x86: correct LDT checks

- MMUEXT_SET_LDT should behave as similarly to the LLDT instruction as
  possible: fail only if the base address is non-canonical
- instead LDT descriptor accesses should fault if the descriptor
  address ends up being non-canonical (by ensuring this we at once
  avoid reading an entry from the mach-to-phys table and consider it a
  page table entry)
- fault propagation on using LDT selectors must distinguish #PF and #GP
  (the latter must be raised for a non-canonical descriptor address,
  which also applies to several other uses of propagate_page_fault(),
  and hence the problem is being fixed there)
- map_ldt_shadow_page() should properly wrap addresses for 32-bit VMs

At once remove the odd invokation of map_ldt_shadow_page() from the
MMUEXT_SET_LDT handler: There's nothing really telling us that the
first LDT page is going to be preferred over others.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jan Beulich committed 2013-10-11 09:28:26 +02:00
1 parent 4c37ed5622
commit 40d66baa46
5 files changed
+35 -26

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+6 -14
View File
@@ -674,12 +674,7 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
fixup_guest_code_selector(d, c.nat->trap_ctxt[i].cs);
}
/* LDT safety checks. */
if ( ((c.nat->ldt_base & (PAGE_SIZE-1)) != 0) ||
(c.nat->ldt_ents > 8192) ||
!array_access_ok(c.nat->ldt_base,
c.nat->ldt_ents,
LDT_ENTRY_SIZE) )
if ( !__addr_ok(c.nat->ldt_base) )
return -EINVAL;
}
else
@@ -692,15 +687,12 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(c.cmp->trap_ctxt); i++ )
fixup_guest_code_selector(d, c.cmp->trap_ctxt[i].cs);
/* LDT safety checks. */
if ( ((c.cmp->ldt_base & (PAGE_SIZE-1)) != 0) ||
(c.cmp->ldt_ents > 8192) ||
!compat_array_access_ok(c.cmp->ldt_base,
c.cmp->ldt_ents,
LDT_ENTRY_SIZE) )
return -EINVAL;
}
/* LDT safety checks. */
if ( ((c(ldt_base) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) != 0) ||
(c(ldt_ents) > 8192) )
return -EINVAL;
}
v->fpu_initialised = !!(flags & VGCF_I387_VALID);
+4 -5
View File
@@ -582,6 +582,8 @@ int map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int off)
BUG_ON(unlikely(in_irq()));
if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d) )
gva = (u32)gva;
guest_get_eff_kern_l1e(v, gva, &l1e);
if ( unlikely(!(l1e_get_flags(l1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT)) )
return 0;
@@ -3229,9 +3231,8 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
MEM_LOG("ignoring SET_LDT hypercall from external domain");
okay = 0;
}
else if ( ((ptr & (PAGE_SIZE-1)) != 0) ||
(ents > 8192) ||
!array_access_ok(ptr, ents, LDT_ENTRY_SIZE) )
else if ( ((ptr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) != 0) || !__addr_ok(ptr) ||
(ents > 8192) )
{
okay = 0;
MEM_LOG("Bad args to SET_LDT: ptr=%lx, ents=%lx", ptr, ents);
@@ -3244,8 +3245,6 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_base = ptr;
curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_ents = ents;
load_LDT(curr);
if ( ents != 0 )
(void)map_ldt_shadow_page(0);
}
break;
}
+22 -5
View File
@@ -1065,12 +1065,24 @@ static void reserved_bit_page_fault(
show_execution_state(regs);
}
void propagate_page_fault(unsigned long addr, u16 error_code)
struct trap_bounce *propagate_page_fault(unsigned long addr, u16 error_code)
{
struct trap_info *ti;
struct vcpu *v = current;
struct trap_bounce *tb = &v->arch.pv_vcpu.trap_bounce;
if ( unlikely(!is_canonical_address(addr)) )
{
ti = &v->arch.pv_vcpu.trap_ctxt[TRAP_gp_fault];
tb->flags = TBF_EXCEPTION | TBF_EXCEPTION_ERRCODE;
tb->error_code = 0;
tb->cs = ti->cs;
tb->eip = ti->address;
if ( TI_GET_IF(ti) )
tb->flags |= TBF_INTERRUPT;
return tb;
}
v->arch.pv_vcpu.ctrlreg[2] = addr;
arch_set_cr2(v, addr);
@@ -1097,6 +1109,8 @@ void propagate_page_fault(unsigned long addr, u16 error_code)
if ( unlikely(error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit) )
reserved_bit_page_fault(addr, guest_cpu_user_regs());
return NULL;
}
static int handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault(
@@ -1130,13 +1144,16 @@ static int handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault(
}
else
{
struct trap_bounce *tb;
/* In hypervisor mode? Leave it to the #PF handler to fix up. */
if ( !guest_mode(regs) )
return 0;
/* In guest mode? Propagate #PF to guest, with adjusted %cr2. */
propagate_page_fault(
curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_base + offset,
regs->error_code);
/* In guest mode? Propagate fault to guest, with adjusted %cr2. */
tb = propagate_page_fault(curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_base + offset,
regs->error_code);
if ( tb )
tb->error_code = ((u16)offset & ~3) | 4;
}
}
else
+1 -1
View File
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long pfn);
void make_cr3(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long mfn);
void update_cr3(struct vcpu *v);
int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *);
void propagate_page_fault(unsigned long addr, u16 error_code);
struct trap_bounce *propagate_page_fault(unsigned long addr, u16 error_code);
void *do_page_walk(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr);
int __sync_local_execstate(void);
+2 -1
View File
@@ -386,7 +386,8 @@ guest_get_eff_l1e(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr, void *eff_l1e)
if ( likely(!paging_mode_translate(v->domain)) )
{
ASSERT(!paging_mode_external(v->domain));
if ( __copy_from_user(eff_l1e,
if ( !__addr_ok(addr) ||
__copy_from_user(eff_l1e,
&__linear_l1_table[l1_linear_offset(addr)],
sizeof(l1_pgentry_t)) != 0 )
*(l1_pgentry_t *)eff_l1e = l1e_empty();
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