An XSM hook for get_dom0_console is currently missing. Using XSM with
a PVH dom0 shows:
(XEN) FLASK: Denying unknown platform_op: 64.
Wire up the hook, and allow it for dom0.
Fixes: 4dd160583c ("x86/platform: introduce hypercall to get initial video console settings")
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@amd.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
The current flow for initial SID assignment is that the function
flask_domain_alloc_security() allocates the security context and assigns an
initial SID based on the limited state information it can access. Specifically
the initial SID is determined by the domid of the domain, where it would assign
the label for one of the domains the hypervisor constructed with the exception
of initial domain (dom0). In the case of the initial domain and all other
domains it would use the unlabeled_t SID.
When it came to the SID for the initial domain, its assignment was managed by
flask_domain_create() where it would be switched from unlabeled_t to dom0_t.
This logic worked under the assumption that the first call to
flask_domain_create() would be the hypervisor constructing the initial domain.
After which it would be the toolstack constructing the domain, for which it is
expected to provide an appropriate SID or else unlabeled_t would be used.
The issue is that the assumptions upon which the current flow is built were
weak and are invalid for PV shim and dom0less. Under the current flow even
though the initial domain for PV shim is not set as privileged, flask would
label the domain as dom0_t. For dom0less, the situation is two-fold. First is
that every domain after the first domain creation will fail as they will be
labeled as unlabeled_t. The second is that if the dom0less configuration does
not include a "dom0", the first domain created would be labeled as dom0_t.
This commit only seeks to address the situation for PV shim, by including a
check for xenboot_t context in flask_domain_alloc_security() to determine if
the domain is being constructed at system boot. Then a check for is_privilged
and pv_shim is added to differentiate between a "dom0" initial domain and a PV
shim initial domain.
The logic for flask_domain_create() was altered to allow the incoming SID to
override the initial label. This allows a domain builder, whether it is a
toolstack, dom0less, or hyperlaunch, to provide the correct label for the
domain at construction.
The base policy was adjusted to allow the idle domain under the xenboot_t
context the ability to construct domains of both types, dom0_t and domu_t.
This will enable a hypervisor resident domain builder to construct domains
beyond the initial domain,
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
The functionality of XEN_SYSCTL_set_parameter is available via hypfs
now, so it can be removed.
This allows to remove the kernel_param structure for runtime parameters
by putting the now only used structure element into the hypfs node
structure of the runtime parameters.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Add the infrastructure for the hypervisor filesystem.
This includes the hypercall interface and the base functions for
entry creation, deletion and modification.
In order not to have to repeat the same pattern multiple times in case
adding a new node should BUG_ON() failure, the helpers for adding a
node (hypfs_add_dir() and hypfs_add_leaf()) get a nofault parameter
causing the BUG() in case of a failure.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
With the final users moved over to using XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpumsr_policy, drop
this domctl and associated infrastructure.
Rename the preexisting set_cpuid XSM vector to set_cpu_policy, now that it is
back to having a single user.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This patch removes all tmem related code and CONFIG_TMEM from the
hypervisor. Also remove tmem hypercalls from the default XSM policy.
It is written as if tmem is disabled and tmem freeable pages is 0.
We will need to keep public/tmem.h around forever to avoid breaking
guests. Remove the hypervisor only part and put guest visible part
under a xen version check. Take the chance to remove trailing
whitespaces.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
This finally (after literally years of work!) marks the point where the
toolstack can ask the hypervisor for the current CPUID configuration of a
specific domain.
Introduce a new flask access vector and update the default policies.
Also extend xen-cpuid's --policy mode to be able to take a domid and dump a
specific domains CPUID and MSR policy.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Now that XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain handles the grant table limits, remove
XEN_DOMCTL_set_gnttab_limits (including XSM hooks and libxc wrappers).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
set_max_evtchn is somewhat weird. It was introduced with the event_fifo work,
but has never been used. Still, it is a bounding on resources consumed by the
event channel infrastructure, and should be part of createdomain, rather than
editable after the fact.
Drop XEN_DOMCTL_set_max_evtchn completely (including XSM hooks and libxc
wrappers), and retain the functionality in XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
This patch renames PSR sysctl/domctl interfaces and related xsm policy to
make them be general for all resource allocation features but not only
for CAT. Then, we can resuse the interfaces for all allocation features.
Basically, it changes 'psr_cat_op' to 'psr_alloc', and remove 'CAT_' from some
macros. E.g.:
1. psr_cat_op -> psr_alloc
2. XEN_DOMCTL_psr_cat_op -> XEN_DOMCTL_psr_alloc
3. XEN_SYSCTL_psr_cat_op -> XEN_SYSCTL_psr_alloc
4. XEN_DOMCTL_PSR_CAT_SET_L3_CBM -> XEN_DOMCTL_PSR_SET_L3_CBM
5. XEN_SYSCTL_PSR_CAT_get_l3_info -> XEN_SYSCTL_PSR_get_l3_info
Signed-off-by: Yi Sun <yi.y.sun@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add a sysctl hypercall to support setting parameters similar to
command line parameters, but at runtime. The parameters to set are
specified as a string, just like the boot parameters.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This operation has no known users, and is primarily useful when an MLS
policy is in use (which has never been shipped with Xen). In addition,
the information it provides does not actually depend on hypervisor
state (only on the XSM policy), so an application that needs it could
compute the results without needing to involve the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
These permissions were initially split because they were in separate
domctls, but this split is very unlikely to actually provide security
benefits: it would require a carefully contrived situation for a domain
to both need access to one type of CPU register and also need to be
prohibited from accessing another type.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Jason Andryuk
Andrew Cooper
Daniel P. Smith
Juergen Gross
Wei Liu
Daniel De Graaf
Sergey Dyasli
Yi Sun