There are several places in xenstored using a permission array and the
size of that array. Introduce a new struct node_perms containing both.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Instead of firing all watches for removing a subtree in one go, do so
only when the related node is being removed.
The watches for the top-most node being removed include all watches
including that node, while watches for nodes below that are only fired
if they are matching exactly. This avoids firing any watch more than
once when removing a subtree.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Today a Xenstore node is being removed by deleting it from the parent
first and then deleting itself and all its children. This results in
stale entries remaining in the data base in case e.g. a memory
allocation is failing during processing. This would result in the
rather strange behavior to be able to read a node (as its still in the
data base) while not being visible in the tree view of Xenstore.
Fix that by deleting the nodes from the leaf side instead of starting
at the root.
As fire_watches() is now called from _rm() the ctx parameter needs a
const attribute.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
The Xenstore command XS_IS_DOMAIN_INTRODUCED should be possible for
privileged domains only (the only user in the tree is the xenpaging
daemon).
Instead of having the privilege test for each command introduce a
per-command flag for that purpose.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
There is no path which allows to call check_event_node() without a
event name. So don't let the result depend on the name being NULL and
add an assert() covering that case.
Rename the function to check_special_event() to better match the
semantics.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
When a node creation fails the number of nodes of the domain should be
the same as before the failed node creation. In case of failure when
trying to create a node requiring to create one or more intermediate
nodes as well (e.g. when /a/b/c/d is to be created, but /a/b isn't
existing yet) it might happen that the number of nodes of the creating
domain is not reset to the value it had before.
So move the quota accounting out of construct_node() and into the node
write loop in create_node() in order to be able to undo the accounting
in case of an error in the intermediate node destructor.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Instead of ignoring the transaction id for XS_WATCH and XS_UNWATCH
commands as it is documented in docs/misc/xenstore.txt, it is tested
for validity today.
Really ignore the transaction id for XS_WATCH and XS_UNWATCH.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
An unprivileged user of Xenstore is not allowed to write nodes with a
size exceeding a global quota, while privileged users like dom0 are
allowed to write such nodes. The size of a node is the needed space
to store all node specific data, this includes the names of all
children of the node.
When deleting a node its parent has to be modified by removing the
name of the to be deleted child from it.
This results in the strange situation that an unprivileged owner of a
node might not succeed in deleting that node in case its parent is
exceeding the quota of that unprivileged user (it might have been
written by dom0), as the user is not allowed to write the updated
parent node.
Fix that by not checking the quota when writing a node for the
purpose of removing a child's name only.
The same applies to transaction handling: a node being read during a
transaction is written to the transaction specific area and it should
not be tested for exceeding the quota, as it might not be owned by
the reader and presumably the original write would have failed if the
node is owned by the reader.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
This was lacking in a disappointing number of places.
The xenstore root node is treated differently from all other nodes, because it
doesn't have a parent, and mutation requires changing the parent.
Unfortunately this lead to open-coding the special case for root into every
single xenstore operation, and out of all the xenstore operations only read
did a permission check when handling the root node.
This means that an unprivileged guest can:
* xenstore-chmod / to its liking and subsequently write new arbitrary nodes
there (subject to quota)
* xenstore-rm -r / deletes almost the entire xenstore tree (xenopsd quickly
refills some, but you are left with a broken system)
* DIRECTORY on / lists all children when called through python
bindings (xenstore-ls stops at /local because it tries to list recursively)
* get-perms on / works too, but that is just a minor information leak
Add the missing permission checks, but this should really be refactored to do
the root handling and permission checks on the node only once from a single
function, instead of getting it wrong nearly everywhere.
This is XSA-353.
Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Use memcpy in getBridge to prevent gcc warnings about truncated
strings. We know that we might truncate it, so the gcc warning
here is wrong.
Revert previous change changing buffer sizes as bigger buffers
are not needed.
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 40fe714ca4)
Fix gcc10 compilation warning about uninitialized variable by setting
it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0241809bf8)
The caller of writev_exact should be notified about malloc errors
when dealing with partial writes.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0d8d289af7)
Making getBridge() static triggered a build error with some gcc versions:
error: 'strncpy' output may be truncated copying 15 bytes from a string of
length 255 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
Fix that by using a buffer with 256 bytes instead.
Fixes: 6d0ec05390 ("tools: split libxenstat into new tools/libs/stat directory")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8099e48c3)
The do_ls() function has somewhat inconsistent handling of errors.
If reading the node's contents with xs_read() fails, then do_ls() will
just quietly not display the contents.
If reading the node's permissions with xs_get_permissions() fails, then
do_ls() will print a warning, continue, and ultimately won't exit with
an error code (unless another error happens).
If recursing into the node with xs_directory() fails, then do_ls() will
abort immediately, not printing any further nodes.
For persistent failure modes — such as ENOENT because a node has been
removed, or EACCES because it has had its permisions changed since the
xs_directory() on the parent directory returned its name — it's
obviously quite likely that if either of the first two errors occur for
a given node, then so will the third and thus xenstore-ls will abort.
The ENOENT one is actually a fairly common case, and has caused tools to
fail to clean up a network device because it *apparently* already
doesn't exist in xenstore.
There is a school of thought that says, "Well, xenstore-ls returned an
error. So the tools should not trust its output."
The natural corollary of this would surely be that the tools must re-run
xenstore-ls as many times as is necessary until its manages to exit
without hitting the race condition. I am not keen on that conclusion.
For the specific case of ENOENT it seems reasonable to declare that,
but for the timing, we might as well just not have seen that node at
all when calling xs_directory() for the parent. By ignoring the error,
we give acceptable output.
The issue can be reproduced as follows:
(dom0) # for a in `seq 1 1000` ; do
xenstore-write /local/domain/2/foo/$a $a ;
done
Now simultaneously:
(dom0) # for a in `seq 1 999` ; do
xenstore-rm /local/domain/2/foo/$a ;
done
(dom2) # while true ; do
./xenstore-ls -p /local/domain/2/foo | grep -c 1000 ;
done
We should expect to see node 1000 in the output, every time.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit beb105af19)
Add a check for snprintf return code and ignore the entry if we get an
error. This should in fact never happen and is more a trick to make gcc
happy and prevent compilation errors.
This is solving the following gcc warning when compiling for arm32 host
platforms with optimization activated:
xenpmd.c:92:37: error: '%s' directive output may be truncated writing
between 4 and 2147483645 bytes into a region of size 271
[-Werror=format-truncation=]
This is also solving the following Debian bug:
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=970802
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0dfddb2116)
In file included from /usr/include/string.h:495,
from libxl_internal.h:38,
from libxl_utils.c:20:
In function 'strncpy',
inlined from 'libxl__prepare_sockaddr_un' at libxl_utils.c:1262:5:
/usr/include/bits/string_fortified.h:106:10: error: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 108 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
106 | return __builtin___strncpy_chk (__dest, __src, __len, __bos (__dest));
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit fff1b7f50e)
It seems xlu_pci_parse_bdf has a state machine that is too complex for
gcc to understand. The build fails with:
libxlu_pci.c: In function 'xlu_pci_parse_bdf':
libxlu_pci.c:32:18: error: 'func' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
32 | pcidev->func = func;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~
libxlu_pci.c:51:29: note: 'func' was declared here
51 | unsigned dom, bus, dev, func, vslot = 0;
| ^~~~
libxlu_pci.c:31:17: error: 'dev' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
31 | pcidev->dev = dev;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~
libxlu_pci.c:51:24: note: 'dev' was declared here
51 | unsigned dom, bus, dev, func, vslot = 0;
| ^~~
libxlu_pci.c:30:17: error: 'bus' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
30 | pcidev->bus = bus;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~
libxlu_pci.c:51:19: note: 'bus' was declared here
51 | unsigned dom, bus, dev, func, vslot = 0;
| ^~~
libxlu_pci.c:29:20: error: 'dom' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
29 | pcidev->domain = domain;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~
libxlu_pci.c:51:14: note: 'dom' was declared here
51 | unsigned dom, bus, dev, func, vslot = 0;
| ^~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Workaround it by setting the initial value to invalid value (0xffffffff)
and then assert on each value being set. This way we mute the gcc
warning, while still detecting bugs in the parse code.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit d25cc3ec93)
ACPI specification contains statements describing memory marked with regular
"ACPI data" type as reclaimable by the guest. Although the guest shouldn't
really do it if it wants kexec or similar functionality to work, there
could still be ambiguities in treating these regions as potentially regular
RAM.
One such example is SeaBIOS which currently reports "ACPI data" regions as
RAM to the guest in its e801 call. Which it might have the right to do as any
user of this is expected to be ACPI unaware. But a QEMU bootloader later seems
to ignore that fact and is instead using e801 to find a place for initrd which
causes the tables to be erased. While arguably QEMU bootloader or SeaBIOS need
to be fixed / improved here, that is just one example of the potential problems
from using a reclaimable memory type.
Flip the type to "ACPI NVS" which doesn't have this ambiguity in it and is
described by the spec as non-reclaimable (so cannot ever be treated like RAM).
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: de6d188a51
master date: 2020-10-20 08:54:23 +0200
Guest kernel does need to know in some cases where the tables are located
to treat these regions properly. One example is kexec process where
the first kernel needs to pass ACPI region locations to the second
kernel which is now a requirement in Linux after 02a3e3cdb7f12 ("x86/boot:
Parse SRAT table and count immovable memory regions") in order for kexec
transition to actually work.
That commit introduced accesses to XSDT and SRAT while the second kernel
is still using kexec transition tables. The transition tables do not have
e820 "reserved" regions mapped where those tables are located currently
in a Xen guest. Instead "ACPI data" regions are mapped with the transition
tables that was introduced by the following commit 6bbeb276b7 ("x86/kexec:
Add the EFI system tables and ACPI tables to the ident map").
Reserve 1MB (out of 16MB currently available) right after ACPI info page for
ACPI tables exclusively but populate this region on demand and only indicate
populated memory as "ACPI data" since according to ACPI spec that memory is
reclaimable by the guest if necessary. That is close to how we treat
the same ACPI data in PVH guests. 1MB should be enough for now but could be
later extended if required.
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 8efa46516c
master date: 2020-09-09 17:56:13 +0200
... including serialisation/deserialisation logic and unit tests.
There is no current way to configure this MSR correctly for guests.
The toolstack side this logic needs building, which is far easier to
do with it in place.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: e32605b07e
master date: 2020-08-27 12:48:46 +0100
AMD CPUs that we classify as X86_BUG_FPU_PTRS don't touch the selector/
offset portion of the save image during FXSAVE unless an unmasked
exception is pending. Hence the selector zapping done between the
initial FXSAVE and the emulated FXRSTOR needs to be mirrored onto the
second FXSAVE, output of which gets fed into memcmp() to compare with
the input image.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Restore Tim's patch. The one that was committed was recreated by me
because git didn't accept my saved copy. I made some mistakes while
recreating that patch and here we are.
Fixes: 3471cafbdd ("kdd: stop using [0] arrays to access packet contents")
Reported-by: Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
input_fd & output_fd may be the same FD. In that case, mark both as -1
when closing one. That avoids a dangling FD reference.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Close open FDs and close th vchan connection when exiting the program.
This addresses some Coverity findings about leaking file descriptors.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Switch data_loop to take a pointer to vchan_proxy_state.
No functional change.
This removes a dead store to input_fd identified by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Use a struct to group the vchan ctrl and FDs. This will facilite
tracking the state of open and closed FDs and ctrl in data_loop().
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Introduce 'ret' for main's return value and remove direct returns. This
is in preparation for a unified exit path with resource cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Check the return value of xs_watch and error out on failure.
This was found by Citrix's Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
errno is reset by subsequent system & library calls, so it may be
inaccurate by the time connect_socket returns. Call perror immediately
after failing system calls to print the proper message.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
The use of perror on the return from listen_socket can produce
misleading results like:
UNIX socket path "/tmp/aa....aa" too long (156 >= 108)
listen socket: Success
errno is reset by subsequent system & library calls, so it may be
inaccurate by the time listen_socket returns. Call perror immediately
after failing system calls to print the proper message.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Check the socket path length to ensure sun_path is NUL terminated.
This was spotted by Citrix's Coverity.
Also use strcpy to avoid a warning "'__builtin_strncpy' specified bound
108 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation]" flagged by
gcc 10.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
When iommu is not enabled for a given domain then pci passthrough
hypercalls such as xc_test_assign_device return EOPNOTSUPP.
The code responsible for this is in "iommu_do_domctl" inside
xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
This patch fixes the error message reported by libxl when assigning
pci devices to domains without iommu.
Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Uriasz <gorbak25@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Grzegorz Uriasz <gorbak25@gmail.com>
Backport: 4.13
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
GCC 10 is unhappy about this, and we already use 64k buffers
in the only places where packets are allocated, so move the
64k size into the packet definition.
Reported-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
c/s 6902cb00e0 "tools/libxendevicemodel: extract functions and add a compat
layer" introduced calls to both xencall_open() and osdep_xendevicemodel_open()
but failed to fix up the error path.
c/s f68c7c618a "libs/devicemodel: free xencall handle in error path in
_open()" fixed up the xencall_open() aspect of the error path (missing the
osdep_xendevicemodel_open() aspect), but positioned the xencall_close()
incorrectly, creating the same pattern proved to be problematic by c/s
30a72f0287 "tools: fix error path of xenhypfs_open()".
Reposition xtl_logger_destroy(), and introduce the missing
osdep_xendevicemodel_close().
Fixes: 6902cb00e0 ("tools/libxendevicemodel: extract functions and add a compat layer")
Fixes: f68c7c618a ("libs/devicemodel: free xencall handle in error path in _open()")
Backport: 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
While commit b72682c602 ("scripts: Use stat to check lock claim")
validly indicates that stat has gained support for the special "-"
command line option in 2009, we should still try to avoid breaking being
able to run on even older distros. As it has been determined, contary to
the comment in the script using /dev/stdin (/proc/self/fd/$_lockfd) is
fine here, as Linux specially treats these /proc inodes.
Suggested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Tested-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
These files are in tree so that people can build (including from git)
without needing less-than-a-decade-old flex and bison.
We should update them periodically. Debian buster has been Debian
stable for a while. Our CI is running buster.
There should be no significant functional change; it's possible that
there are bugfixes but I have not reviewed the changes. I *have*
checked that the flex I am using has the fix for CVE-2016-6354.
CC: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
These files are in tree so that people can build (including from git)
without needing recent autotools.
We should update them periodically. Debian buster has been Debian
stable fopr a while. Our CI is running buster.
There should be no significant functional change; it's possible that
there are bugfixes to the configure scripts but I have not reviewed
them.
These files were last changed in
83c845033d
libxl: use vchan for QMP access with Linux stubdomain
where a new feature was added. However, that commit contains a lot of
extraneous noise in configure compared to its parent.
Compared to 83c845033dc8bb3a35ae245effb7832b6823174a~, this commit
restores those extraneous changes, leaving precisely the correct
changes. So one way of looking at the changes we are making now, is
that we are undoing accidental changes to the autoconf output.
I used Debian's autoconf 2.69-11 on amd64.
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: Nick Rosbrook <rosbrookn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Nick Rosbrook <rosbrookn@gmail.com>
CC: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
`xl shutdown -w` waits for the first of either domain shutdown or death.
Shutdown is the halting of the guest operating system, and death is the
freeing of domain resources.
Allow specifying -w multiple times to wait for only domain death. This
is useful in scripts so that all resources are free before the script
continues.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Otherwise it's difficult to know if operation failed inside the automation.
While at it, also switch to returning 1 and 2 instead of errno to avoid
incompatibilies between errno and special exit code numbers.
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
To combat the absence of mitigating microcode, arrange to hide RDRAND by
default on IvyBridge client hardware.
Adjust the default feature derivation to hide RDRAND on IvyBridge client
parts, unless `cpuid=rdrand` is explicitly provided.
Adjust the restore path in xc_cpuid_apply_policy() to not hide RDRAND from VMs
which migrated from pre-4.14.
In all cases, individual guests can continue using RDRAND if explicitly
enabled in their config files.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Memory Protection eXtension support has been dropped from GCC and Linux, and
will be dropped from future Intel CPUs.
With all other default/max pieces in place, move MPX from default to max.
This means that VMs won't be offered it by default, but can explicitly opt
into using it via cpuid="host,mpx=1" in their vm.cfg file.
The difference as visible to the guest is:
diff --git a/default b/mpx
index 0e91765d6b..c8c33cd584 100644
--- a/default
+++ b/mpx
@@ -13,15 +13,17 @@ Native cpuid:
00000004:00000004 -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
00000005:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
00000006:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
- 00000007:00000000 -> 00000000:009c2fbb:00000000:9c000400
+ 00000007:00000000 -> 00000000:009c6fbb:00000000:9c000400
00000008:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
00000009:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
0000000a:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
0000000b:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
0000000c:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000000
- 0000000d:00000000 -> 00000007:00000240:00000340:00000000
+ 0000000d:00000000 -> 0000001f:00000240:00000440:00000000
0000000d:00000001 -> 0000000f:00000240:00000000:00000000
0000000d:00000002 -> 00000100:00000240:00000000:00000000
+ 0000000d:00000003 -> 00000040:000003c0:00000000:00000000
+ 0000000d:00000004 -> 00000040:00000400:00000000:00000000
40000000:ffffffff -> 40000005:566e6558:65584d4d:4d4d566e
40000001:ffffffff -> 0004000e:00000000:00000000:00000000
40000002:ffffffff -> 00000001:40000000:00000000:00000000
Adjust the legacy restore path in libxc to cope safely with pre-4.14 VMs.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
In order to safely disable some features by default, without breaking
migration from 4.13 or older, the CPUID logic needs to distinguish the two
cases.
Plumb a restore boolean down from the two callers of libxl__cpuid_legacy() all
the way down into xc_cpuid_apply_policy().
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Currently, libxl__cpuid_legacy() passes each element of the policy list to
xc_cpuid_set() individually. This is wasteful both in terms of the number of
hypercalls made, and the quantity of repeated merging/auditing work performed
by Xen.
Move the loop processing down into xc_cpuid_set(), which allows us to do one
set of hypercalls, rather than one per list entry.
In xc_cpuid_set(), obtain the full host, guest max and current policies to
begin with, and loop over the xend array, processing one leaf at a time.
Replace the linear search with a binary search, seeing as the serialised
leaves are sorted.
No change in behaviour from the guests point of view.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
The existing x86_cpuid_copy_to_buffer() does produce sorted results, and we're
about to start relying on this. Extend the unit tests.
As test_cpuid_serialise_success() is a fairly limited set of synthetic
examples right now, introduce test_cpuid_current() to operate on the full
policy for the current CPU.
Tweak the fail() macro to allow for simplified control flow.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
In order to combine the functionality of xc_cpuid_set() with
xc_cpuid_apply_policy(), arrange to pass the data in a single contained
struct, rather than two arrays.
libxl__cpuid_policy is the ideal structure to use, but that would introduce a
reverse dependency between libxc and libxl. Introduce xc_xend_cpuid (with a
transparent union to provide more useful names for the inputs), and use this
structure in libxl.
The public API has libxl_cpuid_policy as an opaque type referencing
libxl__cpuid_policy. Drop the inappropriate comment about its internals, and
use xc_xend_cpuid as a differently named opaque backing object. Users of both
libxl and libxc are not permitted to look at the internals.
No change in behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
The hardcoded tpm_signature is too restrictive to detect many TPMs. For
instance, it doesn't accept a QEMU emulated TPM (VID 0x1014 DID 0x0001).
Make the TPM detection match that in rombios which accepts a wider
range.
With this change, the TPM's TCPA ACPI table is generated and the guest
OS can automatically load the tpm_tis driver. It also allows seabios to
detect and use the TPM. However, seabios skips some TPM initialization
when running under Xen, so it will not populate any PCRs unless modified
to run the initialization under Xen.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Juergen Gross
Edwin Török
Bertrand Marquis
Olaf Hering
David Woodhouse
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Igor Druzhinin
Andrew Cooper
Ian Jackson
Jan Beulich
Wei Liu
Jason Andryuk
Grzegorz Uriasz
Tim Deegan
Tamas K Lengyel