From 3ceb79ceabab58305a0f35aed0117537f7a6b922 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Beulich Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 14:41:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] SUPPORT.md: split XSM from Flask MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit XSM is a generic framework, which in particular is also used by SILO. With this it can't really be experimental: Arm mandates SILO for having a security supported configuration. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith master commit: d7c18b8720824d7efc39ffa7296751e1812865a9 master date: 2024-09-04 16:05:03 +0200 --- SUPPORT.md | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/SUPPORT.md b/SUPPORT.md index 1d8b38cbd0..ba6052477b 100644 --- a/SUPPORT.md +++ b/SUPPORT.md @@ -768,13 +768,21 @@ Compile time disabled for ARM by default. Status, x86: Supported, not security supported -### XSM & FLASK +### XSM (Xen Security Module) Framework + +XSM is a security policy framework. The dummy implementation is covered by this +statement, and implements a policy whereby dom0 is all powerful. See below for +alternative modules (FLASK, SILO). + + Status: Supported + +### FLASK XSM Module Status: Experimental Compile time disabled by default. -Also note that using XSM +Also note that using FLASK to delegate various domain control hypercalls to particular other domains, rather than only permitting use by dom0, is also specifically excluded from security support for many hypercalls. @@ -787,6 +795,13 @@ Please see XSA-77 for more details. The default policy includes FLASK labels and roles for a "typical" Xen-based system with dom0, driver domains, stub domains, domUs, and so on. +### SILO XSM Module + +SILO extends the dummy policy by enforcing that DomU-s can only communicate +with Dom0, yet not with each other. + + Status: Supported + ## Virtual Hardware, Hypervisor ### x86/Nested PV