- This patch fixes a small casting bug in xm. The value of domid was
not returned as an int, causing commands like 'xm vncviewer domid'
to fail.
Signed-off-by: George Coker <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil>
There is an python indentation issue keeping the full range of syntax
for the cpuid config file parameter from working correctly. This
patch fixes that. It also fixes some misspelling and a missing 'x' in
two of the example config files (must have 32 bits represented for
cpuid registers).
Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@novell.com>
This small patch fixes an issue leading to a crash (segfault, although
with earlier changesets I was seeing sigbus - not sure what changed)
in qemu-dm when the following conditions occur:
1. A valid mapping for a bucket on a low address exists
2. Immediately after accessing memory mapped in this bucket, an access
occurs to a high (beyond assigned ram) address beyond the 1GB limit
for 32bit map cache wrapping around to the previous bucket's entry
number.
3. The next call to map cache again accesses the low address.
In this scenario, the guest mem for the low bucket has been unmapped
by the remap_bucket caused by 2., but because the valid_mapping
bit-test fails, map_cache returns before last_address_index has been
updated. The subsequent call to map_cache therefore never remaps the
low, valid bucket and instead returns a vaddr pointing to memory that
has failed to get mapped.
Signed-off-by: Trolle Selander <trolle.selander@eu.citrix.com>
- fix ioemu segv with old firmware
Without notifying ioemu of address, ioemu will segv.
- fix qemu-dm segv with malicous firmware
If notifying ioemu more than once, ioemu will segv.
Usually such cases don't happen, but malicious guest can
do it intentionally.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <yamahata@valinux.co.jp>
I've noticed that the suspend event channel becomes pending as soon as
it is bound. I'm not sure why or whether this is intentional, but it
means that the suspend function will return before the domain has
completed suspending unless the first notification is cleared. Without
this patch, xc_domain_save may find that the guest has not suspended
and sleep in 10ms chunks until it does. Typically this is several
milliseconds of wasted time.
From: Brendan Cully <brendan@cs.ubc.ca>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
Current code does not set dev->msix->table_off variable.
The offset of MSI-X memory mapped table is treated as 0.
The wrong region is unmapped from guest physical memory space.
As a result, guest device driver can't access memory mapped resource.
Signed-off-by: Yuji Shimada <shimada-yxb@necst.nec.co.jp>
- The patch includes a policy for xen that can be booted into
enforcing mode and supports creation and management of
paravirtualized guests. The policy follows the dom0/domU usage
model, extension to other models or the addition of management or IO
permissions should be much more straightforward now. The option
flask_enforcing=1 can be passed on the xen line in grub to boot
into enforcing mode.
- The policy provides a basic policy for booting the platform and
creating a domU with the label system_u:object_r:domU_t. The policy
can be easily extended to support new types by modifying the xen.te
source file.
- The policy includes some basic macros which may be helpful in
extending the policy.
- The policy is compatible with and requires the most recent XSM
patch, xsm-flask-io-sysctl-hooks-090308.diff.
- The policy is not built as part of the make all as it requires the
SELinux policy compiler which may/may not be installed on all
systems. Users must go into the tools/flask/policy directory and
explicitly compile the policy.
Signed-off-by: George Coker <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil>
- The patch does away with the autogenerated xsm.py file and
introduces a config parameter in xend-config.sxp to determine the
security module. The parameter is (xsm_module_name {acm, dummy,
flask}). The default setting/option is dummy. .hgignore is also
updated to stop ignoring xsm.py on commits.
- The patch has created an xsconstant for XS_POLICY_FLASK and updated
the toolchain to check the instance of XS_POLICY_USE. XS_POLICY_USE
evalauates to XS_POLICY_FLASK or XS_POLICY_ACM or XS_POLICY_DUMMY
depending on configuration.
- Flask relies on the current value of ssidref returned by dominfo to
ensure that the label to sid mapping is consistent. ssidref had
been pop'ed from the dominfo object. The patch addresses this
issue.
- Flask python module style cleanups.
Signed-off-by: George Coker <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil>
This patch moves the call to XendDevices.destroy_device_state() to the
function _remove_domain. Previously only Xen-API calls were calling
the destroy_device_state() function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com>
For HVM guest, we can't do pci-attach/pci-detach for >64 times due to
the meaningless checking in pci_register_device(). I made a test of
300 times of attach/detach and everything now works well.
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <dexuan.cui@intel.com>
Apparently 64MB is too short for the domain builder.
No kernel option should be passed, as they are provided by menu.lst,
and would only confuse grub.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@eu.citrix.com>
When domains are destroyed, _prepare_phantom_paths() method
and _cleanup_phantom_devs() method are called twice as follows.
destroy()@XendDomainInfo.py
_prepare_phantom_paths() --------------- 1
_cleanupVm()
destroyDomain()
_prepare_phantom_paths() ----------- 2
xc.domain_destroy_hook()
xc.domain_pause()
do_FLR()
xc.domain_destroy()
XendDomain.remove_domain()
cleanupDomain()
_cleanup_phantom_devs() ------------ 1
_cleanup_phantom_devs() ---------------- 2
XendDomain.domain_delete_by_dominfo()
This is a cleanup patch. It combines destroyDomain() method
into destroy() method, then _prepare_phantom_paths() method and
_cleanup_phantom_devs() method are called only once.
Signed-off-by: Masaki Kanno <kanno.masaki@jp.fujitsu.com>
gcc expects libraries needed for object files to be specified after
the object. Linking usually does not fail, unless it is optimized (for
instance, using -Wl,-as-needed).
The related Gentoo bug is 135145 [ https://bugs.gentoo.org/135145 ].
From: Robert Buchholz <rbu@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
since our seek times are virtually 0. Although this flag is
deprecated by newer ATA standards, Linux at least checks it for CD
drives, and would timeout in some cases if we do not set it.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@eu.citrix.com>
When creating an HVM domain, if e.g. another domain is created before
qemu allocates video memory, the extra 8MB memory ballooning is not
available any more, because it got consumed by the other domain.
This fixes it by taking video memory from the main memory:
- make hvmloader use e820_malloc to reserve some of the main memory
and notify ioemu of its address through the Xen platform PCI card.
- add XENMAPSPACE_mfn to the xen_add_to_physmap memory op, to allow
ioemu to move the MFNs between the original position and the PCI
mapping, when LFB acceleration is disabled/enabled
- add a remove_from_physmap memory op, to allow ioemu to unmap it
completely for the case of old guests with acceleration disabled.
- add xc_domain_memory_translate_gpfn_list to libxc to allow ioemu to
get the MFNs of the video memory.
- have xend save the PCI memory space instead of ioemu: if a memory
page is there, the guest can access it like usual memory, so xend
can safely be responsible to save it. The extra benefit is that
live migration will apply the logdirty optimization there too.
- handle old saved images, populating the video memory from ioemu if
really needed.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@eu.citrix.com>
To avoid flickers, PyGRUB has to avoid spurious ncurses refresh as
much as possible, in particular before the complete screen is drawn,
and eventually call doupdate last.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@eu.citrix.com>
When we "xm destroy" a guest with assigned devices, in
xen/common/domain.c:domain_kill(), we relinquish guest's memory first,
then invoke domain_destroy() -> complete_domain_destroy() ->
arch_domain_destroy() -> pci_release_devices()/iommu_domain_destroy().
Between relinquish_memory() and domain_destroy(), a device may be
issuing DMA request and access guest's relinquished memory.
We can do_FLR() to quiesce devices before xc.domain_destroy().
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <dexuan.cui@intel.com>
pass for the HVM guest to successfully boot.
Currently only one test (REP INS across page boundaries) but more will
be added in future.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
VT-d hot-plug is done in such a way: 1) xend sends 'pci-ins' command
to ioemu via xenstore; 2) ioemu creates pass-through device and raises
SCI to guest OS; guest OS loads device driver, and device driver
initializes the hot-plugged device; 3) xend does FLR. There is a race
condition about 2) and 3). If 3) runs slow, we have troubles. Thanks
for Yuji Shimada's locating the issues.
We can work around the issues by not doing FLR when we create domain
or hotplug device into guest, namely, we only do FLR when we destroy
domain or hotplug device from guest.
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <dexuan.cui@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
This fixes a crash when restoring guests with certain memory sizes (eg
223MB). The ROUNDUP in the call to memcpy, was the main offender, but
I didn't care for the inplace resizing of the p2m entries either.
Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@novell.com>
Attached patch allows to pass arguments to xenconsoled
via XENCONSOLED_TRACE env. variable analogous to xenstored.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Egger <Christoph.Egger@amd.com>
Keir Fraser