Turning scheduling related functions exit codes towards using the
EXIT_[SUCCESS|FAILURE] constants, instead of instead of arbitrary numbers
or libxl return codes.
- for main_*: arbitrary -> EXIT_SUCCESS|EXIT_FAILURE.
- for internal fucntion: arbitrary -> 0/1.
Signed-off-by: Harmandeep Kaur <write.harmandeep@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Turning main() function exit codes towards using the EXIT_[SUCCESS|FAILURE]
constants, instead of instead of arbitrary numbers or libxl return codes.
Also includes a document comment in xl.h stating xl process should always
return EXIT_FOO and main_* can be treated as main() as if they are returning
a process exit status and not a function return value)
Signed-off-by: Harmandeep Kaur <write.harmandeep@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
xendomains will manage guests behind libvirts back:
- libvirt starts a guest
- that guest can be "managed" by libvirt and xl at the same time
- when xendomains runs on shutdown it will save the guest using xl
libvirt does not know about this
- when xendomains runs on boot it will restore the saved guest using xl
libvirt does not know about this, it will just fail to manage the
restored guest
To prevent xendomains from interfering with libvirt add a Conflicts= to
xendomains.service. It will cause libvirt to be stopped if xendomains is
started manually with 'systemctl start'.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
That directory is used to store guest memory dump which contains
sensitive information.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
def_getopt would print a message to stderr, but blunder on anyway.
Sadly this is probably not a backport candidate.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This avoids a long running operation when destroying a domain with a
large PoD cache.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
In fact, when waking up a vCPU, __runq_tickle() is called
to allow the new vCPU to run on a pCPU (which one, depends
on the relationship between the priority of the new vCPU,
and the ones of the vCPUs that are already running).
If there is no idle processor on which the new vCPU can
run (e.g., because of pinning/affinity), we try to migrate
away the vCPU that is currently running on the new vCPU's
processor (i.e., the processor on which the vCPU is waking
up).
Now, trying to migrate a vCPU has the effect of pushing it
through a
running --> offline --> runnable
transition, which, in turn, has the following negative
effects:
1) Credit1 counts that as a wakeup, and it BOOSTs the
vCPU, even if it is a CPU-bound one, which wouldn't
normally have deserved boosting. This can prevent
legit IO-bound vCPUs to get ahold of the processor
until such spurious boosting expires, hurting the
performance!
2) since the vCPU is fails the vcpu_runnable() test
(within the call to csched_schedule() that follows
the wakeup, as a consequence of tickling) the
scheduling rate-limiting mechanism is also fooled,
i.e., the context switch happens even if less than
the minimum execution amount of time passed.
In particular, 1) has been reported to cause the following
issue:
* VM-IO: 1-vCPU pinned to a pCPU, running netperf
* VM-CPU: 1-vCPU pinned the the same pCPU, running a busy
CPU loop
==> Only VM-I/O: throughput is 806.64 Mbps
==> VM-I/O + VM-CPU: throughput is 166.50 Mbps
This patch solves (for the above scenario) the problem
by checking whether or not it makes sense to try to
migrate away the vCPU currently running on the processor.
In fact, if there aren't idle processors where such a vCPU
can execute. attempting the migration is just futile
(harmful, actually!).
With this patch, in the above configuration, results are:
==> Only VM-I/O: throughput is 807.18 Mbps
==> VM-I/O + VM-CPU: throughput is 731.66 Mbps
Reported-by: Kun Suo <ksuo@uccs.edu>
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Kun Suo <ksuo@uccs.edu>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Rather than issuing a (mostly) useless separate message, rely on
domain_crash() providing enough data, and leverage the line number
information it prints.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Recent ld warns about libxenlight.so's dependency libraries not being
available, which can be easily avoided by not just passing the raw
library name on ld's command line.
In the course of checking how things fit together (I originally
suspected the warning to come from the linking of xl) I also noticed a
stray L in SHLIB_libxenguest, which gets removed at once.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
PoD guests need to balloon at least as far as required by PoD, or risk
crashing. Currently they don't necessarily know what the right value
is, because our memory accounting is (at the very least) confusing.
Apply the memory limit fudge factor to the in-hypervisor PoD memory
target, too. This will increase the size of the guest's PoD cache by
the fudge factor LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT (currently 1Mby). This ensures
that even with a slightly-off balloon driver, the guest will be
stable even under memory pressure.
There are two call sites of xc_domain_set_pod_target that need fixing:
The one in libxl_set_memory_target is straightforward.
The one in xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest is more awkward. Simply
setting the PoD target differently does not work because the various
amounts of memory during domain construction no longer match up.
Instead, we adjust the guest memory target in xenstore (but only for
PoD guests).
This introduces a 1Mby discrepancy between the balloon target of a PoD
guest at boot, and the target set by an apparently-equivalent `xl
mem-set' (or similar) later. This approach is low-risk for a security
fix but we need to fix this up properly in xen.git#staging and
probably also in stable trees.
This is XSA-153.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 56fb5fd623)
Some of the sub-ops are acessible to all guests, and hence should be
rate-limited. In the xenoprof case, just like for XSA-146, include them
only in debug builds. Since the vPMU code is rather new, allow them to
be always present, but downgrade them to (rate limited) guest messages.
This is CVE-2015-7971 / XSA-152.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This was overlooked in fb442e2171 ("x86_64: allow more vCPU-s per
guest").
This is CVE-2015-7969 / XSA-151.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Based on the contents of a guests physical address space,
p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() could degrade into a linear memcmp() from 0 to
max_gfn, which runs non-preemptibly.
As p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() runs behind the scenes in a number of contexts,
making it preemptible is not feasible.
Instead, a different approach is taken. Recently-populated pages are eagerly
checked for reclaimation, which amortises the p2m_pod_emergency_sweep()
operation across each p2m_pod_demand_populate() operation.
Note that in the case that a 2M superpage can't be reclaimed as a superpage,
it is shattered if 4K pages of zeros can be reclaimed. This is unfortunate
but matches the previous behaviour, and is required to avoid regressions
(domain crash from PoD exhaustion) with VMs configured close to the limit.
This is CVE-2015-7970 / XSA-150.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
When optional super page support got added (commit bd1cd81d64 "x86: PV
support for hugepages"), two adjustments were missed: mod_l2_entry()
needs to consider the PSE and RW bits when deciding whether to use the
fast path, and the PSE bit must not be removed from L2_DISALLOW_MASK
unconditionally.
This is CVE-2015-7835 / XSA-148.
Reported-by: "栾尚聪(好风)" <shangcong.lsc@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Primarily this means XENMEM_decrease_reservation from a toolstack
domain.
Unlike x86 we have no requirement right now to queue such pages onto
a separate list, if we hit this race then the other code has already
fully accepted responsibility for freeing this page and therefore
there is no more for relinquish_memory to do.
This is CVE-2015-7814 / XSA-147.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
These are guest accessible and should therefore be rate-limited.
Moreover, include them only in debug builds.
This is CVE-2015-7813 / XSA-146.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Multicall for ARM has been supported since commit f0dbdc6 "xen: arm: fully
implement multicall interface.". Although, if an hypercall in multicall
requires preemption, it will crash the host:
(XEN) Xen BUG at domain.c:347
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.7-unstable arm64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
[...]
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<00000000002420cc>] hypercall_create_continuation+0x64/0x380 (PC)
(XEN) [<0000000000217274>] do_memory_op+0x1b00/0x2334 (LR)
(XEN) [<0000000000250d2c>] do_multicall_call+0x114/0x124
(XEN) [<0000000000217ff0>] do_multicall+0x17c/0x23c
(XEN) [<000000000024f97c>] do_trap_hypercall+0x90/0x12c
(XEN) [<0000000000251ca8>] do_trap_hypervisor+0xd2c/0x1ba4
(XEN) [<00000000002582cc>] guest_sync+0x88/0xb8
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 5:
(XEN) Xen BUG at domain.c:347
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)
(XEN) Manual reset required ('noreboot' specified)
Looking to the code, the support of multicall looks valid to me, as we only
need to fill call.args[...]. So drop the BUG();
This is CVE-2015-7812 / XSA-145.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The variable "svc" is declared twice within rt_dom_cntl. However, the
top declaration could be re-used avoiding re-declaring another time the
variable.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
The variable "cur" is declared twice within "cur". However the top
declaration could be re-used avoiding re-declaring another time the
variable.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The variable "d" is declared multiple times within do_memory_op.
The subsequent declaration are not useful because the top one is never
used. So drop them.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The variable "frame" is declared twice within the function
__gntab_map_grant_ref. This makes the code quite confusing to read.
The second definition is not useful as the first one is never used
until then. So drop it.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The variable "d" is defined twice. However, the second one is not
necessary as the vCPU as already been deduced from the first "d".
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
No need to generate xen/lowlevel/xl/_pyxl_types.{h,c}, following c/s
598e97f "tools/python: remove broken xl binding"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Somehow I managed to drop the HVM dependency from v2 to v3 of what
became commit 5c23c760a8 ("x86/HVM: correct page dirty marking in
hvm_map_guest_frame_rw()"), obviously breaking migration of PV guests.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The current domain and the domain pointed by the variable "d" are not
the same.
However, when it's not possible to get a reference on the page, the
target domain ID is not printed. This makes the message difficult to
understand.
Improve the message by printing the target domain ID.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Direct mapped domain needs to retrieve the exact same underlying
physical page when the region is re-populated.
Currently, when the memory reservation for this domain is decreased, the
request is just ignored and the page stayed mapped in the P2M. However,
this make more difficult to spot issue when the domain has not yet mapped
foreign page but trying to access the region.
What we really care for direct mapped domain is to not give back the
page to the allocator. So we can re-enable to direct mapped when the guest
memory region is re-populated.
The rest of the process to remove a page can be safely done. This
also ensures us to stay close to the normal domain memory handling.
At the same time, drop the trailing whitespaces around the code
modified.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
It doesn't depend on GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS. Moving the function to p2m.c
at once allows a bogus #define/#include pair to be removed from
hap/nested_ept.c.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
To make it possible to tell apart the static symbols therein, use their
object file names instead of their source ones.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Rather than dirtying a page when establishing a (permanent) mapping,
dirty it when the page gets unmapped, or - if still mapped - on the
final iteration of a save operation (or in other cases where the guest
is paused or already shut down). (Transient mappings continue to get
dirtied upon getting mapped, to avoid the overhead of tracking.)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Future work will rearange it, invalidating these assumptions.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Expose them to assembly code, and replace open-coded versions.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The last parameter of alloc_domheap_page{s,} contain the memory flags and
not the order of the allocation.
Use 0 for the call in p2m_pod_set_cache_target as it was before
1069d63c5e "x86/mm/p2m: use defines for
page sizes". Note that PAGE_ORDER_4K is also equal to 0 so the behavior
stays the same.
For the call in p2m_pod_offline_or_broken_replace we want to allocate
the new page on the same numa node as the previous page. So retrieve the
numa node and pass it in the memory flags.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
assert is not async-signal-safe.
In practice the effect of calling assert there is that if the
assertion fails we might get a secondary crash, or other undesirable
behaviour from stdio (which is how assert usually reports failures).
Mention in a comment in libxl__self_pipe_wakeup that it has to be
async-signal-safe.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
It will avoid to introduce a new XEN_PSCI_* define every time we support
a new version of PSCI in Xen.
Also fix the coding style in modified place.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
From Xen's point of view, PSCI v0.2 and PSCI v1.0 are very similar. All
the PSCI calls used within Xen (PSCI_VERSION, CPU_ON, SYSTEM_OFF and
SYSTEM_RESET) behave exactly the same.
Furthermore, based on the spec (5.3.1 DEN0022C), any 1.y version must be
compatible with 1.x when y > x for any functions existing in 1.x.
So check the presence of the new compatible string [1] and allow Xen to
boot on any platform using PSCI 1.x.
[1] http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2015-October/374547.html
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
All the quirks have been replaced by proper detection. Lets drop the
callback and hope that no one will need new quirks.
At the same time, remove the definition of platform_dom0_evtchn_ppi
which is not used any more.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- typos ]
We are currently using a per-platform quirk to know if the 2 4KB region of
the GIC CPU interface are each aligned to 64KB. Although, it may be
possible to have different layout on a same platform (depending on the
firmware version).
Rather than having a quirk it's possible to detect by reading the GIC
memory. This patch is based from the Linux commit "irqchip/GIC: Add workaround
for aliased GIC400" [1].
Take the opportunity to clean up the GICv2 of code which was only
required because of the quirk.
Note that none of the platform using the gic-hip04 were actually using
the quirk, so the code has been dropped. I will let the maintainers
decide whether it's relevant or not to add proper detection for aliased
GIC for this hardware.
[1] commit 12e14066f4835f5ee1ca795f0309415b54c067a9
Author: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Date: Sun Sep 13 12:14:31 2015 +0100
irqchip/GIC: Add workaround for aliased GIC400
The GICv2 architecture mandates that the two 4kB GIC regions are
contiguous, and on two separate physical pages (so that access to
the second page can be trapped by a hypervisor). This doesn't work
very well when PAGE_SIZE is 64kB.
A relatively common hack^Wway to work around this is to alias each
4kB region over its own 64kB page. Of course in this case, the base
address you want to use is not really the begining of the region,
but base + 60kB (so that you get a contiguous 8kB region over two
distinct pages).
Normally, this would be described in DT with a new property, but
some HW is already out there, and the firmware makes sure that
it will override whatever you put in the GIC node. Duh. And of course,
said firmware source code is not available, despite being based
on u-boot.
The workaround is to detect the case where the CPU interface size
is set to 128kB, and verify the aliasing by checking that the ID
register for GIC400 (which is the only GIC wired this way so far)
is the same at base and base + 0xF000. In this case, we update
the GIC base address and let it roll.
And if you feel slightly sick by looking at this, rest assured that
I do too...
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Stuart Yoder <stuart.yoder@freescale.com>
Cc: Pavel Fedin <p.fedin@samsung.com>
Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1442142873-20213-2-git-send-email-marc.zyngier@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The size of the CPU interface will be used in a follow-up patch to map the
region in Xen memory.
Based on GICv2 spec, the CPU interface should at least be 8KB, although
most of the platform we are supporting use incorrectly the GICv1 size
(i.e 4KB) in their DT. Only warn and update the size to avoid any
breakage on these platforms.
Furthermore, Xen is relying on the fact that the Virtual CPU interface
is at least 8KB. As in reality the Virtual CPU interface matches the CPU
interface, check that the 2 interfaces have the same size.
For GICv3, vGICv2 is only available for guest. So we only need to check
that the GICV is at least 8KB.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- typos ]
The GICv2 DT node is usually used by the guest to know the address/size
of the regions (GICD, GICC...) to map into their virtual memory.
While the GICv2 spec requires the size of the GICC to be 8KB, we
correctly do an 8KB stage-2 mapping but erroneously report 256 in the
device tree (based on GUEST_GICC_SIZE).
I bet we didn't see any issue so far because all the registers except
GICC_DIR lives in the first 256 bytes of the GICC region and all the
guests I have seen so far are driving the GIC with GICC_CTLR.EIOmode =
0.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- fixed some typos in commit message ]
Various people say this binding doesn't compile or doesn't work. Remove
it for the benefit of xl feature development -- so that new features
won't need to worry about making this broken binding happy.
This isn't going to expose any user visible changes because that module
is not built by default.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Zhigang Wang <zhigang.x.wang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Harmandeep Kaur
Quan Xu
Olaf Hering
Julien Grall
Wei Liu
Ian Jackson
Andrew Cooper
Dario Faggioli
Jan Beulich
Ian Campbell
Shuai Ruan