Setting errno to a negative value makes no sense.
Fixes: e78e8b9bb6 ("libxl: Add interface for querying hypervisor about PCI topology")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 2419a159fb
master date: 2022-04-22 20:39:34 +0100
Setting errno to a negative error value makes no sense.
Fixes: cb99a64029 ("libxc: arm: allow passing a device tree blob to the guest")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 438e96ab47
master date: 2022-04-22 20:39:34 +0100
The claimed reason for setting errno to -1 is wrong. On x86
xc_domain_pod_target() will set errno to a sane value in the error
case.
Fixes: ff1745d588 ("tools: libxl: do not set the PoD target on ARM")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: a0fb7e0e73
master date: 2022-04-22 20:39:34 +0100
Setting errno to a negative value makes no sense.
Fixes: 6b6500b3cb ("tools/libs/evtchn: Add support for restricting a handle")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 60245b71c1
master date: 2022-04-22 20:39:34 +0100
Prevent the assembler from creating a .note.gnu.property section on
the output objects, as it's not useful for firmware related binaries,
and breaks the resulting rombios image.
This requires modifying the cc-option Makefile macro so it can test
assembler options (by replacing the usage of the -S flag with -c) and
also stripping the -Wa, prefix if present when checking for the test
output.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: e270af9428
master date: 2022-04-04 12:30:07 +0100
I've observed this failed assertion:
libxl_event.c:2057: libxl__ao_inprogress_gc: Assertion `ao' failed.
AFAICT, this is happening in qmp_proxy_spawn_outcome where
sdss->qmp_proxy_spawn.ao is NULL.
The out label of spawn_stub_launch_dm() calls qmp_proxy_spawn_outcome(),
but it is only in the success path that sdss->qmp_proxy_spawn.ao gets
set to the current ao.
qmp_proxy_spawn_outcome() should instead use sdss->dm.spawn.ao, which is
the already in-use ao when spawn_stub_launch_dm() is called. The same
is true for spawn_qmp_proxy().
With this, move sdss->qmp_proxy_spawn.ao initialization to
spawn_qmp_proxy() since its use is for libxl__spawn_spawn() and it can
be initialized along with the rest of sdss->qmp_proxy_spawn.
Fixes: 83c845033d ("libxl: use vchan for QMP access with Linux stubdomain")
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
master commit: d62a34423a
master date: 2022-04-01 17:01:57 +0100
If domain_soft_reset_cb can't rename the save file, it doesn't call
initiate_domain_create() and calls domcreate_complete().
Skipping initiate_domain_create() means dcs->console_wait is
uninitialized and all 0s.
We have:
domcreate_complete()
libxl__xswait_stop()
libxl__ev_xswatch_deregister().
The uninitialized slotnum 0 is considered valid (-1 is the invalid
sentinel), so the NULL pointer path to passed to xs_unwatch() which
segfaults.
libxl__ev_xswatch_deregister:watch w=0x12bc250 wpath=(null) token=0/0: deregister slotnum=0
Move dcs->console_xswait initialization into the callers of
initiate_domain_create, do_domain_create() and do_domain_soft_reset(),
so it is initialized along with the other dcs state.
Fixes: c57e6ebd8c ("(lib)xl: soft reset support")
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
master commit: d2ecf97f91
master date: 2022-04-01 17:01:57 +0100
commit babde47a3f "introduce a 'passthrough' configuration option to
xl.cfg..." moved the pci list parsing ahead of the global pci option
parsing. This broke the global pci configuration options since they
need to be set first so that looping over the pci devices assigns their
values.
Move the global pci options ahead of the pci list to restore their
function.
Fixes: babde47a3f ("introduce a 'passthrough' configuration option to xl.cfg...")
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
master commit: e45ad0b1b0
master date: 2022-03-31 19:48:12 +0100
The size of the video memory of PVH guests should be set to 0 in case
no value has been specified.
Doing not so will leave it to be -1, resulting in an additional 1 kB
of RAM being advertised in the memory map (here the output of a PVH
Mini-OS boot with 16 MB of RAM assigned):
Memory map:
000000000000-0000010003ff: RAM
0000feff8000-0000feffffff: Reserved
0000fc008000-0000fc00803f: ACPI
0000fc000000-0000fc000fff: ACPI
0000fc001000-0000fc007fff: ACPI
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
master commit: 0a20a53df1
master date: 2021-12-09 16:26:29 +0000
Prevent libxl from creating guests that attempts to use PoD together
with an IOMMU, even if no devices are actually assigned.
While the hypervisor could support using PoD together with an IOMMU as
long as no devices are assigned, such usage seems doubtful. There's no
guarantee the guest has PoD no longer be active, and thus a later
assignment of a PCI device to such domain could fail.
Preventing the usage of PoD together with an IOMMU at guest creation
avoids having to add checks for active PoD entries in the device
assignment paths.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
master commit: 07449ecfa4
master date: 2022-02-18 09:03:08 +0100
Some libs' Makefile aren't loading the dependencies files *.d2.
We can load them from "libs.mk" as none of the Makefile here are
changing $(DEPS) or $(DEPS_INCLUDE) so it is fine to move the
"include" to "libs.mk".
As a little improvement, don't load the dependencies files (and thus
avoid regenerating the *.d2 files) during `make clean`.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
master commit: e62cc29f9b
master date: 2022-02-08 11:15:53 +0000
By writing an empty "hotplug-status" xenstore node in the backend path
libxl can force Linux netback to wait for hotplug script execution
before proceeding to the 'connected' state.
This is required so that netback doesn't skip state 2 (InitWait) and
thus blocks libxl waiting for such state in order to launch the
hotplug script (see libxl__wait_device_connection).
Reported-by: James Dingwall <james-xen@dingwall.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Tested-by: James Dingwall <james-xen@dingwall.me.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
master commit: 0bdc43c8de
master date: 2022-01-27 13:51:19 +0100
If we are in libxl_list_vcpu() and we are returning NULL, let's avoid
touching the output parameter *nr_vcpus_out, which the caller should
have initialized to 0.
The current behavior could be problematic if are creating a domain and,
in the meantime, an existing one is destroyed when we have already done
some steps of the loop. At which point, we'd return a NULL list of vcpus
but with something different than 0 as the number of vcpus in that list.
And this can cause troubles in the callers (e.g., nr_vcpus_on_nodes()),
when they do a libxl_vcpuinfo_list_free().
Crashes due to this are rare and difficult to reproduce, but have been
observed, with stack traces looking like this one:
#0 libxl_bitmap_dispose (map=map@entry=0x50) at libxl_utils.c:626
#1 0x00007fe72c993a32 in libxl_vcpuinfo_dispose (p=p@entry=0x38) at _libxl_types.c:692
#2 0x00007fe72c94e3c4 in libxl_vcpuinfo_list_free (list=0x0, nr=<optimized out>) at libxl_utils.c:1059
#3 0x00007fe72c9528bf in nr_vcpus_on_nodes (vcpus_on_node=0x7fe71000eb60, suitable_cpumap=0x7fe721df0d38, tinfo_elements=48, tinfo=0x7fe7101b3900, gc=0x7fe7101bbfa0) at libxl_numa.c:258
#4 libxl__get_numa_candidate (gc=gc@entry=0x7fe7100033a0, min_free_memkb=4233216, min_cpus=4, min_nodes=min_nodes@entry=0, max_nodes=max_nodes@entry=0, suitable_cpumap=suitable_cpumap@entry=0x7fe721df0d38, numa_cmpf=0x7fe72c940110 <numa_cmpf>, cndt_out=0x7fe721df0cf0, cndt_found=0x7fe721df0cb4) at libxl_numa.c:394
#5 0x00007fe72c94152b in numa_place_domain (d_config=0x7fe721df11b0, domid=975, gc=0x7fe7100033a0) at libxl_dom.c:209
#6 libxl__build_pre (gc=gc@entry=0x7fe7100033a0, domid=domid@entry=975, d_config=d_config@entry=0x7fe721df11b0, state=state@entry=0x7fe710077700) at libxl_dom.c:436
#7 0x00007fe72c92c4a5 in libxl__domain_build (gc=0x7fe7100033a0, d_config=d_config@entry=0x7fe721df11b0, domid=975, state=0x7fe710077700) at libxl_create.c:444
#8 0x00007fe72c92de8b in domcreate_bootloader_done (egc=0x7fe721df0f60, bl=0x7fe7100778c0, rc=<optimized out>) at libxl_create.c:1222
#9 0x00007fe72c980425 in libxl__bootloader_run (egc=egc@entry=0x7fe721df0f60, bl=bl@entry=0x7fe7100778c0) at libxl_bootloader.c:403
#10 0x00007fe72c92f281 in initiate_domain_create (egc=egc@entry=0x7fe721df0f60, dcs=dcs@entry=0x7fe7100771b0) at libxl_create.c:1159
#11 0x00007fe72c92f456 in do_domain_create (ctx=ctx@entry=0x7fe71001c840, d_config=d_config@entry=0x7fe721df11b0, domid=domid@entry=0x7fe721df10a8, restore_fd=restore_fd@entry=-1, send_back_fd=send_back_fd@entry=-1, params=params@entry=0x0, ao_how=0x0, aop_console_how=0x7fe721df10f0) at libxl_create.c:1856
#12 0x00007fe72c92f776 in libxl_domain_create_new (ctx=0x7fe71001c840, d_config=d_config@entry=0x7fe721df11b0, domid=domid@entry=0x7fe721df10a8, ao_how=ao_how@entry=0x0, aop_console_how=aop_console_how@entry=0x7fe721df10f0) at libxl_create.c:2075
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Tested-by: James Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
master commit: d9d3496e81
master date: 2022-01-31 10:58:07 +0100
The Feb 2022 microcode from Intel retrofits AMD's MSR_SPEC_CTRL.PSFD interface
to Sunny Cove (IceLake) and later cores.
Update the MSR_SPEC_CTRL emulation, and expose it to guests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 52ce1c9784)
While in principle it would be nice to keep leaf 7 in order, that would
involve having an extra 5 words of zeros in a featureset.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit f3709b15fc)
This MSR needs to be identical across the system for TSX to have identical
behaviour everywhere. Furthermore, its CPUID bit (SRBDS_CTRL) shouldn't be
visible to guests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4b45c4faa8)
It was Xen 4.14 where CPUID data was added to the migration stream, and 4.13
that we need to worry about with regards to compatibility. Xen 4.12 isn't
relevant.
Expand and correct the commentary.
Fixes: 111c8c33a8 ("x86/cpuid: do not expand max leaves on restore")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 820cc39343)
commit 0fdb48ffe7 "libxl: Make sure devices added by pci-attach are
reflected in the config" broken PCI hotplug (xl pci-attach) for PV
domains when it moved libxl__create_pci_backend() later in the function.
This also broke HVM + stubdom PCI passthrough coldplug. For that, the
PCI devices are hotplugged to a running PV stubdom, and then the QEMU
QMP device_add commands are made to QEMU inside the stubdom.
A running PV domain calls libxl__wait_for_backend(). With the current
placement of libxl__create_pci_backend(), the path does not exist and
the call immediately fails:
libxl: error: libxl_device.c:1388:libxl__wait_for_backend: Backend /local/domain/0/backend/pci/43/0 does not exist
libxl: error: libxl_pci.c:1764:device_pci_add_done: Domain 42:libxl__device_pci_add failed for PCI device 0:2:0.0 (rc -3)
libxl: error: libxl_create.c:1857:domcreate_attach_devices: Domain 42:unable to add pci devices
The wait is only relevant when:
1) The domain is PV
2) The domain is running
3) The backend is already present
This is because:
1) xen-pcifront is only used for PV. It does not load for HVM domains
where QEMU is used.
2) If the domain is not running (starting), then the frontend state will
be Initialising. xen-pciback waits for the frontend to transition to
at Initialised before attempting to connect. So a wait for a
non-running domain is not applicable as the backend will not
transition to Connected.
3) For presence, num_devs is already used to determine if the backend
needs to be created. Re-use num_devs to determine if the backend
wait is necessary. The wait is necessary to avoid racing with
another PCI attachment reconfiguring the front/back or changing to
some other state like closing. If we are creating the backend, then
we don't have to worry about the state since it is being created.
Fixes: 0fdb48ffe7 ("libxl: Make sure devices added by pci-attach are
reflected in the config")
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
master commit: 73ee2795aa
master date: 2022-01-13 14:33:16 +0100
TSXLDTRK lives in CPUID leaf 7[0].edx, not 7[0].ecx.
Bit 16 in ecx is LA57.
Fixes: a6d1b55847 ("x86emul: support X{SUS,RES}LDTRK")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 249e0f1d8f
master date: 2021-12-14 12:30:48 +0000
This reverts commit c22bd567ce.
While its description is correct from an abstract or real hardware pov,
the range is special inside HVM guests. The range being UC in particular
gets in the way of OVMF, which places itself at [FFE00000,FFFFFFFF].
While this is benign to epte_get_entry_emt() as long as the IOMMU isn't
enabled for a guest, it becomes a very noticable problem otherwise: It
takes about half a minute for OVMF to decompress itself into its
designated address range.
And even beyond OVMF there's no reason to have e.g. the ACPI memory
range marked UC.
Fixes: c22bd567ce ("hvmloader: PA range 0xfc000000-0xffffffff should be UC")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ea187c0b7a
master date: 2021-12-17 08:56:15 +0100
OSSTest has identified a 3rd regression caused by this change. Migration
between Xen 4.15 and 4.16 on the nocera pair of machines (AMD Opteron 4133)
fails with:
xc: error: Failed to set CPUID policy: leaf 00000000, subleaf ffffffff, msr ffffffff (22 = Invalid argument): Internal error
xc: error: Restore failed (22 = Invalid argument): Internal error
which is a safety check to prevent resuming the guest when the CPUID data has
been truncated. The problem is caused by shrinking of the max policies, which
is an ABI that needs handling compatibly between different versions of Xen.
Furthermore, shrinking of the default policies also breaks things in some
cases, because certain cpuid= settings in a VM config file which used to have
an effect will now be silently discarded.
This reverts commit 540d911c28, as well as the
partial fix attempt in 81da2b544c (which added
one new case where cpuid= settings might not apply correctly) and restores the
same behaviour as Xen 4.15.
Fixes: 540d911c28 ("x86/CPUID: shrink max_{,sub}leaf fields according to actual leaf contents")
Fixes: 81da2b544c ("x86/cpuid: prevent shrinking migrated policies max leaves")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release_Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Such max version should be provided by the caller, otherwise the
bindings will default to specifying a max version of 2, which is
inline with the current defaults in the hypervisor.
Fixes: 7379f9e10a ('gnttab: allow setting max version per-domain')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Set the grant table version for the created domains to use version 1,
as such tests domains don't require the usage of the grant table at
all. A TODO note is added to switch those dummy domains to not have a
grant table at all when possible. Without setting the grant version
the domains for the tests cannot be created.
Fixes: 7379f9e10a ('gnttab: allow setting max version per-domain')
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Set the grant table version for the created domains to use version 1,
as that's the used by the test cases. Without setting the grant
version the domains for the tests cannot be created.
Fixes: 7379f9e10a ('gnttab: allow setting max version per-domain')
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Such macro just clamps the passed version to fit in the designated
bits of the domctl field. The main purpose is to make it clearer in
the code when max grant version is being set in the grant_opts field.
Existing users that where setting the version in the grant_opts field
are switched to use the macro.
No functional change intended.
Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Previously, we checked that we could map 40 pages with nothing
complaining. Now we're adding extra logic to check that those 40
frames are "correct".
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jane Malalane <jane.malalane@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CPUID policies from guest being migrated shouldn't have the maximum
leaves shrink, as that would be a guest visible change. The hypervisor
has no knowledge on whether a guest has been migrated or is build from
scratch, and hence it must not blindly shrink the CPUID policy in
recalculate_cpuid_policy. Remove the
x86_cpuid_policy_shrink_max_leaves call from recalculate_cpuid_policy.
Removing such call could be seen as a partial revert of 540d911c28.
Instead let the toolstack shrink the policies for newly created
guests, while keeping the previous values for guests that are migrated
in. Note that guests migrated in without a CPUID policy won't get any
kind of shrinking applied.
Fixes: 540d911c28 ('x86/CPUID: shrink max_{,sub}leaf fields according to actual leaf contents')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
iPXE is only used by QEMU traditional, so make it off by default
unless QEMU traditional is enabled.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Fixes: bcf77ce510 ('configure: modify default of building rombios')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Introduce a new domain create field so that toolstack can specify the
maximum grant table version usable by the domain. This is plumbed into
xl and settable by the user as max_grant_version.
Previously this was only settable on a per host basis using the
gnttab command line option.
Note the version is specified using 4 bits, which leaves room to
specify up to grant table version 15. Given that we only have 2 grant
table versions right now, and a new version is unlikely in the near
future using 4 bits seems more than enough.
xenstored stubdomains are limited to grant table v1 because the
current MiniOS code used to build them only has support for grants v1.
There are existing limits set for xenstored stubdomains at creation
time that already match the defaults in MiniOS.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
In order to let the toolstack be able to set the gnttab version on a
per-domain basis, it needs to know which ABIs Xen supports. Introduce
XEN_SYSCTL_PHYSCAP_gnttab_v{1,2} for the purpose, and plumb in down into
userspace.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Releae-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Using qemu-traditional as device model is deprecated for some time now.
So change the default for building it to "disable". This will affect
ioemu-stubdom, too, as there is a direct dependency between the two.
Today it is possible to use a PVH/HVM Linux-based stubdom as device
model. Additionally using ioemu-stubdom isn't really helping for
security, as it requires to run a very old and potentially buggy qemu
version in a PV domain. This is adding probably more security problems
than it is removing by using a stubdom.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Release-acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
The tools/configure script will default to build rombios if qemu
traditional is enabled. If rombios is being built, ipxe will be built
per default, too.
This results in rombios and ipxe no longer being built by default when
disabling qemu traditional.
Fix that be rearranging the dependencies:
- build ipxe by default
- build rombios by default if either ipxe or qemu traditional are
being built
This modification prepares not building qemu traditional by default
without affecting build of rombios and ipxe.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Release-acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Commit 1787cc1679 ("libs/guest: Move the guest ABI check earlier
into xc_dom_parse_image()") broke starting the xenstore stubdom. This
is due to a rather special way the xenstore stubdom domain config is
being initialized: in order to support both, PV and PVH stubdom,
init-xenstore-domain is using xc_dom_parse_image() to find the correct
domain type. Unfortunately above commit requires xc_dom_boot_xen_init()
to have been called before using xc_dom_parse_image(). This requires
the domid, which is known only after xc_domain_create(), which requires
the domain type.
In order to break this circular dependency, call xc_dom_boot_xen_init()
with an arbitrary domid first, and then set dom->guest_domid later.
Fixes: 1787cc1679 ("libs/guest: Move the guest ABI check earlier into xc_dom_parse_image()")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Using qemu-traditional as device model is deprecated for some time now.
So change the default for building it to "disable". This will affect
ioemu-stubdom, too, as there is a direct dependency between the two.
Today it is possible to use a PVH/HVM Linux-based stubdom as device
model. Additionally using ioemu-stubdom isn't really helping for
security, as it requires to run a very old and potentially buggy qemu
version in a PV domain. This is adding probably more security problems
than it is removing by using a stubdom.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Commit 939775cfd3 "handle dying domains in live update" was meant to
handle gracefully dying domain. However, the @releaseDomain watch
will end up to be sent as soon as we finished to restore Xenstored
state.
This may be before Xen reports the domain to be dying (such as if
the guest decided to revoke access to the xenstore page). Consequently
daemon like xenconsoled will not clean-up the domain and it will be
left as a zombie.
To avoid the problem, mark the connection as ignored. This also
requires to tweak conn_can_write() and conn_can_read() to prevent
dereferencing a NULL pointer (the interface will not mapped).
The check conn->is_ignored was originally added after the callbacks
because the helpers for a socket connection may close the fd. However,
ignore_connection() will close a socket connection directly. So it is
fine to do the re-order.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
Commit f282182af3 ("tools/xenstore: set oom score for xenstore
daemon on Linux") introduced a regression when not setting the oom
value in the xencommons file. Fix that.
Fixes: f282182af3 ("tools/xenstore: set oom score for xenstore daemon on Linux")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Xenstored is absolutely mandatory for a Xen host and it can't be
restarted, so being killed by OOM-killer in case of memory shortage is
to be avoided.
Set /proc/$pid/oom_score_adj (if available) per default to -500 (this
translates to 50% of dom0 memory size) in order to allow xenstored to
use large amounts of memory without being killed.
The percentage of dom0 memory above which the oom killer is allowed to
kill xenstored can be set via XENSTORED_OOM_MEM_THRESHOLD in
xencommons.
Make sure the pid file isn't a left-over from a previous run delete it
before starting xenstored.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
libxl will create an emulated PCI device tree node in the device tree to
enable the guest OS to discover the virtual PCI during guest boot.
Emulated PCI device tree node will only be created when there is any
device assigned to guest.
A new area has been reserved in the arm guest physical map at
which the VPCI bus is declared in the device tree (reg and ranges
parameters of the node).
Note that currently we are using num_pcidevs instead of
c_info->passthrough to decide whether to create a vPCI DT node.
This will be insufficient if and when ARM does PCI hotplug.
Add this note inside libxl_create.c where c_info->passthrough
is set.
Signed-off-by: Rahul Singh <rahul.singh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
... to take a second argument of type libxl_domain_config*
rather than libxl_domain_build_info*.
This change will be needed to get access from
libxl__prepare_dtb to "num_pcidevs" field of
libxl_domain_config to check whether to create
a vPCI DT node or not.
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Suggested-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
... to take a second argument of type libxl_domain_config*
rather than libxl_domain_build_info*.
We need to pass the whole libxl_domain_config
structure as this will be needed later on to modify
the libxl__prepare_dtb function to also take
libxl_domain_config.
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Suggested-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
The extended region (safe range) is a region of guest physical
address space which is unused and could be safely used to create
grant/foreign mappings instead of wasting real RAM pages from
the domain memory for establishing these mappings.
The extended regions are chosen at the domain creation time and
advertised to it via "reg" property under hypervisor node in
the guest device-tree. As region 0 is reserved for grant table
space (always present), the indexes for extended regions are 1...N.
If extended regions could not be allocated for some reason,
Xen doesn't fail and behaves as usual, so only inserts region 0.
Please note the following limitations:
- The extended region feature is only supported for 64-bit domain
currently.
- The ACPI case is not covered.
***
The algorithm to choose extended regions for non-direct mapped
DomU is simpler in comparison with the algorithm for direct mapped
Dom0. We usually have a lot of unused space above 4GB, and might
have some unused space below 4GB (depends on guest memory size).
Try to allocate separate 2MB-aligned extended regions from the first
(below 4GB) and second (above 4GB) RAM banks taking into the account
the maximum supported guest physical address space size and the amount
of memory assigned to the guest. The minimum size of extended region
the same as for Dom0 (64MB).
Please note, we introduce fdt_property_reg_placeholder helper which
purpose is to create N ranges that are zeroed. The interesting fact
is that libfdt already has fdt_property_placeholder(). But this was
introduced only in 2017, so there is a risk that some distros may not
ship the last libfdt version. This is why we implement our own light
variant for now.
Suggested-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
We need to pass info about maximum supported guest physical
address space size to the toolstack on Arm in order to properly
calculate the base and size of the extended region (safe range)
for the guest. The extended region is unused address space which
could be safely used by domain for foreign/grant mappings on Arm.
The extended region itself will be handled by the subsequent
patch.
Currently the same guest physical address space size is used
for all guests (p2m_ipa_bits variable on Arm, the x86 equivalent
is hap_paddr_bits).
Add an explicit padding after "gpaddr_bits" field and also
(while at it) after "domain" field.
Also make sure that full structure is cleared in all cases by
moving the clearing into getdomaininfo(). Currently it is only
cleared by the sysctl caller (and only once).
Please note, we do not need to bump XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION
as a bump has already occurred in this release cycle. But we do
need to bump XEN_SYSCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION as the structure is
re-used in a sysctl.
Suggested-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
[hypervisor parts]
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This reverts commit 2075b410ee.
During the discussion [1] that took place after
the patch was merged it was agreed that it should
be reverted to avoid introducing a bad interface.
Furthermore, the patch rejected usage of flag
XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_vpci for x86 which is not true
as it should be set for dom0 PVH.
Due to XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_vpmu being introduced after
XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_vpci, modify its bit position
from 8 to 7.
[1] https://marc.info/?t=163354215300039&r=1&w=2
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@arm.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com<mailto:christian.lindig@citrix.com>>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Add parameter vpmu to xl domain configuration syntax
to enable the access to PMU registers by disabling
the PMU traps(currently only for ARM).
The current status is that the PMU registers are not
virtualized and the physical registers are directly
accessible when this parameter is enabled. There is no
interrupt support and Xen will not save/restore the
register values on context switches.
According to Arm Arm, section D7.1:
"The Performance Monitors Extension is common
to AArch64 operation and AArch32 operation."
That means we have an ensurance that if PMU is
present in one exception state, it must also be
present in the other.
Please note that this feature is experimental.
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Juergen Gross
Roger Pau Monné
Jason Andryuk
Anthony PERARD
Dario Faggioli
Andrew Cooper
Jan Beulich
Ian Jackson
Jane Malalane
Julien Grall
Rahul Singh
Michal Orzel
Oleksandr Tyshchenko