These are already getting over-large for being inline functions, and are only
going to grow further over time. Out of line them, yielding the following net
delta from bloat-o-meter:
add/remove: 2/0 grow/shrink: 0/4 up/down: 276/-1877 (-1601)
Switch to the newer cpu_policy terminology while doing so.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1027df4c00)
Right now, they're the same underlying type, containing disjoint information.
Use a single object instead. Also take the opportunity to rename 'entries' to
'msrs' which is more descriptive, and more in line with nr_msrs being the
count of MSR entries in the API.
test-tsx uses xg_private.h to access the internals of xc_cpu_policy, so needs
updating at the same time. Take the opportunity to improve the code clarity
by passing a cpu_policy rather than an xc_cpu_policy into some functions.
No practical change. This undoes the transient doubling of storage space from
earlier patches.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit c9985233ca)
These weren't great names to begin with, and using {leaves,msrs} matches up
better with the existing nr_{leaves,msr} parameters anyway.
Furthermore, by renaming these fields we can get away with using some #define
trickery to avoid the struct {cpuid,msr}_policy merge needing to happen in a
single changeset.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 21e3ef57e0)
xen: Correct comments after renaming xen_{dom,sys}ctl_cpu_policy fields
Fixes: 21e3ef57e0 ("x86: Rename {domctl,sysctl}.cpu_policy.{cpuid,msr}_policy fields")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6e06d229d5)
AMD Milan (Zen3) CPUs have an LFENCE Always Serialising CPUID bit in
leaf 80000021.eax. Previous AMD versions used to have a user settable
bit in DE_CFG MSR to select whether LFENCE was dispatch serialising,
which Xen always attempts to set. The forcefully always on setting is
due to the addition of SEV-SNP so that a VMM cannot break the
confidentiality of a guest.
In order to support this new CPUID bit move the LFENCE_DISPATCH
synthetic CPUID bit to map the hardware bit (leaving a hole in the
synthetic range) and either rely on the bit already being set by the
native CPUID output, or attempt to fake it in Xen by modifying the
DE_CFG MSR. This requires adding one more entry to the featureset to
support leaf 80000021.eax.
The bit is always exposed to guests by default even if the underlying
hardware doesn't support leaf 80000021. Note that Xen doesn't allow
guests to change the DE_CFG value, so once set by Xen LFENCE will always
be serialising.
Note that the access to DE_CFG by guests is left as-is: reads will
unconditionally return LFENCE_SERIALISE bit set, while writes are
silently dropped.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
[Always expose to guests by default]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit e9b4fe2636)
x86/cpuid: do not expand max leaves on restore
When restoring limit the maximum leaves to the ones supported by Xen
4.12 in order to not expand the maximum leaves a guests sees. Note
this is unlikely to cause real issues.
Guests restored from Xen versions 4.13 or greater will contain CPUID
data on the stream that will override the values set by
xc_cpuid_apply_policy.
Fixes: e9b4fe2636 ("x86/cpuid: support LFENCE always serialising CPUID bit")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 111c8c33a8)
tools/libxenguest: Fix max_extd_leaf calculation for legacy restore
0x1c is lower than any value which will actually be observed in
p->extd.max_leaf, but higher than the logical 9 leaves worth of extended data
on Intel systems, causing x86_cpuid_copy_to_buffer() to fail with -ENOBUFS.
Correct the calculation.
The problem was first noticed in c/s 34990446ca "libxl: don't ignore the
return value from xc_cpuid_apply_policy" but introduced earlier.
Fixes: 111c8c33a8 ("x86/cpuid: do not expand max leaves on restore")
Reported-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5fa174cbf5)
tools/guest: Fix comment regarding CPUID compatibility
It was Xen 4.14 where CPUID data was added to the migration stream, and 4.13
that we need to worry about with regards to compatibility. Xen 4.12 isn't
relevant.
Expand and correct the commentary.
Fixes: 111c8c33a8 ("x86/cpuid: do not expand max leaves on restore")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 820cc39343)
The TAA mitigation offered the option to hide the HLE and RTM CPUID bits,
which has caused some migration compatibility problems.
These two bits are special. Annotate them with ! to emphasise this point.
Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) may or may not be visible in CPUID, but is
disabled in microcode on all CPUs, and has been removed from the architecture.
Do not advertise it to VMs by default.
Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) may or may not be visible in CPUID, and
may or may not be configured in force-abort mode. Have tsx_init() note
whether RTM has been configured into force-abort mode, so
guest_common_feature_adjustments() can conditionally hide it from VMs by
default.
The host policy values for HLE/RTM may or may not be set, depending on any
previous running kernel's choice of visibility, and Xen's choice. TSX is
available on any CPU which enumerates a TSX-hiding mechanism, so instead of
doing a two-step to clobber any hiding, scan CPUID, then set the visibility,
just force visibility of the bits in the first place.
With the HLE/RTM bits now unilaterally visible in the host policy,
xc_cpuid_apply_policy() can construct a more appropriate policy out of thin
air for pre-4.13 VMs with no CPUID data in their migration stream, and
specifically one where HLE/RTM doesn't potentially disappear behind the back
of a running VM.
Fixes: 8c4330818f ("x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate the TSX Asynchronous Abort sidechannel")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 8fe24090d9
master date: 2021-05-27 19:34:00 +0100
The caller of writev_exact should be notified about malloc errors
when dealing with partial writes.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0d8d289af7)
To combat the absence of mitigating microcode, arrange to hide RDRAND by
default on IvyBridge client hardware.
Adjust the default feature derivation to hide RDRAND on IvyBridge client
parts, unless `cpuid=rdrand` is explicitly provided.
Adjust the restore path in xc_cpuid_apply_policy() to not hide RDRAND from VMs
which migrated from pre-4.14.
In all cases, individual guests can continue using RDRAND if explicitly
enabled in their config files.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Memory Protection eXtension support has been dropped from GCC and Linux, and
will be dropped from future Intel CPUs.
With all other default/max pieces in place, move MPX from default to max.
This means that VMs won't be offered it by default, but can explicitly opt
into using it via cpuid="host,mpx=1" in their vm.cfg file.
The difference as visible to the guest is:
diff --git a/default b/mpx
index 0e91765d6b..c8c33cd584 100644
--- a/default
+++ b/mpx
@@ -13,15 +13,17 @@ Native cpuid:
00000004:00000004 -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
00000005:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
00000006:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
- 00000007:00000000 -> 00000000:009c2fbb:00000000:9c000400
+ 00000007:00000000 -> 00000000:009c6fbb:00000000:9c000400
00000008:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
00000009:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
0000000a:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
0000000b:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
0000000c:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
- 0000000d:00000000 -> 00000007:00000240:00000340:00000000
+ 0000000d:00000000 -> 0000001f:00000240:00000440:00000000
0000000d:00000001 -> 0000000f:00000240:00000000:00000000
0000000d:00000002 -> 00000100:00000240:00000000:00000000
+ 0000000d:00000003 -> 00000040:000003c0:00000000:00000000
+ 0000000d:00000004 -> 00000040:00000400:00000000:00000000
40000000:ffffffff -> 40000005:566e6558:65584d4d:4d4d566e
40000001:ffffffff -> 0004000e:00000000:00000000:00000000
40000002:ffffffff -> 00000001:40000000:00000000:00000000
Adjust the legacy restore path in libxc to cope safely with pre-4.14 VMs.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
In order to safely disable some features by default, without breaking
migration from 4.13 or older, the CPUID logic needs to distinguish the two
cases.
Plumb a restore boolean down from the two callers of libxl__cpuid_legacy() all
the way down into xc_cpuid_apply_policy().
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Currently, libxl__cpuid_legacy() passes each element of the policy list to
xc_cpuid_set() individually. This is wasteful both in terms of the number of
hypercalls made, and the quantity of repeated merging/auditing work performed
by Xen.
Move the loop processing down into xc_cpuid_set(), which allows us to do one
set of hypercalls, rather than one per list entry.
In xc_cpuid_set(), obtain the full host, guest max and current policies to
begin with, and loop over the xend array, processing one leaf at a time.
Replace the linear search with a binary search, seeing as the serialised
leaves are sorted.
No change in behaviour from the guests point of view.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
In order to combine the functionality of xc_cpuid_set() with
xc_cpuid_apply_policy(), arrange to pass the data in a single contained
struct, rather than two arrays.
libxl__cpuid_policy is the ideal structure to use, but that would introduce a
reverse dependency between libxc and libxl. Introduce xc_xend_cpuid (with a
transparent union to provide more useful names for the inputs), and use this
structure in libxl.
The public API has libxl_cpuid_policy as an opaque type referencing
libxl__cpuid_policy. Drop the inappropriate comment about its internals, and
use xc_xend_cpuid as a differently named opaque backing object. Users of both
libxl and libxc are not permitted to look at the internals.
No change in behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
libxl is now the sole caller of xc_cpuid_set(). The config_transformed output
is ignored, and this patch trivially highlights the resulting memory leak.
"transformed" config is now properly forwarded on migrate as part of the
general VM state, so delete the transformation logic completely, rather than
trying to adjust just libxl to avoid leaking memory.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
With all other pieces in place, it is now safe to restore the CPUID and MSR
data in the migration stream, rather than discarding them and using the higher
level toolstacks compatibility logic.
While this is a small patch, it has large implications for migrated/resumed
domains. Most obviously, the CPU family/model/stepping data,
cache/tlb/etc. will no longer change behind the guests back.
Another change is the interpretation of the Xend cpuid strings. The 'k'
option is not a sensible thing to have ever supported, and 's' is how how the
stream will end up behaving.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Pre Xen-4.14 streams will not contain any CPUID/MSR information. There is
nothing libxc can do about this, and will have to rely on the higher level
toolstack to provide backwards compatibility.
To facilitate this, extend the static_data_done() callback, highlighting the
missing information, and modify libxl to use it. At the libxc level, this
requires an arch-specific hook which, for now, always reports CPUID and MSR as
missing. This will be adjusted in a later change.
No overall functional change - this is just plumbing.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
With the destination side now able to understand X86_{CPUID,MSR}_DATA
records (and compatibly handle their absense), update the sending logic to
obtain and forward this data from Xen.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
For now, the data are just stashed, and discarded at the end.
A future change will restore the data, once libxl has been adjusted to avoid
clobbering the data.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Introduce a new static_data() hook which is responsible for writing out
any static data records. The HVM side continues to be a no-op, while
the PV side moves write_x86_pv_info() into this earlier hook. The the
common code writes out a STATIC_DATA_END record, and the stream version
is bumped to 3.
Update convert-legacy-stream to write a v3 stream, because this will
bypass the compatibly logic in libxc.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
A v3 stream can compatibly read a v2 stream by inferring the position of the
STATIC_DATA_END record.
v2 compatibility is only needed for x86. No other architectures exist yet,
but they will have a minimum of v3 when introduced.
The x86 HVM compatibility point being in handle_page_data() (which is common
code) is a bit awkward. However, as the two compatibility points are subtly
different, and it is (intentionally) not possible to call into arch specific
code from common code (except via the ops hooks), use some #ifdef-ary and
opencode the check, rather than make handle_page_data() a per-arch helper.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Higher level toolstacks may wish to know when the static data is complete, so
introduce a restore_callback for the purpose.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Migration data can be split into two parts - that which is invariant of
guest execution, and that which is not. Separate these two with the
STATIC_DATA_END record.
The short term, we want to move the x86 CPU Policy data into the stream.
In the longer term, we want to provisionally send the static data only
to the destination as a more robust compatibility check. In both cases,
we will want a callback into the higher level toolstack.
Mandate the presence of the STATIC_DATA_END record, and declare this v3,
along with instructions for how to compatibly interpret a v2 stream.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Migration v3 is in the process of being introduced, meaning that the code has
to cope with both versions. Use an explicit 2 for now.
For the verify-stream-v2 and convert-legacy-stream scripts, update text to say
"v2 (or later)". What matters is the distinction vs legacy streams.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
While it should have been this way from the beginning, not doing so will
become an actual problem with PVH Dom0. The interface change is binary
compatible, but requires tools side producers to be re-built.
Drop the bogus/unnecessary page alignment restriction on the input
buffer at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
xc_cpuid_apply_policy() is gaining extra parameters to untangle CPUID
complexity in Xen. While an improvement in general, it does have the
unfortunate side effect of duplicating some settings across multiple
parameters.
Rearrange the logic to only consider 'pae' if no explicit featureset is
provided. This reduces the complexity for callers who have already provided a
pae setting in the featureset.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amzn.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
At this moment a guest can call vmfunc to change the altp2m view. This
should be limited in order to avoid any unwanted view switch.
The new xc_altp2m_set_visibility() solves this by making views invisible
to vmfunc.
This is done by having a separate arch.altp2m_working_eptp that is
populated and made invalid in the same places as altp2m_eptp. This is
written to EPTP_LIST_ADDR.
The views are made in/visible by marking them with INVALID_MFN or
copying them back from altp2m_eptp.
To have consistency the visibility also applies to
p2m_switch_domain_altp2m_by_id().
The usage of this hypercall is aimed at dom0 having a logic with a number of views
created and at some time there is a need to be sure that only some of the views
can be switched, saving the rest and making them visible when the time
is right.
Note: If altp2m mode is set to mixed the guest is able to change the view
visibility and then call vmfunc.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
libxc defines XGS_POLICY_ABORT for precopy policy to signal that migration
should be aborted (eg. if the estimated pause time is too huge for the
instance). Default simple precopy policy never returns that, but it could be
overriden with a custom one.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Panyakin <apanyaki@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
[wei: fix coding style issue]
The parameter 'params' of xc_set_parameters() should never be modified.
So mark it as const.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
OCaml is using a string to describe the parameter 'keys' of
xc_send_debug_keys(). Since Ocaml 4.06.01, String_val() will return a
const char * when using -safe-string. This will result to a build
failure because xc_send_debug_keys() expects a char *.
The function should never modify the parameter 'keys' and therefore the
parameter should be const. Unfortunately, this is not directly possible
because DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE() is expecting a non-const variable.
A new macro DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE_IN() is introduced and will take
care of const parameter. The first user will be xc_send_debug_keys() but
this can be used in more place in the future.
Reported-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
For now, write the same content for both. Update the users of the
initialisers to use the new name, and extend xen-cpuid to dump both default
and max featuresets.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Drop XC_FEATUREMASK_DEEP_FEATURES. It isn't used by any callers, and unlike
the other static masks, won't be of interest to anyone without other pieces of
cpuid-autogen.h
In xc_get_static_cpu_featuremask(), use a 2d array instead of individually
named variables, and drop the switch statement completely.
No practical change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Xen has never acted upon the value of HVM_PARAM_PAE_ENABLED, contrary perhaps
to expectations based on how other boolean fields work.
It was only ever used as a non-standard calling convention for
xc_cpuid_apply_policy() but that has been fixed now.
Purge its use, and any possible confusion over its behaviour, by having Xen
reject any attempts to use it. Forgo setting it up in libxl's
hvm_set_conf_params(). The only backwards compatibility necessary is to have
the HVM restore stream discard it if found.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The local xc_hvm_param_deprecated_check() in libxc tries to guess Xen's
behaviour for the MEMORY_EVENT params, but is wrong for the get side, where
Xen would return 0 (which is also a bug). Delete the helper.
In Xen, perform the checks in hvm_allow_set_param(), rather than
hvm_set_param(), and actually implement checks on the get side so the
hypercall doesn't return successfully with 0 as an answer.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
HVM_PARAM_PAE_ENABLED is set and consumed by the toolstack only. It is in
practice a complicated and non-standard way of passing a boolean parameter
into xc_cpuid_apply_policy().
This is silly. Pass PAE as a regular parameter instead.
In libxl__cpuid_legacy(), leave a rather better explaination of why only HVM
guests have a choice in PAE setting.
No change in how a guest is constructed.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The written ABI states that %es will be set up, but libxc doesn't do so. In
practice, it breaks `rep movs` inside guests before they reload %es.
The written ABI doesn't mention %ss, but libxc does set it up. Having %ds
different to %ss is obnoxous to work with, as different registers have
different implicit segments.
Modify the spec to state that %ss is set up as a flat read/write segment.
This a) matches the Multiboot 1 spec, b) matches what is set up in practice,
and c) is the more sane behaviour for guests to use.
Fixes: 68e1183411 ('libxc: introduce a xc_dom_arch for hvm-3.0-x86_32 guests')
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
This reverts commit 7b3c5b70a3 and
re-enables the usage of x2APIC with nested virtualization.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
It turns out that a bug (since forever) in Xen causes XSAVE records to have
non-architectural behaviour on xsave-capable hardware, when a PV guest has not
touched the state.
In such a case, the data record returned from Xen is 2*uint64_t, both claiming
the (illegitimate) state of %xcr0 and %xcr0_accum being 0.
Adjust the bound in handle_x86_pv_vcpu_blob() to cope with this.
Fixes: 2a62c22715 "libxc/restore: Fix data auditing in handle_x86_pv_vcpu_blob()"
Reported-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
By default the sve bits are not set.
This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(),
to set a range of sve bits.
The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not break in case
of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the
given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have
preemption on large ranges.
The gfn of the first error is stored in
xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error_gfn and the error code is
stored in xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi.first_error.
If no error occurred the values will be 0.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
With the 32 PAE build of Xen gone, 32bit PV guests' top level pagetables no
longer behave exactly like PAE in hardware.
They should have A/D bits set, for the same performance reasons as apply to
other levels. This brings the domain builder in line with how Xen constructs
a 32bit dom0.
As a purely code improvement, make use of range notation to initialise
identical values in adjacent array elements.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
We are shortly going to want to introduce some common x86 fields, so having
x86_pv and x86_hvm as the top level objects is a problem. Insert a
surrounding struct x86 and drop the x86 prefix from the pv/hvm objects.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The code has devating from the prevailing style in many ways. Adjust spacing,
indentation, position of operators, layout of multiline comments, removal of
superfluous comments, constness, trailing commas, and use of unqualified
'unsigned'.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Originally, 'checkpointed' was a boolean signalling the difference between a
plain and a Remus stream. COLO was added later, but several bits of code
retained boolean-style logic. While correct, it is confusing to follow.
Additionally, XC_MIG_STREAM_NONE means "no checkpoints" but reads as "no
stream".
Consolidate all the logic on the term 'stream_type', and rename STREAM_NONE
to STREAM_PLAIN. Re-position the stream_type variable so it isn't
duplicated in both the save and restore unions.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
During migration, we buffer several blobs of data which ultimately need
handing back to Xen at an appropriate time.
Currently, this is all handled in an ad-hoc manner, but more blobs are soon
going to be added. Introduce xc_sr_blob to encapsulate a ptr/size pair, and
update_blob() to handle the memory management aspects.
Switch the HVM_CONTEXT and the four PV_VCPU_* blobs over to this new
infrastructure. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xc_dom_p2m() and dom->p2m_host[] implement a linear transform for translated
domains, but waste a substantial chunk of RAM doing so.
ARM literally never reads dom->p2m_host[] (because of the xc_dom_translated()
short circuit in xc_dom_p2m()). Drop it all.
x86 HVM does use dom->p2m_host[] for xc_domain_populate_physmap_exact() calls
when populating 4k pages. Reuse the same tactic from 2M/1G ranges and use an
on-stack array instead. Drop the memory allocation.
x86 PV guests do use dom->p2m_host[] as a non-identity transform. Rename the
field to pv_p2m to make it clear it is PV-only.
No change in the constructed guests.
Reported-by: Varad Gautam <vrd@amazon.de>
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
In-guest p2m's are a concept specific to x86 PV guests. alloc_p2m_list() is
the only hook which initialises dom->p2m_guest, making
xc_dom_update_guest_p2m() a nop for non-PV guests.
Move p2m_guest into xc_dom_image_x86 and adjust alloc_p2m_list() to match.
Drop xc_dom_update_guest_p2m() entirely.
One caller, move_l3_below_4G(), only uses it to modify a single entry, so
rewriting the whole guest p2m is wasteful - opencode the single update
instead. The other caller is common code. Instead, move the logic into the
setup_pgtables() hooks, which know their own sizeof_pfn and can do away with
the switch statement.
No change in the constructed guests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Currently, the setup_pgtable() hook is optional, but alloc_pgtable() hook is
not. Both are specific to x86 PV guests, and stubbed in various ways by the
dombuilders for translated guests (x86 HVM, ARM).
Make alloc_pgtables() optional, and drop all the stubs for translated guest
types.
No change in the constructed guests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
The two xc_dom_params structures for PV pagetables are never modified and can
live in .rodata. Reduce their scope to the alloc_pgtable_*() functions which
construct xc_dom_image_x86 appropriately.
Rename {alloc,setup}_pgtables() to {alloc,setup}_pgtables_pv() to highlight
that they are PV only, and drop some _x86() suffixes from static helpers.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Andrew Cooper
Roger Pau Monné
Olaf Hering
Tamas K Lengyel
Juergen Gross
Jan Beulich
Alexandru Isaila
Andrew Panyakin
Julien Grall