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Olaf Hering
f9b87b670c
Tools.mk contains a dead CONFIG_VTPM, @vtpm@ is never expanded because
@vtpm@ is only known by stubdom/configure.ac. Move the two perl scripts
to stubdom/vtpmmgr and install them as executeable. This was introduced
by the recent commit ffa11862aa ("vtpmmgr:
add example control tools")
Also remove vtpm= from config/Stubdom.mk because vtpm= is (appearently)
not used by make itself.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
98 lines
3.9 KiB
Perl
Executable File
98 lines
3.9 KiB
Perl
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/perl
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use strict;
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use Digest::SHA qw(sha1);
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use Math::BigInt only => 'GMP';
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my $s2 = Digest::SHA->new("SHA256");
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# The key below is an example; its private key is (obviously) not private. This
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# key must be protected at least as well as the vTPM's secrets, since it can
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# approve the release of these secrets to a new TCB. It may make sense to
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# modify this script to use a TPM or some other hardware key storage device to
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# hold the private key instead of holding the key in plaintext; such integration
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# is beyond the scope of this example script.
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#
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# The public exponent of this key must be 65537 (0x10001); this is the default
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# for TPM-generated RSA keys.
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#
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# The manage-tpmmgr.pl script expects the modulus of this RSA key to be
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# available; this may be done using:
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#
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# open KEY, '>rsa-modulus-file';
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# print KEY pack 'H*', $rsa_n;
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# close KEY;
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my $rsa_n = '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';
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my $rsa_d = '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';
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sub rsa_sign {
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my $m = '1'.('ff'x218).'003021300906052b0e03021a05000414';
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$m .= unpack 'H*', sha1(shift);
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$m = Math::BigInt->from_hex($m);
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my $n = Math::BigInt->from_hex($rsa_n);
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my $e = Math::BigInt->from_hex($rsa_d);
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$m->bmodpow($e, $n);
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$m = $m->as_hex();
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$m =~ s/^0x//;
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$m =~ s/^/0/ while length $m < 512;
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pack 'H*', $m;
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}
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sub auth_update_file {
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my($dst,$seq) = (shift, shift);
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my(@plt, @pcrs, @kerns, $cfg);
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open my $update, '>', $dst or die $!;
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for (@_) {
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if (/^([0-9a-fA-F]+)=([0-9a-fA-F]+)$/) {
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push @pcrs, pack 'V', hex $1;
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push @plt, pack 'H*', $2;
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} elsif (/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/) {
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push @kerns, pack 'H*', $_;
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} elsif (length $_ == 20) {
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push @kerns, $_;
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} else {
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print "Bad argument: $_";
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exit 1;
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}
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}
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$cfg = pack 'Q>', $seq;
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$cfg .= pack 'N/(a20)', @plt;
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$cfg .= pack 'N/(a20)', @kerns;
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printf "cfg_hash for %s: %s\n", $dst, Digest::SHA::sha1_hex($cfg);
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print $update rsa_sign($cfg);
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print $update $cfg;
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print $update map { pack 'n/a3', $_ } @pcrs;
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close $update;
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}
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my $out = shift;
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my $seq = $ENV{SEQ} || time;
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if (!$out) {
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print <<EOF;
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Usage: $0 <output> {<pcrs>=<composite>}* {<kernel>}*
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<output> is the file that will contain the signed configuration
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<pcrs> is a 24-bit PCR mask in hexadecimal
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<composite> is a PCR_COMPOSITE_HASH in hexadecimal
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<kernel> is a 160-bit vTPM kernel hash in hexadecimal
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The sequence number may be specified using the SEQ environment variable,
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otherwise the current UNIX timestamp will be used. The sequence number of a
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vTPM group must increase on each update.
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When the vTPM Manager is compiled without support for a domain builder, the
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SHA-1 hash of the vTPM domain's XSM label is used in place of its kernel hash.
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Example:
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A configuration with two valid command lines and one valid vTPM kernel
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PCRs 0-7 and 17-19 are being validated (static RTM and TBOOT).
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$0 auth-0 0e00ff=0593ecb564f532df6ef2f4d7272489da52c4c840 0e00ff=0593ecb564f532df6ef2f4d7272489da52c4c840 2bc65001d506ce6cd12cab90a4a2ad9040d641e1
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EOF
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exit 0;
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}
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print "Sequence: $seq\n";
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auth_update_file $out, $seq, @ARGV;
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