diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c index 0eaef82e51..3ed06f6704 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "cpu.h" @@ -905,6 +906,72 @@ void __init detect_zen2_null_seg_behaviour(void) } +void amd_check_zenbleed(void) +{ + const struct cpu_signature *sig = &this_cpu(cpu_sig); + unsigned int good_rev, chickenbit = (1 << 9); + uint64_t val, old_val; + + /* + * If we're virtualised, we can't do family/model checks safely, and + * we likely wouldn't have access to DE_CFG even if we could see a + * microcode revision. + * + * A hypervisor may hide AVX as a stopgap mitigation. We're not in a + * position to care either way. An admin doesn't want to be disabling + * AVX as a mitigation on any build of Xen with this logic present. + */ + if (cpu_has_hypervisor || boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17) + return; + + switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) { + case 0x30 ... 0x3f: good_rev = 0x0830107a; break; + case 0x60 ... 0x67: good_rev = 0x0860010b; break; + case 0x68 ... 0x6f: good_rev = 0x08608105; break; + case 0x70 ... 0x7f: good_rev = 0x08701032; break; + case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: good_rev = 0x08a00008; break; + default: + /* + * With the Fam17h check above, parts getting here are Zen1. + * They're not affected. + */ + return; + } + + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, val); + old_val = val; + + /* + * Microcode is the preferred mitigation, in terms of performance. + * However, without microcode, this chickenbit (specific to the Zen2 + * uarch) disables Floating Point Mov-Elimination to mitigate the + * issue. + */ + val &= ~chickenbit; + if (sig->rev < good_rev) + val |= chickenbit; + + if (val == old_val) + /* Nothing to change. */ + return; + + /* + * DE_CFG is a Core-scoped MSR, and this write is racy during late + * microcode load. However, both threads calculate the new value from + * state which is shared, and unrelated to the old value, so the + * result should be consistent. + */ + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, val); + + /* + * Inform the admin that we changed something, but don't spam, + * especially during a late microcode load. + */ + if (smp_processor_id() == 0) + printk(XENLOG_INFO "Zenbleed mitigation - using %s\n", + val & chickenbit ? "chickenbit" : "microcode"); +} + static void cf_check init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 l, h; @@ -1171,6 +1238,8 @@ static void cf_check init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if ((smp_processor_id() == 1) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ITSC)) disable_c1_ramping(); + amd_check_zenbleed(); + check_syscfg_dram_mod_en(); amd_log_freq(c); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c index a9a5557835..75fc84e445 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c @@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ static int cf_check apply_microcode(const struct microcode_patch *patch) "microcode: CPU%u updated from revision %#x to %#x, date = %04x-%02x-%02x\n", cpu, old_rev, rev, patch->year, patch->month, patch->day); + amd_check_zenbleed(); + return 0; } diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 3b3cf51814..c0529cc3d9 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -547,6 +547,8 @@ enum ap_boot_method { }; extern enum ap_boot_method ap_boot_method; +void amd_check_zenbleed(void); + #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */