x86/cpu: Sysctl and common infrastructure for levelling context switching

A toolstack needs to know how much control Xen has over the visible cpuid
values in PV guests.  Provide an explicit mechanism to query what Xen is
capable of.

This interface will currently report no capabilities.  This change is
scaffolding for future patches, which will introduce detection and switching
logic, after which the interface will report hardware capabilities correctly.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Cooper committed 2016-04-08 21:54:21 +01:00
1 parent 36e3c8f10f
commit 67528a3f06
8 files changed
+74

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@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ allow dom0_t xen_t:xen2 {
allow dom0_t xen_t:xen2 {
pmu_ctrl
get_symbol
get_cpu_levelling_caps
};
# Allow dom0 to use all XENVER_ subops and VERSION subops that have checks.
+6
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@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ integer_param("cpuid_mask_ext_ecx", opt_cpuid_mask_ext_ecx);
unsigned int opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx = ~0u;
integer_param("cpuid_mask_ext_edx", opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx);
unsigned int __initdata expected_levelling_cap;
unsigned int __read_mostly levelling_caps;
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cpuidmasks, cpuidmasks);
struct cpuidmasks __read_mostly cpuidmask_defaults;
const struct cpu_dev *__read_mostly cpu_devs[X86_VENDOR_NUM] = {};
unsigned int paddr_bits __read_mostly = 36;
+6
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@@ -190,6 +190,12 @@ long arch_do_sysctl(
}
break;
case XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_levelling_caps:
sysctl->u.cpu_levelling_caps.caps = levelling_caps;
if ( __copy_field_to_guest(u_sysctl, sysctl, u.cpu_levelling_caps.caps) )
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
ret = -ENOSYS;
break;
+1
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@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
#define cpu_has_xsaves boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)
#define cpu_has_monitor boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MONITOR)
#define cpu_has_eist boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_EIST)
#define cpu_has_hypervisor boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)
enum _cache_type {
CACHE_TYPE_NULL = 0,
+32
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <asm/cpufeatureset.h>
#include <asm/cpuid-autogen.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#define FSCAPINTS FEATURESET_NR_ENTRIES
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <xen/types.h>
#include <public/sysctl.h>
extern const uint32_t known_features[FSCAPINTS];
extern const uint32_t special_features[FSCAPINTS];
@@ -31,6 +33,36 @@ void calculate_featuresets(void);
const uint32_t *lookup_deep_deps(uint32_t feature);
/*
* Expected levelling capabilities (given cpuid vendor/family information),
* and levelling capabilities actually available (given MSR probing).
*/
#define LCAP_faulting XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_faulting
#define LCAP_1cd (XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_ecx | \
XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_edx)
#define LCAP_e1cd (XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_extd_ecx | \
XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_extd_edx)
#define LCAP_Da1 XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_xsave_eax
#define LCAP_6c XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_thermal_ecx
#define LCAP_7ab0 (XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_l7s0_eax | \
XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_l7s0_ebx)
extern unsigned int expected_levelling_cap, levelling_caps;
struct cpuidmasks
{
uint64_t _1cd;
uint64_t e1cd;
uint64_t Da1;
uint64_t _6c;
uint64_t _7ab0;
};
/* Per CPU shadows of masking MSR values, for lazy context switching. */
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct cpuidmasks, cpuidmasks);
/* Default masking MSR values, calculated at boot. */
extern struct cpuidmasks cpuidmask_defaults;
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* !__X86_CPUID_H__ */
+23
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@@ -766,6 +766,27 @@ struct xen_sysctl_tmem_op {
typedef struct xen_sysctl_tmem_op xen_sysctl_tmem_op_t;
DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_sysctl_tmem_op_t);
/*
* XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_levelling_caps (x86 specific)
*
* Return hardware capabilities concerning masking or faulting of the cpuid
* instruction for PV guests.
*/
struct xen_sysctl_cpu_levelling_caps {
#define XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_faulting (1ul << 0) /* CPUID faulting */
#define XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_ecx (1ul << 1) /* 0x00000001.ecx */
#define XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_edx (1ul << 2) /* 0x00000001.edx */
#define XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_extd_ecx (1ul << 3) /* 0x80000001.ecx */
#define XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_extd_edx (1ul << 4) /* 0x80000001.edx */
#define XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_xsave_eax (1ul << 5) /* 0x0000000D:1.eax */
#define XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_thermal_ecx (1ul << 6) /* 0x00000006.ecx */
#define XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_l7s0_eax (1ul << 7) /* 0x00000007:0.eax */
#define XEN_SYSCTL_CPU_LEVELCAP_l7s0_ebx (1ul << 8) /* 0x00000007:0.ebx */
uint32_t caps;
};
typedef struct xen_sysctl_cpu_levelling_caps xen_sysctl_cpu_levelling_caps_t;
DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_sysctl_cpu_levelling_caps_t);
struct xen_sysctl {
uint32_t cmd;
#define XEN_SYSCTL_readconsole 1
@@ -791,6 +812,7 @@ struct xen_sysctl {
#define XEN_SYSCTL_pcitopoinfo 22
#define XEN_SYSCTL_psr_cat_op 23
#define XEN_SYSCTL_tmem_op 24
#define XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_levelling_caps 25
uint32_t interface_version; /* XEN_SYSCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION */
union {
struct xen_sysctl_readconsole readconsole;
@@ -816,6 +838,7 @@ struct xen_sysctl {
struct xen_sysctl_psr_cmt_op psr_cmt_op;
struct xen_sysctl_psr_cat_op psr_cat_op;
struct xen_sysctl_tmem_op tmem_op;
struct xen_sysctl_cpu_levelling_caps cpu_levelling_caps;
uint8_t pad[128];
} u;
};
+3
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@@ -808,6 +808,9 @@ static int flask_sysctl(int cmd)
case XEN_SYSCTL_tmem_op:
return domain_has_xen(current->domain, XEN__TMEM_CONTROL);
case XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_levelling_caps:
return domain_has_xen(current->domain, XEN2__GET_CPU_LEVELLING_CAPS);
default:
printk("flask_sysctl: Unknown op %d\n", cmd);
return -EPERM;
+2
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@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ class xen2
pmu_ctrl
# PMU use (domains, including unprivileged ones, will be using this operation)
pmu_use
# XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_levelling_caps
get_cpu_levelling_caps
}
# Classes domain and domain2 consist of operations that a domain performs on
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