According to Intel VT-d SPEC rev3.3 Section 6.5, Register-based Invalidation
isn't supported by Intel VT-d version 6 and beyond.
This hardware change impacts following two scenarios: admin can disable
queued invalidation via 'qinval' cmdline and use register-based interface;
VT-d switches to register-based invalidation when queued invalidation needs
to be disabled, for example, during disabling x2apic or during system
suspension or after enabling queued invalidation fails.
To deal with this hardware change, if register-based invalidation isn't
supported, queued invalidation cannot be disabled through Xen cmdline; and
if queued invalidation has to be disabled temporarily in some scenarios,
VT-d won't switch to register-based interface but use some dummy functions
to catch errors in case there is any invalidation request issued when queued
invalidation is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Commit e1de4c196a ("x86/timer: Fix boot on Intel systems using ITSSPRC
static PIT clock gating") was reported to cause boot failures on certain
AMD Ryzen systems.
Refine the fix to do nothing in the default case, and only attempt to
configure legacy replacement mode if IRQ0 is found to not be working. If
legacy replacement mode doesn't help, undo it before falling back to other IRQ
routing configurations.
In addition, introduce a "hpet" command line option so this heuristic
can be overridden. Since it makes little sense to introduce just
"hpet=legacy-replacement", also allow for a boolean argument as well as
"broadcast" to replace the separate "hpetbroadcast" option.
Reported-by: Frédéric Pierret frederic.pierret@qubes-os.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Frédéric Pierret <frederic.pierret@qubes-os.org>
This reverts commit e680cc48b7.
It was committed despite multiple objections. The agreed upon fix is a
different variation of the same original patch, and the delta between the two
is far from clear.
By reverting this commit first, the fixes are clear and coherent as individual
patches, and in the appropriate form for backport to the older trees.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Commit e1de4c196a ("x86/timer: Fix boot on Intel systems using ITSSPRC
static PIT clock gating") was reported to cause boot failures on certain
AMD Ryzen systems. Until we can figure out what the actual issue there
is, skip this new part of HPET setup by default. Introduce a "hpet"
command line option to allow enabling this on hardware where it's really
needed for Xen to boot successfully (i.e. where the PIT doesn't drive
the timer interrupt).
Since it makes little sense to introduce just "hpet=legacy-replacement",
also allow for a boolean argument as well as "broadcast" to replace the
separate "hpetbroadcast" option.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Commit 13dd372834 removed the documentation for XS_RESUME, however
this command is still implemented (at least in C Xenstored) and used by
libxl when resuming a domain.
So re-instate the documentation for the XS_RESUME. Take the opportunity
to update it as there is a user of the command.
Fixes: 13dd372834 ("docs/designs: re-work the xenstore migration document...")
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Introduce an option to allow selecting a behavior similar to the pre
Xen 4.15 one for accesses to MSRs not explicitly handled. Since commit
84e848fd7a and 322ec7c89f accesses to MSRs not explicitly
handled by Xen result in the injection of a #GP to the guest. This
is a behavior change since previously a #GP was only injected if
accessing the MSR on the real hardware would also trigger a #GP, or if
the attempted to be set bits wouldn't match the hardware values (for
PV). The reasons for not leaking hardware MSR values and injecting a
#GP are fully valid, so the solution proposed here should be
considered a temporary workaround until all the required MSRs are
properly handled.
This seems to be problematic for some guests, so introduce an option
to fallback to this kind of legacy behavior without leaking the
underlying MSR values to the guest.
When the option is set, for both PV and HVM don't inject a #GP to the
guest on MSR read if reading the underlying MSR doesn't result in a
#GP, do the same for writes and simply discard the value to be written
on that case.
Note that for guests restored or migrated from previous Xen versions
the option is enabled by default, in order to keep a compatible
MSR behavior. Such compatibility is done at the libxl layer, to avoid
higher-level toolstacks from having to know the details about this flag.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Many CPUs will actually reload microcode when offered the same version as
currently loaded. This allows for easy testing of the late microcode loading
path.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
When the host crashes it would sometimes be nice to have additional
debug data available which could be produced via debug keys, but
halting the server for manual intervention might be impossible due to
the need to reboot/kexec rather sooner than later.
Add support for automatic debug key actions in case of crashes which
can be activated via boot- or runtime-parameter.
Depending on the type of crash the desired data might be different, so
support different settings for the possible types of crashes.
The parameter is "crash-debug" with the following syntax:
crash-debug-<type>=<string>
with <type> being one of:
panic, hwdom, watchdog, kexeccmd, debugkey
and <string> a sequence of debug key characters with '+' having the
special semantics of a 10 millisecond pause.
So "crash-debug-watchdog=0+0qr" would result in special output in case
of watchdog triggered crash (dom0 state, 10 ms pause, dom0 state,
domain info, run queues).
Don't call key handlers in early boot, as some (e.g. for 'd') require
some initializations to be finished, like scheduler or idle domain.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Make /cpupool/<id>/sched-gran in hypfs writable. This will enable per
cpupool selectable scheduling granularity.
Writing this node is allowed only with no cpu assigned to the cpupool.
Allowed are values "cpu", "core" and "socket".
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Add a "sched-gran" entry to the per-cpupool hypfs directories.
For now make this entry read-only and let it contain one of the
strings "cpu", "core" or "socket".
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Add /cpupool/<cpupool-id> directories to hypfs. Those are completely
dynamic, so the related hypfs access functions need to be implemented.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Add the "live-update" command to xenstore-control enabling updating
xenstored to a new version in a running Xen system.
With -c <arg> it is possible to pass a different command line to the
new instance of xenstored. This will replace the command line used
for the invocation of the just running xenstored instance.
The running xenstored (or xenstore-stubdom) needs to support live
updating, of course.
For now just add a small dummy handler to C xenstore denying any
live update action.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
While they're KERN_INFO messages and hence not visible by default, we
still have had reports that the amount of output is too large, not the
least because
- the command line controlled resizing of the console ring buffer
happens only after SRAT parsing (which may alone produce more than 16k
of output),
- the default resizing of the console ring buffer happens only after
ACPI table parsing, since the default size gets calculated depending
on the number or processors found.
Gate all per-processor logging behind a new "acpi=verbose", making sure
we wouldn't unintentionally pass this on to Dom0.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
On the Cortex A53, when executing in AArch64 state, a load or store instruction
which uses the result of an ADRP instruction as a base register, or which uses
a base register written by an instruction immediately after an ADRP to the
same register, might access an incorrect address.
The workaround is to enable the linker flag --fix-cortex-a53-843419
if present, to check and fix the affected sequence. Otherwise print a warning
that Xen may be susceptible to this errata
Signed-off-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
The special watches "@introduceDomain" and "@releaseDomain" should be
allowed for privileged callers only, as they allow to gain information
about presence of other guests on the host. So send watch events for
those watches via privileged connections only.
In order to allow for disaggregated setups where e.g. driver domains
need to make use of those special watches add support for calling
"set permissions" for those special nodes, too.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Fix the command line document to account for the default scheduler in
Kconfig being credit2 now, and the fact that it's selectable at build
time and thus different builds could end up with different default
schedulers.
Fixes: dafd936ddd ('Make credit2 the default scheduler')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
... and increase default "irq-max-guests" to 32.
It's not necessary to have an array of a size more than 1 for non-shareable
IRQs and it might impact scalability in case of high "irq-max-guests"
values being used - every IRQ in the system including MSIs would be
supplied with an array of that size.
Since it's now less impactful to use higher "irq-max-guests" value - bump
the default to 32. That should give more headroom for future systems.
Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
... and increase the default to 16.
Current limit of 7 is too restrictive for modern systems where one GSI
could be shared by potentially many PCI INTx sources where each of them
corresponds to a device passed through to its own guest. Some systems do not
apply due dilligence in swizzling INTx links in case e.g. INTA is declared as
interrupt pin for the majority of PCI devices behind a single router,
resulting in overuse of a GSI.
Introduce a new command line option to configure that limit and dynamically
allocate an array of the necessary size. Set the default size now to 16 which
is higher than 7 but could later be increased even more if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
On the Cortex A55, TLB entries can be allocated by a speculative AT
instruction. If this is happening during a guest context switch with an
inconsistent page table state in the guest, TLBs with wrong values might
be allocated.
The ARM64_WORKAROUND_AT_SPECULATE workaround is used as for erratum
1165522 on Cortex A76 or Neoverse N1.
This change is also introducing the MIDR identifier for the Cortex-A55.
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Rahul Singh <rahul.singh@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
On the affected Cortex-A76/Neoverse-N1 cores (r0p0 to r3p0),
if a virtual address for a cacheable mapping of a location is being
accessed by a core while another core is remapping the virtual
address to a new physical page using the recommended break-before-make
sequence, then under very rare circumstances TLBI+DSB completes before
a read using the translation being invalidated has been observed by
other observers. The workaround repeats the TLBI+DSB operation for all
the TLB flush operations. While this is stricly not necessary, we don't
want to take any risk.
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
CNTVCT_EL0 or CNTPCT_EL0 counter read in Cortex-A73 (all versions)
might return a wrong value when the counter crosses a 32bit boundary.
Until now, there is no case for Xen itself to access CNTVCT_EL0,
and it also should be the Guest OS's responsibility to deal with
this part.
But for CNTPCT, there exists several cases in Xen involving reading
CNTPCT, so a possible workaround is that performing the read twice,
and to return one or the other depending on whether a transition has
taken place.
Signed-off-by: Penny Zheng <penny.zheng@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
The Cortex-A72 erratum #853709 is the same as the Cortex-A57
erratum #852523. As the latter is already workaround, we only
need to update the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@arm.com>
[julieng: Reworded the commit message]
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
This patch adds support for bundling the xen.efi hypervisor, the xen.cfg
configuration file, the Linux kernel and initrd, as well as the XSM,
and architectural specific files into a single "unified" EFI executable.
This allows an administrator to update the components independently
without requiring rebuilding xen, as well as to replace the components
in an existing image.
The resulting EFI executable can be invoked directly from the UEFI Boot
Manager, removing the need to use a separate loader like grub as well
as removing dependencies on local filesystem access. And since it is
a single file, it can be signed and validated by UEFI Secure Boot without
requring the shim protocol.
It is inspired by systemd-boot's unified kernel technique and borrows the
function to locate PE sections from systemd's LGPL'ed code. During EFI
boot, Xen looks at its own loaded image to locate the PE sections for
the Xen configuration (`.config`), dom0 kernel (`.kernel`), dom0 initrd
(`.ramdisk`), and XSM config (`.xsm`), which are included after building
xen.efi using objcopy to add named sections for each input file.
For x86, the CPU ucode can be included in a section named `.ucode`,
which is loaded in the efi_arch_cfg_file_late() stage of the boot process.
On ARM systems the Device Tree can be included in a section named
`.dtb`, which is loaded during the efi_arch_cfg_file_early() stage of
the boot process.
Note that the system will fall back to loading files from disk if
the named sections do not exist. This allows distributions to continue
with the status quo if they want a signed kernel + config, while still
allowing a user provided initrd (which is how the shim protocol currently
works as well).
This patch also adds constness to the section parameter of
efi_arch_cfg_file_early() and efi_arch_cfg_file_late(),
changes pe_find_section() to use a const CHAR16 section name,
and adds pe_name_compare() to match section names.
Signed-off-by: Trammell Hudson <hudson@trmm.net>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
[Fix ARM build by including pe.init.o]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Commit 858c0be8c2 "xen/arm: Enable CPU Erratum 1165522 for Neoverse"
added a new erratum but forgot to update silicon-errata.txt.
Update the file accordingly to keep track of errata workaround in Xen.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
There is currently no documentation to state what MTU a frontend should
adertise to its network stack. It has however long been assumed that the
default value of 1500 is correct.
This patch specifies a mechanism to allow the tools to set the MTU via a
xenstore node in the frontend area and states that the absence of that node
means the frontend should assume an MTU of 1500 octets.
NOTE: The Windows PV frontend has used an MTU sampled from the xenstore
node specified in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
The new format specifier is '%pp', and prints a pci_sbdf_t using the
seg:bus:dev.func format. Replace all SBDFs printed using
'%04x:%02x:%02x.%u' to use the new format specifier.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
For just the pieces where Jan is the only maintainer:
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
In docs/misc/hypfs-paths.pandoc the supported paths in the hypervisor
file system are specified. Make it more clear that path availability
might change, e.g. due to scope widening or narrowing (e.g. being
limited to a specific architecture).
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
The specification of pvcalls suggests there is padding for 32-bit x86 at
the end of most the structure. However, they are not described in in the
public header.
Because of that all the structures would have a different size between
32-bit x86 and 64-bit x86.
For all the other architectures supported (Arm and 64-bit x86), the
structure have the sames sizes because they contain implicit padding
thanks to the 64-bit alignment of the field uint64_t field.
Given the specification is authoritative, the padding will now be the
same for all architectures. The potential breakage of compatibility is
ought to be fine as pvcalls is still a tech preview.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>
To combat the absence of mitigating microcode, arrange to hide RDRAND by
default on IvyBridge client hardware.
Adjust the default feature derivation to hide RDRAND on IvyBridge client
parts, unless `cpuid=rdrand` is explicitly provided.
Adjust the restore path in xc_cpuid_apply_policy() to not hide RDRAND from VMs
which migrated from pre-4.14.
In all cases, individual guests can continue using RDRAND if explicitly
enabled in their config files.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
RDRAND/RDSEED can be hidden using cpuid= to mitigate SRBDS if microcode
isn't available.
This is part of XSA-320 / CVE-2020-0543.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
See patch documentation and comments.
This is part of XSA-320 / CVE-2020-0543
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
With all other plumbing in place, activate shadow stacks when possible.
Note that CET shares the similar problems to SMEP/SMAP with Ring1 being
supervisor to the processor, and that the layout of the shadow stack differs
between an IRET to Ring 1 and Ring 3. Therefore, we disable PV32 when CET is
enabled. Compatibility can be maintained if necessary via PV-Shim.
The BSP needs to wait until alternatives have run (to avoid interaction with
CR0.WP), and after the first reset_stack_and_jump() to avoid having a pristine
shadow stack interact in problematic ways with an in-use regular stack.
Activate shadow stack in reinit_bsp_stack().
APs have all infrastructure set up by the booting CPU, so enable shadow stacks
before entering C. Adjust the logic to call start_secondary rather than jump
to it, so stack traces make more sense.
The crash path needs to turn CET off to avoid interfering with the crash
kernel's environment.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Introduce CONFIG_HAS_AS_CET_SS to determine whether CET Shadow Stack
instructions are supported in the assembler, and CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK as the main
build option.
Introduce cet={no-,}shstk to for a user to select whether or not to use shadow
stacks at runtime, and X86_FEATURE_XEN_SHSTK to determine Xen's overall
enablement of shadow stacks.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
In Credit2 CPUs (can) share runqueues, depending on the topology. For
instance, with per-socket runqueues (the default) all the CPUs that are
part of the same socket share a runqueue.
On platform with a huge number of CPUs per socket, that could be a
problem. An example is AMD EPYC2 servers, where we can have up to 128
CPUs in a socket.
It is of course possible to define other, still topology-based, runqueue
arrangements (e.g., per-LLC, per-DIE, etc). But that may still result in
runqueues with too many CPUs on other/future platforms. For instance, a
system with 96 CPUs and 2 NUMA nodes will end up having 48 CPUs per
runqueue. Not as bad, but still a lot!
Therefore, let's set a limit to the max number of CPUs that can share a
Credit2 runqueue. The actual value is configurable (at boot time), the
default being 16. If, for instance, there are more than 16 CPUs in a
socket, they'll be split among two (or more) runqueues.
Note: with core scheduling enabled, this parameter sets the max number
of *scheduling resources* that can share a runqueue. Therefore, with
granularity set to core (and assumint 2 threads per core), we will have
at most 16 cores per runqueue, which corresponds to 32 threads. But that
is fine, considering how core scheduling works.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Add support to read and modify values of hypervisor runtime parameters
via the hypervisor file system.
As runtime parameters can be modified via a sysctl, too, this path has
to take the hypfs rw_lock as writer.
For custom runtime parameters the connection between the parameter
value and the file system is done via an init function which will set
the initial value (if needed) and the leaf properties.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Add the /buildinfo/config entry to the hypervisor filesystem. This
entry contains the .config file used to build the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Provide version and compile information in /buildinfo/ node of the
Xen hypervisor file system. As this information is accessible by dom0
only no additional security problem arises.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
On the 2019 Xen developer summit there was agreement that the Xen
hypervisor should gain support for a hierarchical name-value store
similar to the Linux kernel's sysfs.
In the beginning there should only be basic support: entries can be
added from the hypervisor itself only, there is a simple hypercall
interface to read the data.
Add a feature document for setting the base of a discussion regarding
the desired functionality and the entries to add.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Inspired by Linux commit c49a0a80137c7ca7d6ced4c812c9e07a949f6f24:
There have been reports of RDRAND issues after resuming from suspend on
some AMD family 15h and family 16h systems. This issue stems from a BIOS
not performing the proper steps during resume to ensure RDRAND continues
to function properly.
Update the CPU initialization to clear the RDRAND CPUID bit for any family
15h and 16h processor that supports RDRAND. If it is known that the family
15h or family 16h system does not have an RDRAND resume issue or that the
system will not be placed in suspend, the "cpuid=rdrand" kernel parameter
can be used to stop the clearing of the RDRAND CPUID bit.
Note, that clearing the RDRAND CPUID bit does not prevent a processor
that normally supports the RDRAND instruction from executing it. So any
code that determined the support based on family and model won't #UD.
Warn if no explicit choice was given on affected hardware.
Check RDRAND functions at boot as well as after S3 resume (the retry
limit chosen is entirely arbitrary).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
... to specify a separate migration stream that will also be suitable for
live update.
The original scope of the document was to support non-cooperative migration
of guests [1] but, since then, live update of xenstored has been brought into
scope. Thus it makes more sense to define a separate image format for
serializing xenstore state that is suitable for both purposes.
The document has been limited to specifying a new image format. The mechanism
for acquiring the image for live update or migration is not covered as that
is more appropriately dealt with by a patch to docs/misc/xenstore.txt. It is
also expected that, when the first implementation of live update or migration
making use of this specification is committed, that the document is moved from
docs/designs into docs/specs.
NOTE: It will only be necessary to save and restore state for active xenstore
connections, but the documentation for 'RESUME' in xenstore.txt implies
otherwise. That command is unused so this patch deletes it from the
specification.
[1] See https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=blob;f=docs/designs/non-cooperative-migration.md
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
This is the start of some performance and security-hardening improvements,
based on the fact that 32bit PV guests are few and far between these days.
Ring1 is full of architectural corner cases, such as counting as supervisor
from a paging point of view. This accounts for a substantial performance hit
on processors from the last 8 years (adjusting SMEP/SMAP on every privilege
transition), and the gap is only going to get bigger with new hardware
features.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The if_changed macro from Linux, in addition to check if any files
needs an update, check if the command line has changed since the last
invocation. The latter will force a rebuild if any options to the
executable have changed.
if_changed_rule checks dependencies like if_changed, but execute
rule_$(1) instead of cmd_$(1) when a target needs to be rebuilt. A rule_
macro can call more than one cmd_ macro. One of the cmd_ macro in a
rule need to be call using a macro that record the command line, so
cmd_and_record is introduced. It is similar to cmd_and_fixup from
Linux but without a call to fixdep which we don't have yet. (We will
later replace cmd_and_record by cmd_and_fixup.)
Example of a rule_ macro:
define rule_cc_o_c
$(call cmd_and_record,cc_o_o)
$(call cmd,objcopy)
endef
This needs one of the call to use cmd_and_record, otherwise no .*.cmd
file will be created, and the target will keep been rebuilt.
In order for if_changed to works correctly, we need to load the .%.cmd
files that the macro generates, this is done by adding targets in to
the $(targets) variable. We use intermediate_targets to add %.init.o
dependency %.o to target since there aren't in obj-y.
We also add $(MAKECMDGOALS) to targets so that when running for
example `make common/memory.i`, make will load the associated .%.cmd
dependency file.
Beside the if_changed*, we import the machinery used for a "beautify
output". The important one is when running make with V=2 which help to
debug the makefiles by printing why a target is been rebuilt, via the
$(echo-why) macro.
if_changed and if_changed_rule aren't used yet.
Most of this code is copied from Linux v5.4, including the
documentation.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This start explainning the variables that can be used in the many
Makefiles in xen/.
Most of the document copies and modifies text from Linux v5.4 document
linux.git/Documentation/kbuild/makefiles.rst. Modification are mostly
to avoid mentioning kbuild. Thus I've added the SPDX tag which was
only in index.rst in linux.git.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Chao Gao
Jan Beulich
Andrew Cooper
Julien Grall
Roger Pau Monné
Juergen Gross
Luca Fancellu
Igor Druzhinin
Bertrand Marquis
Michal Orzel
Penny Zheng
Trammell Hudson
Paul Durrant
Dario Faggioli
Jason Andryuk
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Anthony PERARD