the interrupted context.
*/
BUG();
shstk_done:
#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK */
/* Fixup the regular stack. */
regs->rip = fixup;
}
static bool extable_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool print)
@@ -842,10 +850,7 @@ static bool extable_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool print)
vec_name(regs->entry_vector), regs->error_code,
_p(regs->rip), _p(regs->rip), _p(fixup));
if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) )
extable_shstk_fixup(regs, fixup);
regs->rip = fixup;
fixup_exception_return(regs, fixup);
this_cpu(last_extable_addr) = regs->rip;
return true;
@@ -1138,7 +1143,7 @@ void do_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
void (*fn)(struct cpu_user_regs *) = bug_ptr(bug);
fn(regs);
regs->rip = (unsigned long)eip;
fixup_exception_return(regs, (unsigned long)eip);
return;
}
@@ -1159,7 +1164,7 @@ void do_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
case BUGFRAME_warn:
printk("Xen WARN at %s%s:%d\n", prefix, filename, lineno);
show_execution_state(regs);
regs->rip = (unsigned long)eip;
fixup_exception_return(regs, (unsigned long)eip);
return;
case BUGFRAME_bug:
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