Files
xen/tools/libs/call/solaris.c
T
Jan Beulich 6409210a5f libxencall: osdep_hypercall() should return long
Some hypercalls, memory-op in particular, can return values requiring
more than 31 bits to represent. Hence the underlying layers need to make
sure they won't truncate such values. (Note that for Solaris the
function also gets renamed, to match the other OSes.)

Due to them merely propagating ioctl()'s return value, this change is
benign on Linux and Solaris. IOW there's an actual effect here only for
the BSDs and MiniOS, but even then further adjustments are needed at the
xencall<N>() level.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
2021-06-24 16:38:37 +02:00

103 lines
2.5 KiB
C

/******************************************************************************
*
* Copyright 2006 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Use is subject to license terms.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation;
* version 2.1 of the License.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* Split from xc_solaris.c
*/
#include "xc_private.h"
#include <xen/memory.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <malloc.h>
int osdep_xencall_open(xencall_handle *xcall)
{
int flags, saved_errno;
int fd = open("/dev/xen/privcmd", O_RDWR);
if ( fd == -1 )
{
PERROR("Could not obtain handle on privileged command interface");
return -1;
}
/* Although we return the file handle as the 'xc handle' the API
does not specify / guarentee that this integer is in fact
a file handle. Thus we must take responsiblity to ensure
it doesn't propagate (ie leak) outside the process */
if ( (flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD)) < 0 )
{
PERROR("Could not get file handle flags");
goto error;
}
flags |= FD_CLOEXEC;
if ( fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags) < 0 )
{
PERROR("Could not set file handle flags");
goto error;
}
xcall->fd = fd;
return 0;
error:
saved_errno = errno;
close(fd);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
int osdep_xencall_close(xencall_handle *xcall)
{
int fd = xcall->fd;
return close(fd);
}
void *osdep_alloc_hypercall_buffer(xencall_handle *xcall, size_t npages)
{
return memalign(XC_PAGE_SIZE, npages * XC_PAGE_SIZE);
}
void osdep_free_hypercall_buffer(xencall_handle *xcall, void *ptr,
size_t npages)
{
free(ptr);
}
long osdep_hypercall(xencall_handle *xcall, privcmd_hypercall_t *hypercall)
{
int fd = xcall->fd;
return ioctl(fd, IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL, hypercall);
}
int xencall_buffers_never_fault(xencall_handle *xcall)
{
return 1;
}
/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
* c-file-style: "BSD"
* c-basic-offset: 4
* tab-width: 4
* indent-tabs-mode: nil
* End:
*/