In the shim case, the number of CPUs should be solely controlled by the
guest configuration file. Make sure the command line options are fully
(and not just partially) ignored.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
* Command line documentation for what the option does.
* Implement a canonicalise_addr() helper and replace the opencoded use in
sign_extend_msr()
* Canonicalise the ler pointers and print symbol information.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
The documentation for the iommu_inclusive_mapping Xen command line option
states:
"Use this to work around firmware issues providing incorrect RMRR entries"
Unfortunately this workaround does not function correctly if the dom0-strict
iommu option is also specified.
The documentation goes on to say:
"Rather than only mapping RAM pages for IOMMU accesses for Dom0, with this
option all pages up to 4GB, not marked as unusable in the E820 table, will
get a mapping established."
This patch modifies the VT-d hardware domain initialization code such that
the workaround will continue to function in dom0-strict mode, by mapping
all pages not marked as unusable *unless* they are RAM pages not assigned
to dom0.
NOTE: This patch modifies the test in drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c from
need_iommu() to is_pv_domain() since dom0-strict implies need_iommu()
so we no longer want to gate invocation of vtd_set_hwdom_mapping()
on that.
It also exports the iommu_dom0_strict flag so that the implementation
of vtd_set_hwdom_mapping() can test it explicitly. It would be
possible to test need_iommu() instead, but it is more illustrative
to test the original flag rather than one of its side-effects.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
It is hard to reconcile the comment at the top of the loop in
vtd_set_hwdom_mapping() with the if statement following it. This patch
re-phrases the logic, preserving the semantics, but making it easier
to read.
The patch also modifies the Xen command line documentation to make it
clear that iommu_inclusive_mapping only applies to pages up to the 4GB
boundary.
NOTE: This patch also corrects the indentation of the printk() towards
the end of vtd_set_hwdom_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
On a system where the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, it may be
useful to either permanently enable or disable the workaround for cases
where the user decides that they'd rather not get a trap overhead, and
keep the mitigation permanently on or off instead of switching it on
exception entry/exit. In any case, default to mitigation being enabled.
The new command line option is implemented as list of one option to
follow x86 option and also allow to extend it more easily in the future.
Note that for convenience, the full implemention of the workaround is
done in the .matches callback.
Lastly, a accessor is provided to know the state of the mitigation.
After this patch, there are 3 methods complementing each other to find the
state of the mitigation:
- The capability ARM_SSBD indicates the platform is affected by the
vulnerability. This will also return false if the user decide to force
disabled the mitigation (spec-ctrl="ssbd=force-disable"). The
capability is useful for putting shortcut in place using alternative.
- ssbd_state indicates the global state of the mitigation (e.g
unknown, force enable...). The global state is required to report
the state to a guest.
- The per-cpu ssbd_callback_required indicates whether a pCPU
requires to call the SMC. This allows to shortcut SMC call
and save an entry/exit to EL3.
This is part of XSA-263.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Intel Core processors since at least Nehalem speculate past #NM, which is the
mechanism by which lazy FPU context switching is implemented.
On affected processors, Xen must use fully eager FPU context switching to
prevent guests from being able to read FPU state (SSE/AVX/etc) from previously
scheduled vcpus.
This is part of XSA-267 / CVE-2018-3665
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To combat GPZ SP4 "Speculative Store Bypass", Intel have extended their
speculative sidechannel mitigations specification as follows:
* A feature bit to indicate that Speculative Store Bypass Disable is
supported.
* A new bit in MSR_SPEC_CTRL which, when set, disables memory disambiguation
in the pipeline.
* A new bit in MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, which will be set in future hardware,
indicating that the hardware is not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
sidechannels.
For contemporary processors, this interface will be implemented via a
microcode update.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
AMD processors will execute loads and stores with the same base register in
program order, which is typically how a compiler emits code.
Therefore, by default no mitigating actions are taken, despite there being
corner cases which are vulnerable to the issue.
For performance testing, or for users with particularly sensitive workloads,
the `spec-ctrl=ssbd` command line option is available to force Xen to disable
Memory Disambiguation on applicable hardware.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
"make -C docs all" fails due to incorrect markdown syntax in
livepatch.markdown. Correct it.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Misc fixes:
* Insert real URLs
* Drop trailing whitespace
* Consistent alignment and indentation for code blocks and lists
* Consistent capitalisation
* Consistent use of `` blocks for command line arguments and function names
* Rearrange things not to leave < and > in the text
No change in content. The document now reads rather more consistently in HTML
and PDF form.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
In hindsight, the options for `bti=` aren't as flexible or useful as expected
(including several options which don't appear to behave as intended).
Changing the behaviour of an existing option is problematic for compatibility,
so introduce a new `spec-ctrl=` in the hopes that we can do better.
One common way of deploying Xen is with a single PV dom0 and all domUs being
HVM domains. In such a setup, an administrator who has weighed up the risks
may wish to forgo protection against malicious PV domains, to reduce the
overall performance hit. To cater for this usecase, `spec-ctrl=no-pv` will
disable all speculative protection for PV domains, while leaving all
speculative protection for HVM domains intact.
For coding clarity as much as anything else, the suboptions are grouped by
logical area; those which affect the alternatives blocks, and those which
affect Xen's in-hypervisor settings. See the xen-command-line.markdown for
full details of the new options.
While changing the command line options, take the time to change how the data
is reported to the user. The three DEBUG printks are upgraded to unilateral,
as they are all relevant pieces of information, and the old "mitigations:"
line is split in the two logical areas described above.
Sample output from booting with `spec-ctrl=no-pv` looks like:
(XEN) Speculative mitigation facilities:
(XEN) Hardware features: IBRS/IBPB STIBP IBPB
(XEN) Compiled-in support: INDIRECT_THUNK
(XEN) Xen settings: BTI-Thunk RETPOLINE, SPEC_CTRL: IBRS-, Other: IBPB
(XEN) Support for VMs: PV: None, HVM: MSR_SPEC_CTRL RSB
(XEN) XPTI (64-bit PV only): Dom0 enabled, DomU enabled
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
credit2_cap_period_ms isn't mentioned in xen-command-line.markdown.
Add a description.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Many of the architecture specific boot parameters are not qualified
as such. Correct that. Reorder PKU to be alphabetical.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Avoid flushing the complete TLB when switching %cr3 for mitigation of
Meltdown by using the PCID feature if available.
We are using 4 PCID values for a 64 bit pv domain subject to XPTI and
2 values for the non-XPTI case:
- guest active and in kernel mode
- guest active and in user mode
- hypervisor active and guest in user mode (XPTI only)
- hypervisor active and guest in kernel mode (XPTI only)
We use PCID only if PCID _and_ INVPCID are supported. With PCID in use
we disable global pages in cr4. A command line parameter controls in
which cases PCID is being used.
As the non-XPTI case has shown not to perform better with PCID at least
on some machines the default is to use PCID only for domains subject to
XPTI.
With PCID enabled we always disable global pages. This avoids having to
either flush the complete TLB or do a cycle through all PCID values
when invalidating a single global page.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
If possible use the INVPCID instruction for flushing the TLB instead of
toggling cr4.pge for that purpose.
While at it remove the dependency on cr4.pge being required for mtrr
loading, as this will be required later anyway.
Add a command line option "invpcid" for controlling the use of
INVPCID (default to true).
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Instead of switching XPTI globally on or off add a per-domain flag for
that purpose. This allows to modify the xpti boot parameter to support
running dom0 without Meltdown mitigations. Using "xpti=no-dom0" as boot
parameter will achieve that.
Move the xpti boot parameter handling to xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c as
it is pv-domain specific.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Some underscores are not escaped in xen-command-line.markdown.
Correct that.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Some of the boot parameters in docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown are
not in the correct alphabetically order. Correct that.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This archaeology script:
- figures out what the current and previous Xen versions were
- looks for appropriate git branches for them
- finds SUPPORT.md for each one
- feeds its findings to parse-support-md
We do not intend to integrate this into docs/Makefile, because it
relies on the git history. Instead, we will take the rune provided in
the head comment and paste a variant of it into an appropriate cronjob
on xenbits.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Lars Kurth <lars.kurth@citrix.com>
---
v3: Provide -D option.
Add pvcalls support to libxl and xl. Create the appropriate pvcalls
entries in xenstore.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano@aporeto.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
All this information is now covered in SUPPORT.md.
Most of the emulated hardware is obvious a couple of the items are
worth pointing out specifically.
"xen_disk" is listed under "Blkback"
"...the PCI host bridge and the PIIX3 chipset...": This statement is
redundant -- the PCI host bridge is a part of the piix3 chipset, which
is listed as supported.
xenfb: The "graphics" side of "xenfb" is listed under "PV Framebuffer
(backend)", and the "input" side of "xenfb" (including both keyboard
and mouse) is listed under "PV Keyboard (backend)".
Backing storage image format is listed in the "Blkback" section.
Fix 'stdvga' spelling while we're here.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Xen does not properly support big.LITTLE platform. All vCPUs of a guest
will always have the MIDR of the boot CPU (see arch_domain_create).
At best the guest may see unreliable performance (vCPU switching between
big and LITTLE), at worst the guest will become unreliable or insecure.
This is becoming more apparent with branch predictor hardening in Linux
because they target a specific kind of CPUs and may not work on other
CPUs.
For the time being, park any CPUs with a MDIR different from the boot
CPU. This will be revisited in the future once Xen gains understanding
of big.LITTLE.
[1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-12/msg00826.html
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenkko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This patch was originally released as part of XSA-226. It retains the same
command line syntax (as various downstreams are mitigating XSA-226 using this
mechanism) but the defaults have been updated due to the revised XSA-226
patched, after which transitive grants are believed to functioning
properly.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The current XPTI implementation isolates the directmap (and therefore a lot of
guest data), but a large quantity of CPU0's state (including its stack)
remains visible.
Furthermore, an attacker able to read .text is in a vastly superior position
to normal when it comes to fingerprinting Xen for known vulnerabilities, or
scanning for ROP/Spectre gadgets.
Collect together the entrypoints in .text.entry (currently 3x4k frames, but
can almost certainly be slimmed down), and create a common mapping which is
inserted into each per-cpu shadow. The stubs are also inserted into this
mapping by pointing at the in-use L2. This allows stubs allocated later (SMP
boot, or CPU hotplug) to work without further changes to the common mappings.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
So it can be used by both gcc and clang. Just add the Kconfig option
and modify the makefiles so the llvm coverage specific code can be
added in a follow up patch.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
[jb: also change the shim config]
Support both a "disable everything" and a "disable all RSB overwriting"
sub-option.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Issuing an IBPB command flushes the Branch Target Buffer, so that any poison
left by one vcpu won't remain when beginning to execute the next.
The cost of IBPB is substantial, and skipped on transition to idle, as Xen's
idle code is robust already. All transitions into vcpu context are fully
serialising in practice (and under consideration for being retroactively
declared architecturally serialising), so a cunning attacker cannot use SP1 to
try and skip the flush.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
See the logic and comments in init_speculation_mitigations() for further
details.
There are two controls for RSB overwriting, because in principle there are
cases where it might be safe to forego rsb_native (Off the top of my head,
SMEP active, no 32bit PV guests at all, no use of vmevent/paging subsystems
for HVM guests, but I make no guarantees that this list of restrictions is
exhaustive).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
shim_mem will now account for both the memory used by the hypervisor
loaded in memory and the free memory slack given to the shim for
runtime usage.
From experimental testing it seems like the total amount of MiB used
by the shim (giving it ~1MB of free memory for runtime) is:
memory/113 + 20
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Instead of gaining yet another top level boolean, introduce a more generic
cpuid= option. Also introduce a helper function to parse a generic boolean
value.
This is part of XSA-254.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Depending on hardware and microcode availability, we will want to replace
IND_THUNK_REPOLINE with other implementations.
For AMD hardware, choose IND_THUNK_LFENCE in preference to retpoline if lfence
is known to be (or was successfully made) dispatch serialising.
This is part of XSA-254.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
First of all we don't need it on AMD systems. Additionally allow its use
to be controlled by command line option. For best backportability, this
intentionally doesn't use alternative instruction patching to achieve
the intended effect - while we likely want it, this will be later
follow-up.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Allowing pagetables to point to other pagetables of the same level
(often called 'linear pagetables') has been included in Xen since its
inception; but recently it has been the source of a number of subtle
reference-counting bugs.
It is not used by Linux or MiniOS; but it is used by NetBSD and Novell
Netware. There are significant numbers of people who are never going
to use the feature, along with significant numbers who need the
feature.
Add a Kconfig option for the feature (default to 'y'). Also add a
command-line option to control whether PV linear pagetables are
allowed (default to 'true').
NB that we leave linear_pt_count in the page struct. It's in a union,
so its presence doesn't increase the size of the data struct.
Changing the layout of the other elements based on configuration
options is asking for trouble however; so we'll just leave it there
and ASSERT that it's zero.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Make it possible for the user to specify, with the boot
time parameter rcu-idle-timer-period-ms, how frequently
a CPU that went idle with pending RCU callbacks should be
woken up to check if the grace period ended.
Typical values (i.e., some of the values used by Linux as
the tick frequency) are 10, 4 or 1 ms. Default valus (used
when this parameter is not specified) is 10ms. Maximum is
100ms.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Instead of using the same global resource limits of grant tables (max.
number of grant frames, max. number of maptrack frames) for all domains
make these limits per domain. Set those per-domain limits in
grant_table_set_limits(). The global settings are serving as an upper
boundary now which must not be exceeded by a per-domain value. The
default of max_grant_frames is set to the maximum default xl will use.
While updating the semantics of the boot parameters remove the
documentation of the no longer existing gnttab_max_nr_frames and
correct the default gnttab_max_maptrack_frames uses.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> [non-ARM parts]
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Support modifying conswitch, console_timestamps, loglvl and
guest_loglvl at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Jan Beulich
Andrew Cooper
Julien Grall
Paul Durrant
Juergen Gross
Wei Liu
Ian Jackson
Amit Singh Tomar
Stefano Stabellini
George Dunlap
Roger Pau Monné
Yi Sun
Sergey Dyasli
Dario Faggioli
Joao Martins
Bhupinder Thakur