Pass 128 bytes of random seed via FDT, so that guests' CRNGs are better seeded
early at boot. This is larger than ChaCha20 key size of 32, so each byte of
CRNG state will be mixed 4 times using this seed. There does not seem to be
advantage in larger seed though.
Depending on its configuration Linux can use the seed as device randomness
or to just quickly initialize CRNG.
In either case this will provide extra randomness to further harden CRNG.
Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@arm.com>
Introduce an option to allow selecting a behavior similar to the pre
Xen 4.15 one for accesses to MSRs not explicitly handled. Since commit
84e848fd7a and 322ec7c89f accesses to MSRs not explicitly
handled by Xen result in the injection of a #GP to the guest. This
is a behavior change since previously a #GP was only injected if
accessing the MSR on the real hardware would also trigger a #GP, or if
the attempted to be set bits wouldn't match the hardware values (for
PV). The reasons for not leaking hardware MSR values and injecting a
#GP are fully valid, so the solution proposed here should be
considered a temporary workaround until all the required MSRs are
properly handled.
This seems to be problematic for some guests, so introduce an option
to fallback to this kind of legacy behavior without leaking the
underlying MSR values to the guest.
When the option is set, for both PV and HVM don't inject a #GP to the
guest on MSR read if reading the underlying MSR doesn't result in a
#GP, do the same for writes and simply discard the value to be written
on that case.
Note that for guests restored or migrated from previous Xen versions
the option is enabled by default, in order to keep a compatible
MSR behavior. Such compatibility is done at the libxl layer, to avoid
higher-level toolstacks from having to know the details about this flag.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Fixes: 804fe75137 ("tools/libxl: pass libxl__domain_build_state to libxl__arch_domain_create")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Today xenctrl_dom.h is part of libxenctrl as it is included by
xc_private.c. This seems not to be needed, so merge xenctrl_dom.h into
xenguest.h where its contents really should be.
Replace all #includes of xenctrl_dom.h by xenguest.h ones or drop them
if xenguest.h is already included.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Carve out all libxenlight related sources and move them to
tools/libs/light in order to use the generic library build environment.
The closely related sources for libxl-save-helper and the libxl test
environment are being moved, too.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Sergiy Kibrik
Roger Pau Monné
Andrew Cooper
Igor Druzhinin
Juergen Gross