mirror of
https://github.com/xen-project/xen.git
synced 2026-10-28 10:11:27 +01:00
Emmanuel Ackaouy
ad8ae4055e
By default, it's off. When enabled on the command line, it causes dom0's VCPUs to be pinned to their respective physical CPUs at creation time. Once pinned, they can never be moved. ALso cleanup VCPU initialization of scheduler parameters. Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Ackaouy <ack@xensource.com>
4312 lines
167 KiB
TeX
4312 lines
167 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,twoside,final,openright]{report}
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\usepackage{a4,graphicx,html,parskip,setspace,times,xspace,url}
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\setstretch{1.15}
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\renewcommand{\ttdefault}{pcr}
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\def\Xend{{Xend}\xspace}
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\def\xend{{xend}\xspace}
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\latexhtml{\renewcommand{\path}[1]{{\small {\tt #1}}}}{\renewcommand{\path}[1]{{\tt #1}}}
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\begin{document}
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% TITLE PAGE
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\pagestyle{empty}
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\begin{center}
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\vspace*{\fill}
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\includegraphics{figs/xenlogo.eps}
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\vfill
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\vfill
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\vfill
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\begin{tabular}{l}
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{\Huge \bf Users' Manual} \\[4mm]
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{\huge Xen v3.0} \\[80mm]
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\end{tabular}
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\end{center}
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{\bf DISCLAIMER: This documentation is always under active development
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and as such there may be mistakes and omissions --- watch out for
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these and please report any you find to the developers' mailing list,
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xen-devel@lists.xensource.com. The latest version is always available
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on-line. Contributions of material, suggestions and corrections are
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welcome.}
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\vfill
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\clearpage
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% COPYRIGHT NOTICE
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\pagestyle{empty}
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\vspace*{\fill}
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Xen is Copyright \copyright 2002-2005, University of Cambridge, UK, XenSource
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Inc., IBM Corp., Hewlett-Packard Co., Intel Corp., AMD Inc., and others. All
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rights reserved.
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Xen is an open-source project. Most portions of Xen are licensed for copying
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under the terms of the GNU General Public License, version 2. Other portions
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are licensed under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License, the
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Zope Public License 2.0, or under ``BSD-style'' licenses. Please refer to the
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COPYING file for details.
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Xen includes software by Christopher Clark. This software is covered by the
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following licence:
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\begin{quote}
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Copyright (c) 2002, Christopher Clark. All rights reserved.
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Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
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this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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\item Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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\item Neither the name of the original author; nor the names of any
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contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this
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software without specific prior written permission.
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\end{itemize}
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THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
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AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
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SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
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CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
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OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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\end{quote}
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\cleardoublepage
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% TABLE OF CONTENTS
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\pagestyle{plain}
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\pagenumbering{roman}
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{ \parskip 0pt plus 1pt
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\tableofcontents }
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\cleardoublepage
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% PREPARE FOR MAIN TEXT
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\pagenumbering{arabic}
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\raggedbottom
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\widowpenalty=10000
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\clubpenalty=10000
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\parindent=0pt
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\parskip=5pt
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\renewcommand{\topfraction}{.8}
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\renewcommand{\bottomfraction}{.8}
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\renewcommand{\textfraction}{.2}
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\renewcommand{\floatpagefraction}{.8}
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\setstretch{1.1}
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%% Chapter Introduction moved to introduction.tex
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\chapter{Introduction}
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Xen is an open-source \emph{para-virtualizing} virtual machine monitor
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(VMM), or ``hypervisor'', for the x86 processor architecture. Xen can
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securely execute multiple virtual machines on a single physical system
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with close-to-native performance. Xen facilitates enterprise-grade
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functionality, including:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Virtual machines with performance close to native hardware.
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\item Live migration of running virtual machines between physical hosts.
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\item Up to 32 virtual CPUs per guest virtual machine, with VCPU hotplug.
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\item x86/32, x86/32 with PAE, and x86/64 platform support.
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\item Intel Virtualization Technology (VT-x) for unmodified guest operating systems (including Microsoft Windows).
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\item Excellent hardware support (supports almost all Linux device
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drivers).
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\end{itemize}
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\section{Usage Scenarios}
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Usage scenarios for Xen include:
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\begin{description}
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\item [Server Consolidation.] Move multiple servers onto a single
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physical host with performance and fault isolation provided at the
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virtual machine boundaries.
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\item [Hardware Independence.] Allow legacy applications and operating
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systems to exploit new hardware.
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\item [Multiple OS configurations.] Run multiple operating systems
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simultaneously, for development or testing purposes.
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\item [Kernel Development.] Test and debug kernel modifications in a
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sand-boxed virtual machine --- no need for a separate test machine.
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\item [Cluster Computing.] Management at VM granularity provides more
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flexibility than separately managing each physical host, but better
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control and isolation than single-system image solutions,
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particularly by using live migration for load balancing.
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\item [Hardware support for custom OSes.] Allow development of new
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OSes while benefiting from the wide-ranging hardware support of
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existing OSes such as Linux.
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\end{description}
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\section{Operating System Support}
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Para-virtualization permits very high performance virtualization, even
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on architectures like x86 that are traditionally very hard to
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virtualize.
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This approach requires operating systems to be \emph{ported} to run on
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Xen. Porting an OS to run on Xen is similar to supporting a new
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hardware platform, however the process is simplified because the
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para-virtual machine architecture is very similar to the underlying
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native hardware. Even though operating system kernels must explicitly
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support Xen, a key feature is that user space applications and
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libraries \emph{do not} require modification.
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With hardware CPU virtualization as provided by Intel VT and AMD
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SVM technology, the ability to run an unmodified guest OS kernel
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is available. No porting of the OS is required, although some
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additional driver support is necessary within Xen itself. Unlike
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traditional full virtualization hypervisors, which suffer a tremendous
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performance overhead, the combination of Xen and VT or Xen and
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Pacifica technology complement one another to offer superb performance
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for para-virtualized guest operating systems and full support for
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unmodified guests running natively on the processor. Full support for
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VT and Pacifica chipsets will appear in early 2006.
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Paravirtualized Xen support is available for increasingly many
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operating systems: currently, mature Linux support is available and
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included in the standard distribution. Other OS ports---including
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NetBSD, FreeBSD and Solaris x86 v10---are nearing completion.
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\section{Hardware Support}
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Xen currently runs on the x86 architecture, requiring a ``P6'' or
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newer processor (e.g.\ Pentium Pro, Celeron, Pentium~II, Pentium~III,
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Pentium~IV, Xeon, AMD~Athlon, AMD~Duron). Multiprocessor machines are
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supported, and there is support for HyperThreading (SMT). In
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addition, ports to IA64 and Power architectures are in progress.
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The default 32-bit Xen supports up to 4GB of memory. However Xen 3.0
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adds support for Intel's Physical Addressing Extensions (PAE), which
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enable x86/32 machines to address up to 64 GB of physical memory. Xen
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3.0 also supports x86/64 platforms such as Intel EM64T and AMD Opteron
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which can currently address up to 1TB of physical memory.
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Xen offloads most of the hardware support issues to the guest OS
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running in the \emph{Domain~0} management virtual machine. Xen itself
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contains only the code required to detect and start secondary
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processors, set up interrupt routing, and perform PCI bus
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enumeration. Device drivers run within a privileged guest OS rather
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than within Xen itself. This approach provides compatibility with the
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majority of device hardware supported by Linux. The default XenLinux
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build contains support for most server-class network and disk
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hardware, but you can add support for other hardware by configuring
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your XenLinux kernel in the normal way.
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\section{Structure of a Xen-Based System}
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A Xen system has multiple layers, the lowest and most privileged of
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which is Xen itself.
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Xen may host multiple \emph{guest} operating systems, each of which is
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executed within a secure virtual machine. In Xen terminology, a
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\emph{domain}. Domains are scheduled by Xen to make effective use of the
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available physical CPUs. Each guest OS manages its own applications.
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This management includes the responsibility of scheduling each
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application within the time allotted to the VM by Xen.
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The first domain, \emph{domain~0}, is created automatically when the
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system boots and has special management privileges. Domain~0 builds
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other domains and manages their virtual devices. It also performs
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administrative tasks such as suspending, resuming and migrating other
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virtual machines.
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Within domain~0, a process called \emph{xend} runs to manage the system.
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\Xend\ is responsible for managing virtual machines and providing access
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to their consoles. Commands are issued to \xend\ over an HTTP interface,
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via a command-line tool.
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\section{History}
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Xen was originally developed by the Systems Research Group at the
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University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory as part of the XenoServers
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project, funded by the UK-EPSRC\@.
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XenoServers aim to provide a ``public infrastructure for global
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distributed computing''. Xen plays a key part in that, allowing one to
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efficiently partition a single machine to enable multiple independent
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clients to run their operating systems and applications in an
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environment. This environment provides protection, resource isolation
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and accounting. The project web page contains further information along
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with pointers to papers and technical reports:
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\path{http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/xeno}
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Xen has grown into a fully-fledged project in its own right, enabling us
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to investigate interesting research issues regarding the best techniques
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for virtualizing resources such as the CPU, memory, disk and network.
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Project contributors now include XenSource, Intel, IBM, HP, AMD, Novell,
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RedHat.
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Xen was first described in a paper presented at SOSP in
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2003\footnote{\tt
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http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/netos/papers/2003-xensosp.pdf}, and the first
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public release (1.0) was made that October. Since then, Xen has
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significantly matured and is now used in production scenarios on many
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sites.
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\section{What's New}
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Xen 3.0.0 offers:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Support for up to 32-way SMP guest operating systems
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\item Intel (Physical Addressing Extensions) PAE to support 32-bit
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servers with more than 4GB physical memory
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\item x86/64 support (Intel EM64T, AMD Opteron)
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\item Intel VT-x support to enable the running of unmodified guest
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operating systems (Windows XP/2003, Legacy Linux)
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\item Enhanced control tools
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\item Improved ACPI support
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\item AGP/DRM graphics
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\end{itemize}
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Xen 3.0 features greatly enhanced hardware support, configuration
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flexibility, usability and a larger complement of supported operating
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systems. This latest release takes Xen a step closer to being the
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definitive open source solution for virtualization.
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\part{Installation}
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%% Chapter Basic Installation
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\chapter{Basic Installation}
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The Xen distribution includes three main components: Xen itself, ports
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of Linux and NetBSD to run on Xen, and the userspace tools required to
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manage a Xen-based system. This chapter describes how to install the
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Xen~3.0 distribution from source. Alternatively, there may be pre-built
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packages available as part of your operating system distribution.
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\section{Prerequisites}
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\label{sec:prerequisites}
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The following is a full list of prerequisites. Items marked `$\dag$' are
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required by the \xend\ control tools, and hence required if you want to
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run more than one virtual machine; items marked `$*$' are only required
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if you wish to build from source.
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\begin{itemize}
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\item A working Linux distribution using the GRUB bootloader and running
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on a P6-class or newer CPU\@.
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\item [$\dag$] The \path{iproute2} package.
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\item [$\dag$] The Linux bridge-utils\footnote{Available from {\tt
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http://bridge.sourceforge.net}} (e.g., \path{/sbin/brctl})
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\item [$\dag$] The Linux hotplug system\footnote{Available from {\tt
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http://linux-hotplug.sourceforge.net/}} (e.g.,
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\path{/sbin/hotplug} and related scripts). On newer distributions,
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this is included alongside the Linux udev system\footnote{See {\tt
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http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/hotplug/udev.html/}}.
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\item [$*$] Build tools (gcc v3.2.x or v3.3.x, binutils, GNU make).
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\item [$*$] Development installation of zlib (e.g.,\ zlib-dev).
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\item [$*$] Development installation of Python v2.2 or later (e.g.,\
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python-dev).
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\item [$*$] \LaTeX\ and transfig are required to build the
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documentation.
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\end{itemize}
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Once you have satisfied these prerequisites, you can now install either
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a binary or source distribution of Xen.
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\section{Installing from Binary Tarball}
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Pre-built tarballs are available for download from the XenSource downloads
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page:
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\begin{quote} {\tt http://www.xensource.com/downloads/}
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\end{quote}
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Once you've downloaded the tarball, simply unpack and install:
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\begin{verbatim}
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# tar zxvf xen-3.0-install.tgz
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# cd xen-3.0-install
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# sh ./install.sh
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\end{verbatim}
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Once you've installed the binaries you need to configure your system as
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described in Section~\ref{s:configure}.
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\section{Installing from RPMs}
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Pre-built RPMs are available for download from the XenSource downloads
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page:
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\begin{quote} {\tt http://www.xensource.com/downloads/}
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\end{quote}
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Once you've downloaded the RPMs, you typically install them via the
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RPM commands:
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\verb|# rpm -iv rpmname|
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See the instructions and the Release Notes for each RPM set referenced at:
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\begin{quote}
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{\tt http://www.xensource.com/downloads/}.
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\end{quote}
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\section{Installing from Source}
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This section describes how to obtain, build and install Xen from source.
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\subsection{Obtaining the Source}
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The Xen source tree is available as either a compressed source tarball
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or as a clone of our master Mercurial repository.
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\begin{description}
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\item[Obtaining the Source Tarball]\mbox{} \\
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Stable versions and daily snapshots of the Xen source tree are
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available from the Xen download page:
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\begin{quote} {\tt \tt http://www.xensource.com/downloads/}
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\end{quote}
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\item[Obtaining the source via Mercurial]\mbox{} \\
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The source tree may also be obtained via the public Mercurial
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repository at:
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\begin{quote}{\tt http://xenbits.xensource.com}
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\end{quote} See the instructions and the Getting Started Guide
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referenced at:
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\begin{quote}
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{\tt http://www.xensource.com/downloads/}
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\end{quote}
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\end{description}
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% \section{The distribution}
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%
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% The Xen source code repository is structured as follows:
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%
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% \begin{description}
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% \item[\path{tools/}] Xen node controller daemon (Xend), command line
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% tools, control libraries
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% \item[\path{xen/}] The Xen VMM.
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% \item[\path{buildconfigs/}] Build configuration files
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% \item[\path{linux-*-xen-sparse/}] Xen support for Linux.
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% \item[\path{patches/}] Experimental patches for Linux.
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% \item[\path{docs/}] Various documentation files for users and
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% developers.
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% \item[\path{extras/}] Bonus extras.
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% \end{description}
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\subsection{Building from Source}
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The top-level Xen Makefile includes a target ``world'' that will do the
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following:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Build Xen.
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\item Build the control tools, including \xend.
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\item Download (if necessary) and unpack the Linux 2.6 source code, and
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patch it for use with Xen.
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\item Build a Linux kernel to use in domain~0 and a smaller unprivileged
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kernel, which can be used for unprivileged virtual machines.
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\end{itemize}
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After the build has completed you should have a top-level directory
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called \path{dist/} in which all resulting targets will be placed. Of
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particular interest are the two XenLinux kernel images, one with a
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``-xen0'' extension which contains hardware device drivers and drivers
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for Xen's virtual devices, and one with a ``-xenU'' extension that
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just contains the virtual ones. These are found in
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\path{dist/install/boot/} along with the image for Xen itself and the
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configuration files used during the build.
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%The NetBSD port can be built using:
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%\begin{quote}
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%\begin{verbatim}
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%# make netbsd20
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%\end{verbatim}\end{quote}
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%NetBSD port is built using a snapshot of the netbsd-2-0 cvs branch.
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%The snapshot is downloaded as part of the build process if it is not
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%yet present in the \path{NETBSD\_SRC\_PATH} search path. The build
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%process also downloads a toolchain which includes all of the tools
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%necessary to build the NetBSD kernel under Linux.
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To customize the set of kernels built you need to edit the top-level
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Makefile. Look for the line:
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\begin{quote}
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\begin{verbatim}
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KERNELS ?= linux-2.6-xen0 linux-2.6-xenU
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\end{verbatim}
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\end{quote}
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|
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You can edit this line to include any set of operating system kernels
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which have configurations in the top-level \path{buildconfigs/}
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directory.
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%% Inspect the Makefile if you want to see what goes on during a
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%% build. Building Xen and the tools is straightforward, but XenLinux
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%% is more complicated. The makefile needs a `pristine' Linux kernel
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%% tree to which it will then add the Xen architecture files. You can
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%% tell the makefile the location of the appropriate Linux compressed
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%% tar file by
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%% setting the LINUX\_SRC environment variable, e.g. \\
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%% \verb!# LINUX_SRC=/tmp/linux-2.6.11.tar.bz2 make world! \\ or by
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%% placing the tar file somewhere in the search path of {\tt
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%% LINUX\_SRC\_PATH} which defaults to `{\tt .:..}'. If the
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%% makefile can't find a suitable kernel tar file it attempts to
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%% download it from kernel.org (this won't work if you're behind a
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%% firewall).
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%% After untaring the pristine kernel tree, the makefile uses the {\tt
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%% mkbuildtree} script to add the Xen patches to the kernel.
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%% \framebox{\parbox{5in}{
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%% {\bf Distro specific:} \\
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%% {\it Gentoo} --- if not using udev (most installations,
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%% currently), you'll need to enable devfs and devfs mount at boot
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%% time in the xen0 config. }}
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|
\subsection{Custom Kernels}
|
|
|
|
% If you have an SMP machine you may wish to give the {\tt '-j4'}
|
|
% argument to make to get a parallel build.
|
|
|
|
If you wish to build a customized XenLinux kernel (e.g.\ to support
|
|
additional devices or enable distribution-required features), you can
|
|
use the standard Linux configuration mechanisms, specifying that the
|
|
architecture being built for is \path{xen}, e.g:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# cd linux-2.6.12-xen0
|
|
# make ARCH=xen xconfig
|
|
# cd ..
|
|
# make
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
You can also copy an existing Linux configuration (\path{.config}) into
|
|
e.g.\ \path{linux-2.6.12-xen0} and execute:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# make ARCH=xen oldconfig
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
You may be prompted with some Xen-specific options. We advise accepting
|
|
the defaults for these options.
|
|
|
|
Note that the only difference between the two types of Linux kernels
|
|
that are built is the configuration file used for each. The ``U''
|
|
suffixed (unprivileged) versions don't contain any of the physical
|
|
hardware device drivers, leading to a 30\% reduction in size; hence you
|
|
may prefer these for your non-privileged domains. The ``0'' suffixed
|
|
privileged versions can be used to boot the system, as well as in driver
|
|
domains and unprivileged domains.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Installing Generated Binaries}
|
|
|
|
The files produced by the build process are stored under the
|
|
\path{dist/install/} directory. To install them in their default
|
|
locations, do:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# make install
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Alternatively, users with special installation requirements may wish to
|
|
install them manually by copying the files to their appropriate
|
|
destinations.
|
|
|
|
%% Files in \path{install/boot/} include:
|
|
%% \begin{itemize}
|
|
%% \item \path{install/boot/xen-3.0.gz} Link to the Xen 'kernel'
|
|
%% \item \path{install/boot/vmlinuz-2.6-xen0} Link to domain 0
|
|
%% XenLinux kernel
|
|
%% \item \path{install/boot/vmlinuz-2.6-xenU} Link to unprivileged
|
|
%% XenLinux kernel
|
|
%% \end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
The \path{dist/install/boot} directory will also contain the config
|
|
files used for building the XenLinux kernels, and also versions of Xen
|
|
and XenLinux kernels that contain debug symbols such as
|
|
(\path{xen-syms-3.0.0} and \path{vmlinux-syms-2.6.12.6-xen0}) which are
|
|
essential for interpreting crash dumps. Retain these files as the
|
|
developers may wish to see them if you post on the mailing list.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Configuration}
|
|
\label{s:configure}
|
|
|
|
Once you have built and installed the Xen distribution, it is simple to
|
|
prepare the machine for booting and running Xen.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{GRUB Configuration}
|
|
|
|
An entry should be added to \path{grub.conf} (often found under
|
|
\path{/boot/} or \path{/boot/grub/}) to allow Xen / XenLinux to boot.
|
|
This file is sometimes called \path{menu.lst}, depending on your
|
|
distribution. The entry should look something like the following:
|
|
|
|
%% KMSelf Thu Dec 1 19:06:13 PST 2005 262144 is useful for RHEL/RH and
|
|
%% related Dom0s.
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
title Xen 3.0 / XenLinux 2.6
|
|
kernel /boot/xen-3.0.gz dom0_mem=262144
|
|
module /boot/vmlinuz-2.6-xen0 root=/dev/sda4 ro console=tty0
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
The kernel line tells GRUB where to find Xen itself and what boot
|
|
parameters should be passed to it (in this case, setting the domain~0
|
|
memory allocation in kilobytes and the settings for the serial port).
|
|
For more details on the various Xen boot parameters see
|
|
Section~\ref{s:xboot}.
|
|
|
|
The module line of the configuration describes the location of the
|
|
XenLinux kernel that Xen should start and the parameters that should be
|
|
passed to it. These are standard Linux parameters, identifying the root
|
|
device and specifying it be initially mounted read only and instructing
|
|
that console output be sent to the screen. Some distributions such as
|
|
SuSE do not require the \path{ro} parameter.
|
|
|
|
%% \framebox{\parbox{5in}{
|
|
%% {\bf Distro specific:} \\
|
|
%% {\it SuSE} --- Omit the {\tt ro} option from the XenLinux
|
|
%% kernel command line, since the partition won't be remounted rw
|
|
%% during boot. }}
|
|
|
|
To use an initrd, add another \path{module} line to the configuration,
|
|
like: {\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
module /boot/my_initrd.gz
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
%% KMSelf Thu Dec 1 19:05:30 PST 2005 Other configs as an appendix?
|
|
|
|
When installing a new kernel, it is recommended that you do not delete
|
|
existing menu options from \path{menu.lst}, as you may wish to boot your
|
|
old Linux kernel in future, particularly if you have problems.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Serial Console (optional)}
|
|
|
|
Serial console access allows you to manage, monitor, and interact with
|
|
your system over a serial console. This can allow access from another
|
|
nearby system via a null-modem (``LapLink'') cable or remotely via a serial
|
|
concentrator.
|
|
|
|
You system's BIOS, bootloader (GRUB), Xen, Linux, and login access must
|
|
each be individually configured for serial console access. It is
|
|
\emph{not} strictly necessary to have each component fully functional,
|
|
but it can be quite useful.
|
|
|
|
For general information on serial console configuration under Linux,
|
|
refer to the ``Remote Serial Console HOWTO'' at The Linux Documentation
|
|
Project: \url{http://www.tldp.org}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Serial Console BIOS configuration}
|
|
|
|
Enabling system serial console output neither enables nor disables
|
|
serial capabilities in GRUB, Xen, or Linux, but may make remote
|
|
management of your system more convenient by displaying POST and other
|
|
boot messages over serial port and allowing remote BIOS configuration.
|
|
|
|
Refer to your hardware vendor's documentation for capabilities and
|
|
procedures to enable BIOS serial redirection.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Serial Console GRUB configuration}
|
|
|
|
Enabling GRUB serial console output neither enables nor disables Xen or
|
|
Linux serial capabilities, but may made remote management of your system
|
|
more convenient by displaying GRUB prompts, menus, and actions over
|
|
serial port and allowing remote GRUB management.
|
|
|
|
Adding the following two lines to your GRUB configuration file,
|
|
typically either \path{/boot/grub/menu.lst} or \path{/boot/grub/grub.conf}
|
|
depending on your distro, will enable GRUB serial output.
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
{\small \begin{verbatim}
|
|
serial --unit=0 --speed=115200 --word=8 --parity=no --stop=1
|
|
terminal --timeout=10 serial console
|
|
\end{verbatim}}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Note that when both the serial port and the local monitor and keyboard
|
|
are enabled, the text ``\emph{Press any key to continue}'' will appear
|
|
at both. Pressing a key on one device will cause GRUB to display to
|
|
that device. The other device will see no output. If no key is
|
|
pressed before the timeout period expires, the system will boot to the
|
|
default GRUB boot entry.
|
|
|
|
Please refer to the GRUB documentation for further information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Serial Console Xen configuration}
|
|
|
|
Enabling Xen serial console output neither enables nor disables Linux
|
|
kernel output or logging in to Linux over serial port. It does however
|
|
allow you to monitor and log the Xen boot process via serial console and
|
|
can be very useful in debugging.
|
|
|
|
%% kernel /boot/xen-2.0.gz dom0_mem=131072 console=com1,vga com1=115200,8n1
|
|
%% module /boot/vmlinuz-2.6-xen0 root=/dev/sda4 ro
|
|
|
|
In order to configure Xen serial console output, it is necessary to
|
|
add a boot option to your GRUB config; e.g.\ replace the previous
|
|
example kernel line with:
|
|
\begin{quote} {\small \begin{verbatim}
|
|
kernel /boot/xen.gz dom0_mem=131072 com1=115200,8n1
|
|
\end{verbatim}}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
This configures Xen to output on COM1 at 115,200 baud, 8 data bits, no
|
|
parity and 1 stop bit. Modify these parameters for your environment.
|
|
See Section~\ref{s:xboot} for an explanation of all boot parameters.
|
|
|
|
One can also configure XenLinux to share the serial console; to achieve
|
|
this append ``\path{console=ttyS0}'' to your module line.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Serial Console Linux configuration}
|
|
|
|
Enabling Linux serial console output at boot neither enables nor
|
|
disables logging in to Linux over serial port. It does however allow
|
|
you to monitor and log the Linux boot process via serial console and can be
|
|
very useful in debugging.
|
|
|
|
To enable Linux output at boot time, add the parameter
|
|
\path{console=ttyS0} (or ttyS1, ttyS2, etc.) to your kernel GRUB line.
|
|
Under Xen, this might be:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
{\footnotesize \begin{verbatim}
|
|
module /vmlinuz-2.6-xen0 ro root=/dev/VolGroup00/LogVol00 \
|
|
console=ttyS0, 115200
|
|
\end{verbatim}}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
to enable output over ttyS0 at 115200 baud.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Serial Console Login configuration}
|
|
|
|
Logging in to Linux via serial console, under Xen or otherwise, requires
|
|
specifying a login prompt be started on the serial port. To permit root
|
|
logins over serial console, the serial port must be added to
|
|
\path{/etc/securetty}.
|
|
|
|
\newpage
|
|
To automatically start a login prompt over the serial port,
|
|
add the line: \begin{quote} {\small {\tt c:2345:respawn:/sbin/mingetty
|
|
ttyS0}} \end{quote} to \path{/etc/inittab}. Run \path{init q} to force
|
|
a reload of your inttab and start getty.
|
|
|
|
To enable root logins, add \path{ttyS0} to \path{/etc/securetty} if not
|
|
already present.
|
|
|
|
Your distribution may use an alternate getty; options include getty,
|
|
mgetty and agetty. Consult your distribution's documentation
|
|
for further information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsection{TLS Libraries}
|
|
|
|
Users of the XenLinux 2.6 kernel should disable Thread Local Storage
|
|
(TLS) (e.g.\ by doing a \path{mv /lib/tls /lib/tls.disabled}) before
|
|
attempting to boot a XenLinux kernel\footnote{If you boot without first
|
|
disabling TLS, you will get a warning message during the boot process.
|
|
In this case, simply perform the rename after the machine is up and
|
|
then run \path{/sbin/ldconfig} to make it take effect.}. You can
|
|
always reenable TLS by restoring the directory to its original location
|
|
(i.e.\ \path{mv /lib/tls.disabled /lib/tls}).
|
|
|
|
The reason for this is that the current TLS implementation uses
|
|
segmentation in a way that is not permissible under Xen. If TLS is not
|
|
disabled, an emulation mode is used within Xen which reduces performance
|
|
substantially. To ensure full performance you should install a
|
|
`Xen-friendly' (nosegneg) version of the library.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Booting Xen}
|
|
|
|
It should now be possible to restart the system and use Xen. Reboot and
|
|
choose the new Xen option when the Grub screen appears.
|
|
|
|
What follows should look much like a conventional Linux boot. The first
|
|
portion of the output comes from Xen itself, supplying low level
|
|
information about itself and the underlying hardware. The last portion
|
|
of the output comes from XenLinux.
|
|
|
|
You may see some error messages during the XenLinux boot. These are not
|
|
necessarily anything to worry about---they may result from kernel
|
|
configuration differences between your XenLinux kernel and the one you
|
|
usually use.
|
|
|
|
When the boot completes, you should be able to log into your system as
|
|
usual. If you are unable to log in, you should still be able to reboot
|
|
with your normal Linux kernel by selecting it at the GRUB prompt.
|
|
|
|
|
|
% Booting Xen
|
|
\chapter{Booting a Xen System}
|
|
|
|
Booting the system into Xen will bring you up into the privileged
|
|
management domain, Domain0. At that point you are ready to create
|
|
guest domains and ``boot'' them using the \texttt{xm create} command.
|
|
|
|
\section{Booting Domain0}
|
|
|
|
After installation and configuration is complete, reboot the system
|
|
and and choose the new Xen option when the Grub screen appears.
|
|
|
|
What follows should look much like a conventional Linux boot. The
|
|
first portion of the output comes from Xen itself, supplying low level
|
|
information about itself and the underlying hardware. The last
|
|
portion of the output comes from XenLinux.
|
|
|
|
%% KMSelf Wed Nov 30 18:09:37 PST 2005: We should specify what these are.
|
|
|
|
When the boot completes, you should be able to log into your system as
|
|
usual. If you are unable to log in, you should still be able to
|
|
reboot with your normal Linux kernel by selecting it at the GRUB prompt.
|
|
|
|
The first step in creating a new domain is to prepare a root
|
|
filesystem for it to boot. Typically, this might be stored in a normal
|
|
partition, an LVM or other volume manager partition, a disk file or on
|
|
an NFS server. A simple way to do this is simply to boot from your
|
|
standard OS install CD and install the distribution into another
|
|
partition on your hard drive.
|
|
|
|
To start the \xend\ control daemon, type
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb!# xend start!
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
If you wish the daemon to start automatically, see the instructions in
|
|
Section~\ref{s:xend}. Once the daemon is running, you can use the
|
|
\path{xm} tool to monitor and maintain the domains running on your
|
|
system. This chapter provides only a brief tutorial. We provide full
|
|
details of the \path{xm} tool in the next chapter.
|
|
|
|
% \section{From the web interface}
|
|
%
|
|
% Boot the Xen machine and start Xensv (see Chapter~\ref{cha:xensv}
|
|
% for more details) using the command: \\
|
|
% \verb_# xensv start_ \\
|
|
% This will also start Xend (see Chapter~\ref{cha:xend} for more
|
|
% information).
|
|
%
|
|
% The domain management interface will then be available at {\tt
|
|
% http://your\_machine:8080/}. This provides a user friendly wizard
|
|
% for starting domains and functions for managing running domains.
|
|
%
|
|
% \section{From the command line}
|
|
\section{Booting Guest Domains}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Creating a Domain Configuration File}
|
|
|
|
Before you can start an additional domain, you must create a
|
|
configuration file. We provide two example files which you can use as
|
|
a starting point:
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\item \path{/etc/xen/xmexample1} is a simple template configuration
|
|
file for describing a single VM\@.
|
|
\item \path{/etc/xen/xmexample2} file is a template description that
|
|
is intended to be reused for multiple virtual machines. Setting the
|
|
value of the \path{vmid} variable on the \path{xm} command line
|
|
fills in parts of this template.
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
There are also a number of other examples which you may find useful.
|
|
Copy one of these files and edit it as appropriate. Typical values
|
|
you may wish to edit include:
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[kernel] Set this to the path of the kernel you compiled for use
|
|
with Xen (e.g.\ \path{kernel = ``/boot/vmlinuz-2.6-xenU''})
|
|
\item[memory] Set this to the size of the domain's memory in megabytes
|
|
(e.g.\ \path{memory = 64})
|
|
\item[disk] Set the first entry in this list to calculate the offset
|
|
of the domain's root partition, based on the domain ID\@. Set the
|
|
second to the location of \path{/usr} if you are sharing it between
|
|
domains (e.g.\ \path{disk = ['phy:your\_hard\_drive\%d,sda1,w' \%
|
|
(base\_partition\_number + vmid),
|
|
'phy:your\_usr\_partition,sda6,r' ]}
|
|
\item[dhcp] Uncomment the dhcp variable, so that the domain will
|
|
receive its IP address from a DHCP server (e.g.\ \path{dhcp=``dhcp''})
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
You may also want to edit the {\bf vif} variable in order to choose
|
|
the MAC address of the virtual ethernet interface yourself. For
|
|
example:
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_vif = ['mac=00:16:3E:F6:BB:B3']_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
If you do not set this variable, \xend\ will automatically generate a
|
|
random MAC address from the range 00:16:3E:xx:xx:xx, assigned by IEEE to
|
|
XenSource as an OUI (organizationally unique identifier). XenSource
|
|
Inc. gives permission for anyone to use addresses randomly allocated
|
|
from this range for use by their Xen domains.
|
|
|
|
For a list of IEEE OUI assignments, see
|
|
\url{http://standards.ieee.org/regauth/oui/oui.txt}
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Booting the Guest Domain}
|
|
|
|
The \path{xm} tool provides a variety of commands for managing
|
|
domains. Use the \path{create} command to start new domains. Assuming
|
|
you've created a configuration file \path{myvmconf} based around
|
|
\path{/etc/xen/xmexample2}, to start a domain with virtual machine
|
|
ID~1 you should type:
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm create -c myvmconf vmid=1
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
The \path{-c} switch causes \path{xm} to turn into the domain's
|
|
console after creation. The \path{vmid=1} sets the \path{vmid}
|
|
variable used in the \path{myvmconf} file.
|
|
|
|
You should see the console boot messages from the new domain appearing
|
|
in the terminal in which you typed the command, culminating in a login
|
|
prompt.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Starting / Stopping Domains Automatically}
|
|
|
|
It is possible to have certain domains start automatically at boot
|
|
time and to have dom0 wait for all running domains to shutdown before
|
|
it shuts down the system.
|
|
|
|
To specify a domain is to start at boot-time, place its configuration
|
|
file (or a link to it) under \path{/etc/xen/auto/}.
|
|
|
|
A Sys-V style init script for Red Hat and LSB-compliant systems is
|
|
provided and will be automatically copied to \path{/etc/init.d/}
|
|
during install. You can then enable it in the appropriate way for
|
|
your distribution.
|
|
|
|
For instance, on Red Hat:
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_# chkconfig --add xendomains_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
By default, this will start the boot-time domains in runlevels 3, 4
|
|
and 5.
|
|
|
|
You can also use the \path{service} command to run this script
|
|
manually, e.g:
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_# service xendomains start_
|
|
|
|
Starts all the domains with config files under /etc/xen/auto/.
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_# service xendomains stop_
|
|
|
|
Shuts down all running Xen domains.
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\part{Configuration and Management}
|
|
|
|
%% Chapter Domain Management Tools and Daemons
|
|
\chapter{Domain Management Tools}
|
|
|
|
This chapter summarizes the management software and tools available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{\Xend\ }
|
|
\label{s:xend}
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \Xend\ node control daemon performs system management functions
|
|
related to virtual machines. It forms a central point of control of
|
|
virtualized resources, and must be running in order to start and manage
|
|
virtual machines. \Xend\ must be run as root because it needs access to
|
|
privileged system management functions.
|
|
|
|
An initialization script named \texttt{/etc/init.d/xend} is provided to
|
|
start \Xend\ at boot time. Use the tool appropriate (i.e. chkconfig) for
|
|
your Linux distribution to specify the runlevels at which this script
|
|
should be executed, or manually create symbolic links in the correct
|
|
runlevel directories.
|
|
|
|
\Xend\ can be started on the command line as well, and supports the
|
|
following set of parameters:
|
|
|
|
\begin{tabular}{ll}
|
|
\verb!# xend start! & start \xend, if not already running \\
|
|
\verb!# xend stop! & stop \xend\ if already running \\
|
|
\verb!# xend restart! & restart \xend\ if running, otherwise start it \\
|
|
% \verb!# xend trace_start! & start \xend, with very detailed debug logging \\
|
|
\verb!# xend status! & indicates \xend\ status by its return code
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
|
|
A SysV init script called {\tt xend} is provided to start \xend\ at
|
|
boot time. {\tt make install} installs this script in
|
|
\path{/etc/init.d}. To enable it, you have to make symbolic links in
|
|
the appropriate runlevel directories or use the {\tt chkconfig} tool,
|
|
where available. Once \xend\ is running, administration can be done
|
|
using the \texttt{xm} tool.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Logging}
|
|
|
|
As \xend\ runs, events will be logged to \path{/var/log/xen/xend.log} and
|
|
(less frequently) to \path{/var/log/xen/xend-debug.log}. These, along with
|
|
the standard syslog files, are useful when troubleshooting problems.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Configuring \Xend\ }
|
|
|
|
\Xend\ is written in Python. At startup, it reads its configuration
|
|
information from the file \path{/etc/xen/xend-config.sxp}. The Xen
|
|
installation places an example \texttt{xend-config.sxp} file in the
|
|
\texttt{/etc/xen} subdirectory which should work for most installations.
|
|
|
|
See the example configuration file \texttt{xend-debug.sxp} and the
|
|
section 5 man page \texttt{xend-config.sxp} for a full list of
|
|
parameters and more detailed information. Some of the most important
|
|
parameters are discussed below.
|
|
|
|
An HTTP interface and a Unix domain socket API are available to
|
|
communicate with \Xend. This allows remote users to pass commands to the
|
|
daemon. By default, \Xend does not start an HTTP server. It does start a
|
|
Unix domain socket management server, as the low level utility
|
|
\texttt{xm} requires it. For support of cross-machine migration, \Xend\
|
|
can start a relocation server. This support is not enabled by default
|
|
for security reasons.
|
|
|
|
Note: the example \texttt{xend} configuration file modifies the defaults and
|
|
starts up \Xend\ as an HTTP server as well as a relocation server.
|
|
|
|
From the file:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
#(xend-http-server no)
|
|
(xend-http-server yes)
|
|
#(xend-unix-server yes)
|
|
#(xend-relocation-server no)
|
|
(xend-relocation-server yes)
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Comment or uncomment lines in that file to disable or enable features
|
|
that you require.
|
|
|
|
Connections from remote hosts are disabled by default:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# Address xend should listen on for HTTP connections, if xend-http-server is
|
|
# set.
|
|
# Specifying 'localhost' prevents remote connections.
|
|
# Specifying the empty string '' (the default) allows all connections.
|
|
#(xend-address '')
|
|
(xend-address localhost)
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
It is recommended that if migration support is not needed, the
|
|
\texttt{xend-relocation-server} parameter value be changed to
|
|
``\texttt{no}'' or commented out.
|
|
|
|
\section{Xm}
|
|
\label{s:xm}
|
|
|
|
The xm tool is the primary tool for managing Xen from the console. The
|
|
general format of an xm command line is:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm command [switches] [arguments] [variables]
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
The available \emph{switches} and \emph{arguments} are dependent on the
|
|
\emph{command} chosen. The \emph{variables} may be set using
|
|
declarations of the form {\tt variable=value} and command line
|
|
declarations override any of the values in the configuration file being
|
|
used, including the standard variables described above and any custom
|
|
variables (for instance, the \path{xmdefconfig} file uses a {\tt vmid}
|
|
variable).
|
|
|
|
For online help for the commands available, type:
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm help
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
This will list the most commonly used commands. The full list can be obtained
|
|
using \verb_xm help --long_. You can also type \path{xm help $<$command$>$}
|
|
for more information on a given command.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Basic Management Commands}
|
|
|
|
One useful command is \verb_# xm list_ which lists all domains running in rows
|
|
of the following format:
|
|
\begin{center} {\tt name domid memory vcpus state cputime}
|
|
\end{center}
|
|
|
|
The meaning of each field is as follows:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[name] The descriptive name of the virtual machine.
|
|
\item[domid] The number of the domain ID this virtual machine is
|
|
running in.
|
|
\item[memory] Memory size in megabytes.
|
|
\item[vcpus] The number of virtual CPUs this domain has.
|
|
\item[state] Domain state consists of 5 fields:
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[r] running
|
|
\item[b] blocked
|
|
\item[p] paused
|
|
\item[s] shutdown
|
|
\item[c] crashed
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
\item[cputime] How much CPU time (in seconds) the domain has used so
|
|
far.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
The \path{xm list} command also supports a long output format when the
|
|
\path{-l} switch is used. This outputs the full details of the
|
|
running domains in \xend's SXP configuration format.
|
|
|
|
If you want to know how long your domains have been running for, then
|
|
you can use the \verb_# xm uptime_ command.
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can get access to the console of a particular domain using
|
|
the \verb_# xm console_ command (e.g.\ \verb_# xm console myVM_).
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Domain Scheduling Management Commands}
|
|
|
|
The credit CPU scheduler automatically load balances guest VCPUs
|
|
across all available physical CPUs on an SMP host. The user need
|
|
not manually pin VCPUs to load balance the system. However, she
|
|
can restrict which CPUs a particular VCPU may run on using
|
|
the \path{xm vcpu-pin} command.
|
|
|
|
Each guest domain is assigned a \path{weight} and a \path{cap}.
|
|
|
|
A domain with a weight of 512 will get twice as much CPU as a
|
|
domain with a weight of 256 on a contended host. Legal weights
|
|
range from 1 to 65535 and the default is 256.
|
|
|
|
The cap optionally fixes the maximum amount of CPU a guest will
|
|
be able to consume, even if the host system has idle CPU cycles.
|
|
The cap is expressed in percentage of one physical CPU: 100 is
|
|
1 physical CPU, 50 is half a CPU, 400 is 4 CPUs, etc... The
|
|
default, 0, means there is no upper cap.
|
|
|
|
When you are running with the credit scheduler, you can check and
|
|
modify your domains' weights and caps using the \path{xm sched-credit}
|
|
command:
|
|
|
|
\begin{tabular}{ll}
|
|
\verb!xm sched-credit -d <domain>! & lists weight and cap \\
|
|
\verb!xm sched-credit -d <domain> -w <weight>! & sets the weight \\
|
|
\verb!xm sched-credit -d <domain> -c <cap>! & sets the cap
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
%% Chapter Domain Configuration
|
|
\chapter{Domain Configuration}
|
|
\label{cha:config}
|
|
|
|
The following contains the syntax of the domain configuration files
|
|
and description of how to further specify networking, driver domain
|
|
and general scheduling behavior.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Configuration Files}
|
|
\label{s:cfiles}
|
|
|
|
Xen configuration files contain the following standard variables.
|
|
Unless otherwise stated, configuration items should be enclosed in
|
|
quotes: see the configuration scripts in \path{/etc/xen/}
|
|
for concrete examples.
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[kernel] Path to the kernel image.
|
|
\item[ramdisk] Path to a ramdisk image (optional).
|
|
% \item[builder] The name of the domain build function (e.g.
|
|
% {\tt'linux'} or {\tt'netbsd'}.
|
|
\item[memory] Memory size in megabytes.
|
|
\item[vcpus] The number of virtual CPUs.
|
|
\item[console] Port to export the domain console on (default 9600 +
|
|
domain ID).
|
|
\item[vif] Network interface configuration. This may simply contain
|
|
an empty string for each desired interface, or may override various
|
|
settings, e.g.\
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3E:00:00:11, bridge=xen-br0',
|
|
'bridge=xen-br1' ]
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
to assign a MAC address and bridge to the first interface and assign
|
|
a different bridge to the second interface, leaving \xend\ to choose
|
|
the MAC address. The settings that may be overridden in this way are
|
|
type, mac, bridge, ip, script, backend, and vifname.
|
|
\item[disk] List of block devices to export to the domain e.g.
|
|
\verb_disk = [ 'phy:hda1,sda1,r' ]_
|
|
exports physical device \path{/dev/hda1} to the domain as
|
|
\path{/dev/sda1} with read-only access. Exporting a disk read-write
|
|
which is currently mounted is dangerous -- if you are \emph{certain}
|
|
you wish to do this, you can specify \path{w!} as the mode.
|
|
\item[dhcp] Set to {\tt `dhcp'} if you want to use DHCP to configure
|
|
networking.
|
|
\item[netmask] Manually configured IP netmask.
|
|
\item[gateway] Manually configured IP gateway.
|
|
\item[hostname] Set the hostname for the virtual machine.
|
|
\item[root] Specify the root device parameter on the kernel command
|
|
line.
|
|
\item[nfs\_server] IP address for the NFS server (if any).
|
|
\item[nfs\_root] Path of the root filesystem on the NFS server (if
|
|
any).
|
|
\item[extra] Extra string to append to the kernel command line (if
|
|
any)
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
Additional fields are documented in the example configuration files
|
|
(e.g. to configure virtual TPM functionality).
|
|
|
|
For additional flexibility, it is also possible to include Python
|
|
scripting commands in configuration files. An example of this is the
|
|
\path{xmexample2} file, which uses Python code to handle the
|
|
\path{vmid} variable.
|
|
|
|
|
|
%\part{Advanced Topics}
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Network Configuration}
|
|
|
|
For many users, the default installation should work ``out of the
|
|
box''. More complicated network setups, for instance with multiple
|
|
Ethernet interfaces and/or existing bridging setups will require some
|
|
special configuration.
|
|
|
|
The purpose of this section is to describe the mechanisms provided by
|
|
\xend\ to allow a flexible configuration for Xen's virtual networking.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Xen virtual network topology}
|
|
|
|
Each domain network interface is connected to a virtual network
|
|
interface in dom0 by a point to point link (effectively a ``virtual
|
|
crossover cable''). These devices are named {\tt
|
|
vif$<$domid$>$.$<$vifid$>$} (e.g.\ {\tt vif1.0} for the first
|
|
interface in domain~1, {\tt vif3.1} for the second interface in
|
|
domain~3).
|
|
|
|
Traffic on these virtual interfaces is handled in domain~0 using
|
|
standard Linux mechanisms for bridging, routing, rate limiting, etc.
|
|
Xend calls on two shell scripts to perform initial configuration of
|
|
the network and configuration of new virtual interfaces. By default,
|
|
these scripts configure a single bridge for all the virtual
|
|
interfaces. Arbitrary routing / bridging configurations can be
|
|
configured by customizing the scripts, as described in the following
|
|
section.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Xen networking scripts}
|
|
|
|
Xen's virtual networking is configured by two shell scripts (by
|
|
default \path{network-bridge} and \path{vif-bridge}). These are called
|
|
automatically by \xend\ when certain events occur, with arguments to
|
|
the scripts providing further contextual information. These scripts
|
|
are found by default in \path{/etc/xen/scripts}. The names and
|
|
locations of the scripts can be configured in
|
|
\path{/etc/xen/xend-config.sxp}.
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[network-bridge:] This script is called whenever \xend\ is started or
|
|
stopped to respectively initialize or tear down the Xen virtual
|
|
network. In the default configuration initialization creates the
|
|
bridge `xen-br0' and moves eth0 onto that bridge, modifying the
|
|
routing accordingly. When \xend\ exits, it deletes the Xen bridge
|
|
and removes eth0, restoring the normal IP and routing configuration.
|
|
|
|
%% In configurations where the bridge already exists, this script
|
|
%% could be replaced with a link to \path{/bin/true} (for instance).
|
|
|
|
\item[vif-bridge:] This script is called for every domain virtual
|
|
interface and can configure firewalling rules and add the vif to the
|
|
appropriate bridge. By default, this adds and removes VIFs on the
|
|
default Xen bridge.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
Other example scripts are available (\path{network-route} and
|
|
\path{vif-route}, \path{network-nat} and \path{vif-nat}).
|
|
For more complex network setups (e.g.\ where routing is required or
|
|
integrate with existing bridges) these scripts may be replaced with
|
|
customized variants for your site's preferred configuration.
|
|
|
|
\section{Driver Domain Configuration}
|
|
\label{s:ddconf}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{PCI}
|
|
\label{ss:pcidd}
|
|
|
|
Individual PCI devices can be assigned to a given domain (a PCI driver domain)
|
|
to allow that domain direct access to the PCI hardware.
|
|
|
|
While PCI Driver Domains can increase the stability and security of a system
|
|
by addressing a number of security concerns, there are some security issues
|
|
that remain that you can read about in Section~\ref{s:ddsecurity}.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Compile-Time Setup}
|
|
To use this functionality, ensure
|
|
that the PCI Backend is compiled in to a privileged domain (e.g. domain 0)
|
|
and that the domains which will be assigned PCI devices have the PCI Frontend
|
|
compiled in. In XenLinux, the PCI Backend is available under the Xen
|
|
configuration section while the PCI Frontend is under the
|
|
architecture-specific "Bus Options" section. You may compile both the backend
|
|
and the frontend into the same kernel; they will not affect each other.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{PCI Backend Configuration - Binding at Boot}
|
|
The PCI devices you wish to assign to unprivileged domains must be "hidden"
|
|
from your backend domain (usually domain 0) so that it does not load a driver
|
|
for them. Use the \path{pciback.hide} kernel parameter which is specified on
|
|
the kernel command-line and is configurable through GRUB (see
|
|
Section~\ref{s:configure}). Note that devices are not really hidden from the
|
|
backend domain. The PCI Backend appears to the Linux kernel as a regular PCI
|
|
device driver. The PCI Backend ensures that no other device driver loads
|
|
for the devices by binding itself as the device driver for those devices.
|
|
PCI devices are identified by hexadecimal slot/function numbers (on Linux,
|
|
use \path{lspci} to determine slot/function numbers of your devices) and
|
|
can be specified with or without the PCI domain: \\
|
|
\centerline{ {\tt ({\em bus}:{\em slot}.{\em func})} example {\tt (02:1d.3)}} \\
|
|
\centerline{ {\tt ({\em domain}:{\em bus}:{\em slot}.{\em func})} example {\tt (0000:02:1d.3)}} \\
|
|
|
|
An example kernel command-line which hides two PCI devices might be: \\
|
|
\centerline{ {\tt root=/dev/sda4 ro console=tty0 pciback.hide=(02:01.f)(0000:04:1d.0) } } \\
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{PCI Backend Configuration - Late Binding}
|
|
PCI devices can also be bound to the PCI Backend after boot through the manual
|
|
binding/unbinding facilities provided by the Linux kernel in sysfs (allowing
|
|
for a Xen user to give PCI devices to driver domains that were not specified
|
|
on the kernel command-line). There are several attributes with the PCI
|
|
Backend's sysfs directory (\path{/sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback}) that can be
|
|
used to bind/unbind devices:
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[slots] lists all of the PCI slots that the PCI Backend will try to seize
|
|
(or "hide" from Domain 0). A PCI slot must appear in this list before it can
|
|
be bound to the PCI Backend through the \path{bind} attribute.
|
|
\item[new\_slot] write the name of a slot here (in 0000:00:00.0 format) to
|
|
have the PCI Backend seize the device in this slot.
|
|
\item[remove\_slot] write the name of a slot here (same format as
|
|
\path{new\_slot}) to have the PCI Backend no longer try to seize devices in
|
|
this slot. Note that this does not unbind the driver from a device it has
|
|
already seized.
|
|
\item[bind] write the name of a slot here (in 0000:00:00.0 format) to have
|
|
the Linux kernel attempt to bind the device in that slot to the PCI Backend
|
|
driver.
|
|
\item[unbind] write the name of a skit here (same format as \path{bind}) to have
|
|
the Linux kernel unbind the device from the PCI Backend. DO NOT unbind a
|
|
device while it is currently given to a PCI driver domain!
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
Some examples:
|
|
|
|
Bind a device to the PCI Backend which is not bound to any other driver.
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# # Add a new slot to the PCI Backend's list
|
|
# echo -n 0000:01:04.d > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/new_slot
|
|
# # Now that the backend is watching for the slot, bind to it
|
|
# echo -n 0000:01:04.d > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/bind
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Unbind a device from its driver and bind to the PCI Backend.
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# # Unbind a PCI network card from its network driver
|
|
# echo -n 0000:05:02.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/3c905/unbind
|
|
# # And now bind it to the PCI Backend
|
|
# echo -n 0000:05:02.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/new_slot
|
|
# echo -n 0000:05:02.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/bind
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Note that the "-n" option in the example is important as it causes echo to not
|
|
output a new-line.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{PCI Backend Configuration - User-space Quirks}
|
|
Quirky devices (such as the Broadcom Tigon 3) may need write access to their
|
|
configuration space registers. Xen can be instructed to allow specified PCI
|
|
devices write access to specific configuration space registers. The policy may
|
|
be found in:
|
|
|
|
\centerline{ \path{/etc/xen/xend-pci-quirks.sxp} }
|
|
|
|
The policy file is heavily commented and is intended to provide enough
|
|
documentation for developers to extend it.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{PCI Backend Configuration - Permissive Flag}
|
|
If the user-space quirks approach doesn't meet your needs you may want to enable
|
|
the permissive flag for that device. To do so, first get the PCI domain, bus,
|
|
slot, and function information from dom0 via \path{lspci}. Then augment the
|
|
user-space policy for permissive devices. The permissive policy can be found
|
|
in:
|
|
|
|
\centerline{ \path{/etc/xen/xend-pci-permissive.sxp} }
|
|
|
|
Currently, the only way to reset the permissive flag is to unbind the device
|
|
from the PCI Backend driver.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{PCI Backend - Checking Status}
|
|
There two important sysfs nodes that provide a mechanism to view specifics on
|
|
quirks and permissive devices:
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item \path{/sys/bus/drivers/pciback/permissive} \\
|
|
Use \path{cat} on this file to view a list of permissive slots.
|
|
\item \path{/sys/bus/drivers/pciback/quirks} \\
|
|
Use \path{cat} on this file view a hierarchical view of devices bound to the
|
|
PCI backend, their PCI vendor/device ID, and any quirks that are associated with
|
|
that particular slot.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
You may notice that every device bound to the PCI backend has 17 quirks standard
|
|
"quirks" regardless of \path{xend-pci-quirks.sxp}. These default entries are
|
|
necessary to support interactions between the PCI bus manager and the device bound
|
|
to it. Even non-quirky devices should have these standard entries.
|
|
|
|
In this case, preference was given to accuracy over aesthetics by choosing to
|
|
show the standard quirks in the quirks list rather than hide them from the
|
|
inquiring user
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{PCI Frontend Configuration}
|
|
To configure a domU to receive a PCI device:
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[Command-line:]
|
|
Use the {\em pci} command-line flag. For multiple devices, use the option
|
|
multiple times. \\
|
|
\centerline{ {\tt xm create netcard-dd pci=01:00.0 pci=02:03.0 }} \\
|
|
|
|
\item[Flat Format configuration file:]
|
|
Specify all of your PCI devices in a python list named {\em pci}. \\
|
|
\centerline{ {\tt pci=['01:00.0','02:03.0'] }} \\
|
|
|
|
\item[SXP Format configuration file:]
|
|
Use a single PCI device section for all of your devices (specify the numbers
|
|
in hexadecimal with the preceding '0x'). Note that {\em domain} here refers
|
|
to the PCI domain, not a virtual machine within Xen.
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(device (pci
|
|
(dev (domain 0x0)(bus 0x3)(slot 0x1a)(func 0x1)
|
|
(dev (domain 0x0)(bus 0x1)(slot 0x5)(func 0x0)
|
|
)
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
%% There are two possible types of privileges: IO privileges and
|
|
%% administration privileges.
|
|
|
|
\section{Support for virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM)}
|
|
\label{ss:vtpm}
|
|
|
|
Paravirtualized domains can be given access to a virtualized version
|
|
of a TPM. This enables applications in these domains to use the services
|
|
of the TPM device for example through a TSS stack
|
|
\footnote{Trousers TSS stack: http://sourceforge.net/projects/trousers}.
|
|
The Xen source repository provides the necessary software components to
|
|
enable virtual TPM access. Support is provided through several
|
|
different pieces. First, a TPM emulator has been modified to provide TPM's
|
|
functionality for the virtual TPM subsystem. Second, a virtual TPM Manager
|
|
coordinates the virtual TPMs efforts, manages their creation, and provides
|
|
protected key storage using the TPM. Third, a device driver pair providing
|
|
a TPM front- and backend is available for XenLinux to deliver TPM commands
|
|
from the domain to the virtual TPM manager, which dispatches it to a
|
|
software TPM. Since the TPM Manager relies on a HW TPM for protected key
|
|
storage, therefore this subsystem requires a Linux-supported hardware TPM.
|
|
For development purposes, a TPM emulator is available for use on non-TPM
|
|
enabled platforms.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Compile-Time Setup}
|
|
To enable access to the virtual TPM, the virtual TPM backend driver must
|
|
be compiled for a privileged domain (e.g. domain 0). Using the XenLinux
|
|
configuration, the necessary driver can be selected in the Xen configuration
|
|
section. Unless the driver has been compiled into the kernel, its module
|
|
must be activated using the following command:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
modprobe tpmbk
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Similarly, the TPM frontend driver must be compiled for the kernel trying
|
|
to use TPM functionality. Its driver can be selected in the kernel
|
|
configuration section Device Driver / Character Devices / TPM Devices.
|
|
Along with that the TPM driver for the built-in TPM must be selected.
|
|
If the virtual TPM driver has been compiled as module, it
|
|
must be activated using the following command:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
modprobe tpm_xenu
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Furthermore, it is necessary to build the virtual TPM manager and software
|
|
TPM by making changes to entries in Xen build configuration files.
|
|
The following entry in the file Config.mk in the Xen root source
|
|
directory must be made:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
VTPM_TOOLS ?= y
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
After a build of the Xen tree and a reboot of the machine, the TPM backend
|
|
drive must be loaded. Once loaded, the virtual TPM manager daemon
|
|
must be started before TPM-enabled guest domains may be launched.
|
|
To enable being the destination of a virtual TPM Migration, the virtual TPM
|
|
migration daemon must also be loaded.
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
vtpm_managerd
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
vtpm_migratord
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Once the VTPM manager is running, the VTPM can be accessed by loading the
|
|
front end driver in a guest domain.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Development and Testing TPM Emulator}
|
|
For development and testing on non-TPM enabled platforms, a TPM emulator
|
|
can be used in replacement of a platform TPM. First, the entry in the file
|
|
tools/vtpm/Rules.mk must look as follows:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
BUILD_EMULATOR = y
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Second, the entry in the file tool/vtpm\_manager/Rules.mk must be uncommented
|
|
as follows:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# TCS talks to fifo's rather than /dev/tpm. TPM Emulator assumed on fifos
|
|
CFLAGS += -DDUMMY_TPM
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Before starting the virtual TPM Manager, start the emulator by executing
|
|
the following in dom0:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
tpm_emulator clear
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{vTPM Frontend Configuration}
|
|
To provide TPM functionality to a user domain, a line must be added to
|
|
the virtual TPM configuration file using the following format:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
vtpm = ['instance=<instance number>, backend=<domain id>']
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
The { \it instance number} reflects the preferred virtual TPM instance
|
|
to associate with the domain. If the selected instance is
|
|
already associated with another domain, the system will automatically
|
|
select the next available instance. An instance number greater than
|
|
zero must be provided. It is possible to omit the instance
|
|
parameter from the configuration file.
|
|
|
|
The {\it domain id} provides the ID of the domain where the
|
|
virtual TPM backend driver and virtual TPM are running in. It should
|
|
currently always be set to '0'.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Examples for valid vtpm entries in the configuration file are
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
vtpm = ['instance=1, backend=0']
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
and
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
vtpm = ['backend=0'].
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Using the virtual TPM}
|
|
|
|
Access to TPM functionality is provided by the virtual TPM frontend driver.
|
|
Similar to existing hardware TPM drivers, this driver provides basic TPM
|
|
status information through the {\it sysfs} filesystem. In a Xen user domain
|
|
the sysfs entries can be found in /sys/devices/xen/vtpm-0.
|
|
|
|
Commands can be sent to the virtual TPM instance using the character
|
|
device /dev/tpm0 (major 10, minor 224).
|
|
|
|
% Chapter Storage and FileSytem Management
|
|
\chapter{Storage and File System Management}
|
|
|
|
Storage can be made available to virtual machines in a number of
|
|
different ways. This chapter covers some possible configurations.
|
|
|
|
The most straightforward method is to export a physical block device (a
|
|
hard drive or partition) from dom0 directly to the guest domain as a
|
|
virtual block device (VBD).
|
|
|
|
Storage may also be exported from a filesystem image or a partitioned
|
|
filesystem image as a \emph{file-backed VBD}.
|
|
|
|
Finally, standard network storage protocols such as NBD, iSCSI, NFS,
|
|
etc., can be used to provide storage to virtual machines.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Exporting Physical Devices as VBDs}
|
|
\label{s:exporting-physical-devices-as-vbds}
|
|
|
|
One of the simplest configurations is to directly export individual
|
|
partitions from domain~0 to other domains. To achieve this use the
|
|
\path{phy:} specifier in your domain configuration file. For example a
|
|
line like
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_disk = ['phy:hda3,sda1,w']_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
specifies that the partition \path{/dev/hda3} in domain~0 should be
|
|
exported read-write to the new domain as \path{/dev/sda1}; one could
|
|
equally well export it as \path{/dev/hda} or \path{/dev/sdb5} should
|
|
one wish.
|
|
|
|
In addition to local disks and partitions, it is possible to export
|
|
any device that Linux considers to be ``a disk'' in the same manner.
|
|
For example, if you have iSCSI disks or GNBD volumes imported into
|
|
domain~0 you can export these to other domains using the \path{phy:}
|
|
disk syntax. E.g.:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_disk = ['phy:vg/lvm1,sda2,w']_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
\begin{center}
|
|
\framebox{\bf Warning: Block device sharing}
|
|
\end{center}
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
Block devices should typically only be shared between domains in a
|
|
read-only fashion otherwise the Linux kernel's file systems will get
|
|
very confused as the file system structure may change underneath
|
|
them (having the same ext3 partition mounted \path{rw} twice is a
|
|
sure fire way to cause irreparable damage)! \Xend\ will attempt to
|
|
prevent you from doing this by checking that the device is not
|
|
mounted read-write in domain~0, and hasn't already been exported
|
|
read-write to another domain. If you want read-write sharing,
|
|
export the directory to other domains via NFS from domain~0 (or use
|
|
a cluster file system such as GFS or ocfs2).
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Using File-backed VBDs}
|
|
|
|
It is also possible to use a file in Domain~0 as the primary storage
|
|
for a virtual machine. As well as being convenient, this also has the
|
|
advantage that the virtual block device will be \emph{sparse} ---
|
|
space will only really be allocated as parts of the file are used. So
|
|
if a virtual machine uses only half of its disk space then the file
|
|
really takes up half of the size allocated.
|
|
|
|
For example, to create a 2GB sparse file-backed virtual block device
|
|
(actually only consumes 1KB of disk):
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_# dd if=/dev/zero of=vm1disk bs=1k seek=2048k count=1_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Make a file system in the disk file:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_# mkfs -t ext3 vm1disk_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
(when the tool asks for confirmation, answer `y')
|
|
|
|
Populate the file system e.g.\ by copying from the current root:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# mount -o loop vm1disk /mnt
|
|
# cp -ax /{root,dev,var,etc,usr,bin,sbin,lib} /mnt
|
|
# mkdir /mnt/{proc,sys,home,tmp}
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Tailor the file system by editing \path{/etc/fstab},
|
|
\path{/etc/hostname}, etc.\ Don't forget to edit the files in the
|
|
mounted file system, instead of your domain~0 filesystem, e.g.\ you
|
|
would edit \path{/mnt/etc/fstab} instead of \path{/etc/fstab}. For
|
|
this example put \path{/dev/sda1} to root in fstab.
|
|
|
|
Now unmount (this is important!):
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_# umount /mnt_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
In the configuration file set:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_disk = ['tap:aio:/full/path/to/vm1disk,sda1,w']_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
As the virtual machine writes to its `disk', the sparse file will be
|
|
filled in and consume more space up to the original 2GB.
|
|
|
|
{\em{Note:}} Users that have worked with file-backed VBDs on Xen in previous
|
|
versions will be interested to know that this support is now provided through
|
|
the blktap driver instead of the loopback driver. This change results in
|
|
file-based block devices that are higher-performance, more scalable, and which
|
|
provide better safety properties for VBD data. All that is required to update
|
|
your existing file-backed VM configurations is to change VBD configuration
|
|
lines from:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_disk = ['file:/full/path/to/vm1disk,sda1,w']_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
to:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_disk = ['tap:aio:/full/path/to/vm1disk,sda1,w']_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Loopback-mounted file-backed VBDs (deprecated)}
|
|
|
|
{\em{{\bf{Note:}} Loopback mounted VBDs have now been replaced with
|
|
blktap-based support for raw image files, as described above. This
|
|
section remains to detail a configuration that was used by older Xen
|
|
versions.}}
|
|
|
|
Raw image file-backed VBDs amy also be attached to VMs using the
|
|
Linux loopback driver. The only required change to the raw file
|
|
instructions above are to specify the configuration entry as:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\verb_disk = ['file:/full/path/to/vm1disk,sda1,w']_
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
{\bf Note that loopback file-backed VBDs may not be appropriate for backing
|
|
I/O-intensive domains.} This approach is known to experience
|
|
substantial slowdowns under heavy I/O workloads, due to the I/O
|
|
handling by the loopback block device used to support file-backed VBDs
|
|
in dom0. Loopbach support remains for old Xen installations, and users
|
|
are strongly encouraged to use the blktap-based file support (using
|
|
``{\tt{tap:aio}}'' as described above).
|
|
|
|
Additionally, Linux supports a maximum of eight loopback file-backed
|
|
VBDs across all domains by default. This limit can be statically
|
|
increased by using the \emph{max\_loop} module parameter if
|
|
CONFIG\_BLK\_DEV\_LOOP is compiled as a module in the dom0 kernel, or
|
|
by using the \emph{max\_loop=n} boot option if CONFIG\_BLK\_DEV\_LOOP
|
|
is compiled directly into the dom0 kernel. Again, users are encouraged
|
|
to use the blktap-based file support described above which scales to much
|
|
larger number of active VBDs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Using LVM-backed VBDs}
|
|
\label{s:using-lvm-backed-vbds}
|
|
|
|
A particularly appealing solution is to use LVM volumes as backing for
|
|
domain file-systems since this allows dynamic growing/shrinking of
|
|
volumes as well as snapshot and other features.
|
|
|
|
To initialize a partition to support LVM volumes:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# pvcreate /dev/sda10
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Create a volume group named `vg' on the physical partition:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# vgcreate vg /dev/sda10
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Create a logical volume of size 4GB named `myvmdisk1':
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# lvcreate -L4096M -n myvmdisk1 vg
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
You should now see that you have a \path{/dev/vg/myvmdisk1} Make a
|
|
filesystem, mount it and populate it, e.g.:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# mkfs -t ext3 /dev/vg/myvmdisk1
|
|
# mount /dev/vg/myvmdisk1 /mnt
|
|
# cp -ax / /mnt
|
|
# umount /mnt
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Now configure your VM with the following disk configuration:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
disk = [ 'phy:vg/myvmdisk1,sda1,w' ]
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
LVM enables you to grow the size of logical volumes, but you'll need
|
|
to resize the corresponding file system to make use of the new space.
|
|
Some file systems (e.g.\ ext3) now support online resize. See the LVM
|
|
manuals for more details.
|
|
|
|
You can also use LVM for creating copy-on-write (CoW) clones of LVM
|
|
volumes (known as writable persistent snapshots in LVM terminology).
|
|
This facility is new in Linux 2.6.8, so isn't as stable as one might
|
|
hope. In particular, using lots of CoW LVM disks consumes a lot of
|
|
dom0 memory, and error conditions such as running out of disk space
|
|
are not handled well. Hopefully this will improve in future.
|
|
|
|
To create two copy-on-write clones of the above file system you would
|
|
use the following commands:
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# lvcreate -s -L1024M -n myclonedisk1 /dev/vg/myvmdisk1
|
|
# lvcreate -s -L1024M -n myclonedisk2 /dev/vg/myvmdisk1
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Each of these can grow to have 1GB of differences from the master
|
|
volume. You can grow the amount of space for storing the differences
|
|
using the lvextend command, e.g.:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# lvextend +100M /dev/vg/myclonedisk1
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Don't let the `differences volume' ever fill up otherwise LVM gets
|
|
rather confused. It may be possible to automate the growing process by
|
|
using \path{dmsetup wait} to spot the volume getting full and then
|
|
issue an \path{lvextend}.
|
|
|
|
In principle, it is possible to continue writing to the volume that
|
|
has been cloned (the changes will not be visible to the clones), but
|
|
we wouldn't recommend this: have the cloned volume as a `pristine'
|
|
file system install that isn't mounted directly by any of the virtual
|
|
machines.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Using NFS Root}
|
|
|
|
First, populate a root filesystem in a directory on the server
|
|
machine. This can be on a distinct physical machine, or simply run
|
|
within a virtual machine on the same node.
|
|
|
|
Now configure the NFS server to export this filesystem over the
|
|
network by adding a line to \path{/etc/exports}, for instance:
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{small}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
/export/vm1root 1.2.3.4/24 (rw,sync,no_root_squash)
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{small}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Finally, configure the domain to use NFS root. In addition to the
|
|
normal variables, you should make sure to set the following values in
|
|
the domain's configuration file:
|
|
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{small}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
root = '/dev/nfs'
|
|
nfs_server = '2.3.4.5' # substitute IP address of server
|
|
nfs_root = '/path/to/root' # path to root FS on the server
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{small}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
The domain will need network access at boot time, so either statically
|
|
configure an IP address using the config variables \path{ip},
|
|
\path{netmask}, \path{gateway}, \path{hostname}; or enable DHCP
|
|
(\path{dhcp='dhcp'}).
|
|
|
|
Note that the Linux NFS root implementation is known to have stability
|
|
problems under high load (this is not a Xen-specific problem), so this
|
|
configuration may not be appropriate for critical servers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\chapter{CPU Management}
|
|
|
|
%% KMS Something sage about CPU / processor management.
|
|
|
|
Xen allows a domain's virtual CPU(s) to be associated with one or more
|
|
host CPUs. This can be used to allocate real resources among one or
|
|
more guests, or to make optimal use of processor resources when
|
|
utilizing dual-core, hyperthreading, or other advanced CPU technologies.
|
|
|
|
Xen enumerates physical CPUs in a `depth first' fashion. For a system
|
|
with both hyperthreading and multiple cores, this would be all the
|
|
hyperthreads on a given core, then all the cores on a given socket,
|
|
and then all sockets. I.e. if you had a two socket, dual core,
|
|
hyperthreaded Xeon the CPU order would be:
|
|
|
|
|
|
\begin{center}
|
|
\begin{tabular}{l|l|l|l|l|l|l|r}
|
|
\multicolumn{4}{c|}{socket0} & \multicolumn{4}{c}{socket1} \\ \hline
|
|
\multicolumn{2}{c|}{core0} & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{core1} &
|
|
\multicolumn{2}{c|}{core0} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{core1} \\ \hline
|
|
ht0 & ht1 & ht0 & ht1 & ht0 & ht1 & ht0 & ht1 \\
|
|
\#0 & \#1 & \#2 & \#3 & \#4 & \#5 & \#6 & \#7 \\
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
\end{center}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Having multiple vcpus belonging to the same domain mapped to the same
|
|
physical CPU is very likely to lead to poor performance. It's better to
|
|
use `vcpus-set' to hot-unplug one of the vcpus and ensure the others are
|
|
pinned on different CPUs.
|
|
|
|
If you are running IO intensive tasks, its typically better to dedicate
|
|
either a hyperthread or whole core to running domain 0, and hence pin
|
|
other domains so that they can't use CPU 0. If your workload is mostly
|
|
compute intensive, you may want to pin vcpus such that all physical CPU
|
|
threads are available for guest domains.
|
|
|
|
\chapter{Migrating Domains}
|
|
|
|
\section{Domain Save and Restore}
|
|
|
|
The administrator of a Xen system may suspend a virtual machine's
|
|
current state into a disk file in domain~0, allowing it to be resumed at
|
|
a later time.
|
|
|
|
For example you can suspend a domain called ``VM1'' to disk using the
|
|
command:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm save VM1 VM1.chk
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
This will stop the domain named ``VM1'' and save its current state
|
|
into a file called \path{VM1.chk}.
|
|
|
|
To resume execution of this domain, use the \path{xm restore} command:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm restore VM1.chk
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
This will restore the state of the domain and resume its execution.
|
|
The domain will carry on as before and the console may be reconnected
|
|
using the \path{xm console} command, as described earlier.
|
|
|
|
\section{Migration and Live Migration}
|
|
|
|
Migration is used to transfer a domain between physical hosts. There
|
|
are two varieties: regular and live migration. The former moves a
|
|
virtual machine from one host to another by pausing it, copying its
|
|
memory contents, and then resuming it on the destination. The latter
|
|
performs the same logical functionality but without needing to pause
|
|
the domain for the duration. In general when performing live migration
|
|
the domain continues its usual activities and---from the user's
|
|
perspective---the migration should be imperceptible.
|
|
|
|
To perform a live migration, both hosts must be running Xen / \xend\ and
|
|
the destination host must have sufficient resources (e.g.\ memory
|
|
capacity) to accommodate the domain after the move. Furthermore we
|
|
currently require both source and destination machines to be on the same
|
|
L2 subnet.
|
|
|
|
Currently, there is no support for providing automatic remote access
|
|
to filesystems stored on local disk when a domain is migrated.
|
|
Administrators should choose an appropriate storage solution (i.e.\
|
|
SAN, NAS, etc.) to ensure that domain filesystems are also available
|
|
on their destination node. GNBD is a good method for exporting a
|
|
volume from one machine to another. iSCSI can do a similar job, but is
|
|
more complex to set up.
|
|
|
|
When a domain migrates, it's MAC and IP address move with it, thus it is
|
|
only possible to migrate VMs within the same layer-2 network and IP
|
|
subnet. If the destination node is on a different subnet, the
|
|
administrator would need to manually configure a suitable etherip or IP
|
|
tunnel in the domain~0 of the remote node.
|
|
|
|
A domain may be migrated using the \path{xm migrate} command. To live
|
|
migrate a domain to another machine, we would use the command:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm migrate --live mydomain destination.ournetwork.com
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Without the \path{--live} flag, \xend\ simply stops the domain and
|
|
copies the memory image over to the new node and restarts it. Since
|
|
domains can have large allocations this can be quite time consuming,
|
|
even on a Gigabit network. With the \path{--live} flag \xend\ attempts
|
|
to keep the domain running while the migration is in progress, resulting
|
|
in typical down times of just 60--300ms.
|
|
|
|
For now it will be necessary to reconnect to the domain's console on the
|
|
new machine using the \path{xm console} command. If a migrated domain
|
|
has any open network connections then they will be preserved, so SSH
|
|
connections do not have this limitation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
%% Chapter Securing Xen
|
|
\chapter{Securing Xen}
|
|
|
|
This chapter describes how to secure a Xen system. It describes a number
|
|
of scenarios and provides a corresponding set of best practices. It
|
|
begins with a section devoted to understanding the security implications
|
|
of a Xen system.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Xen Security Considerations}
|
|
|
|
When deploying a Xen system, one must be sure to secure the management
|
|
domain (Domain-0) as much as possible. If the management domain is
|
|
compromised, all other domains are also vulnerable. The following are a
|
|
set of best practices for Domain-0:
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item \textbf{Run the smallest number of necessary services.} The less
|
|
things that are present in a management partition, the better.
|
|
Remember, a service running as root in the management domain has full
|
|
access to all other domains on the system.
|
|
\item \textbf{Use a firewall to restrict the traffic to the management
|
|
domain.} A firewall with default-reject rules will help prevent
|
|
attacks on the management domain.
|
|
\item \textbf{Do not allow users to access Domain-0.} The Linux kernel
|
|
has been known to have local-user root exploits. If you allow normal
|
|
users to access Domain-0 (even as unprivileged users) you run the risk
|
|
of a kernel exploit making all of your domains vulnerable.
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
\section{Driver Domain Security Considerations}
|
|
\label{s:ddsecurity}
|
|
|
|
Driver domains address a range of security problems that exist regarding
|
|
the use of device drivers and hardware. On many operating systems in common
|
|
use today, device drivers run within the kernel with the same privileges as
|
|
the kernel. Few or no mechanisms exist to protect the integrity of the kernel
|
|
from a misbehaving (read "buggy") or malicious device driver. Driver
|
|
domains exist to aid in isolating a device driver within its own virtual
|
|
machine where it cannot affect the stability and integrity of other
|
|
domains. If a driver crashes, the driver domain can be restarted rather than
|
|
have the entire machine crash (and restart) with it. Drivers written by
|
|
unknown or untrusted third-parties can be confined to an isolated space.
|
|
Driver domains thus address a number of security and stability issues with
|
|
device drivers.
|
|
|
|
However, due to limitations in current hardware, a number of security
|
|
concerns remain that need to be considered when setting up driver domains (it
|
|
should be noted that the following list is not intended to be exhaustive).
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item \textbf{Without an IOMMU, a hardware device can DMA to memory regions
|
|
outside of its controlling domain.} Architectures which do not have an
|
|
IOMMU (e.g. most x86-based platforms) to restrict DMA usage by hardware
|
|
are vulnerable. A hardware device which can perform arbitrary memory reads
|
|
and writes can read/write outside of the memory of its controlling domain.
|
|
A malicious or misbehaving domain could use a hardware device it controls
|
|
to send data overwriting memory in another domain or to read arbitrary
|
|
regions of memory in another domain.
|
|
\item \textbf{Shared buses are vulnerable to sniffing.} Devices that share
|
|
a data bus can sniff (and possible spoof) each others' data. Device A that
|
|
is assigned to Domain A could eavesdrop on data being transmitted by
|
|
Domain B to Device B and then relay that data back to Domain A.
|
|
\item \textbf{Devices which share interrupt lines can either prevent the
|
|
reception of that interrupt by the driver domain or can trigger the
|
|
interrupt service routine of that guest needlessly.} A devices which shares
|
|
a level-triggered interrupt (e.g. PCI devices) with another device can
|
|
raise an interrupt and never clear it. This effectively blocks other devices
|
|
which share that interrupt line from notifying their controlling driver
|
|
domains that they need to be serviced. A device which shares an
|
|
any type of interrupt line can trigger its interrupt continually which
|
|
forces execution time to be spent (in multiple guests) in the interrupt
|
|
service routine (potentially denying time to other processes within that
|
|
guest). System architectures which allow each device to have its own
|
|
interrupt line (e.g. PCI's Message Signaled Interrupts) are less
|
|
vulnerable to this denial-of-service problem.
|
|
\item \textbf{Devices may share the use of I/O memory address space.} Xen can
|
|
only restrict access to a device's physical I/O resources at a certain
|
|
granularity. For interrupt lines and I/O port address space, that
|
|
granularity is very fine (per interrupt line and per I/O port). However,
|
|
Xen can only restrict access to I/O memory address space on a page size
|
|
basis. If more than one device shares use of a page in I/O memory address
|
|
space, the domains to which those devices are assigned will be able to
|
|
access the I/O memory address space of each other's devices.
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Security Scenarios}
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsection{The Isolated Management Network}
|
|
|
|
In this scenario, each node has two network cards in the cluster. One
|
|
network card is connected to the outside world and one network card is a
|
|
physically isolated management network specifically for Xen instances to
|
|
use.
|
|
|
|
As long as all of the management partitions are trusted equally, this is
|
|
the most secure scenario. No additional configuration is needed other
|
|
than forcing Xend to bind to the management interface for relocation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsection{A Subnet Behind a Firewall}
|
|
|
|
In this scenario, each node has only one network card but the entire
|
|
cluster sits behind a firewall. This firewall should do at least the
|
|
following:
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item Prevent IP spoofing from outside of the subnet.
|
|
\item Prevent access to the relocation port of any of the nodes in the
|
|
cluster except from within the cluster.
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
The following iptables rules can be used on each node to prevent
|
|
migrations to that node from outside the subnet assuming the main
|
|
firewall does not do this for you:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# this command disables all access to the Xen relocation
|
|
# port:
|
|
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --destination-port 8002 -j REJECT
|
|
|
|
# this command enables Xen relocations only from the specific
|
|
# subnet:
|
|
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp -{}-source 192.168.1.1/8 \
|
|
--destination-port 8002 -j ACCEPT
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Nodes on an Untrusted Subnet}
|
|
|
|
Migration on an untrusted subnet is not safe in current versions of Xen.
|
|
It may be possible to perform migrations through a secure tunnel via an
|
|
VPN or SSH. The only safe option in the absence of a secure tunnel is to
|
|
disable migration completely. The easiest way to do this is with
|
|
iptables:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# this command disables all access to the Xen relocation port
|
|
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -{}-destination-port 8002 -j REJECT
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
%% Chapter Xen Mandatory Access Control Framework
|
|
\chapter{sHype/Xen Access Control}
|
|
|
|
The Xen mandatory access control framework is an implementation of the
|
|
sHype Hypervisor Security Architecture
|
|
(www.research.ibm.com/ssd\_shype). It permits or denies communication
|
|
and resource access of domains based on a security policy. The
|
|
mandatory access controls are enforced in addition to the Xen core
|
|
controls, such as memory protection. They are designed to remain
|
|
transparent during normal operation of domains (policy-conform
|
|
behavior) but to intervene when domains move outside their intended
|
|
sharing behavior. This chapter will describe how the sHype access
|
|
controls in Xen can be configured to prevent viruses from spilling
|
|
over from one into another workload type and secrets from leaking from
|
|
one workload type to another. sHype/Xen depends on the correct
|
|
behavior of Domain0 (cf previous chapter).
|
|
|
|
Benefits of configuring sHype/ACM in Xen include:
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\item robust workload and resource protection effective against rogue
|
|
user domains
|
|
\item simple, platform- and operating system-independent security
|
|
policies (ideal for heterogeneous distributed environments)
|
|
\item safety net with minimal performance overhead in case operating
|
|
system security is missing, does not scale, or fails
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
These benefits are very valuable because today's operating systems
|
|
become increasingly complex and often have no or insufficient
|
|
mandatory access controls. (Discretionary access controls, supported
|
|
by of most operating systems, are not effective against viruses or
|
|
misbehaving programs.) Where mandatory access control exists (e.g.,
|
|
SELinux), they usually deploy complex and difficult to understand
|
|
security policies. Additionally, multi-tier applications in business
|
|
environments usually require different types of operating systems
|
|
(e.g., AIX, Windows, Linux) which cannot be configured with compatible
|
|
security policies. Related distributed transactions and workloads
|
|
cannot be easily protected on the OS level. The Xen access control
|
|
framework steps in to offer a coarse-grained but very robust security
|
|
layer and safety net in case operating system security fails or is
|
|
missing.
|
|
|
|
To control sharing between domains, Xen mediates all inter-domain
|
|
communication (shared memory, events) as well as the access of domains
|
|
to resources such as disks. Thus, Xen can confine distributed
|
|
workloads (domain payloads) by permitting sharing among domains
|
|
running the same type of workload and denying sharing between pairs of
|
|
domains that run different workload types. We assume that--from a Xen
|
|
perspective--only one workload type is running per user domain. To
|
|
enable Xen to associate domains and resources with workload types,
|
|
security labels including the workload types are attached to domains
|
|
and resources. These labels and the hypervisor sHype controls cannot
|
|
be manipulated or bypassed and are effective even against rogue
|
|
domains.
|
|
|
|
\section{Overview}
|
|
This section gives an overview of how workloads can be protected using
|
|
the sHype mandatory access control framework in Xen.
|
|
Figure~\ref{fig:acmoverview} shows the necessary steps in activating
|
|
the Xen workload protection. These steps are described in detail in
|
|
Section~\ref{section:acmexample}.
|
|
|
|
\begin{figure}
|
|
\centering
|
|
\includegraphics[width=13cm]{figs/acm_overview.eps}
|
|
\caption{Overview of activating sHype workload protection in Xen.
|
|
Section numbers point to representative examples.}
|
|
\label{fig:acmoverview}
|
|
\end{figure}
|
|
|
|
First, the sHype/ACM access control must be enabled in the Xen
|
|
distribution and the distribution must be built and installed (cf
|
|
Subsection~\ref{subsection:acmexampleconfigure}). Before we can
|
|
enforce security, a Xen security policy must be created (cf
|
|
Subsection~\ref{subsection:acmexamplecreate}) and deployed (cf
|
|
Subsection~\ref{subsection:acmexampleinstall}). This policy defines
|
|
the workload types differentiated during access control. It also
|
|
defines the rules that compare workload types of domains and resources
|
|
to provide access decisions. Workload types are represented by
|
|
security labels that can be attached to domains and resources (cf
|
|
Subsections~\ref{subsection:acmexamplelabeldomains}
|
|
and~\ref{subsection:acmexamplelabelresources}). The functioning of
|
|
the active sHype/Xen workload protection is demonstrated using simple
|
|
resource assignment, and domain creation tests in
|
|
Subsection~\ref{subsection:acmexampletest}.
|
|
Section~\ref{section:acmpolicy} describes the syntax and semantics of
|
|
the sHype/Xen security policy in detail and introduces briefly the
|
|
tools that are available to help create valid security policies.
|
|
|
|
The next section describes all the necessary steps to create, deploy,
|
|
and test a simple workload protection policy. It is meant to enable
|
|
anybody to quickly try out the sHype/Xen workload protection. Those
|
|
readers who are interested in learning more about how the sHype access
|
|
control in Xen works and how it is configured using the XML security
|
|
policy should read Section~\ref{section:acmpolicy} as well.
|
|
Section~\ref{section:acmlimitations} concludes this chapter with
|
|
current limitations of the sHype implementation for Xen.
|
|
|
|
\section{Xen Workload Protection Step-by-Step}
|
|
\label{section:acmexample}
|
|
|
|
What you are about to do consists of the following sequence:
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\item configure and install sHype/Xen
|
|
\item create a simple workload protection security policy
|
|
\item deploy the sHype/Xen security policy
|
|
\item associate domains and resources with workload labels,
|
|
\item test the workload protection
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
The essential commands to create and deploy a sHype/Xen security
|
|
policy are numbered throughout the following sections. If you want a
|
|
quick-guide or return at a later time to go quickly through this
|
|
demonstration, simply look for the numbered commands and apply them in
|
|
order.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Configuring/Building sHype Support into Xen}
|
|
\label{subsection:acmexampleconfigure}
|
|
First, we need to configure the access control module in Xen and
|
|
install the ACM-enabled Xen hypervisor. This step installs security
|
|
tools and compiles sHype/ACM controls into the Xen hypervisor.
|
|
|
|
To enable sHype/ACM in Xen, please edit the Config.mk file in the top
|
|
Xen directory.
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(1) In Config.mk
|
|
Change: ACM_SECURITY ?= n
|
|
To: ACM_SECURITY ?= y
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Then install the security-enabled Xen environment as follows:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(2) # make world
|
|
# make install
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Creating A WLP Policy in 3 Simple Steps with ezPolicy}
|
|
\label{subsection:acmexamplecreate}
|
|
|
|
We will use the ezPolicy tool to quickly create a policy that protects
|
|
workloads. You will need both the Python and wxPython packages to run
|
|
this tool. To run the tool in Domain0, you can download the wxPython
|
|
package from www.wxpython.org or use the command
|
|
\verb|yum install wxPython| in Redhat/Fedora. To run the tool on MS
|
|
Windows, you also need to download the Python package from
|
|
www.python.org. After these packages are installed, start the ezPolicy
|
|
tool with the following command:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(3) # xensec_ezpolicy
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Figure~\ref{fig:acmezpolicy} shows a screen-shot of the tool. The
|
|
following steps show you how to create the policy shown in
|
|
Figure~\ref{fig:acmezpolicy}. You can use \verb|<CTRL>-h| to pop up a
|
|
help window at any time. The indicators (a), (b), and (c) in
|
|
Figure~\ref{fig:acmezpolicy} show the buttons that are used during the
|
|
3 steps of creating a policy:
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item defining workloads
|
|
\item defining run-time conflicts
|
|
\item translating the workload definition into a sHype/Xen access
|
|
control policy
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Defining workloads.} Workloads are defined for each
|
|
organization and department that you enter in the left panel. Please
|
|
use the ``New Org'' button (a) to create the organizations ``Avis'',
|
|
``Hertz'', ``CocaCola'', and ``PepsiCo''.
|
|
|
|
You can refine an organization to differentiate between multiple
|
|
department workloads by right-clicking the organization and selecting
|
|
\verb|Add Department| (or selecting an organization and pressing
|
|
\verb|<CRTL>-a|). Create department workloads ``Intranet'',
|
|
``Extranet'', ``HumanResources'', and ``Payroll'' for the ``CocaCola''
|
|
organization and department workloads ``Intranet'' and ``Extranet''
|
|
for the ``PepsiCo'' organization. The resulting layout of the tool
|
|
should be similar to the left panel shown in
|
|
Figure~\ref{fig:acmezpolicy}.
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Defining run-time conflicts.} Workloads that shall be
|
|
prohibited from running concurrently on the same hypervisor platform
|
|
are grouped into ``Run-time Exclusion rules'' on the right panel of
|
|
the window.
|
|
|
|
To prevent PepsiCo and CocaCola workloads (including their
|
|
departmental workloads) from running simultaneously on the same
|
|
hypervisor system, select the organization ``PepsiCo'' and, while
|
|
pressing the \verb|<CTRL>|-key, select the organization ``CocaCola''.
|
|
Now press the button (b) named ``Create run-time exclusion rule from
|
|
selection''. A popup window will ask for the name for this run-time
|
|
exclusion rule (enter a name or just hit \verb|<ENTER>|). A rule will
|
|
appear on the right panel. The name is used as reference only and does
|
|
not affect the hypervisor policy.
|
|
|
|
Repeat the process to create a run-time exclusion rule just for the
|
|
department workloads CocaCola.Extranet and CocaCola.Payroll.
|
|
|
|
\begin{figure}[htb]
|
|
\centering
|
|
\includegraphics[width=13cm]{figs/acm_ezpolicy.eps}
|
|
\caption{Final layout including workload definition and Run-time Exclusion rules.}
|
|
\label{fig:acmezpolicy}
|
|
\end{figure}
|
|
|
|
The resulting layout of your window should be similar to
|
|
Figure~\ref{fig:acmezpolicy}. Save this workload definition by
|
|
selecting ``Save Workload Definition as ...'' in the ``File'' menu
|
|
(c). This workload definition can be later refined if required.
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Translating the workload definition into a sHype/Xen access
|
|
control policy.} To translate the workload definition into a access
|
|
control policy understood by Xen, please select the ``Save as Xen ACM
|
|
Security Policy'' in the ``File'' menu (c). Enter the following policy
|
|
name in the popup window: \verb|example.chwall_ste.test-wld|. If you
|
|
are running ezPolicy in Domain0, the resulting policy file
|
|
test-wld\_security-policy.xml will automatically be placed into the
|
|
right directory (/etc/xen/acm-security/ policies/example/chwall\_ste).
|
|
If you run the tool on another system, then you need to copy the
|
|
resulting policy file into Domain0 before continuing. See
|
|
Section~\ref{subsection:acmnaming} for naming conventions of security
|
|
policies.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Deploying a WLP Policy}
|
|
\label{subsection:acmexampleinstall}
|
|
To deploy the workload protection policy we created in
|
|
Section~\ref{subsection:acmexamplecreate}, we create a policy
|
|
representation (test-wld.bin) that can be loaded into the Xen
|
|
hypervisor and we configure Xen to actually load this policy at
|
|
startup time.
|
|
|
|
The following command translates the source policy representation
|
|
into a format that can be loaded into Xen with sHype/ACM support.
|
|
Refer to the \verb|xm| man page for further details:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(4) # xm makepolicy example.chwall_ste.test-wld
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
The easiest way to install a security policy for Xen is to include the
|
|
policy in the boot sequence. The following command does just this:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(5) # xm cfgbootpolicy example.chwall_ste.test-wld
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
\textit{Alternatively, if this command fails} (e.g., because it cannot
|
|
identify the Xen boot entry), you can manually install the policy in 2
|
|
steps. First, manually copy the policy binary file into the boot
|
|
directory:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# cp /etc/xen/acm-security/policies/example/chwall_ste/test-wld.bin \
|
|
/boot/example.chwall_ste.test-wld.bin
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
Second, manually add a module line to your Xen boot entry so that grub
|
|
loads this policy file during startup:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
title Xen (2.6.16.13)
|
|
root (hd0,0)
|
|
kernel /xen.gz dom0_mem=2000000 console=vga
|
|
module /vmlinuz-2.6.16.13-xen ro root=/dev/hda3
|
|
module /initrd-2.6.16.13-xen.img
|
|
module /example.chwall_ste.test-wld.bin
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
Now reboot into this Xen boot entry to activate the policy and the
|
|
security-enabled Xen hypervisor.
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(6) # reboot
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
After reboot, check if security is enabled:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm list --label
|
|
Name ID Mem(MiB) VCPUs State Time(s) Label
|
|
Domain-0 0 1949 4 r----- 163.9 SystemManagement
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
If the security label at the end of the line says ``INACTIV'' then the
|
|
security is not enabled. Verify the previous steps. Note: Domain0 is
|
|
assigned a default label (see \verb|bootstrap| policy attribute
|
|
explained in Section~\ref{section:acmpolicy}). All other domains must
|
|
be labeled in order to start on this sHype/ACM-enabled Xen hypervisor
|
|
(see following sections for labeling domains and resources).
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Labeling Domains}
|
|
\label{subsection:acmexamplelabeldomains}
|
|
You should have a Xen domain configuration file that looks like the
|
|
following (Note: www.jailtime.org or www.xen-get.org might be good
|
|
places to look for example domU images). The following configuration
|
|
file defines \verb|domain1|:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# cat domain1.xm
|
|
kernel = "/boot/vmlinuz-2.6.16.13-xen"
|
|
memory = 128
|
|
name = "domain1"
|
|
vif = [ '' ]
|
|
dhcp = "dhcp"
|
|
disk = ['file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.fc5.img,sda1,w', \
|
|
'file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.swap,sda2,w']
|
|
root = "/dev/sda1 ro"
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
If you try to start domain1, you will get the following error:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm create domain1.xm
|
|
Using config file "domain1.xm".
|
|
domain1: DENIED
|
|
--> Domain not labeled
|
|
Checking resources: (skipped)
|
|
Security configuration prevents domain from starting
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
Every domain must be associated with a security label before it can
|
|
start on sHype/Xen. Otherwise, sHype/Xen would not be able to enforce
|
|
the policy consistently. The following command prints all domain
|
|
labels available in the active policy:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm labels type=dom
|
|
Avis
|
|
CocaCola
|
|
CocaCola.Extranet
|
|
CocaCola.HumanResources
|
|
CocaCola.Intranet
|
|
CocaCola.Payroll
|
|
Hertz
|
|
PepsiCo
|
|
PepsiCo.Extranet
|
|
PepsiCo.Intranet
|
|
SystemManagement
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
Now label domain1 with the CocaCola label and another domain2 with the
|
|
PepsiCo.Extranet label. Please refer to the xm man page for further
|
|
information.
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(7) # xm addlabel CocaCola dom domain1.xm
|
|
# xm addlabel PepsiCo.Extranet dom domain2.xm
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Let us try to start the domain again:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm create domain1.xm
|
|
Using config file "domain1.xm".
|
|
file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.fc5.img: DENIED
|
|
--> res:__NULL_LABEL__ (NULL)
|
|
--> dom:CocaCola (example.chwall_ste.test-wld)
|
|
file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.swap: DENIED
|
|
--> res:__NULL_LABEL__ (NULL)
|
|
--> dom:CocaCola (example.chwall_ste.test-wld)
|
|
Security configuration prevents domain from starting
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
This error indicates that domain1, if started, would not be able to
|
|
access its image and swap files because they are not labeled. This
|
|
makes sense because to confine workloads, access of domains to
|
|
resources must be controlled. Otherwise, domains that are not allowed
|
|
to communicate or run simultaneously could share data through storage
|
|
resources.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Labeling Resources}
|
|
\label{subsection:acmexamplelabelresources}
|
|
You can use the \verb|xm labels type=res| command to list available
|
|
resource labels. Let us assign the CocaCola resource label to the domain1
|
|
image file representing \verb|/dev/sda1| and to its swap file:
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(8) # xm addlabel CocaCola res \
|
|
file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.fc5.img
|
|
Resource file not found, creating new file at:
|
|
/etc/xen/acm-security/policies/resource_labels
|
|
# xm addlabel CocaCola res \
|
|
file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.swap
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
Starting \verb|domain1| now will succeed:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm create domain1.xm
|
|
# xm list --label
|
|
Name ID Mem(MiB) VCPUs State Time(s) Label
|
|
domain1 1 128 1 r----- 2.8 CocaCola
|
|
Domain-0 0 1949 4 r----- 387.7 SystemManagement
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
The following command lists all labeled resources on the
|
|
system, e.g., to lookup or verify the labeling:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm resources
|
|
file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.swap
|
|
policy: example.chwall_ste.test-wld
|
|
label: CocaCola
|
|
file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.fc5.img
|
|
policy: example.chwall_ste.test-wld
|
|
label: CocaCola
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
Currently, if a labeled resource is moved to another location, the
|
|
label must first be manually removed, and after the move re-attached
|
|
using the xm commands \verb|xm rmlabel| and \verb|xm addlabel|
|
|
respectively. Please see Section~\ref{section:acmlimitations} for
|
|
further details.
|
|
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(9) Label the resources of domain2 as PepsiCo.Extranet
|
|
Do not try to start this domain yet
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Testing The Xen Workload Protection}
|
|
\label{subsection:acmexampletest}
|
|
We are about to demonstrate how the workload protection works by
|
|
verifying:
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\item that domains with conflicting workloads cannot run
|
|
simultaneously
|
|
\item that domains cannot access resources of other workloads
|
|
\item that domains cannot exchange network packets if they are not
|
|
associated with the same workload type
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Test 1: Run-time exclusion rules.} We assume that domain1
|
|
with the CocaCola label is still running. While domain1 is running,
|
|
the run-time exclusion set of our policy says that domain2 cannot
|
|
start because the label of domain1 includes the CHWALL type CocaCola
|
|
and the label of domain2 includes the CHWALL type PepsiCo. The
|
|
run-time exclusion rule of our policy enforces that PepsiCo and
|
|
CocaCola cannot run at the same time on the same hypervisor platform.
|
|
Once domain1 is stopped or saved, domain2 can start but domain1 can no
|
|
longer start or be resumed. The ezPolicy tool, when creating the
|
|
Chinese Wall types for the workload labels, ensures that department
|
|
workloads inherit the organization type (and with it any organization
|
|
exclusions).
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm list --label
|
|
Name ID Mem(MiB) VCPUs State Time(s) Label
|
|
domain1 2 128 1 -b---- 6.9 CocaCola
|
|
Domain-0 0 1949 4 r----- 273.1 SystemManagement
|
|
|
|
# xm create domain2.xm
|
|
Using config file "domain2.xm".
|
|
Error: (1, 'Operation not permitted')
|
|
|
|
# xm destroy domain1
|
|
# xm create domain2.xm
|
|
Using config file "domain2.xm".
|
|
Started domain domain2
|
|
|
|
# xm list --label
|
|
Name ID Mem(MiB) VCPUs State Time(s) Label
|
|
domain2 4 164 1 r----- 4.3 PepsiCo.Extranet
|
|
Domain-0 0 1949 4 r----- 298.4 SystemManagement
|
|
|
|
# xm create domain1.xm
|
|
Using config file "domain1.xm".
|
|
Error: (1, 'Operation not permitted')
|
|
|
|
# xm destroy domain2
|
|
# xm list
|
|
Name ID Mem(MiB) VCPUs State Time(s)
|
|
Domain-0 0 1949 4 r----- 391.2
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
You can verify that domains with Avis label can run together with
|
|
domains labeled CocaCola, PepsiCo, or Hertz.
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Test2: Resource access.} In this test, we will re-label the
|
|
swap file for domain1 with the Avis resource label. We expect that
|
|
Domain1 will no longer start because it cannot access this resource.
|
|
This test checks the sharing abilities of domains, which are defined
|
|
by the Simple Type Enforcement Policy component.
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm rmlabel res file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.swap
|
|
# xm addlabel Avis res file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.swap
|
|
# xm resources
|
|
file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.swap
|
|
policy: example.chwall_ste.test-wld
|
|
label: Avis
|
|
file:/home/xen/dom_fc5/fedora.fc5.img
|
|
policy: example.chwall_ste.test-wld
|
|
label: CocaCola
|
|
|
|
# xm create domain1.xm
|
|
Using config file "domain1.xm".
|
|
file:/home/xen/dom_fc4/fedora.swap: DENIED
|
|
--> res:Avis (example.chwall_ste.test-wld)
|
|
--> dom:CocaCola (example.chwall_ste.test-wld)
|
|
Security configuration prevents domain from starting
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Test 3: Communication.} In this test we would verify that
|
|
two domains with labels Hertz and Avis cannot exchange network packets
|
|
by using the 'ping' connectivity test. It is also related to the STE
|
|
policy.{\bf Note:} sHype/Xen does control direct communication between
|
|
domains. However, domains associated with different workloads can
|
|
currently still communicate through the Domain0 virtual network. We
|
|
are working on the sHype/ACM controls for local and remote network
|
|
traffic through Domain0. Please monitor the xen-devel mailing list
|
|
for updated information.
|
|
|
|
\section{Xen Access Control Policy}
|
|
\label{section:acmpolicy}
|
|
|
|
This section describes the sHype/Xen access control policy in detail.
|
|
It gives enough information to enable the reader to write custom
|
|
access control policies and to use the available Xen policy tools. The
|
|
policy language is expressive enough to specify most symmetric access
|
|
relationships between domains and resources efficiently.
|
|
|
|
The Xen access control policy consists of two policy components. The
|
|
first component, called Chinese Wall (CHWALL) policy, controls which
|
|
domains can run simultaneously on the same virtualized platform. The
|
|
second component, called Simple Type Enforcement (STE) policy,
|
|
controls the sharing between running domains, i.e., communication or
|
|
access to shared resources. The CHWALL and STE policy components can
|
|
be configured to run alone, however in our examples we will assume
|
|
that both policy components are configured together since they
|
|
complement each other. The XML policy file includes all information
|
|
needed by Xen to enforce the policies.
|
|
|
|
Figures~\ref{fig:acmxmlfilea} and \ref{fig:acmxmlfileb} show a fully
|
|
functional but very simple example policy for Xen. The policy can
|
|
distinguish two workload types \verb|CocaCola| and \verb|PepsiCo| and
|
|
defines the labels necessary to associate domains and resources with
|
|
one of these workload types. The XML Policy consists of four parts:
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item policy header including the policy name
|
|
\item Simple Type Enforcement block
|
|
\item Chinese Wall Policy block
|
|
\item label definition block
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
\begin{figure}
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
01 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
|
|
02 <!-- Auto-generated by ezPolicy -->
|
|
03 <SecurityPolicyDefinition
|
|
xmlns="http://www.ibm.com"
|
|
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
|
|
xsi:schemaLocation=
|
|
"http://www.ibm.com ../../security_policy.xsd ">
|
|
04 <PolicyHeader>
|
|
05 <PolicyName>example.chwall_ste.test</PolicyName>
|
|
06 <Date>Wed Jul 12 17:32:59 2006</Date>
|
|
07 </PolicyHeader>
|
|
08
|
|
09 <SimpleTypeEnforcement>
|
|
10 <SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
11 <Type>SystemManagement</Type>
|
|
12 <Type>PepsiCo</Type>
|
|
13 <Type>CocaCola</Type>
|
|
14 </SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
15 </SimpleTypeEnforcement>
|
|
16
|
|
17 <ChineseWall priority="PrimaryPolicyComponent">
|
|
18 <ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
19 <Type>SystemManagement</Type>
|
|
20 <Type>PepsiCo</Type>
|
|
21 <Type>CocaCola</Type>
|
|
22 </ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
23
|
|
24 <ConflictSets>
|
|
25 <Conflict name="RER1">
|
|
26 <Type>CocaCola</Type>
|
|
27 <Type>PepsiCo</Type>
|
|
28 </Conflict>
|
|
29 </ConflictSets>
|
|
30 </ChineseWall>
|
|
31
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
\caption{Example XML security policy file -- Part I: Types and Rules Definition.}
|
|
\label{fig:acmxmlfilea}
|
|
\end{figure}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Policy Header and Policy Name}
|
|
\label{subsection:acmnaming}
|
|
Lines 1-2 (cf Figure~\ref{fig:acmxmlfilea}) include the usual XML
|
|
header. The security policy definition starts in Line 3 and refers to
|
|
the policy schema. The XML-Schema definition for the Xen policy can be
|
|
found in the file
|
|
\textit{/etc/xen/acm-security/policies/security-policy.xsd}. Examples
|
|
for security policies can be found in the example subdirectory. The
|
|
acm-security directory is only installed if ACM security is configured
|
|
during installation (cf Section~\ref{subsection:acmexampleconfigure}).
|
|
|
|
The \verb|Policy Header| spans lines 4-7. It includes a date field and
|
|
defines the policy name \verb|example.chwall_ste.test|. It can also
|
|
include optional fields that are not shown and are for future use (see
|
|
schema definition).
|
|
|
|
The policy name serves two purposes: First, it provides a unique name
|
|
for the security policy. This name is also exported by the Xen
|
|
hypervisor to the Xen management tools in order to ensure that both
|
|
enforce the same policy. We plan to extend the policy name with a
|
|
digital fingerprint of the policy contents to better protect this
|
|
correlation. Second, it implicitly points the xm tools to the
|
|
location where the XML policy file is stored on the Xen system.
|
|
Replacing the colons in the policy name by slashes yields the local
|
|
path to the policy file starting from the global policy directory
|
|
\verb|/etc/xen/acm-security/policies|. The last part of the policy
|
|
name is the prefix for the XML policy file name, completed by
|
|
\verb|-security_policy.xml|. Consequently, the policy with the name
|
|
\verb|example.chwall_ste.test| can be found in the XML policy file
|
|
named \verb|test-security_policy.xml| that is stored in the local
|
|
directory \verb|example/chwall_ste| under the global policy directory.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Simple Type Enforcement Policy Component}
|
|
|
|
The Simple Type Enforcement (STE) policy controls which domains can
|
|
communicate or share resources. This way, Xen can enforce confinement
|
|
of workload types by confining the domains running those workload
|
|
types. The mandatory access control framework enforces its policy when
|
|
domains access intended ways of communication or cooperation (shared
|
|
memory, events, shared resources such as block devices). It builds on
|
|
top of the core hypervisor isolation, which restricts the ways of
|
|
inter-communication to those intended means. STE does not protect or
|
|
intend to protect from covert channels in the hypervisor or hardware;
|
|
this is an orthogonal problem that can be mitigated by using the
|
|
Run-time Exclusion rules described above or by fixing the problem in
|
|
the core hypervisor.
|
|
|
|
Xen controls sharing between domains on the resource and domain level
|
|
because this is the abstraction the hypervisor and its management
|
|
understand naturally. While this is coarse-grained, it is also very
|
|
reliable and robust and it requires minimal changes to implement
|
|
mandatory access controls in the hypervisor. It enables platform- and
|
|
operation system-independent policies as part of a layered security
|
|
approach.
|
|
|
|
Lines 9-15 (cf Figure~\ref{fig:acmxmlfilea}) define the Simple Type
|
|
Enforcement policy component. Essentially, they define the workload
|
|
type names \verb|SystemManagement|, \verb|PepsiCo|, and
|
|
\verb|CocaCola| that are available in the STE policy component. The
|
|
policy rules are implicit: Xen permits a domain to communicate with
|
|
another domain if and only if the labels of the domains share an
|
|
common STE type. Xen permits a domain to access a resource if and
|
|
only if the labels of the domain and the resource share a common STE
|
|
workload type.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Chinese Wall Policy Component}
|
|
|
|
The Chinese Wall security policy interpretation of sHype enables users
|
|
to prevent certain workloads from running simultaneously on the same
|
|
hypervisor platform. Run-time Exclusion rules (RER), also called
|
|
Conflict Sets, define a set of workload types that are not permitted
|
|
to run simultaneously. Of all the workloads specified in a Run-time
|
|
Exclusion rule, at most one type can run on the same hypervisor
|
|
platform at a time. Run-time Exclusion Rules implement a less
|
|
rigorous variant of the original Chinese Wall security component. They
|
|
do not implement the *-property of the policy, which would require to
|
|
restrict also types that are not part of an exclusion rule once they
|
|
are running together with a type in an exclusion rule (please refer to
|
|
http://www.gammassl.co.uk/topics/chinesewall.html for more information
|
|
on the original Chinese Wall policy).
|
|
|
|
Xen considers the \verb|ChineseWallTypes| part of the label for the
|
|
enforcement of the Run-time Exclusion rules. It is illegal to define
|
|
labels including conflicting Chinese Wall types.
|
|
|
|
Lines 17-30 (cf Figure~\ref{fig:acmxmlfilea}) define the Chinese Wall
|
|
policy component. Lines 17-22 define the known Chinese Wall types,
|
|
which coincide here with the STE types defined above. This usually
|
|
holds if the criteria for sharing among domains and sharing of the
|
|
hardware platform are the same. Lines 24-29 define one Run-time
|
|
Exclusion rule:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
<Conflict name="RER1">
|
|
<Type>CocaCola</Type>
|
|
<Type>PepsiCo</Type>
|
|
</Conflict>
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
Based on this rule, Xen enforces that only one of the types
|
|
\verb|CocaCola| or \verb|PepsiCo| will run on a single hypervisor
|
|
platform at a time. For example, once a domain assigned a
|
|
\verb|CocaCola| workload type is started, domains with the
|
|
\verb|PepsiCo| type will be denied to start. When the former domain
|
|
stops and no other domains with the \verb|CocaCola| type are running,
|
|
then domains with the \verb|PepsiCo| type can start.
|
|
|
|
Xen maintains reference counts on each running workload type to keep
|
|
track of which workload types are running. Every time a domain starts
|
|
or resumes, the reference count on those Chinese Wall types that are
|
|
referenced in the domain's label are incremented. Every time a domain
|
|
is destroyed or saved, the reference counts of its Chinese Wall types
|
|
are decremented. sHype in Xen covers migration and live-migration,
|
|
which is treated the same way as saving a domain on the source
|
|
platform and resuming it on the destination platform.
|
|
|
|
Reasons why users would want to restrict which workloads or domains
|
|
can share the system hardware include:
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\item Imperfect resource management or control might enable a rogue
|
|
domain to starve another domain and the workload running in it.
|
|
\item Redundant domains might run the same workload to increase
|
|
availability; such domains should not run on the same hardware to
|
|
avoid single points of failure.
|
|
\item Imperfect Xen core domain isolation might enable two rogue
|
|
domains running different workload types to use unintended and
|
|
unknown ways (covert channels) to exchange some data. This way, they
|
|
bypass the policed Xen access control mechanisms. Such
|
|
imperfections cannot be completely eliminated and are a result of
|
|
trade-offs between security and other design requirements. For a
|
|
simple example of a covert channel see
|
|
http://www.multicians.org/timing-chn.html. Such covert channels
|
|
exist also between workloads running on different platforms if they
|
|
are connected through networks. The Xen Chinese Wall policy provides
|
|
an approximation of this imperfect ``air-gap'' between selected
|
|
workload types.
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Security Labels}
|
|
|
|
To enable Xen to associate domains with workload types running in
|
|
them, each domain is assigned a security label that includes the
|
|
workload types of the domain.
|
|
|
|
\begin{figure}
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
32 <SecurityLabelTemplate>
|
|
33 <SubjectLabels bootstrap="SystemManagement">
|
|
34 <VirtualMachineLabel>
|
|
35 <Name>SystemManagement</Name>
|
|
36 <SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
37 <Type>SystemManagement</Type>
|
|
38 <Type>PepsiCo</Type>
|
|
39 <Type>CocaCola</Type>
|
|
40 </SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
41 <ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
42 <Type>SystemManagement</Type>
|
|
43 </ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
44 </VirtualMachineLabel>
|
|
45
|
|
46 <VirtualMachineLabel>
|
|
47 <Name>PepsiCo</Name>
|
|
48 <SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
49 <Type>PepsiCo</Type>
|
|
50 </SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
51 <ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
52 <Type>PepsiCo</Type>
|
|
53 </ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
54 </VirtualMachineLabel>
|
|
55
|
|
56 <VirtualMachineLabel>
|
|
57 <Name>CocaCola</Name>
|
|
58 <SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
59 <Type>CocaCola</Type>
|
|
60 </SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
61 <ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
62 <Type>CocaCola</Type>
|
|
63 </ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
64 </VirtualMachineLabel>
|
|
65 </SubjectLabels>
|
|
66
|
|
67 <ObjectLabels>
|
|
68 <ResourceLabel>
|
|
69 <Name>SystemManagement</Name>
|
|
70 <SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
71 <Type>SystemManagement</Type>
|
|
72 </SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
73 </ResourceLabel>
|
|
74
|
|
75 <ResourceLabel>
|
|
76 <Name>PepsiCo</Name>
|
|
77 <SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
78 <Type>PepsiCo</Type>
|
|
79 </SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
80 </ResourceLabel>
|
|
81
|
|
82 <ResourceLabel>
|
|
83 <Name>CocaCola</Name>
|
|
84 <SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
85 <Type>CocaCola</Type>
|
|
86 </SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
87 </ResourceLabel>
|
|
88 </ObjectLabels>
|
|
89 </SecurityLabelTemplate>
|
|
90 </SecurityPolicyDefinition>
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
\caption{Example XML security policy file -- Part II: Label Definition.}
|
|
\label{fig:acmxmlfileb}
|
|
\end{figure}
|
|
|
|
Lines 32-89 (cf Figure~\ref{fig:acmxmlfileb}) define the
|
|
\verb|SecurityLabelTemplate|, which includes the labels that can be
|
|
attached to domains and resources when this policy is active. The
|
|
domain labels include Chinese Wall types while resource labels do not
|
|
include Chinese Wall types. Lines 33-65 define the
|
|
\verb|SubjectLabels| that can be assigned to domains. For example, the
|
|
virtual machine label \verb|CocaCola| (cf lines 56-64 in
|
|
Figure~\ref{fig:acmxmlfileb}) associates the domain that carries it
|
|
with the workload type \verb|CocaCola|.
|
|
|
|
The \verb|bootstrap| attribute names the label
|
|
\verb|SystemManagement|. Xen will assign this label to Domain0 at
|
|
boot time. All other domains are assigned labels according to their
|
|
domain configuration file (see
|
|
Section~\ref{subsection:acmexamplelabeldomains} for examples of how to
|
|
label domains). Lines 67-88 define the \verb|ObjectLabels|. Those
|
|
labels can be assigned to resources when this policy is active.
|
|
|
|
In general, user domains should be assigned labels that have only a
|
|
single SimpleTypeEnforcement workload type. This way, workloads remain
|
|
confined even if user domains become rogue. Any domain that is
|
|
assigned a label with multiple STE types must be trusted to keep
|
|
information belonging to the different STE types separate (confined).
|
|
For example, Domain0 is assigned the bootstrap label
|
|
\verb|SystemsManagement|, which includes all existing STE types.
|
|
Therefore, Domain0 must take care not to enable unauthorized
|
|
information flow (eg. through block devices or virtual networking)
|
|
between domains or resources that are assigned different STE types.
|
|
|
|
Security administrators simply use the name of a label (specified in
|
|
the \verb|<Name>| field) to associate a label with a domain (cf.
|
|
Section~\ref{subsection:acmexamplelabeldomains}). The types inside the
|
|
label are used by the Xen access control enforcement. While the name
|
|
can be arbitrarily chosen (as long as it is unique), it is advisable
|
|
to choose the label name in accordance to the security types included.
|
|
While the XML representation in the above label seems unnecessary
|
|
flexible, labels in general can consist of multiple types as we will
|
|
see in the following example.
|
|
|
|
Assume that \verb|PepsiCo| and \verb|CocaCola| workloads use virtual
|
|
disks that are provided by a virtual I/O domain hosting a physical
|
|
storage device and carrying the following label:
|
|
|
|
\begin{scriptsize}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
<VirtualMachineLabel>
|
|
<Name>VIO</Name>
|
|
<SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
<Type>CocaCola</Type>
|
|
<Type>PepsiCo</Type>
|
|
</SimpleTypeEnforcementTypes>
|
|
<ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
<Type>VIOServer</Type>
|
|
</ChineseWallTypes>
|
|
</VirtualMachineLabel>
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{scriptsize}
|
|
|
|
This Virtual I/O domain (VIO) exports its virtualized disks by
|
|
communicating both to domains labeled with the \verb|PepsiCo| label
|
|
and domains labeled with the \verb|CocaCola| label. This requires the
|
|
VIO domain to carry both the STE types \verb|CocaCola| and
|
|
\verb|PepsiCo|. In this example, the confinement of \verb|CocaCola|
|
|
and \verb|PepsiCo| workload depends on a VIO domain that must keep the
|
|
data of those different workloads separate. The virtual disks are
|
|
labeled as well (see Section~\ref{subsection:acmexamplelabelresources}
|
|
for labeling resources) and enforcement functions inside the VIO
|
|
domain must ensure that the labels of the domain mounting a virtual
|
|
disk and the virtual disk label share a common STE type. The VIO label
|
|
carrying its own VIOServer CHWALL type introduces the flexibility to
|
|
permit the trusted VIO server to run together with CocaCola or PepsiCo
|
|
workloads.
|
|
|
|
Alternatively, a system that has two hard-drives does not need a VIO
|
|
domain but can directly assign one hardware storage device to each of
|
|
the workloads (if the platform offers an IO-MMU, cf
|
|
Section~\ref{s:ddsecurity}. Sharing hardware through virtualization
|
|
is a trade-off between the amount of trusted code (size of the trusted
|
|
computing base) and the amount of acceptable over-provisioning. This
|
|
holds both for peripherals and for system platforms.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Tools For Creating sHype/Xen Security Policies}
|
|
To create a security policy for Xen, you can use one of the following
|
|
tools:
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\item \verb|ezPolicy| GUI tool -- start writing policies
|
|
\item \verb|xensec_gen| tool -- refine policies created with \verb|ezPolicy|
|
|
\item text or XML editor
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
We use the \verb|ezPolicy| tool in
|
|
Section~\ref{subsection:acmexamplecreate} to quickly create a workload
|
|
protection policy. If desired, the resulting XML policy file can be
|
|
loaded into the \verb|xensec_gen| tool to refine it. It can also be
|
|
directly edited using an XML editor. Any XML policy file is verified
|
|
against the security policy schema when it is translated (see
|
|
Subsection~\ref{subsection:acmexampleinstall}).
|
|
|
|
\section{Current Limitations}
|
|
\label{section:acmlimitations}
|
|
|
|
The sHype/ACM configuration for Xen is work in progress. There is
|
|
ongoing work for protecting virtualized resources and planned and
|
|
ongoing work for protecting access to remote resources and domains.
|
|
The following sections describe limitations of some of the areas into
|
|
which access control is being extended.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Network Traffic}
|
|
Local and remote network traffic is currently not controlled.
|
|
Solutions to add sHype/ACM policy enforcement to the virtual network
|
|
exist but need to be discussed before they can become part of Xen.
|
|
Subjecting external network traffic to the ACM security policy is work
|
|
in progress. Manually setting up filters in domain 0 is required for
|
|
now but does not scale well.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Resource Access and Usage Control}
|
|
|
|
Enforcing the security policy across multiple hypervisor systems and
|
|
on access to remote shared resources is work in progress. Extending
|
|
access control to new types of resources is ongoing work (e.g. network
|
|
storage).
|
|
|
|
On a single Xen system, information about the association of resources
|
|
and security labels is stored in
|
|
\verb|/etc/xen/acm-security/policy/resource_labels|. This file relates
|
|
a full resource path with a security label. This association is weak
|
|
and will break if resources are moved or renamed without adapting the
|
|
label file. Improving the protection of label-resource relationships
|
|
is ongoing work.
|
|
|
|
Controlling resource usage and enforcing resource limits in general is
|
|
ongoing work in the Xen community.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Domain Migration}
|
|
|
|
Labels on domains are enforced during domain migration and the
|
|
destination hypervisor will ensure that the domain label is valid and
|
|
the domain is permitted to run (considering the Chinese Wall policy
|
|
rules) before it accepts the migration. However, the network between
|
|
the source and destination hypervisor as well as both hypervisors must
|
|
be trusted. Architectures and prototypes exist that both protect the
|
|
network connection and ensure that the hypervisors enforce access
|
|
control consistently but patches are not yet available for the main
|
|
stream.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Covert Channels}
|
|
|
|
The sHype access control aims at system independent security policies.
|
|
It builds on top of the core hypervisor isolation. Any covert channels
|
|
that exist in the core hypervisor or in the hardware (e.g., shared
|
|
processor cache) will be inherited. If those covert channels are not
|
|
the result of trade-offs between security and other system properties,
|
|
then they are most effectively minimized or eliminated where they are
|
|
caused. sHype offers however some means to mitigate their impact
|
|
(cf. run-time exclusion rules).
|
|
|
|
\part{Reference}
|
|
|
|
%% Chapter Build and Boot Options
|
|
\chapter{Build and Boot Options}
|
|
|
|
This chapter describes the build- and boot-time options which may be
|
|
used to tailor your Xen system.
|
|
|
|
\section{Top-level Configuration Options}
|
|
|
|
Top-level configuration is achieved by editing one of two
|
|
files: \path{Config.mk} and \path{Makefile}.
|
|
|
|
The former allows the overall build target architecture to be
|
|
specified. You will typically not need to modify this unless
|
|
you are cross-compiling or if you wish to build a PAE-enabled
|
|
Xen system. Additional configuration options are documented
|
|
in the \path{Config.mk} file.
|
|
|
|
The top-level \path{Makefile} is chiefly used to customize the set of
|
|
kernels built. Look for the line:
|
|
\begin{quote}
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
KERNELS ?= linux-2.6-xen0 linux-2.6-xenU
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
Allowable options here are any kernels which have a corresponding
|
|
build configuration file in the \path{buildconfigs/} directory.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Xen Build Options}
|
|
|
|
Xen provides a number of build-time options which should be set as
|
|
environment variables or passed on make's command-line.
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[verbose=y] Enable debugging messages when Xen detects an
|
|
unexpected condition. Also enables console output from all domains.
|
|
\item[debug=y] Enable debug assertions. Implies {\bf verbose=y}.
|
|
(Primarily useful for tracing bugs in Xen).
|
|
\item[debugger=y] Enable the in-Xen debugger. This can be used to
|
|
debug Xen, guest OSes, and applications.
|
|
\item[perfc=y] Enable performance counters for significant events
|
|
within Xen. The counts can be reset or displayed on Xen's console
|
|
via console control keys.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Xen Boot Options}
|
|
\label{s:xboot}
|
|
|
|
These options are used to configure Xen's behaviour at runtime. They
|
|
should be appended to Xen's command line, either manually or by
|
|
editing \path{grub.conf}.
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item [ noreboot ] Don't reboot the machine automatically on errors.
|
|
This is useful to catch debug output if you aren't catching console
|
|
messages via the serial line.
|
|
\item [ nosmp ] Disable SMP support. This option is implied by
|
|
`ignorebiostables'.
|
|
\item [ watchdog ] Enable NMI watchdog which can report certain
|
|
failures.
|
|
\item [ noirqbalance ] Disable software IRQ balancing and affinity.
|
|
This can be used on systems such as Dell 1850/2850 that have
|
|
workarounds in hardware for IRQ-routing issues.
|
|
\item [ badpage=$<$page number$>$,$<$page number$>$, \ldots ] Specify
|
|
a list of pages not to be allocated for use because they contain bad
|
|
bytes. For example, if your memory tester says that byte 0x12345678
|
|
is bad, you would place `badpage=0x12345' on Xen's command line.
|
|
\item [ com1=$<$baud$>$,DPS,$<$io\_base$>$,$<$irq$>$
|
|
com2=$<$baud$>$,DPS,$<$io\_base$>$,$<$irq$>$ ] \mbox{}\\
|
|
Xen supports up to two 16550-compatible serial ports. For example:
|
|
`com1=9600, 8n1, 0x408, 5' maps COM1 to a 9600-baud port, 8 data
|
|
bits, no parity, 1 stop bit, I/O port base 0x408, IRQ 5. If some
|
|
configuration options are standard (e.g., I/O base and IRQ), then
|
|
only a prefix of the full configuration string need be specified. If
|
|
the baud rate is pre-configured (e.g., by the bootloader) then you
|
|
can specify `auto' in place of a numeric baud rate.
|
|
\item [ console=$<$specifier list$>$ ] Specify the destination for Xen
|
|
console I/O. This is a comma-separated list of, for example:
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[ vga ] Use VGA console (until domain 0 boots, unless {\bf
|
|
vga=keep } is specified).
|
|
\item[ com1 ] Use serial port com1.
|
|
\item[ com2H ] Use serial port com2. Transmitted chars will have the
|
|
MSB set. Received chars must have MSB set.
|
|
\item[ com2L] Use serial port com2. Transmitted chars will have the
|
|
MSB cleared. Received chars must have MSB cleared.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
The latter two examples allow a single port to be shared by two
|
|
subsystems (e.g.\ console and debugger). Sharing is controlled by
|
|
MSB of each transmitted/received character. [NB. Default for this
|
|
option is `com1,vga']
|
|
\item [ vga=$<$options$>$ ] This is a comma-separated list of options:
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[ text-$<$mode$>$ ] Select text-mode resolution, where mode is
|
|
one of 80x25, 80x28, 80x30, 80x34, 80x43, 80x50, 80x60.
|
|
\item[ keep ] Keep the VGA console even after domain 0 boots.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
\item [ sync\_console ] Force synchronous console output. This is
|
|
useful if you system fails unexpectedly before it has sent all
|
|
available output to the console. In most cases Xen will
|
|
automatically enter synchronous mode when an exceptional event
|
|
occurs, but this option provides a manual fallback.
|
|
\item [ conswitch=$<$switch-char$><$auto-switch-char$>$ ] Specify how
|
|
to switch serial-console input between Xen and DOM0. The required
|
|
sequence is CTRL-$<$switch-char$>$ pressed three times. Specifying
|
|
the backtick character disables switching. The
|
|
$<$auto-switch-char$>$ specifies whether Xen should auto-switch
|
|
input to DOM0 when it boots --- if it is `x' then auto-switching is
|
|
disabled. Any other value, or omitting the character, enables
|
|
auto-switching. [NB. Default switch-char is `a'.]
|
|
\item [ nmi=xxx ]
|
|
Specify what to do with an NMI parity or I/O error. \\
|
|
`nmi=fatal': Xen prints a diagnostic and then hangs. \\
|
|
`nmi=dom0': Inform DOM0 of the NMI. \\
|
|
`nmi=ignore': Ignore the NMI.
|
|
\item [ mem=xxx ] Set the physical RAM address limit. Any RAM
|
|
appearing beyond this physical address in the memory map will be
|
|
ignored. This parameter may be specified with a B, K, M or G suffix,
|
|
representing bytes, kilobytes, megabytes and gigabytes respectively.
|
|
The default unit, if no suffix is specified, is kilobytes.
|
|
\item [ dom0\_mem=xxx ] Set the amount of memory to be allocated to
|
|
domain0. In Xen 3.x the parameter may be specified with a B, K, M or
|
|
G suffix, representing bytes, kilobytes, megabytes and gigabytes
|
|
respectively; if no suffix is specified, the parameter defaults to
|
|
kilobytes. In previous versions of Xen, suffixes were not supported
|
|
and the value is always interpreted as kilobytes.
|
|
\item [ dom0\_vcpus\_pin ] Pins domain 0 VCPUs on their respective
|
|
physical CPUS (default=false).
|
|
\item [ tbuf\_size=xxx ] Set the size of the per-cpu trace buffers, in
|
|
pages (default 0).
|
|
\item [ sched=xxx ] Select the CPU scheduler Xen should use. The
|
|
current possibilities are `credit' (default), and `sedf'.
|
|
\item [ apic\_verbosity=debug,verbose ] Print more detailed
|
|
information about local APIC and IOAPIC configuration.
|
|
\item [ lapic ] Force use of local APIC even when left disabled by
|
|
uniprocessor BIOS.
|
|
\item [ nolapic ] Ignore local APIC in a uniprocessor system, even if
|
|
enabled by the BIOS.
|
|
\item [ apic=bigsmp,default,es7000,summit ] Specify NUMA platform.
|
|
This can usually be probed automatically.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
In addition, the following options may be specified on the Xen command
|
|
line. Since domain 0 shares responsibility for booting the platform,
|
|
Xen will automatically propagate these options to its command line.
|
|
These options are taken from Linux's command-line syntax with
|
|
unchanged semantics.
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item [ acpi=off,force,strict,ht,noirq,\ldots ] Modify how Xen (and
|
|
domain 0) parses the BIOS ACPI tables.
|
|
\item [ acpi\_skip\_timer\_override ] Instruct Xen (and domain~0) to
|
|
ignore timer-interrupt override instructions specified by the BIOS
|
|
ACPI tables.
|
|
\item [ noapic ] Instruct Xen (and domain~0) to ignore any IOAPICs
|
|
that are present in the system, and instead continue to use the
|
|
legacy PIC.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{XenLinux Boot Options}
|
|
|
|
In addition to the standard Linux kernel boot options, we support:
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[ xencons=xxx ] Specify the device node to which the Xen virtual
|
|
console driver is attached. The following options are supported:
|
|
\begin{center}
|
|
\begin{tabular}{l}
|
|
`xencons=off': disable virtual console \\
|
|
`xencons=tty': attach console to /dev/tty1 (tty0 at boot-time) \\
|
|
`xencons=ttyS': attach console to /dev/ttyS0
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
\end{center}
|
|
The default is ttyS for dom0 and tty for all other domains.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
|
|
%% Chapter Further Support
|
|
\chapter{Further Support}
|
|
|
|
If you have questions that are not answered by this manual, the
|
|
sources of information listed below may be of interest to you. Note
|
|
that bug reports, suggestions and contributions related to the
|
|
software (or the documentation) should be sent to the Xen developers'
|
|
mailing list (address below).
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Other Documentation}
|
|
|
|
For developers interested in porting operating systems to Xen, the
|
|
\emph{Xen Interface Manual} is distributed in the \path{docs/}
|
|
directory of the Xen source distribution.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Online References}
|
|
|
|
The official Xen web site can be found at:
|
|
\begin{quote} {\tt http://www.xensource.com}
|
|
\end{quote}
|
|
|
|
This contains links to the latest versions of all online
|
|
documentation, including the latest version of the FAQ.
|
|
|
|
Information regarding Xen is also available at the Xen Wiki at
|
|
\begin{quote} {\tt http://wiki.xensource.com/xenwiki/}\end{quote}
|
|
The Xen project uses Bugzilla as its bug tracking system. You'll find
|
|
the Xen Bugzilla at http://bugzilla.xensource.com/bugzilla/.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Mailing Lists}
|
|
|
|
There are several mailing lists that are used to discuss Xen related
|
|
topics. The most widely relevant are listed below. An official page of
|
|
mailing lists and subscription information can be found at \begin{quote}
|
|
{\tt http://lists.xensource.com/} \end{quote}
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[xen-devel@lists.xensource.com] Used for development
|
|
discussions and bug reports. Subscribe at: \\
|
|
{\small {\tt http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel}}
|
|
\item[xen-users@lists.xensource.com] Used for installation and usage
|
|
discussions and requests for help. Subscribe at: \\
|
|
{\small {\tt http://lists.xensource.com/xen-users}}
|
|
\item[xen-announce@lists.xensource.com] Used for announcements only.
|
|
Subscribe at: \\
|
|
{\small {\tt http://lists.xensource.com/xen-announce}}
|
|
\item[xen-changelog@lists.xensource.com] Changelog feed
|
|
from the unstable and 2.0 trees - developer oriented. Subscribe at: \\
|
|
{\small {\tt http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog}}
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
|
|
\appendix
|
|
|
|
\chapter{Unmodified (VMX) guest domains in Xen with Intel\textregistered Virtualization Technology (VT)}
|
|
|
|
Xen supports guest domains running unmodified Guest operating systems using Virtualization Technology (VT) available on recent Intel Processors. More information about the Intel Virtualization Technology implementing Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX) in the processor is available on the Intel website at \\
|
|
{\small {\tt http://www.intel.com/technology/computing/vptech}}
|
|
|
|
\section{Building Xen with VT support}
|
|
|
|
The following packages need to be installed in order to build Xen with VT support. Some Linux distributions do not provide these packages by default.
|
|
|
|
\begin{tabular}{lp{11.0cm}}
|
|
{\bfseries Package} & {\bfseries Description} \\
|
|
|
|
dev86 & The dev86 package provides an assembler and linker for real mode 80x86 instructions. You need to have this package installed in order to build the BIOS code which runs in (virtual) real mode.
|
|
|
|
If the dev86 package is not available on the x86\_64 distribution, you can install the i386 version of it. The dev86 rpm package for various distributions can be found at {\scriptsize {\tt http://www.rpmfind.net/linux/rpm2html/search.php?query=dev86\&submit=Search}} \\
|
|
|
|
LibVNCServer & The unmodified guest's VGA display, keyboard, and mouse can be virtualized by the vncserver library. You can get the sources of libvncserver from {\small {\tt http://sourceforge.net/projects/libvncserver}}. Build and install the sources on the build system to get the libvncserver library. There is a significant performance degradation in 0.8 version. The current sources in the CVS tree have fixed this degradation. So it is highly recommended to download the latest CVS sources and install them.\\
|
|
|
|
SDL-devel, SDL & Simple DirectMedia Layer (SDL) is another way of virtualizing the unmodified guest console. It provides an X window for the guest console.
|
|
|
|
If the SDL and SDL-devel packages are not installed by default on the build system, they can be obtained from {\scriptsize {\tt http://www.rpmfind.net/linux/rpm2html/search.php?query=SDL\&submit=Search}}
|
|
, {\scriptsize {\tt http://www.rpmfind.net/linux/rpm2html/search.php?query=SDL-devel\&submit=Search}} \\
|
|
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
|
|
\section{Configuration file for unmodified VMX guests}
|
|
|
|
The Xen installation includes a sample configuration file, {\small {\tt /etc/xen/xmexample.vmx}}. There are comments describing all the options. In addition to the common options that are the same as those for paravirtualized guest configurations, VMX guest configurations have the following settings:
|
|
|
|
\begin{tabular}{lp{11.0cm}}
|
|
|
|
{\bfseries Parameter} & {\bfseries Description} \\
|
|
|
|
kernel & The VMX firmware loader, {\small {\tt /usr/lib/xen/boot/vmxloader}}\\
|
|
|
|
builder & The domain build function. The VMX domain uses the vmx builder.\\
|
|
|
|
acpi & Enable VMX guest ACPI, default=0 (disabled)\\
|
|
|
|
apic & Enable VMX guest APIC, default=0 (disabled)\\
|
|
|
|
pae & Enable VMX guest PAE, default=0 (disabled)\\
|
|
|
|
vif & Optionally defines MAC address and/or bridge for the network interfaces. Random MACs are assigned if not given. {\small {\tt type=ioemu}} means ioemu is used to virtualize the VMX NIC. If no type is specified, vbd is used, as with paravirtualized guests.\\
|
|
|
|
disk & Defines the disk devices you want the domain to have access to, and what you want them accessible as. If using a physical device as the VMX guest's disk, each disk entry is of the form
|
|
|
|
{\small {\tt phy:UNAME,ioemu:DEV,MODE,}}
|
|
|
|
where UNAME is the device, DEV is the device name the domain will see, and MODE is r for read-only, w for read-write. ioemu means the disk will use ioemu to virtualize the VMX disk. If not adding ioemu, it uses vbd like paravirtualized guests.
|
|
|
|
If using disk image file, its form should be like
|
|
|
|
{\small {\tt file:FILEPATH,ioemu:DEV,MODE}}
|
|
|
|
If using more than one disk, there should be a comma between each disk entry. For example:
|
|
|
|
{\scriptsize {\tt disk = ['file:/var/images/image1.img,ioemu:hda,w', 'file:/var/images/image2.img,ioemu:hdb,w']}}\\
|
|
|
|
cdrom & Disk image for CD-ROM. The default is {\small {\tt /dev/cdrom}} for Domain0. Inside the VMX domain, the CD-ROM will available as device {\small {\tt /dev/hdc}}. The entry can also point to an ISO file.\\
|
|
|
|
boot & Boot from floppy (a), hard disk (c) or CD-ROM (d). For example, to boot from CD-ROM, the entry should be:
|
|
|
|
boot='d'\\
|
|
|
|
device\_model & The device emulation tool for VMX guests. This parameter should not be changed.\\
|
|
|
|
sdl & Enable SDL library for graphics, default = 0 (disabled)\\
|
|
|
|
vnc & Enable VNC library for graphics, default = 1 (enabled)\\
|
|
|
|
vncviewer & Enable spawning of the vncviewer (only valid when vnc=1), default = 1 (enabled)
|
|
|
|
If vnc=1 and vncviewer=0, user can use vncviewer to manually connect VMX from remote. For example:
|
|
|
|
{\small {\tt vncviewer domain0\_IP\_address:VMX\_domain\_id}} \\
|
|
|
|
ne2000 & Enable ne2000, default = 0 (disabled; use pcnet)\\
|
|
|
|
serial & Enable redirection of VMX serial output to pty device\\
|
|
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
|
|
\begin{tabular}{lp{10cm}}
|
|
|
|
usb & Enable USB support without defining a specific USB device.
|
|
This option defaults to 0 (disabled) unless the option usbdevice is
|
|
specified in which case this option then defaults to 1 (enabled).\\
|
|
|
|
usbdevice & Enable USB support and also enable support for the given
|
|
device. Devices that can be specified are {\small {\tt mouse}} (a PS/2 style
|
|
mouse), {\small {\tt tablet}} (an absolute pointing device) and
|
|
{\small {\tt host:id1:id2}} (a physical USB device on the host machine whose
|
|
ids are {\small {\tt id1}} and {\small {\tt id2}}). The advantage
|
|
of {\small {\tt tablet}} is that Windows guests will automatically recognize
|
|
and support this device so specifying the config line
|
|
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
usbdevice='tablet'
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
will create a mouse that works transparently with Windows guests under VNC.
|
|
Linux doesn't recognize the USB tablet yet so Linux guests under VNC will
|
|
still need the Summagraphics emulation.
|
|
Details about mouse emulation are provided in section \textbf{A.4.3}.\\
|
|
|
|
localtime & Set the real time clock to local time [default=0, that is, set to UTC].\\
|
|
|
|
enable-audio & Enable audio support. This is under development.\\
|
|
|
|
full-screen & Start in full screen. This is under development.\\
|
|
|
|
nographic & Another way to redirect serial output. If enabled, no 'sdl' or 'vnc' can work. Not recommended.\\
|
|
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Creating virtual disks from scratch}
|
|
\subsection{Using physical disks}
|
|
If you are using a physical disk or physical disk partition, you need to install a Linux OS on the disk first. Then the boot loader should be installed in the correct place. For example {\small {\tt dev/sda}} for booting from the whole disk, or {\small {\tt /dev/sda1}} for booting from partition 1.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Using disk image files}
|
|
You need to create a large empty disk image file first; then, you need to install a Linux OS onto it. There are two methods you can choose. One is directly installing it using a VMX guest while booting from the OS installation CD-ROM. The other is copying an installed OS into it. The boot loader will also need to be installed.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection*{To create the image file:}
|
|
The image size should be big enough to accommodate the entire OS. This example assumes the size is 1G (which is probably too small for most OSes).
|
|
|
|
{\small {\tt \# dd if=/dev/zero of=hd.img bs=1M count=1 seek=1023}}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection*{To directly install Linux OS into an image file using a VMX guest:}
|
|
|
|
Install Xen and create VMX with the original image file with booting from CD-ROM. Then it is just like a normal Linux OS installation. The VMX configuration file should have these two entries before creating:
|
|
|
|
{\small {\tt cdrom='/dev/cdrom'
|
|
boot='d'}}
|
|
|
|
If this method does not succeed, you can choose the following method of copying an installed Linux OS into an image file.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection*{To copy a installed OS into an image file:}
|
|
Directly installing is an easier way to make partitions and install an OS in a disk image file. But if you want to create a specific OS in your disk image, then you will most likely want to use this method.
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item {\bfseries Install a normal Linux OS on the host machine}\\
|
|
You can choose any way to install Linux, such as using yum to install Red Hat Linux or YAST to install Novell SuSE Linux. The rest of this example assumes the Linux OS is installed in {\small {\tt /var/guestos/}}.
|
|
|
|
\item {\bfseries Make the partition table}\\
|
|
The image file will be treated as hard disk, so you should make the partition table in the image file. For example:
|
|
|
|
{\scriptsize {\tt \# losetup /dev/loop0 hd.img\\
|
|
\# fdisk -b 512 -C 4096 -H 16 -S 32 /dev/loop0\\
|
|
press 'n' to add new partition\\
|
|
press 'p' to choose primary partition\\
|
|
press '1' to set partition number\\
|
|
press "Enter" keys to choose default value of "First Cylinder" parameter.\\
|
|
press "Enter" keys to choose default value of "Last Cylinder" parameter.\\
|
|
press 'w' to write partition table and exit\\
|
|
\# losetup -d /dev/loop0}}
|
|
|
|
\item {\bfseries Make the file system and install grub}\\
|
|
{\scriptsize {\tt \# ln -s /dev/loop0 /dev/loop\\
|
|
\# losetup /dev/loop0 hd.img\\
|
|
\# losetup -o 16384 /dev/loop1 hd.img\\
|
|
\# mkfs.ext3 /dev/loop1\\
|
|
\# mount /dev/loop1 /mnt\\
|
|
\# mkdir -p /mnt/boot/grub\\
|
|
\# cp /boot/grub/stage* /boot/grub/e2fs\_stage1\_5 /mnt/boot/grub\\
|
|
\# umount /mnt\\
|
|
\# grub\\
|
|
grub> device (hd0) /dev/loop\\
|
|
grub> root (hd0,0)\\
|
|
grub> setup (hd0)\\
|
|
grub> quit\\
|
|
\# rm /dev/loop\\
|
|
\# losetup -d /dev/loop0\\
|
|
\# losetup -d /dev/loop1}}
|
|
|
|
The {\small {\tt losetup}} option {\small {\tt -o 16384}} skips the partition table in the image file. It is the number of sectors times 512. We need {\small {\tt /dev/loop}} because grub is expecting a disk device \emph{name}, where \emph{name} represents the entire disk and \emph{name1} represents the first partition.
|
|
|
|
\item {\bfseries Copy the OS files to the image}\\
|
|
If you have Xen installed, you can easily use {\small {\tt lomount}} instead of {\small {\tt losetup}} and {\small {\tt mount}} when coping files to some partitions. {\small {\tt lomount}} just needs the partition information.
|
|
|
|
{\scriptsize {\tt \# lomount -t ext3 -diskimage hd.img -partition 1 /mnt/guest\\
|
|
\# cp -ax /var/guestos/\{root,dev,var,etc,usr,bin,sbin,lib\} /mnt/guest\\
|
|
\# mkdir /mnt/guest/\{proc,sys,home,tmp\}}}
|
|
|
|
\item {\bfseries Edit the {\small {\tt /etc/fstab}} of the guest image}\\
|
|
The fstab should look like this:
|
|
|
|
{\scriptsize {\tt \# vim /mnt/guest/etc/fstab\\
|
|
/dev/hda1 / ext3 defaults 1 1\\
|
|
none /dev/pts devpts gid=5,mode=620 0 0\\
|
|
none /dev/shm tmpfs defaults 0 0\\
|
|
none /proc proc defaults 0 0\\
|
|
none /sys sysfs efaults 0 0}}
|
|
|
|
\item {\bfseries umount the image file}\\
|
|
{\small {\tt \# umount /mnt/guest}}
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
Now, the guest OS image {\small {\tt hd.img}} is ready. You can also reference {\small {\tt http://free.oszoo.org}} for quickstart images. But make sure to install the boot loader.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Install Windows into an Image File using a VMX guest}
|
|
In order to install a Windows OS, you should keep {\small {\tt acpi=0}} in your VMX configuration file.
|
|
|
|
\section{VMX Guests}
|
|
\subsection{Editing the Xen VMX config file}
|
|
Make a copy of the example VMX configuration file {\small {\tt /etc/xen/xmeaxmple.vmx}} and edit the line that reads
|
|
|
|
{\small {\tt disk = [ 'file:/var/images/\emph{guest.img},ioemu:hda,w' ]}}
|
|
|
|
replacing \emph{guest.img} with the name of the guest OS image file you just made.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Creating VMX guests}
|
|
Simply follow the usual method of creating the guest, using the -f parameter and providing the filename of your VMX configuration file:\\
|
|
|
|
{\small {\tt \# xend start\\
|
|
\# xm create /etc/xen/vmxguest.vmx}}
|
|
|
|
In the default configuration, VNC is on and SDL is off. Therefore VNC windows will open when VMX guests are created. If you want to use SDL to create VMX guests, set {\small {\tt sdl=1}} in your VMX configuration file. You can also turn off VNC by setting {\small {\tt vnc=0}}.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Mouse issues, especially under VNC}
|
|
Mouse handling when using VNC is a little problematic.
|
|
The problem is that the VNC viewer provides a virtual pointer which is
|
|
located at an absolute location in the VNC window and only absolute
|
|
coordinates are provided.
|
|
The VMX device model converts these absolute mouse coordinates
|
|
into the relative motion deltas that are expected by the PS/2
|
|
mouse driver running in the guest.
|
|
Unfortunately,
|
|
it is impossible to keep these generated mouse deltas
|
|
accurate enough for the guest cursor to exactly match
|
|
the VNC pointer.
|
|
This can lead to situations where the guest's cursor
|
|
is in the center of the screen and there's no way to
|
|
move that cursor to the left
|
|
(it can happen that the VNC pointer is at the left
|
|
edge of the screen and,
|
|
therefore,
|
|
there are no longer any left mouse deltas that
|
|
can be provided by the device model emulation code.)
|
|
|
|
To deal with these mouse issues there are 4 different
|
|
mouse emulations available from the VMX device model:
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[PS/2 mouse over the PS/2 port.]
|
|
This is the default mouse
|
|
that works perfectly well under SDL.
|
|
Under VNC the guest cursor will get
|
|
out of sync with the VNC pointer.
|
|
When this happens you can re-synchronize
|
|
the guest cursor to the VNC pointer by
|
|
holding down the
|
|
\textbf{left-ctl}
|
|
and
|
|
\textbf{left-alt}
|
|
keys together.
|
|
While these keys are down VNC pointer motions
|
|
will not be reported to the guest so
|
|
that the VNC pointer can be moved
|
|
to a place where it is possible
|
|
to move the guest cursor again.
|
|
|
|
\item[Summagraphics mouse over the serial port.]
|
|
The device model also provides emulation
|
|
for a Summagraphics tablet,
|
|
an absolute pointer device.
|
|
This emulation is provided over the second
|
|
serial port,
|
|
\textbf{/dev/ttyS1}
|
|
for Linux guests and
|
|
\textbf{COM2}
|
|
for Windows guests.
|
|
Unfortunately,
|
|
neither Linux nor Windows provides
|
|
default support for the Summagraphics
|
|
tablet so the guest will have to be
|
|
manually configured for this mouse.
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Linux configuration.}
|
|
|
|
First,
|
|
configure the GPM service to use the Summagraphics tablet.
|
|
This can vary between distributions but,
|
|
typically,
|
|
all that needs to be done is modify the file
|
|
\path{/etc/sysconfig/mouse} to contain the lines:
|
|
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
MOUSETYPE="summa"
|
|
XMOUSETYPE="SUMMA"
|
|
DEVICE=/dev/ttyS1
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
and then restart the GPM daemon.
|
|
|
|
Next,
|
|
modify the X11 config
|
|
\path{/etc/X11/xorg.conf}
|
|
to support the Summgraphics tablet by replacing
|
|
the input device stanza with the following:
|
|
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
Section "InputDevice"
|
|
Identifier "Mouse0"
|
|
Driver "summa"
|
|
Option "Device" "/dev/ttyS1"
|
|
Option "InputFashion" "Tablet"
|
|
Option "Mode" "Absolute"
|
|
Option "Name" "EasyPen"
|
|
Option "Compatible" "True"
|
|
Option "Protocol" "Auto"
|
|
Option "SendCoreEvents" "on"
|
|
Option "Vendor" "GENIUS"
|
|
EndSection
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Restart X and the X cursor should now properly
|
|
track the VNC pointer.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Windows configuration.}
|
|
|
|
Get the file
|
|
\path{http://www.cad-plan.de/files/download/tw2k.exe}
|
|
and execute that file on the guest,
|
|
answering the questions as follows:
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item When the program asks for \textbf{model},
|
|
scroll down and selese \textbf{SummaSketch (MM Compatible)}.
|
|
|
|
\item When the program asks for \textbf{COM Port} specify \textbf{com2}.
|
|
|
|
\item When the programs asks for a \textbf{Cursor Type} specify
|
|
\textbf{4 button cursor/puck}.
|
|
|
|
\item The guest system will then reboot and,
|
|
when it comes back up,
|
|
the guest cursor will now properly track
|
|
the VNC pointer.
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
\item[PS/2 mouse over USB port.]
|
|
This is just the same PS/2 emulation except it is
|
|
provided over a USB port.
|
|
This emulation is enabled by the configuration flag:
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
usbdevice='mouse'
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\item[USB tablet over USB port.]
|
|
The USB tablet is an absolute pointing device
|
|
that has the advantage that it is automatically
|
|
supported under Windows guests,
|
|
although Linux guests still require some
|
|
manual configuration.
|
|
This mouse emulation is enabled by the
|
|
configuration flag:
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
usbdevice='tablet'
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Linux configuration.}
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately,
|
|
there is no GPM support for the
|
|
USB tablet at this point in time.
|
|
If you intend to use a GPM pointing
|
|
device under VNC you should
|
|
configure the guest for Summagraphics
|
|
emulation.
|
|
|
|
Support for X11 is available by following
|
|
the instructions at\\
|
|
\verb+http://stz-softwaretechnik.com/~ke/touchscreen/evtouch.html+\\
|
|
with one minor change.
|
|
The
|
|
\path{xorg.conf}
|
|
given in those instructions
|
|
uses the wrong values for the X \& Y minimums and maximums,
|
|
use the following config stanza instead:
|
|
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
Section "InputDevice"
|
|
Identifier "Tablet"
|
|
Driver "evtouch"
|
|
Option "Device" "/dev/input/event2"
|
|
Option "DeviceName" "touchscreen"
|
|
Option "MinX" "0"
|
|
Option "MinY" "0"
|
|
Option "MaxX" "32256"
|
|
Option "MaxY" "32256"
|
|
Option "ReportingMode" "Raw"
|
|
Option "Emulate3Buttons"
|
|
Option "Emulate3Timeout" "50"
|
|
Option "SendCoreEvents" "On"
|
|
EndSection
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Windows configuration.}
|
|
|
|
Just enabling the USB tablet in the
|
|
guest's configuration file is sufficient,
|
|
Windows will automatically recognize and
|
|
configure device drivers for this
|
|
pointing device.
|
|
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{USB Support}
|
|
There is support for an emulated USB mouse,
|
|
an emulated USB tablet
|
|
and physical low speed USB devices
|
|
(support for high speed USB 2.0 devices is
|
|
still under development).
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
\item[USB PS/2 style mouse.]
|
|
Details on the USB mouse emulation are
|
|
given in sections
|
|
\textbf{A.2}
|
|
and
|
|
\textbf{A.4.3}.
|
|
Enabling USB PS/2 style mouse emulation
|
|
is just a matter of adding the line
|
|
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
usbdevice='mouse'
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
to the configuration file.
|
|
\item[USB tablet.]
|
|
Details on the USB tablet emulation are
|
|
given in sections
|
|
\textbf{A.2}
|
|
and
|
|
\textbf{A.4.3}.
|
|
Enabling USB tablet emulation
|
|
is just a matter of adding the line
|
|
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
usbdevice='tablet'
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
to the configuration file.
|
|
\item[USB physical devices.]
|
|
Access to a physical (low speed) USB device
|
|
is enabled by adding a line of the form
|
|
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
usbdevice='host:vid:pid'
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
into the the configuration file.\footnote{
|
|
There is an alternate
|
|
way of specifying a USB device that
|
|
uses the syntax
|
|
\textbf{host:bus.addr}
|
|
but this syntax suffers from
|
|
a major problem that makes
|
|
it effectively useless.
|
|
The problem is that the
|
|
\textbf{addr}
|
|
portion of this address
|
|
changes every time the USB device
|
|
is plugged into the system.
|
|
For this reason this addressing
|
|
scheme is not recommended and
|
|
will not be documented further.
|
|
}
|
|
\textbf{vid}
|
|
and
|
|
\textbf{pid}
|
|
are a
|
|
product id and
|
|
vendor id
|
|
that uniquely identify
|
|
the USB device.
|
|
These ids can be identified
|
|
in two ways:
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item Through the control window.
|
|
As described in section
|
|
\textbf{A.4.6}
|
|
the control window
|
|
is activated by pressing
|
|
\textbf{ctl-alt-2}
|
|
in the guest VGA window.
|
|
As long as USB support is
|
|
enabled in the guest by including
|
|
the config file line
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
usb=1
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
then executing the command
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
info usbhost
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
in the control window
|
|
will display a list of all
|
|
usb devices and their ids.
|
|
For example,
|
|
this output:
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
Device 1.3, speed 1.5 Mb/s
|
|
Class 00: USB device 04b3:310b
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
was created from a USB mouse with
|
|
vendor id
|
|
\textbf{04b3}
|
|
and product id
|
|
\textbf{310b}.
|
|
This device could be made available
|
|
to the VMX guest by including the
|
|
config file entry
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
usbdevice='host:04be:310b'
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
It is also possible to
|
|
enable access to a USB
|
|
device dynamically through
|
|
the control window.
|
|
The control window command
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
usb_add host:vid:pid
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
will also allow access to a
|
|
USB device with vendor id
|
|
\textbf{vid}
|
|
and product id
|
|
\textbf{pid}.
|
|
\item Through the
|
|
\path{/proc} file system.
|
|
The contents of the pseudo file
|
|
\path{/proc/bus/usb/devices}
|
|
can also be used to identify
|
|
vendor and product ids.
|
|
Looking at this file,
|
|
the line starting with
|
|
\textbf{P:}
|
|
has a field
|
|
\textbf{Vendor}
|
|
giving the vendor id and
|
|
another field
|
|
\textbf{ProdID}
|
|
giving the product id.
|
|
The contents of
|
|
\path{/proc/bus/usb/devices}
|
|
for the example mouse is as
|
|
follows:
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=02 Dev#= 3 Spd=1.5 MxCh= 0
|
|
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS= 8 #Cfgs= 1
|
|
P: Vendor=04b3 ProdID=310b Rev= 1.60
|
|
C:* #Ifs= 1 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=100mA
|
|
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=03(HID ) Sub=01 Prot=02 Driver=(none)
|
|
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 4 Ivl=10ms
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
Note that the
|
|
\textbf{P:}
|
|
line correctly identifies the
|
|
vendor id and product id
|
|
for this mouse as
|
|
\textbf{04b3:310b}.
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
There is one other issue to
|
|
be aware of when accessing a
|
|
physical USB device from the guest.
|
|
The Dom0 kernel must not have
|
|
a device driver loaded for
|
|
the device that the guest wishes
|
|
to access.
|
|
This means that the Dom0
|
|
kernel must not have that
|
|
device driver compiled into
|
|
the kernel or,
|
|
if using modules,
|
|
that driver module must
|
|
not be loaded.
|
|
Note that this is the device
|
|
specific USB driver that must
|
|
not be loaded,
|
|
either the
|
|
\textbf{UHCI}
|
|
or
|
|
\textbf{OHCI}
|
|
USB controller driver must
|
|
still be loaded.
|
|
|
|
Going back to the USB mouse
|
|
as an example,
|
|
if \textbf{lsmod}
|
|
gives the output:
|
|
|
|
{\small
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
Module Size Used by
|
|
usbmouse 4128 0
|
|
usbhid 28996 0
|
|
uhci_hcd 35409 0
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
then the USB mouse is being
|
|
used by the Dom0 kernel and is
|
|
not available to the guest.
|
|
Executing the command
|
|
\textbf{rmmod usbhid}\footnote{
|
|
Turns out the
|
|
\textbf{usbhid}
|
|
driver is the significant
|
|
one for the USB mouse,
|
|
the presence or absence of
|
|
the module
|
|
\textbf{usbmouse}
|
|
has no effect on whether or
|
|
not the guest can see a USB mouse.}
|
|
will remove the USB mouse
|
|
driver from the Dom0 kernel
|
|
and the mouse will now be
|
|
accessible by the VMX guest.
|
|
|
|
Be aware the the Linux USB
|
|
hotplug system will reload
|
|
the drivers if a USB device
|
|
is removed and plugged back
|
|
in.
|
|
This means that just unloading
|
|
the driver module might not
|
|
be sufficient if the USB device
|
|
is removed and added back.
|
|
A more reliable technique is
|
|
to first
|
|
\textbf{rmmod}
|
|
the driver and then rename the
|
|
driver file in the
|
|
\path{/lib/modules}
|
|
directory,
|
|
just to make sure it doesn't get
|
|
reloaded.
|
|
\end{description}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Destroy VMX guests}
|
|
VMX guests can be destroyed in the same way as can paravirtualized guests. We recommend that you type the command
|
|
|
|
{\small {\tt poweroff}}
|
|
|
|
in the VMX guest's console first to prevent data loss. Then execute the command
|
|
|
|
{\small {\tt xm destroy \emph{vmx\_guest\_id} }}
|
|
|
|
at the Domain0 console.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{VMX window (X or VNC) Hot Key}
|
|
If you are running in the X environment after creating a VMX guest, an X window is created. There are several hot keys for control of the VMX guest that can be used in the window.
|
|
|
|
{\bfseries Ctrl+Alt+2} switches from guest VGA window to the control window. Typing {\small {\tt help }} shows the control commands help. For example, 'q' is the command to destroy the VMX guest.\\
|
|
{\bfseries Ctrl+Alt+1} switches back to VMX guest's VGA.\\
|
|
{\bfseries Ctrl+Alt+3} switches to serial port output. It captures serial output from the VMX guest. It works only if the VMX guest was configured to use the serial port. \\
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Save/Restore and Migration}
|
|
VMX guests currently cannot be saved and restored, nor migrated. These features are currently under active development.
|
|
|
|
\chapter{Vnets - Domain Virtual Networking}
|
|
|
|
Xen optionally supports virtual networking for domains using {\em vnets}.
|
|
These emulate private LANs that domains can use. Domains on the same
|
|
vnet can be hosted on the same machine or on separate machines, and the
|
|
vnets remain connected if domains are migrated. Ethernet traffic
|
|
on a vnet is tunneled inside IP packets on the physical network. A vnet is a virtual
|
|
network and addressing within it need have no relation to addressing on
|
|
the underlying physical network. Separate vnets, or vnets and the physical network,
|
|
can be connected using domains with more than one network interface and
|
|
enabling IP forwarding or bridging in the usual way.
|
|
|
|
Vnet support is included in \texttt{xm} and \xend:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm vnet-create <config>
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
creates a vnet using the configuration in the file \verb|<config>|.
|
|
When a vnet is created its configuration is stored by \xend and the vnet persists until it is
|
|
deleted using
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm vnet-delete <vnetid>
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
The vnets \xend knows about are listed by
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# xm vnet-list
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
More vnet management commands are available using the
|
|
\texttt{vn} tool included in the vnet distribution.
|
|
|
|
The format of a vnet configuration file is
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(vnet (id <vnetid>)
|
|
(bridge <bridge>)
|
|
(vnetif <vnet interface>)
|
|
(security <level>))
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
White space is not significant. The parameters are:
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\item \verb|<vnetid>|: vnet id, the 128-bit vnet identifier. This can be given
|
|
as 8 4-digit hex numbers separated by colons, or in short form as a single 4-digit hex number.
|
|
The short form is the same as the long form with the first 7 fields zero.
|
|
Vnet ids must be non-zero and id 1 is reserved.
|
|
|
|
\item \verb|<bridge>|: the name of a bridge interface to create for the vnet. Domains
|
|
are connected to the vnet by connecting their virtual interfaces to the bridge.
|
|
Bridge names are limited to 14 characters by the kernel.
|
|
|
|
\item \verb|<vnetif>|: the name of the virtual interface onto the vnet (optional). The
|
|
interface encapsulates and decapsulates vnet traffic for the network and is attached
|
|
to the vnet bridge. Interface names are limited to 14 characters by the kernel.
|
|
|
|
\item \verb|<level>|: security level for the vnet (optional). The level may be one of
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\item \verb|none|: no security (default). Vnet traffic is in clear on the network.
|
|
\item \verb|auth|: authentication. Vnet traffic is authenticated using IPSEC
|
|
ESP with hmac96.
|
|
\item \verb|conf|: confidentiality. Vnet traffic is authenticated and encrypted
|
|
using IPSEC ESP with hmac96 and AES-128.
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
Authentication and confidentiality are experimental and use hard-wired keys at present.
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
When a vnet is created its configuration is stored by \xend and the vnet persists until it is
|
|
deleted using \texttt{xm vnet-delete <vnetid>}. The interfaces and bridges used by vnets
|
|
are visible in the output of \texttt{ifconfig} and \texttt{brctl show}.
|
|
|
|
\section{Example}
|
|
If the file \path{vnet97.sxp} contains
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(vnet (id 97) (bridge vnet97) (vnetif vnif97)
|
|
(security none))
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
Then \texttt{xm vnet-create vnet97.sxp} will define a vnet with id 97 and no security.
|
|
The bridge for the vnet is called vnet97 and the virtual interface for it is vnif97.
|
|
To add an interface on a domain to this vnet set its bridge to vnet97
|
|
in its configuration. In Python:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
vif="bridge=vnet97"
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
In sxp:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(dev (vif (mac aa:00:00:01:02:03) (bridge vnet97)))
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
Once the domain is started you should see its interface in the output of \texttt{brctl show}
|
|
under the ports for \texttt{vnet97}.
|
|
|
|
To get best performance it is a good idea to reduce the MTU of a domain's interface
|
|
onto a vnet to 1400. For example using \texttt{ifconfig eth0 mtu 1400} or putting
|
|
\texttt{MTU=1400} in \texttt{ifcfg-eth0}.
|
|
You may also have to change or remove cached config files for eth0 under
|
|
\texttt{/etc/sysconfig/networking}. Vnets work anyway, but performance can be reduced
|
|
by IP fragmentation caused by the vnet encapsulation exceeding the hardware MTU.
|
|
|
|
\section{Installing vnet support}
|
|
Vnets are implemented using a kernel module, which needs to be loaded before
|
|
they can be used. You can either do this manually before starting \xend, using the
|
|
command \texttt{vn insmod}, or configure \xend to use the \path{network-vnet}
|
|
script in the xend configuration file \texttt{/etc/xend/xend-config.sxp}:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
(network-script network-vnet)
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
This script insmods the module and calls the \path{network-bridge} script.
|
|
|
|
The vnet code is not compiled and installed by default.
|
|
To compile the code and install on the current system
|
|
use \texttt{make install} in the root of the vnet source tree,
|
|
\path{tools/vnet}. It is also possible to install to an installation
|
|
directory using \texttt{make dist}. See the \path{Makefile} in
|
|
the source for details.
|
|
|
|
The vnet module creates vnet interfaces \texttt{vnif0002},
|
|
\texttt{vnif0003} and \texttt{vnif0004} by default. You can test that
|
|
vnets are working by configuring IP addresses on these interfaces
|
|
and trying to ping them across the network. For example, using machines
|
|
hostA and hostB:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
hostA# ifconfig vnif0004 10.0.0.100 up
|
|
hostB# ifconfig vnif0004 10.0.0.101 up
|
|
hostB# ping 10.0.0.100
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
The vnet implementation uses IP multicast to discover vnet interfaces, so
|
|
all machines hosting vnets must be reachable by multicast. Network switches
|
|
are often configured not to forward multicast packets, so this often
|
|
means that all machines using a vnet must be on the same LAN segment,
|
|
unless you configure vnet forwarding.
|
|
|
|
You can test multicast coverage by pinging the vnet multicast address:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# ping -b 224.10.0.1
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
You should see replies from all machines with the vnet module running.
|
|
You can see if vnet packets are being sent or received by dumping traffic
|
|
on the vnet UDP port:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
# tcpdump udp port 1798
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
|
|
If multicast is not being forwaded between machines you can configure
|
|
multicast forwarding using vn. Suppose we have machines hostA on 10.10.0.100
|
|
and hostB on 10.11.0.100 and that multicast is not forwarded between them.
|
|
We use vn to configure each machine to forward to the other:
|
|
\begin{verbatim}
|
|
hostA# vn peer-add hostB
|
|
hostB# vn peer-add hostA
|
|
\end{verbatim}
|
|
Multicast forwarding needs to be used carefully - you must avoid creating forwarding
|
|
loops. Typically only one machine on a subnet needs to be configured to forward,
|
|
as it will forward multicasts received from other machines on the subnet.
|
|
|
|
%% Chapter Glossary of Terms moved to glossary.tex
|
|
\chapter{Glossary of Terms}
|
|
|
|
\begin{description}
|
|
|
|
\item[Domain] A domain is the execution context that contains a
|
|
running {\bf virtual machine}. The relationship between virtual
|
|
machines and domains on Xen is similar to that between programs and
|
|
processes in an operating system: a virtual machine is a persistent
|
|
entity that resides on disk (somewhat like a program). When it is
|
|
loaded for execution, it runs in a domain. Each domain has a {\bf
|
|
domain ID}.
|
|
|
|
\item[Domain 0] The first domain to be started on a Xen machine.
|
|
Domain 0 is responsible for managing the system.
|
|
|
|
\item[Domain ID] A unique identifier for a {\bf domain}, analogous to
|
|
a process ID in an operating system.
|
|
|
|
\item[Full virtualization] An approach to virtualization which
|
|
requires no modifications to the hosted operating system, providing
|
|
the illusion of a complete system of real hardware devices.
|
|
|
|
\item[Hypervisor] An alternative term for {\bf VMM}, used because it
|
|
means `beyond supervisor', since it is responsible for managing
|
|
multiple `supervisor' kernels.
|
|
|
|
\item[Live migration] A technique for moving a running virtual machine
|
|
to another physical host, without stopping it or the services
|
|
running on it.
|
|
|
|
\item[Paravirtualization] An approach to virtualization which requires
|
|
modifications to the operating system in order to run in a virtual
|
|
machine. Xen uses paravirtualization but preserves binary
|
|
compatibility for user space applications.
|
|
|
|
\item[Shadow pagetables] A technique for hiding the layout of machine
|
|
memory from a virtual machine's operating system. Used in some {\bf
|
|
VMMs} to provide the illusion of contiguous physical memory, in
|
|
Xen this is used during {\bf live migration}.
|
|
|
|
\item[Virtual Block Device] Persistant storage available to a virtual
|
|
machine, providing the abstraction of an actual block storage device.
|
|
{\bf VBD}s may be actual block devices, filesystem images, or
|
|
remote/network storage.
|
|
|
|
\item[Virtual Machine] The environment in which a hosted operating
|
|
system runs, providing the abstraction of a dedicated machine. A
|
|
virtual machine may be identical to the underlying hardware (as in
|
|
{\bf full virtualization}, or it may differ, as in {\bf
|
|
paravirtualization}).
|
|
|
|
\item[VMM] Virtual Machine Monitor - the software that allows multiple
|
|
virtual machines to be multiplexed on a single physical machine.
|
|
|
|
\item[Xen] Xen is a paravirtualizing virtual machine monitor,
|
|
developed primarily by the Systems Research Group at the University
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of Cambridge Computer Laboratory.
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\item[XenLinux] A name for the port of the Linux kernel that
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runs on Xen.
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\end{description}
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\end{document}
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%% Other stuff without a home
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%% Instructions Re Python API
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%% Other Control Tasks using Python
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%% ================================
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%% A Python module 'Xc' is installed as part of the tools-install
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%% process. This can be imported, and an 'xc object' instantiated, to
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%% provide access to privileged command operations:
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%% # import Xc
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%% # xc = Xc.new()
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%% # dir(xc)
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%% # help(xc.domain_create)
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%% In this way you can see that the class 'xc' contains useful
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%% documentation for you to consult.
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%% A further package of useful routines (xenctl) is also installed:
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%% # import xenctl.utils
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%% # help(xenctl.utils)
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%% You can use these modules to write your own custom scripts or you
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%% can customise the scripts supplied in the Xen distribution.
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|
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% Explain about AGP GART
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|
|
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%% If you're not intending to configure the new domain with an IP
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%% address on your LAN, then you'll probably want to use NAT. The
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%% 'xen_nat_enable' installs a few useful iptables rules into domain0
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%% to enable NAT. [NB: We plan to support RSIP in future]
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|
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|
%% Installing the file systems from the CD
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|
%% =======================================
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%% If you haven't got an existing Linux installation onto which you
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%% can just drop down the Xen and Xenlinux images, then the file
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|
%% systems on the CD provide a quick way of doing an install. However,
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%% you would be better off in the long run doing a proper install of
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%% your preferred distro and installing Xen onto that, rather than
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%% just doing the hack described below:
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|
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|
%% Choose one or two partitions, depending on whether you want a
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%% separate /usr or not. Make file systems on it/them e.g.:
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|
%% mkfs -t ext3 /dev/hda3
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|
%% [or mkfs -t ext2 /dev/hda3 && tune2fs -j /dev/hda3 if using an old
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%% version of mkfs]
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%% Next, mount the file system(s) e.g.:
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|
%% mkdir /mnt/root && mount /dev/hda3 /mnt/root
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|
%% [mkdir /mnt/usr && mount /dev/hda4 /mnt/usr]
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|
|
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%% To install the root file system, simply untar /usr/XenDemoCD/root.tar.gz:
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|
%% cd /mnt/root && tar -zxpf /usr/XenDemoCD/root.tar.gz
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|
%% You'll need to edit /mnt/root/etc/fstab to reflect your file system
|
|
%% configuration. Changing the password file (etc/shadow) is probably a
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|
%% good idea too.
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|
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|
%% To install the usr file system, copy the file system from CD on
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|
%% /usr, though leaving out the "XenDemoCD" and "boot" directories:
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|
%% cd /usr && cp -a X11R6 etc java libexec root src bin dict kerberos
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|
%% local sbin tmp doc include lib man share /mnt/usr
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|
|
|
%% If you intend to boot off these file systems (i.e. use them for
|
|
%% domain 0), then you probably want to copy the /usr/boot
|
|
%% directory on the cd over the top of the current symlink to /boot
|
|
%% on your root filesystem (after deleting the current symlink)
|
|
%% i.e.:
|
|
%% cd /mnt/root ; rm boot ; cp -a /usr/boot .
|