Otherwise an incremental build will fail to overwrite the destination
files.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
vCPU soft affinity and NUMA-aware scheduling does not have
to be related. However, soft affinity is how NUMA-aware
scheduling is actually implemented, and therefore, by default,
the results of automatic NUMA placement (at VM creation time)
are also used to set the soft affinity of all the vCPUs of
the domain.
Of course, this only happens if automatic NUMA placement is
enabled and actually takes place (for instance, if the user
does not specify any hard and soft affiniy in the xl config
file).
This also takes care of the vice-versa, i.e., don't trigger
automatic placement if the config file specifies either an
hard (the check for which was already there) or a soft (the
check for which is introduced by this commit) affinity.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
To do so, we add the vcpu_soft_affinity array to build_info, and
treat it much like vcpu_hard_affinity. The new config option is
called "cpus_soft".
Note that the vcpu_hard_affinity array, introduced in a previous
patch, and the vcpu_soft_affinity array, introduced here, share
the same LIBXL_HAVE_xxx macro, in libxl.h. That is called
LIBXL_HAVE_BUILDINFO_VCPU_AFFINITY_ARRAYS, and was introduced
together with vcpu_hard_affinity, but only inside a comment.
In this change, we uncomment, and hence properly define it.
In order to avoid having to issue separate calls to
libxl_set_vcpuaffinity() (one for hard affinity and one for soft
affinity) in libxl__build_pre(), in case the caller uses
b_info->cpumap (for the former) and b_info->vcpu_soft_affinity (for
the latter), we also set (again!) a new default for b_info->cpumap.
This allows, from this change on, to always and only deal with
b_info->vcpu_hard_affinity all around libxl internals.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
and start using the vcpu_hard_affinity array instead. This is done
as when, in a subsequent patch ("libxl/xl: make it possible to
specify soft-affinity in domain config file") we will become able
to deal with soft affinity, code can be shared.
This change also enables more advanced VCPU to PCPU (hard, for now)
affinity specification, in case a list is used, like:
cpus = ["3-4", "2-6,^4"]
What it means is that VCPU 0 must be pinned to PCPU 3,4 and VCPU 1
to PCPUs 2,3,5,6 (before this change, cpus=[xx, yy] only supported
single values). Of course, the old (e.g., cpus=[2, 3]) syntax
continues to work.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Getting happens via `xl vcpu-list', which now looks like this:
# xl vcpu-list -s
Name ID VCPU CPU State Time(s) Affinity (Hard / Soft)
Domain-0 0 0 11 -b- 5.4 8-15 / all
Domain-0 0 1 11 -b- 1.0 8-15 / all
Domain-0 0 14 13 -b- 1.4 8-15 / all
Domain-0 0 15 8 -b- 1.6 8-15 / all
vm-test 3 0 4 -b- 2.5 0-12 / 0-7
vm-test 3 1 0 -b- 3.2 0-12 / 0-7
Setting happens by specifying two pCPU masks to the `xl vcpu-pin'
command, the first one will be hard affinity, the second soft
affinity. If only one mask is specified, it is only hard affinity
that is affected. To change only soft affinity, '-' can be used
as the hard affinity mask parameter, and it will be left alone.
xl manual page is updated accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_domstatus is already safe. It loops at most over every vcpu
in a domain and breaks at the first vcpu with an event pending, marking it as
not-pending.
XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu had an incorrect bounds check against the vcpu id,
allowing an overflow of d->vcpu[] with an id between d->max_vcpus and
MAX_VIRT_CPUS. It was also able to overflow a vcpus pause count by many
repeated hypercalls.
The bounds check is fixed, and vcpu_pause() has been replaced with
vcpu_pause_by_systemcontroller() which cuts out at 255 uses.
XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu suffered from the same bounds problems as its
pause counterpart, and is fixed in exactly the same way. Despite the
atomic_read(&v->pause_count), this code didn't successfully prevent against an
underflow of the vcpu pause count.
The vcpu_unpause() has been replaced with vcpu_pause_by_systemcontroller()
which correctly prevents against underflow. The printk() is updated to have a
proper guest logging level, and provide more useful information in the XSM
case of one domain having debugger privileges over another.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
When using a multiboot capable bootloader this is exactly the field which
should be used.
Replace the deprecation wording with a reference to the information on the
priority of the bootargs fields.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
If the "generation_id" option is set in the domain configuration,
generate and set a new random VM generation ID every time a domain is
created or restored.
xl lacks the infrastructure to fully track the lifecycle of VM images
as they are snapshotted and cloned (etc) so always using a new ID is
the safe option and ensures that a new one will be used where it matters.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Before this change, each vcpu had its own vcpu-affinity
(in v->cpu_affinity), representing the set of pcpus where
the vcpu is allowed to run. Since when NUMA-aware scheduling
was introduced the (credit1 only, for now) scheduler also
tries as much as it can to run all the vcpus of a domain
on one of the nodes that constitutes the domain's
node-affinity.
The idea here is making the mechanism more general by:
* allowing for this 'preference' for some pcpus/nodes to be
expressed on a per-vcpu basis, instead than for the domain
as a whole. That is to say, each vcpu should have its own
set of preferred pcpus/nodes, instead than it being the
very same for all the vcpus of the domain;
* generalizing the idea of 'preferred pcpus' to not only NUMA
awareness and support. That is to say, independently from
it being or not (mostly) useful on NUMA systems, it should
be possible to specify, for each vcpu, a set of pcpus where
it prefers to run (in addition, and possibly unrelated to,
the set of pcpus where it is allowed to run).
We will be calling this set of *preferred* pcpus the vcpu's
soft affinity, and this changes introduce it, and starts using it
for scheduling, replacing the indirect use of the domain's NUMA
node-affinity. This is more general, as soft affinity does not
have to be related to NUMA. Nevertheless, it allows to achieve the
same results of NUMA-aware scheduling, just by making soft affinity
equal to the domain's node affinity, for all the vCPUs (e.g.,
from the toolstack).
This also means renaming most of the NUMA-aware scheduling related
functions, in credit1, to something more generic, hinting toward
the concept of soft affinity rather than directly to NUMA awareness.
As a side effects, this simplifies the code quit a bit. In fact,
prior to this change, we needed to cache the translation of
d->node_affinity (which is a nodemask_t) to a cpumask_t, since that
is what scheduling decisions require (we used to keep it in
node_affinity_cpumask). This, and all the complicated logic
required to keep it updated, is not necessary any longer.
The high level description of NUMA placement and scheduling in
docs/misc/xl-numa-placement.markdown is being updated too, to match
the new architecture.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The page scrubbing is done in 128MB chunks in lockstep across all the
non-SMT CPU's. This allows for the boot CPU to hold the heap_lock whilst each
chunk is being scrubbed and then release the heap_lock when the CPU's are
finished scrubing their individual chunk. This allows for the heap_lock to
not be held continously and for pending softirqs are to be serviced
periodically across the CPU's.
The page scrub memory chunks are allocated to the CPU's in a NUMA aware
fashion to reduce socket interconnect overhead and improve performance.
Specifically in the first phase we scrub at the same time on all the
NUMA nodes that have CPUs - we also weed out the SMT threads so that
we only use cores (that gives a 50% boost). The second phase is for NUMA
nodes that have no CPUs - for that we use the closest NUMA node's CPUs
(non-SMT again) to do the job.
This patch reduces the boot page scrub time on a 128GB 64 core AMD Opteron
6386 machine from 49 seconds to 3 seconds.
On a IvyBridge-EX 8 socket box with 1.5TB it cuts it down from 15 minutes
to 63 seconds.
Signed-off-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Print out a warning and suggest user use "-V" option when invoking "xl
create". Also remove that option in manpage. This will introduce a
minor functional regression but it's very easy to work around.
The rationale behind this change is that, this option is actually not
part of domain configuration. It just affects whether a vncviewer
should be automatically spawn, but has nothing to do with how a domain
should be constructed. And this option is also bogus, considering if you
migrate a domain to a remote host and the receiver spawns a vncviewer on
the receiving side then it either dies silently or occupies resource.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
cpufreq parameter can take more options than currently
documented. Include these with some comments regarding
their intention.
Signed-off-by: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <aravind.gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
Finally last patch in the series to enable creation of pvh dom0.
A pvh dom0 is created by adding dom0pvh to grub xen command line.
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Handle new boolean option discard/no-discard for disk configuration. It
is supposed to disable discard support if file based backing storage was
intentionally created non-sparse to avoid fragmentation of the file.
The option intended for the backend driver. A new boolean property
"discard-enable" is written to the backend node. An upcoming patch for
qemu will make use of this property. The kernel blkback driver may be
updated as well to disable discard for phy based backing storage.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is a new security
feature disclosed by Intel, please refer to the following
document:
http://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/319433-014.pdf
If CR4.SMAP = 1, supervisor-mode data accesses are not allowed
to linear addresses that are accessible in user mode. If CPL < 3,
SMAP protections are disabled if EFLAGS.AC = 1. If CPL = 3, SMAP
applies to all supervisor-mode data accesses (these are implicit
supervisor accesses) regardless of the value of EFLAGS.AC.
This patch enables SMAP in Xen to prevent Xen hypervisor from
accessing pv guest data, whose translation paging-structure
entries' U/S flags are all set.
Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
With proper permission (and, for the I/O port case, wrap-around) checks
added (note that for the I/O port case a count of zero is now being
disallowed, in line with I/O memory handling):
XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
Of both IRQs and I/O ports there is only a reasonably small amount, so
there's no excess resource consumption involved here. Additionally
they both have a specialized XSM hook associated.
XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
While this also has a specialized XSM hook associated (just like
XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,ioport}_permission), it's not clear whether it's
reasonable to expect XSM to restrict the number of ranges associated
with a domain via this hook (which is the main resource consumption
item here).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Document and implement a new option that permits disk backends which
would otherwise have to avoid O_DIRECT (because of the network memory
lifetime bug) to use it anyway. This is:
direct-io-safe in the xl domain disk config specification
direct_io_safe in the libxl disk API
direct-io-safe in the backend xenstore interface
Add a reference to xen/include/public/io/blkif.h in
docs/misc/vbd-interface.txt.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Felipe Franciosi <felipe@paradoxo.org>
In a number of cases, loops over each vCPU in a domain are involved
here. For large numbers of vCPU-s these may still take some time to
complete, but we're limiting them at a couple of thousand at most, so I
would think this should not by itself be an issue. I wonder though
whether it shouldn't be possible to have XSM restrict the vCPU count
that can be set through XEN_DOMCTL_max_vcpus.
XEN_DOMCTL_pausedomain:
A loop over vcpu_sleep_sync() for each of vCPU in the domain. That
function itself has a loop waiting for the subject vCPU to become non-
runnable, which ought to complete quickly (involving an IPI to be sent
and acted on). No other unbounded resource usage.
XEN_DOMCTL_unpausedomain:
Simply a loop calling vcpu_wake() (not having any loops or other
resource usage itself) for each of vCPU in the domain.
XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
Two loops (one over all domains, i.e. bounded by the limit of 32k
domains, and another over all vCPU-s in the domain); no other
unbounded resource usage.
XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo:
Inquiring just a single MFN, i.e. no loops and no other unbounded
resource usage.
XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo{2,3}:
Number of inquired MFNs is limited to 1024. Beyond that just like
XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo.
XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuinfo:
Only obtaining information on the vCPU, no loops or other resource
usage.
XEN_DOMCTL_setdomainhandle:
Simply a memcpy() of a very limited amount of data.
XEN_DOMCTL_setdebugging:
A domain_{,un}pause() pair (see XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}pausedomain) framing
the setting of a flag.
XEN_DOMCTL_hypercall_init:
Initializing a guest provided page with hypercall stubs. No other
resource consumption.
XEN_DOMCTL_arch_setup:
IA64 leftover, interface structure being removed from the public
header.
XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
Setting a couple of guest state fields. No other resource consumption.
XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuaffinity:
XEN_DOMCTL_getnodeaffinity:
Involve temporary memory allocations (approximately) bounded by the
number of CPUs in the system / number of nodes built for, which is
okay. Beyond that trivial operation.
XEN_DOMCTL_real_mode_area:
PPC leftover, interface structure being removed from the public
header.
XEN_DOMCTL_resumedomain:
A domain_{,un}pause() pair framing operation very similar to
XEN_DOMCTL_unpausedomain (see above).
XEN_DOMCTL_sendtrigger:
Injects an interrupt (SCI or NMI) without any other resource
consumption.
XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe:
Updates the suspend event channel, i.e. affecting only the controlled
domain.
XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate:
XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults:
Just setting respective flags on the domain.
XEN_DOMCTL_get_address_size:
Simply reading the guest property.
XEN_DOMCTL_set_opt_feature:
Was already tagged IA64-only.
XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpuid:
MAX_CPUID_INPUT bounded loop, which is okay. No other resource
consumption.
XEN_DOMCTL_get_machine_address_size:
Simply obtaining the value set by XEN_DOMCTL_set_machine_address_size
(or the default set at domain creation time).
XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo:
XEN_DOMCTL_settscinfo:
Reading/writing of a couple of guest state fields wrapped in a
domain_{,un}pause() pair.
XEN_DOMCTL_audit_p2m:
Enabled only in debug builds.
XEN_DOMCTL_set_max_evtchn:
While the limit set here implies other (subsequent) resource usage,
this is the purpose of the operation.
I also verified that all removed domctls' handlers don't leak
hypervisor memory contents .
Inspected but questionable (and hence left in place for now):
XEN_DOMCTL_max_mem:
While only setting the field capping a domain's allocation (this
implies potential successive resource usage, but that's the purpose of
the operation). However, XSM doesn't see the value that's being set
here, so the net effect would be potential unbounded memory use.
XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler:
This modifies a global array. While that is the purpose of the
operation, if multiple domains are granted permission they can badly
interfere with one another. Hence I'd appreciate a second opinion
here. [Andrew confirms that this being the nature of the operation,
it's fine to be removed from the list - will be done in a 2nd round.]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Add support for changing max number of hypervisor leaves from configuration
file.
This number can be specified using xl's standard 'cpuid' option. Only lowest
8 bits of leaf's 0x4000xx00 eax register are processed, all others are ignored.
The changes allow us to revert commit 80ecb40362
which is most likely no longer needed now anyway (Solaris bug that it addressed
has been fixed and backported to earlier releases) but leave possibility of
running unpatched version of Solaris by forcing number of leaves to 2 in the
configuration file.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The man page mentions passing config snippets key=val in xl create.
Unfortunately, the config syntax contain characters which are
interpreted (and often discarded) by the shell before getting passed
in, resulting in a parsing error.
For example:
xl create hvm.cfg cpus="0-3"
The shell will eat the quotes and pass 'cpus=0-3' to xl, which won't
parse properly without the quotes.
Mention this in the man page, and recommend the use of single quotes, as well
as separating multiple arguments with a semicolon, thus:
xl create hvm.cfg 'cpus="0-3"; pci=["1.0","1.1"]'
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Add a "force-ept" command line option to allow EPT to be enabled when
VMX feature VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT is not present.
Due to CVE-2013-2212, this feature is required by default as a
prerequisite for using EPT. If you are not using PCI Passthrough, or
trust the guest administrator who would be using passthrough, then the
requirement can be relaxed. This option is particularly useful for
nested virtualization, to allow the L1 hypervisor to use EPT even if
the L0 hypervisor does not provide VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT.
Signed-off-by: Aravindh Puthiyaparambil <aravindp@cisco.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Because there is not currently a method for the vTPM Manager to obtain a
build hash of a vTPM, use the hash of the vTPM's XSM label as a
substitute. This allows the vTPM Manager to distinguish between vTPMs
intended to be paired with a hardware domain kernel (which cannot use
pv-grub) and vTPMs which are paired with a pv-grub domain and therefore
contain reliable measurements of the guest kernel in PCRs 4 and 5.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This is a complete rewrite of the disk format and key hierarchy for the
TPM Manager. The new format supports multiple groups of vTPMs which
define the permitted configurations where a given vTPM's keys are
available, allowing upgrades of critical components while retaining the
secrecy of cryptographic keys.
New features of the TPM Manager are explained in the README and in the
definitions of the management commands in vtpm_manager.h.
New features for vTPMs:
1. The size of the state blob for a vTPM is expanded from 52 to 64
bytes in order to support future vTPMs using SHA-2/3 instead of SHA-1.
2. vTPMs can obtain a quote from the physical TPM with certain
resettable PCRs set to include information about the vTPM. This can be
used by a vTPM to provide evidence of its integrity, including the
secrecy of its EK, and for deep quotes.
Some additional changes made by this rewrite that may impact existing
users:
1. The value of WELLKNOWN_OWNER_AUTH was incorrect for the physical TPM;
the convention is to use all zero bits for well-known authentication
values, not all one bits.
2. Randomly generating the owner auth value for the physical TPM is no
longer supported, as it prevents later creation or certification of
AIKs (which the old manager did not support).
3. The vTPM Manager needs to be provisioned with a PCR composite and an
upgrade authority's public key before it will save data across boots.
The current implementation still has some limitations:
* 5 valid system PCR selections per group
* The vTPM Manager's disk can use at most 2MB of space
* The vTPM domain's build hash is always set to null/zero
Most of the code relating to upgrade and rollback protection is
currently stubbed out, but future versions can add:
* Support for using the TPM's monotonic counter to prevent rollback
of vTPM data by taking and restoring disk snapshots
* Masking the master disk encryption key using a value stored in the
TPM's NVRAM so that revocation of old data is possible without
relying on all previously authorized software stacks to respect the
monotonic counter's value
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This adds a hypervisor command line option "hardware_dom=" which takes a
domain ID. When the domain with this ID is created, it will be used
as the hardware domain.
This is intended to be used when domain 0 is a dedicated stub domain for
domain building, allowing the hardware domain to be de-privileged and
act only as a driver domain.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
When dom0 is not the hardware domain, it can be destroyed in the same
way as any other service domain. To avoid accidental use when a domain
is not resolved, destroying domain 0 requires passing -f to xl destroy.
Since the hypervisor already prevents a domain from destroying itself,
this patch is only useful in a disaggregated environment.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
These were added by 7dbfc2f8b0 "docs: Honour --{en, dis}able-xend when
building docs" between v1 and the (eventually committed) v2 of 9e8672f1c3
"tools: remove xend and associated python modules" and were missed when
rebasing for v2.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
I've retained xen.lowlevel.{xc,xs} since they seem more widely useful. I also
kept xen.lowlevel.xl even though it is disabled by default and IMHO useless in
its current form.
I've tried to clean up the various associated bits like example configs, init
scripts, udev rules etc but no doubt I have missed something, those can easily
be cleaned up later.
I've also removed xm-test since although it could in theory be reworked to
test xl it hasn't been touched for years. If someone wants to resurrect it
then they could do so via the git history.
This has been built but not runtime tested.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
v2: Clean out some .*ignore cruft
Remove some xm/xend docs.
Split the current install target into two subtargets, install-man-pages and
install-html, with the main install target depending on both.
This helps packagers who want the man pages to put in appropriate rpms/debs,
but don't want to build the html developer docs.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
If a user has specified --disable-xend, they wont want the manpages either.
Propagating this parameters requires reorganising the way in which the
makefile chooses which documents to build.
There is now a split of {MAN1,MAN5,MARKDOWN,TXT}SRC-y to select which
documentation to build, which is separate from the patsubst section which
generates appropriate paths to trigger the later rules.
The manpages are quite easy to split between xend, xl and xenstore, and have
been. Items from misc/ are much harder and been left.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
[ ijc -- reran autogen.sh as requested. ]
This adds a new "Linux style" console timestamp method, which is shorter and
more useful than the current date/time timestamps with single-second
granularity.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Jan Beulich
Dario Faggioli
Andrew Cooper
Ian Campbell
Yang Hongyang
David Vrabel
Malcolm Crossley
Wei Liu
Aravind Gopalakrishnan
Mukesh Rathor
Zhigang Wang
Olaf Hering
Feng Wu
Stefano Stabellini
Boris Ostrovsky
George Dunlap
Aravindh Puthiyaparambil
Daniel De Graaf
Julien Grall
Ian Jackson
Fabio Fantoni