Specifically:
s/\.xsplice/\.livepatch/
s/XSPLICE/LIVEPATCH/
s/xsplice/livepatch/
s/livepatch_patch_func/livepatch_func/
s/xSplice/Xen Live Patch/
s/livepatching/livepatch/
s/arch_livepatch_enter/arch_livepatch_quiesce/
s/arch_livepatch_exit/arch_livepatch_revive/
And then modify some of the function arguments
to have two more characters.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
If the hypervisor was built with build-ids we can expose the
build-id value to the toolstack (if it is not built with
it will just return -ENODATA). This is a priviligied operation
so only the controlling stack is able to request this.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The implementation does not actually do any patching.
It just adds the framework for doing the hypercalls,
keeping track of ELF payloads, and the basic operations:
- query which payloads exist,
- query for specific payloads,
- check*1, apply*1, replace*1, and unload payloads.
*1: Which of course in this patch are nops.
The functionality is disabled on ARM until all arch
components are implemented.
Also by default it is disabled until the implementation
is in place.
We also use recursive spinlocks to so that the find_payload
function does not need to have a 'lock' and 'non-lock' variant.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This reverts commit 2716d87537.
As it was decided that the existing XENVER hypercall - while having
grown organically over the years can still be expanded.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Requested-and-acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
A toolstack needs to know how much control Xen has over the visible cpuid
values in PV guests. Provide an explicit mechanism to query what Xen is
capable of.
This interface will currently report no capabilities. This change is
scaffolding for future patches, which will introduce detection and switching
logic, after which the interface will report hardware capabilities correctly.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
This hypercall mirrors the XENVER_ in that it has similar functionality.
However it is designed differently:
- No compat layer. The data structures are the same size on 32
as on 64-bit.
- The hypercall accepts three arguments - the command, pointer to
an buffer, and the length of the buffer.
- Each sub-ops can be "probed" for size by returning the size of
buffer that will be needed - if the buffer is NULL.
- Subops can complete even if the buffer is too small - truncated
data will be filled and hypercall will return -ENOBUFS.
- VERSION_commandline, VERSION_changeset are privileged.
- There is no XENVER_compile_info equivalent.
- The hypercall can return -EPERM and toolstack/OSes are expected
to deal with. However there are three subops: XEN_VERSION_version,
XEN_VERSION_platform_parameters and XEN_VERSION_get_features
that will always return an value as guests cannot survive without them.
While we combine some of the common code between XENVER_ and VERSION_
take the liberty of moving pae_extended_cr3 in x86 area.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> [XSM bits]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Most of XENVER_* have now an XSM check for their sub-ops.
The subop for XENVER_commandline is now a priviliged operation.
To not break guests we still return an string - but it is
just '<denied>\0'.
The XENVER_[version|platform_parameters|get_features] - will
always return an value to the guest.
The rest: XENVER_[extraversion|capabilities|page_size|
guest_handle|changeset| compile_info] behave as before -
allowed by default for all guests if using the XSM default
policy or with the dummy one. And if the system admin
wants to curtail access to some of them - they can do
that now with a non-default XSM policy.
Also we add a local variable block.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
v2: Do XSM check for all the XENVER_ ops.
- Add empty data conditions.
- Return <denied> for priv subops.
- Move extraversion from priv to normal. Drop the XSM check
for the non-priv subops.
v3:
- Add +1 for strlen(xen_deny()) to include NULL. Move changeset,
compile_info to non-priv subops.
- Remove the \0 on xen_deny()
- Add new XSM domain for xenver hypercall. Add all subops to it.
- Remove the extra line, Add Ack from Daniel
v4:
- Rename the XSM from xen_version_op to xsm_xen_version.
Prefix the types with 'xen' to distinguish it from another
hypercall performing similar operation. Removed Ack from Daniel
as it was so large. Add local variable block.
v5:
- Make XENVER_platform_parameters,get_features,version be excluded
from the XSM check per Jans' review. Add BUILD_BUG_CHECK and fix
odd line removals. Remove stray changes and fix spelling.
Allows:
(XEN) avc: denied { pcilevel } for domid=2 target=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:dm_dom_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t_target tclass=hvm
Which otherwise leads to the following on resume after migrate (comparing
non-XSM to XSM):
ata2.00: configured for MWDMA2
usb 1-2: reset full-speed USB device number 2 using uhci_hcd
+PM: restore of devices complete after 3779.268 msecs
usb 1-2: USB disconnect, device number 2
-PM: restore of devices complete after 2342.528 msecs
usb 1-2: new full-speed USB device number 3 using uhci_hcd
usb 1-2: New USB device found, idVendor=0627, idProduct=0001
usb 1-2: New USB device strings: Mfr=3, Product=2, SerialNumber=1
usb 1-2: Product: QEMU USB Tablet
usb 1-2: Manufacturer: QEMU 0.10.2
usb 1-2: SerialNumber: 1
input: QEMU 0.10.2 QEMU USB Tablet as /devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:01.2/usb1/1-2/1-2:1.0/input/input8
generic-usb 0003:0627:0001.0002: input,hidraw0: USB HID v0.01 Pointer [QEMU 0.10.2 QEMU USB Tablet] on usb-0000:00:01.2-2/input0
Restarting tasks ... done.
Setting capacity to 20480000
Setting capacity to 20480000
+uhci_hcd 0000:00:01.2: Unlink after no-IRQ? Controller is probably using the wrong IRQ.
And a glitch in the domU which is sufficient to disrupt the post migration
checks done by osstest.
This has been through a test run on merlot1 and resolved the migration
issues with the test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm
osstest test case.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
It looks to be missing in the policy file for the initial
domain. Eventually we may want to extend this access to
non-dom0 domains but for now it certainly dom0-only.
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Add new soft_reset vector to domain2 class, add it to create_domain
in the default policy.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add runtime interface for setting PMU mode and flags. Three main modes are
provided:
* XENPMU_MODE_OFF: PMU is not virtualized
* XENPMU_MODE_SELF: Guests can access PMU MSRs and receive PMU interrupts.
* XENPMU_MODE_HV: Same as XENPMU_MODE_SELF for non-proviledged guests, dom0
can profile itself and the hypervisor.
Note that PMU modes are different from what can be provided at Xen's boot line
with 'vpmu' argument. An 'off' (or '0') value is equivalent to XENPMU_MODE_OFF.
Any other value, on the other hand, will cause VPMU mode to be set to
XENPMU_MODE_SELF during boot.
For feature flags only Intel's BTS is currently supported.
Mode and flags are set via HYPERVISOR_xenpmu_op hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Add xsm policies for Cache Allocation Technology(CAT) related hypercalls
to restrict the functions visibility to control domain only.
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Migration and HVM domain creation both trigger AVC denials that should
be allowed in the default policy; add these rules.
Guest console writes need to be either allowed or denied without audit
depending on the decision of the local administrator; introduce a policy
boolean to switch between these possibilities.
Reported-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Add default security contexts to the XSM policy for use by the toolstack
when a domain is created without specifying an explicit security label.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
On ARM the virtual GIC may differ between each guest (emulated GIC version,
number of SPIs...). This information is already known at the domain creation
and can never change.
For now only the gic_version is set. In the long run, there will be more
parameters such as the number of SPIs. All will be required to be set at the
same time.
A new arch-specific structure arch_domainconfig has been created, the x86
one doesn't have any specific configuration, for now, a dummy structure
(C-spec compliant) has been created.
Some external tools (qemu, xenstore) may be required to create a domain.
Rather than asking them to take care of the arch-specific domain
configuration, let the current function (xc_domain_create) chose a
default configuration and introduce a new one (xc_domain_create_config).
This patch also drops the previously introduced DOMCTL arm_configure_domain
in Xen 4.5, as it has been made useless.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
The definitions of static device labels must be placed at the end of the
policy.conf before passing it to checkpolicy; the existing examples
(which are commented out) are in the wrong location. Create a new file
for device contexts which will place them in the proper location.
This also removes some directions about using the xen policy type in
checkpolicy which is no longer needed.
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This adds support in the hypervisor and policy build toolchain for
Xen/Flask policy version 30, which adds the ability to label ARM device
tree nodes and expands the IOMEM ocontext entries to 64 bits.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The original rule to target "distclean" in tools/Rules.mk was in effect
"make clean". It should be "make distclean".
However not all Makefiles in subdirectories have distclean target
defined. So this patch also adds a bunch of distclean targets to various
Makefiles. They only depend on clean target and don't have any actions
in most cases.
With the patch applied, following command outputs 0 results:
find tools -name 'Makefile*' -exec grep -L 'distclean' {} \+ \
| grep -v ocaml | grep -v libfsimage
Ocaml and libfsimage are known to have distclean defined in a dedicated
rules file.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The vGIC will emulate the same version as the hardware. The toolstack has
to retrieve the version of the vGIC in order to be able to create the
corresponding device tree node.
A new DOMCTL has been introduced for ARM to configure the domain. For now
it only allow the toolstack to retrieve the version of vGIC.
This DOMCTL will be extend later to let the user choose the version of the
emulated GIC.
Signed-off-by: Vijaya Kumar K <Vijaya.Kumar@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Define xsm_get_vnumainfo hypercall used for domain which
wish to receive vnuma topology. Add xsm hook for
XEN_DOMCTL_setvnumainfo. Also adds basic policies.
Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <ufimtseva@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
CFLAGS+=-Wall is already provided by Config.mk
WARN_FLAGS is not used.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Patch generated by the following semantic patch
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/):
@@
expression *P;
@@
- if(P) free(P);
+ free(P);
...and then by filtering through the following command:
filterdiff -p1 -x 'stubdom/*' -x 'tools/firmware/*' -x 'tools/qemu-*' -x 'tools/blktap*'
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Add XEN_DOMCTL_set_max_evtchn which may be used during domain creation to
set the maximum event channel port a domain may use. This may be used to
limit the amount of Xen resources (global mapping space and xenheap) that
a domain may use for event channels.
A domain that does not have a limit set may use all the event channels
supported by the event channel ABI in use.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
30.07.2013 13:51, Ian Campbell wrote:
> I think it would be a bit less surprising for drive by patchers etc to
> remove the DESTDIR from POLICY_LOADPATH and add it to the install
> target, which is the usual way to do things. Up to you/Vadim though.
Signed-off-by: Vadim A. Misbakh-Soloviov <mva@mva.name>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
This fixes framebuffer support for device model stubdoms after 3f28d007
which added the target_hack permission but did not allow the permission
to the stubdom it was created for.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Adds XSM hooks for the recently introduced XENMEM_claim_pages and
XENMEM_get_outstanding_pages operations, and adds FLASK access vectors
for them. This makes the access control decisions for these operations
match those in the rest of the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> (for 4.3 release)
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This adds an XSM hook for enabling nested HVM support, replacing an
IS_PRIV check. This hook is a partial duplicate with the xsm_hvm_param
hook, but using the existing hook would require adding the index to the
hook and would require the use of a custom hook for the xsm-disabled
case (using XSM_OTHER, which is less immediately readable) - whereas
adding a new hook retains the clarity of the existing code.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> (release perspective)
Make it possible to pass the node-affinity of a domain to the hypervisor
from the upper layers, instead of always being computed automatically.
Note that this also required generalizing the Flask hooks for setting
and getting the affinity, so that they now deal with both vcpu and
node affinity.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This patch enables the compilation of the FLASK policy as part of the
tools build if the needed prerequisites are present.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
This adds the ability to define security classes and access vectors in
FLASK policy not defined by the hypervisor, for the use of stub domains
or applications without their own security policies.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
For the example policy shipped with Xen, it makes sense to allow dom0
access to all system calls so that policy does not need to be updated
for each new hypervisor or toolstack feature used.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add getscheduler and setscheduler permissions to replace the
monolithic scheduler permission in the scheduler_op domctl and sysctl.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This adds a pair of XSM hooks for tmem operations: xsm_tmem_op which
controls any use of tmem, and xsm_tmem_control which allows use of the
TMEM_CONTROL operations. By default, all domains can use tmem while
only IS_PRIV domains can use control operations.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
There are three callers of get_pg_owner:
* do_mmuext_op, which does not have XSM hooks on all subfunctions
* do_mmu_update, which has hooks that are inefficient
* do_update_va_mapping_otherdomain, which has a simple XSM hook
In order to preserve return values for the do_mmuext_op hypercall, an
additional XSM hook is required to check the operation even for those
subfunctions that do not use the pg_owner field. This also covers the
MMUEXT_UNPIN_TABLE operation which did previously have an XSM hook.
The XSM hooks in do_mmu_update were capable of replacing the checks in
get_pg_owner; however, the hooks are buried in the inner loop of the
function - not very good for performance when XSM is enabled and these
turn in to indirect function calls. This patch removes the PTE from
the hooks and replaces it with a bitfield describing what accesses are
being requested. The XSM hook can then be called only when additional
bits are set instead of once per iteration of the loop.
This patch results in a change in the FLASK permissions used for
mapping an MMIO page: the target for the permisison check on the
memory mapping is no longer resolved to the device-specific type, and
is instead either the domain's own type or domio_t (depending on if
the domain uses DOMID_SELF or DOMID_IO in the map
command). Device-specific access is still controlled via the "resource
use" permisison checked at domain creation (or device hotplug).
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Because the FLASK XSM module no longer checks IS_PRIV for remote
domain accesses covered by XSM permissions, domains now have the
ability to perform memory management and other functions on all
domains that have the same type. While it is possible to prevent this
by only creating one domain per type, this solution significantly
limits the flexibility of the type system.
This patch introduces a domain type transition to represent a domain
that is operating on itself. In the example policy, this is
demonstrated by creating a type with _self appended when declaring a
domain type which will be used for reflexive operations. AVCs for a
domain of type domU_t will look like the following:
scontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t
tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t_self
This change also allows policy to distinguish between event channels a
domain creates to itself and event channels created between domains of
the same type.
The IS_PRIV_FOR check used for device model domains is also no longer
checked by FLASK; a similar transition is performed when the target is
set and used when the device model accesses its target domain.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Daniel De Graaf
Andrew Cooper
Ian Campbell
Vitaly Kuznetsov
Ravi Sahita
Boris Ostrovsky
Chao Peng
Olaf Hering
Julien Grall
Wei Liu
Dongxiao Xu
Elena Ufimtseva
Don Slutz
Matthew Daley
David Vrabel
Vadim A. Misbakh-Soloviov
Dario Faggioli