These TPM 2.0 Exposed APIs for the Mini-os to access TPM 2.0
hardware.
Signed-off-by: Quan Xu <quan.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
This is a complete rewrite of the disk format and key hierarchy for the
TPM Manager. The new format supports multiple groups of vTPMs which
define the permitted configurations where a given vTPM's keys are
available, allowing upgrades of critical components while retaining the
secrecy of cryptographic keys.
New features of the TPM Manager are explained in the README and in the
definitions of the management commands in vtpm_manager.h.
New features for vTPMs:
1. The size of the state blob for a vTPM is expanded from 52 to 64
bytes in order to support future vTPMs using SHA-2/3 instead of SHA-1.
2. vTPMs can obtain a quote from the physical TPM with certain
resettable PCRs set to include information about the vTPM. This can be
used by a vTPM to provide evidence of its integrity, including the
secrecy of its EK, and for deep quotes.
Some additional changes made by this rewrite that may impact existing
users:
1. The value of WELLKNOWN_OWNER_AUTH was incorrect for the physical TPM;
the convention is to use all zero bits for well-known authentication
values, not all one bits.
2. Randomly generating the owner auth value for the physical TPM is no
longer supported, as it prevents later creation or certification of
AIKs (which the old manager did not support).
3. The vTPM Manager needs to be provisioned with a PCR composite and an
upgrade authority's public key before it will save data across boots.
The current implementation still has some limitations:
* 5 valid system PCR selections per group
* The vTPM Manager's disk can use at most 2MB of space
* The vTPM domain's build hash is always set to null/zero
Most of the code relating to upgrade and rollback protection is
currently stubbed out, but future versions can add:
* Support for using the TPM's monotonic counter to prevent rollback
of vTPM data by taking and restoring disk snapshots
* Masking the master disk encryption key using a value stored in the
TPM's NVRAM so that revocation of old data is possible without
relying on all previously authorized software stacks to respect the
monotonic counter's value
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Correct format string, fixing:
vtpm_storage.c: In function 'vtpm_storage_load_header': vtpm_storage.c:658: error: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 5 has type 'unsigned int'
vtpm_storage.c:658: error: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 5 has type 'unsigned int' make[2]: *** [vtpm_storage.o] Error 1
Add padlock.o to PSSL_OBJS, fixing:
/local/scratch/ianc/devel/xen-unstable.git/stubdom/mini-os-x86_32-vtpmmgr/mini-os.o: In function `aes_crypt_ecb': /local/scratch/ianc/devel/xen-unstable.git/stubdom/polarssl-x86_32/library/aes.c:659: undefined reference to `padlock_supports'
/local/scratch/ianc/devel/xen-unstable.git/stubdom/polarssl-x86_32/library/aes.c:661: undefined reference to `padlock_xcryptecb' /local/scratch/ianc/devel/xen-unstable.git/stubdom/mini-os-x86_32-vtpmmgr/mini-os.o: In function `aes_crypt_cbc': /local/scratch/ianc/devel/xen-unstable.git/stubdom/polarssl-x86_32/library/aes.c:771: undefined reference to `padlock_supports'
/local/scratch/ianc/devel/xen-unstable.git/stubdom/polarssl-x86_32/library/aes.c:773: undefined reference to `padlock_xcryptcbc'
make[1]: ***
[/local/scratch/ianc/devel/xen-unstable.git/stubdom/mini-os-x86_32-vtpmmgr/mini-os]
Error 1
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked by: Matthew Fioravante <matthew.fioravante@jhuapl.edu>
[ ijc -- applied same fix to stubdom/vtpm/Makefile ]
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Quan Xu
Olaf Hering
Daniel De Graaf
Ian Campbell
Matthew Fioravante