diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig index 06fd85cc77..2782ee6589 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR config ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR def_bool y if ARM_64 && HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR +config ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + def_bool y if ARM_32 && HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + source "common/Kconfig" source "drivers/Kconfig" diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S index 64876c1184..828e52c25c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S @@ -34,6 +34,20 @@ blne save_guest_regs save_guest_regs: +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + /* + * Restore vectors table to the default as it may have been + * changed when returning to the guest (see + * return_to_hypervisor). We need to do that early (e.g before + * any interrupts are unmasked) because hardened vectors requires + * SP to be 8 bytes aligned. This does not hold when running in + * the hypervisor. + */ + ldr r1, =hyp_traps_vector + mcr p15, 4, r1, c12, c0, 0 + isb +#endif + ldr r11, =0xffffffff /* Clobber SP which is only valid for hypervisor frames. */ str r11, [sp, #UREGS_sp] SAVE_ONE_BANKED(SP_usr) @@ -179,12 +193,37 @@ return_to_guest: RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(R11_fiq); RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(R12_fiq); /* Fall thru */ return_to_hypervisor: - cpsid i + cpsid ai ldr lr, [sp, #UREGS_lr] ldr r11, [sp, #UREGS_pc] msr ELR_hyp, r11 ldr r11, [sp, #UREGS_cpsr] msr SPSR_hyp, r11 +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + /* + * Hardening branch predictor may require to setup a different + * vector tables before returning to the guests. Those vectors + * may rely on the state of registers that does not hold when + * running in the hypervisor (e.g SP is 8 bytes aligned). So setup + * HVBAR very late. + * + * Default vectors table will be restored on exit (see + * save_guest_regs). + */ + mov r9, #0 /* vector tables = NULL */ + /* + * Load vector tables pointer from the per-cpu bp_harden_vecs + * when returning to the guest only. + */ + and r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK + cmp r11, #PSR_MODE_HYP + ldrne r11, =per_cpu__bp_harden_vecs + mrcne p15, 4, r10, c13, c0, 2 /* r10 = per-cpu offset (HTPIDR) */ + addne r11, r11, r10 /* r11 = offset of the vector tables */ + ldrne r9, [r11] /* r9 = vector tables */ + cmp r9, #0 /* Only update HVBAR when the vector */ + mcrne p15, 4, r9, c12, c0, 0 /* tables is not NULL. */ +#endif pop {r0-r12} add sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp); /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */ clrex diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c index f1ea7f3c5b..0a138fa735 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c @@ -170,6 +170,36 @@ static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data) #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ +/* Hardening Branch predictor code for Arm32 */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + +/* + * Per-CPU vector tables to use when returning to the guests. They will + * only be used on platform requiring to harden the branch predictor. + */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, bp_harden_vecs); + +extern char hyp_traps_vector_bp_inv[]; + +static void __maybe_unused +install_bp_hardening_vecs(const struct arm_cpu_capabilities *entry, + const char *hyp_vecs, const char *desc) +{ + /* + * Enable callbacks are called on every CPU based on the + * capabilities. So double-check whether the CPU matches the + * entry. + */ + if ( !entry->matches(entry) ) + return; + + printk(XENLOG_INFO "CPU%u will %s on guest exit\n", + smp_processor_id(), desc); + this_cpu(bp_harden_vecs) = hyp_vecs; +} + +#endif + #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ .matches = is_affected_midr_range, \ .midr_model = model, \