Create a basic Makefile to build and install libxenlight Golang
bindings. Also add a stub package which only opens libxl context.
Include a global xenlight.Ctx variable which can be used as the
default context by the entire program if desired.
For now, return simple errors. Proper error handling will be
added in next patch.
Until we get configure support, disable it by default. It can be
enabled either by adding "CONFIG_GOLANG=y" to .config, or adding it to
the 'make' line.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Rojas <ronladred@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
These records shouldn't be in a stream, but accidentally are. Warn about
them, but don't abort the verification.
While here, add a missing length check to the X86_PV_P2M_FRAMES record
checker.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The code as written attempted to elide zero-content records, as such records
serve no purpose but come with a performance hit. Unfortunately, in the case
where the hypervisor reported max size is non-zero, but the actual size is
zero, the record is not elided.
This previously tripped up the sanity checks in the restore side of migration,
but as the underlying reasons for eliding the records in the first place are
still valid, fix the elision logic.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The migration v2 save code was written to avoid sending data records with no
content, as such records serve no purpose but come with a performance hit.
The restore code sanity checks this expectation.
Under some circumstances (most notably, on AMD hardware with Debug Extensions,
and a PV guest kernel which is not using the feature), the save code would
generate a record with no content, which trips the sanity check in the restore
code.
As the stream is otherwise fine, tolerate these records and avoid failing the
migration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Currently xc_translate_foreign_address() only checks for the PSE bit on
level 2 entries (that's 2 MB pages on x64 and 32-bit with PAE, and 4 MB
pages on 32-bit). But the Linux kernel sometimes uses 1 GB pages. This
patch fixes that, by checking the PSE bit on level 3 entries if the guest
has 4 translation levels (that means 64-bit guests only).
Signed-off-by: Cristian-Bogdan Sirb <csirb@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
* 'staging' of git://xenbits.xen.org/people/konradwilk/xen:
Introduce the pvcalls header
Introduce the Xen 9pfs transport header
xen: introduce a C99 headers check
ring.h: introduce macros to handle monodirectional rings with multiple req sizes
tmem: Parse UUIDs correctly.
tmem: Fix tmem-shared-auth 'auth' values
tmem: By default to join an shared pool it must be authorized.
xen/libxc: Move TMEM_AUTH to XEN_SYSCTL_TMEM_OP_SET_AUTH
xen/libcx/tmem: Replace TMEM_RESTORE_NEW with XEN_SYSCTL_TMEM_OP_SET_POOLS
displif: add ABI for para-virtual display
GCC7 complains about a possible overflow/truncation in xenlockprof.
xenlockprof.c: In function ‘main’:
xenlockprof.c:100:53: error: ‘%s’ directive writing up to 39 bytes into a
region of size between 17 and 37 [-Werror=format-overflow=]
sprintf(name, "unknown type(%d) %d lock %s", data[j].type,
^~
xenlockprof.c:100:13: note: ‘sprintf’ output between 24 and 83 bytes
into a destination of size 60
sprintf(name, "unknown type(%d) %d lock %s", data[j].type,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
data[j].idx, data[j].name);
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This increases the size of name to 100. Not the most scalable solution,
but certainly the "cheapest", as it doesn't add dependencies for
asprintf.
Signed-off-by: Seraphime Kirkovski <kirkseraph@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
A simple
xl tmem-shared-auth -u 00000000-0000-000A-0000-000000000001 -A 0 0
resulted in uuid_low = 1 (correct) and uuid_high = 0 (umm?).
The issue was that for hex values above 'A' (or 'a') we forgot
to add 10.
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The hypervisor code (tmemc_shared_pool_auth) since the inception
would consider auth values of:
0 - to disable authentication!
1 - to enable authentication for the given UUID.
The docs have it the other way around, so lets fix it.
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
which surprisingly (or maybe not) looks like
XEN_SYSCTL_TMEM_OP_SET_POOLS.
This hypercall came about, as explained in docs/misc/tmem-internals.html:
When tmem was first proposed to the linux kernel mailing list
(LKML), there was concern expressed about security of shared ephemeral
pools. The initial tmem implementation only
required a client to provide a 128-bit UUID to identify a shared pool, and the
linux-side tmem implementation obtained this UUID from the superblock of the
shared filesystem (in ocfs2). It was
pointed out on LKML that the UUID was essentially a security key and any
malicious domain that guessed it would have access to any data from the shared
filesystem that found its way into tmem.
..
As a result, a Xen boot option -- tmem_shared_auth; -- was
added. The option defaults to disabled,
but when it is enabled, management tools must explicitly authenticate (or may
explicitly deny) shared pool access to any client.
On Xen, this is done with the xm tmem-shared-auth command.
"
However the implementation has some rather large holes:
a) The hypercall was accessed from any guest.
b) If the ->domain id value is 0xFFFF then one can toggle the
tmem_global.shared_auth knob on/off. That with a)
made it pretty bad.
c) If one toggles the tmem_global.shared_auth off, then the
'tmem_shared_auth=1' bootup parameter is ignored and
one can join any shared pool (if UUID is known)!
d) If the 'tmem_shared_auth=1' and tmem_global.shared_auth is
set to 1, then one can only join an shared pool if the
UUID has been set by 'xl tmem-shared-auth'. Otherwise
the joining of a pool fails and a non-shared pool is
created (without errors to guest). Not exactly sure if
the shared pool creation at that point should error out
or not.
e) If a guest is migrated, the policy values (which UUID
can be shared, whether tmem_global.shared_auth is set, etc)
are completely ignored.
This patch only fixes a) and only allows the hypercall to
be called by the control domain. Subsequent patches will
fix the remaining issues.
We also have to call client_create as the guest at this
point may not have done any tmem hypercalls - and hence
the '->tmem' from 'struct domain' is still NULL. Us calling
client_create fixes this.
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> [libxc changes]
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> [hypervisor changes]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
This used to be done under TMEM_RESTORE_NEW which was an hypercall
accessible by the guest. However there are couple of reasons
not to do it:
- No checking of domid on TMEM_RESTORE_NEW which meant that
any guest could create TMEM pools for other guests.
- The guest can already create pools using TMEM_NEW_POOL
(which is limited to guest doing the hypercall)
- This functionality is only needed during migration - there
is no need for the guest to have this functionality.
However to move this we also have to allocate the 'struct domain'
->tmem pointer. It is by default set to NULL and would be initialized
via the guest do_tmem() hypercalls. Presumarily that was the
initial reason that TMEM_RESTORE_NEW was in the guest accessible
hypercalls.
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> [libxc change]
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> [hypervisor changes]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Currently in xc_interface_open, xch->fmem is not initialized
and in some rare case the code fails before ever assigning a value
to it.
I got this in master:
$ sudo ./xl/xl run
xencall: error: Could not obtain handle on privileged command interface: No such file or directory
Segmentation fault
This initializes the whole xch_buff to 0.
Signed-off-by: Seraphime Kirkovski <kirkseraph@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
If ocaml.m4 didn't find ocamlopt, disable all the ocaml builds.
Currently our Makefiles do not work properly when the native code
compiler (`ocamlopt') is not available. In principle this should be
fixed to fall back to bytecode, but this is not a task for this stage
of the Xen 4.9 release.
Without this change, we cannot build on systems with only ocamlc.
That includes Debian jessie ARM64, as used on the new ARM64 hardware
in the Xen Project CI test lab.
When the Makefiles are fixed, this commit should be reverted.
Committers: Please rerun autogen.sh.
CC: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
CC: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
CC: Jonathan Ludlam <Jonathan.Ludlam@citrix.com>
CC: David Scott <dave@recoil.org>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Remove all unused functions from tdb.c. This will reduce code size of
xenstored and - more important - of xenstore stubdom.
tdb.c hasn't been updated to a newer version since its introduction in
2005. Any backport of bug fixes or update to a new version will need
major work, so there is no real downside to remove not needed code.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The handling of transactions in xenstored is rather clumsy today:
- Each transaction in progress is keeping a local copy of the complete
xenstore data base
- A transaction will fail as soon as any node is being modified outside
the transaction
This is leading to a very bad behavior in case of a large xenstore.
Memory consumption of xenstored is much higher than necessary and with
many domains up transactions failures will be more and more common.
Instead of keeping a complete copy of the data base for each
transaction store the transaction data in the same data base as the
normal xenstore entries prepended with the transaction in the single
nodes either read or modified. At the end of the transaction walk
through all nodes accessed and check for conflicting modifications.
In case no conflicts are found write all modified nodes to the data
base without transaction identifier.
Following tests have been performed:
- create/destroy of various domains, including HVM with ioemu-stubdom
(xenstored and xenstore-stubdom)
- multiple concurrent runs of xs-test over several minutes
(xenstored and xenstore-stubdom)
- test for memory leaks of xenstored by dumping talloc reports before
and after the tests
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Instead of setting errno and returning true or false return the error
value directly.
In order to ensure all call sites have been changed according to the
modification rename the functions to xs_*.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The use of seabios defconfig kills boot performance of Windows guests
because the default is for the int13 handler to use PIO when accessing
the emulated IDE device.
By instead using a canned configuration with the ATA settings overridden
to enable DMA access (and also wider PIO) boot performance is markedly
improved without the need to use a different (and possibly not supported)
device model.
This patch adds the canned configuration into tools/firmware and modifies
the Makefile rule to copy it into place.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
colo_merge_secondary_dirty_bitmap() unconditionally free()s the .data
member of its local xc_sr_record structure rec on its exit path.
However, if the initial call to read_record() fails then this member is
uninitialised. Initialise it.
Signed-off-by: Joshua Otto <jtotto@uwaterloo.ca>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Add functions to libxl to setup a Xen 9pfs frontend/backend connection.
Add support to xl to parse a 9pfs option in the VM config file, in the
following format:
p9=["tag=share_dir,security_model=none,path=/root/share_dir"]
where tag identifies the 9pfs share and it is required to mount it on
the guest side, path is the path of the filesystem to share and the only
security_model supported is "none" which means that files are stored
using the same credentials as they are created on the guest (no user
ownership squash or remap).
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano@aporeto.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
For information related to transaction conflicts, potentially frequent
logging at "info" priority has been changed to "debug" priority, and
once per two minutes there is an "info" priority summary.
Additional detailed logging has been added at "debug" priority.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
In the main loop, when choosing the timeout for the select function
call, we were setting it so as to wake up to issue conflict-credit to
any domains that could accept it. When xenstore is idle, this would
mean waking up every 50ms (by default) to do no work. With this
commit, we check whether any domain is below its cap, and if not then
we set the timeout for longer (the same timeout as before the
conflict-protection feature was added).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
The packet telling us to end the transaction has always carried an
argument telling us whether to commit.
If the transaction made no modifications to the tree, now we ignore
that argument and do not commit: it is just a waste of effort.
This makes read-only transactions immune to conflicts, and means that
we do not need to store any of their details in the history that is
used for assigning blame for conflicts.
We count a transaction as a read-only transaction only if it contains
no operations that modified the tree.
This means that (for example) a transaction that creates a new node
then deletes it would NOT count as read-only, even though it makes no
change overall. A more sophisticated algorithm could judge the
transaction based on comparison of its initial and final states, but
this would add complexity and computational cost.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
We already avoid inter-domain conflicts but now allow intra-domain
conflicts. Although there are no known practical examples of a domain
that might perform operations that conflict with its own transactions,
this is conceivable, so here we avoid changing those semantics
unnecessarily.
When a transaction commit fails with a conflict and we look through
the history of commits to see which connection(s) to blame, ignore
historical commits that were made by the same connection as the
failing commit.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Blame each connection found to have made a commit that would cause this
transaction to fail. Each blamed connection is penalised by having its
conflict-credit decremented.
Note the change in semantics for the replay function: we no longer stop after
finding the first operation that can't be replayed. This allows us to identify
all operations that conflicted with this transaction, not just the one that
conflicted first.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
v1 Reviewed-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
Changes since v1:
* use correct log levels for informational messages
Changes since v2:
* fix the blame algorithm and improve logging
(fix was reviewed by Jonathan Davies)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
Since the list of historic activity cannot grow without bound, it is safe to use
this to track commits.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
The history of commits is to be used for working out which historical
commit(s) (including atomic writes) caused conflicts with a
currently-failing commit of a transaction. Any commit that was made
before the current transaction started cannot be relevant. Therefore
we never need to keep history from before the start of the
longest-running transaction that is open at any given time: whenever a
transaction ends (with or without a commit) then if it was the
longest-running open transaction we can delete history up until start
of the the next-longest-running open transaction.
Some transactions might stay open for a very long time, so if any
transaction exceeds conflict_max_history_seconds then we remove it
from consideration in this context, and will not guarantee to keep
remembering about historical commits made during such a transaction.
We implement this by keeping a list of all open transactions that have
not been open too long. When a transaction ends, we remove it from the
list, along with any that have been open longer than the maximum; then
we delete any history from before the start of the longest-running
transaction remaining in the list.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
There is no need to record "read" operations as they will never cause another
transaction to fail.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
Forward port to xen-unstable:
* Remove Xenbus.Xb.Op.Restrict
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Add ability to track xenstore tree operations -- either non-transactional
operations or committed transactions.
For now, the call to actually retain commits is commented out because history
can grow without bound.
For now, we call record_commit for all non-transactional operations. A
subsequent patch will make it retain only the ones with side-effects.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
When processing connections, skip those from domains with no remaining
conflict-credit.
Also, issue a point of conflict-credit at regular intervals, the
period being set by the configuration option "conflict-max-history-
seconds". When issuing conflict-credit, we give a point either to
every domain at once (one each) or only to the single domain at the
front of the queue, depending on the configuration option
"conflict-rate-limit-is-aggregate".
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
This commit gives each domain a conflict-credit variable, which will
later be used for limiting how often a domain can cause other domain's
transaction-commits to fail.
This commit also provides functions and data for manipulating domains
and their conflict-credit, and checking whether they have credit.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
This avoids a rogue client being about to stall another client (eg the
toolstack) indefinitely.
This is XSA-206.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Commit 5823d6eb "add a call to restrict the handle" added a new function
to the foreignmemory API. This API is considered stable and so the new
function should be bound to a new version.
This patch creates version 1.1 of the API, dependent on version 1.0, and
binds the restrict call to version 1.1. Thus version 1.0 is as it was
before the new function was added.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Commit 8ef5f344d0 "tools/libxendevicemodel: add a call to restrict the
handle" added a function to the devicemodel interface to restrict
operations through the API to a specific domain, where a capable under-
lying privcmd driver exists.
This patch adds similar functionality to the xenforeignmemory API. This
will be necessary (as much as xendevicemodel restriction) for limiting
the scope of device models to specific domains.
NOTE: My patch to the linux kernel [1] added the appropriate checks to
the foreign memory ioctls.
[1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ostr/linux.git/commit/?id=4610d240
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Section 2.4.4 of the Hypervisor Top Level Functional Specification states
that enabling bit 10 in EDX of CPUID leaf 3 advertises to Windows a set
of MSRs into which it can write crash information.
This patch advertises that bit and implements the MSRs such that Xen can
log the information if a Windows guest crashes.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Replace raw xs_read() calls with libxl__xs_read_checked() and bail on error.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
On soft reset we remove the domain from xenstore and introduce it back to
have everything reconnected. Console, however, stays attached (as xenconsoled
checks if the domain is dying and our domain is not) but we lose the
information about tty:
before soft reset:
console = ""
...
type = "xenconsoled"
output = "pty"
tty = "/dev/pts/1"
...
after:
console = ""
...
type = "xenconsoled"
output = "pty"
tty = ""
...
The issue applies to both HVM and PVH but for HVM guests serial console
through QEMU is usually in use and for PVH we don't have it.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Guests with LIBXL_DEVICE_MODEL_VERSION_NONE don't have a device model
running so there is no save file to rename.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
c/s 4045953 "x86/paging: Enforce PG_external == PG_translate == PG_refcounts"
in the hypervisor finally prevented the construction of PV autotranslate
guests.
Remove support for such guests in the domain builder, bailing out with an
obvious "no longer supported" message, rather than a more obscure
"SHADOW_OP_ENABLED failed".
As a piece of cleanup, rename xc_dom_feature_translated() to
xc_dom_translated() to match its actual semantics.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
When the number of permitted xenstore entries for a domain is being
exceeded the operation trying to create a new entry is denied.
Unfortunately errno isn't being set in this case so the error code
returned to the client is undefined.
Set errno to ENOSPC in this case.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Ronald Rojas
Andrew Cooper
Cristian-Bogdan Sirb
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Seraphime Kirkovski
Juergen Gross
Ian Jackson
Paul Durrant
Joshua Otto
Stefano Stabellini
Thomas Sanders
Jonathan Davies
Dario Faggioli
Vitaly Kuznetsov
Zhang Chen