Files
xen/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
T
Andrew Cooper 54deff5e13 x86/intel: Drop more cpuid_mask_* infrastructure
Despite removing references from the documentation, the Intel parts of CPUID
Masking were accidentally left behind and still active.

Intel CPUID Masking is even more niche than AMD masking, as the MSRs only
exist between Nehalem and SandyBridge, being fully replaced with CPUID
Faulting from IvyBridge onwards.

Fixes: 317051c2f0 ("x86/amd: Drop the cpuid_mask_* command line options")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
2026-01-21 10:47:46 +00:00

678 lines
19 KiB
C

#include <xen/bitops.h>
#include <xen/init.h>
#include <xen/kernel.h>
#include <xen/sched.h>
#include <xen/smp.h>
#include <xen/string.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/i387.h>
#include <asm/match-cpu.h>
#include <asm/mpspec.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/trampoline.h>
#include "cpu.h"
/*
* MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL is a collection of unrelated functionality, with separate
* enablement requirements, but which want to be consistent across the system.
*/
static uint32_t __ro_after_init mcu_opt_ctrl_mask;
static uint32_t __ro_after_init mcu_opt_ctrl_val;
void update_mcu_opt_ctrl(void)
{
uint64_t mask = mcu_opt_ctrl_mask, val;
if ( !mask )
return;
val = rdmsr(MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL);
val &= ~mask;
val |= mcu_opt_ctrl_val;
wrmsrns(MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL, val);
}
void __init set_in_mcu_opt_ctrl(uint32_t mask, uint32_t val)
{
mcu_opt_ctrl_mask |= mask;
mcu_opt_ctrl_val &= ~mask;
mcu_opt_ctrl_val |= (val & mask);
update_mcu_opt_ctrl();
}
static uint32_t __ro_after_init pb_opt_ctrl_mask;
static uint32_t __ro_after_init pb_opt_ctrl_val;
void update_pb_opt_ctrl(void)
{
uint64_t mask = pb_opt_ctrl_mask, val;
if ( !mask )
return;
val = rdmsr(MSR_PB_OPT_CTRL);
val &= ~mask;
val |= pb_opt_ctrl_val;
wrmsrns(MSR_PB_OPT_CTRL, val);
}
void __init set_in_pb_opt_ctrl(uint32_t mask, uint32_t val)
{
pb_opt_ctrl_mask |= mask;
pb_opt_ctrl_val &= ~mask;
pb_opt_ctrl_val |= (val & mask);
update_pb_opt_ctrl();
}
/*
* Processors which have self-snooping capability can handle conflicting
* memory type across CPUs by snooping its own cache. However, there exists
* CPU models in which having conflicting memory types still leads to
* unpredictable behavior, machine check errors, or hangs. Clear this
* feature to prevent its use on machines with known erratas.
*/
static void __init check_memory_type_self_snoop_errata(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SS))
return;
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
case 0x0f: /* Merom */
case 0x16: /* Merom L */
case 0x17: /* Penryn */
case 0x1d: /* Dunnington */
case 0x1e: /* Nehalem */
case 0x1f: /* Auburndale / Havendale */
case 0x1a: /* Nehalem EP */
case 0x2e: /* Nehalem EX */
case 0x25: /* Westmere */
case 0x2c: /* Westmere EP */
case 0x2a: /* SandyBridge */
return;
}
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SELFSNOOP);
}
/*
* Set caps in expected_levelling_cap, probe a specific masking MSR, and set
* caps in levelling_caps if it is found, or clobber the MSR index if missing.
* If preset, reads the default value into msr_val.
*/
static uint64_t __init _probe_mask_msr(unsigned int *msr, uint64_t caps)
{
uint64_t val = 0;
expected_levelling_cap |= caps;
if (rdmsr_safe(*msr, &val) || wrmsr_safe(*msr, val))
*msr = 0;
else
levelling_caps |= caps;
return val;
}
/* Indices of the masking MSRs, or 0 if unavailable. */
static unsigned int __read_mostly msr_basic, __read_mostly msr_ext,
__read_mostly msr_xsave;
/*
* Probe for the existance of the expected masking MSRs. They might easily
* not be available if Xen is running virtualised.
*/
static void __init probe_masking_msrs(void)
{
const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
unsigned int exp_msr_basic, exp_msr_ext, exp_msr_xsave;
/* Only family 6 supports this feature. */
if (c->x86 != 6)
return;
switch (c->x86_model) {
case 0x17: /* Yorkfield, Wolfdale, Penryn, Harpertown(DP) */
case 0x1d: /* Dunnington(MP) */
msr_basic = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V1_CPUID1;
break;
case 0x1a: /* Bloomfield, Nehalem-EP(Gainestown) */
case 0x1e: /* Clarksfield, Lynnfield, Jasper Forest */
case 0x1f: /* Something Nehalem-based - perhaps Auburndale/Havendale? */
case 0x25: /* Arrandale, Clarksdale */
case 0x2c: /* Gulftown, Westmere-EP */
case 0x2e: /* Nehalem-EX(Beckton) */
case 0x2f: /* Westmere-EX */
msr_basic = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V2_CPUID1;
msr_ext = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V2_CPUID80000001;
break;
case 0x2a: /* SandyBridge */
case 0x2d: /* SandyBridge-E, SandyBridge-EN, SandyBridge-EP */
msr_basic = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V3_CPUID1;
msr_ext = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V3_CPUID80000001;
msr_xsave = MSR_INTEL_MASK_V3_CPUIDD_01;
break;
}
exp_msr_basic = msr_basic;
exp_msr_ext = msr_ext;
exp_msr_xsave = msr_xsave;
if (msr_basic)
cpuidmask_defaults._1cd = _probe_mask_msr(&msr_basic, LCAP_1cd);
if (msr_ext)
cpuidmask_defaults.e1cd = _probe_mask_msr(&msr_ext, LCAP_e1cd);
if (msr_xsave)
cpuidmask_defaults.Da1 = _probe_mask_msr(&msr_xsave, LCAP_Da1);
/*
* Don't bother warning about a mismatch if virtualised. These MSRs
* are not architectural and almost never virtualised.
*/
if ((expected_levelling_cap == levelling_caps) ||
cpu_has_hypervisor)
return;
printk(XENLOG_WARNING "Mismatch between expected (%#x) "
"and real (%#x) levelling caps: missing %#x\n",
expected_levelling_cap, levelling_caps,
(expected_levelling_cap ^ levelling_caps) & levelling_caps);
printk(XENLOG_WARNING "Fam %#x, model %#x expected (%#x/%#x/%#x), "
"got (%#x/%#x/%#x)\n", c->x86, c->x86_model,
exp_msr_basic, exp_msr_ext, exp_msr_xsave,
msr_basic, msr_ext, msr_xsave);
printk(XENLOG_WARNING
"If not running virtualised, please report a bug\n");
}
/*
* Context switch CPUID masking state to the next domain. Only called if
* CPUID Faulting isn't available, but masking MSRs have been detected. A
* parameter of NULL is used to context switch to the default host state (by
* the cpu bringup-code, crash path, etc).
*/
static void cf_check intel_ctxt_switch_masking(const struct vcpu *next)
{
struct cpuidmasks *these_masks = &this_cpu(cpuidmasks);
const struct domain *nextd = next ? next->domain : NULL;
const struct cpuidmasks *masks =
(nextd && is_pv_domain(nextd) && nextd->arch.pv.cpuidmasks)
? nextd->arch.pv.cpuidmasks : &cpuidmask_defaults;
if (msr_basic) {
uint64_t val = masks->_1cd;
/*
* OSXSAVE defaults to 1, which causes fast-forwarding of
* Xen's real setting. Clobber it if disabled by the guest
* kernel.
*/
if (next && is_pv_vcpu(next) && !is_idle_vcpu(next) &&
!(next->arch.pv.ctrlreg[4] & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE))
val &= ~(uint64_t)cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE);
if (unlikely(these_masks->_1cd != val)) {
wrmsrl(msr_basic, val);
these_masks->_1cd = val;
}
}
#define LAZY(msr, field) \
({ \
if (unlikely(these_masks->field != masks->field) && \
(msr)) \
{ \
wrmsrl((msr), masks->field); \
these_masks->field = masks->field; \
} \
})
LAZY(msr_ext, e1cd);
LAZY(msr_xsave, Da1);
#undef LAZY
}
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_IBT /* Announce the function to ENDBR clobbering logic. */
static const typeof(ctxt_switch_masking) __initconst_cf_clobber __used csm =
intel_ctxt_switch_masking;
#endif
static void __init noinline intel_init_levelling(void)
{
uint32_t eax, ecx, edx, tmp;
/*
* Intel Fam0f is old enough that probing for CPUID faulting support
* introduces spurious #GP(0) when the appropriate MSRs are read,
* so skip it altogether. In the case where Xen is virtualized these
* MSRs may be emulated though, so we allow it in that case.
*/
if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0xf || cpu_has_hypervisor) &&
probe_cpuid_faulting()) {
expected_levelling_cap |= LCAP_faulting;
levelling_caps |= LCAP_faulting;
return;
}
probe_masking_msrs();
if (msr_basic) {
cpuid(0x00000001, &tmp, &tmp, &ecx, &edx);
/* Fast-forward bits - Must be set. */
if (ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
ecx |= cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE);
edx |= cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_APIC);
cpuidmask_defaults._1cd &= ((u64)edx << 32) | ecx;
}
if (msr_ext) {
cpuid(0x80000001, &tmp, &tmp, &ecx, &edx);
cpuidmask_defaults.e1cd &= ((u64)edx << 32) | ecx;
}
if (msr_xsave) {
cpuid_count(0x0000000d, 1, &eax, &tmp, &tmp, &tmp);
cpuidmask_defaults.Da1 &= (~0ULL << 32) | eax;
}
if (opt_cpu_info) {
printk(XENLOG_INFO "Levelling caps: %#x\n", levelling_caps);
if (!cpu_has_cpuid_faulting)
printk(XENLOG_INFO
"MSR defaults: 1d 0x%08x, 1c 0x%08x, e1d 0x%08x, "
"e1c 0x%08x, Da1 0x%08x\n",
(uint32_t)(cpuidmask_defaults._1cd >> 32),
(uint32_t)cpuidmask_defaults._1cd,
(uint32_t)(cpuidmask_defaults.e1cd >> 32),
(uint32_t)cpuidmask_defaults.e1cd,
(uint32_t)cpuidmask_defaults.Da1);
}
if (levelling_caps)
ctxt_switch_masking = intel_ctxt_switch_masking;
}
/* Unmask CPUID levels if masked. */
void intel_unlock_cpuid_leaves(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
uint64_t misc_enable, disable;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, misc_enable);
disable = misc_enable & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID;
if (disable) {
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, misc_enable & ~disable);
bootsym(trampoline_misc_enable_off) |= disable;
c->cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0);
printk(KERN_INFO "revised cpuid level: %u\n", c->cpuid_level);
}
}
static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/* Netburst reports 64 bytes clflush size, but does IO in 128 bytes */
if (c->x86 == 15 && c->x86_cache_alignment == 64)
c->x86_cache_alignment = 128;
if (c == &boot_cpu_data &&
bootsym(trampoline_misc_enable_off) & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE)
printk(KERN_INFO "re-enabled NX (Execute Disable) protection\n");
intel_unlock_cpuid_leaves(c);
/* CPUID workaround for Intel 0F33/0F34 CPU */
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0xF && boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 3 &&
(boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 3 || boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 4))
paddr_bits = 36;
if (c == &boot_cpu_data) {
uint64_t misc_enable;
check_memory_type_self_snoop_errata();
/*
* If fast string is not enabled in IA32_MISC_ENABLE for any reason,
* clear the enhanced fast string CPU capability.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, misc_enable);
if (!(misc_enable & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ERMS);
intel_init_levelling();
}
ctxt_switch_levelling(NULL);
}
/*
* Errata BA80, AAK120, AAM108, AAO67, BD59, AAY54: Rapid Core C3/C6 Transition
* May Cause Unpredictable System Behavior
*
* Under a complex set of internal conditions, cores rapidly performing C3/C6
* transitions in a system with Intel Hyper-Threading Technology enabled may
* cause a machine check error (IA32_MCi_STATUS.MCACOD = 0x0106), system hang
* or unpredictable system behavior.
*/
static void probe_c3_errata(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
static const struct x86_cpu_id models[] = {
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_NEHALEM_EP, NULL),
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_NEHALEM, NULL),
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_NEHALEM_G, NULL),
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_NEHALEM_EX, NULL), /* BA80 */
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_WESTMERE, NULL),
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_WESTMERE_EP, NULL),
/* Westmere-EX is not affected */
{ }
};
/* Serialized by the AP bringup code. */
if ( max_cstate > 1 && (c->apicid & (c->x86_num_siblings - 1)) &&
x86_match_cpu(models) )
{
printk(XENLOG_WARNING
"Disabling C-states C3 and C6 due to CPU errata\n");
max_cstate = 1;
}
}
static void __init probe_mwait_errata(void)
{
static const struct x86_cpu_id __initconst models[] = {
/*
* APL30: One use of the MONITOR/MWAIT instruction pair is to allow a
* logical processor to wait in a sleep state until a store to the
* armed address range occurs. Due to this erratum, stores to the
* armed address range may not trigger MWAIT to resume execution.
*/
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT, NULL),
/*
* ICX143: Under complex microarchitectural conditions, a monitor that
* is armed with the MWAIT instruction may not be triggered, leading
* to a processor hang.
*/
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, NULL),
/*
* LNL030: P-cores may not exit power state Core C6 on monitor hit.
*/
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_LUNARLAKE_M, NULL),
{ }
};
if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MONITOR) && x86_match_cpu(models) )
{
printk(XENLOG_WARNING
"Forcing IPI MWAIT wakeup due to CPU erratum\n");
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_MONITOR);
}
}
/*
* P4 Xeon errata 037 workaround.
* Hardware prefetcher may cause stale data to be loaded into the cache.
*
* Xeon 7400 erratum AAI65 (and further newer Xeons)
* MONITOR/MWAIT may have excessive false wakeups
* https://web.archive.org/web/20090219054841/http://download.intel.com/design/xeon/specupdt/32033601.pdf
*/
static void Intel_errata_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
uint64_t val;
if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 1) && (c->x86_mask == 1)) {
val = rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE);
if ((val & (1 << 9)) == 0) {
printk (KERN_INFO "CPU: C0 stepping P4 Xeon detected.\n");
printk (KERN_INFO "CPU: Disabling hardware prefetching (Errata 037)\n");
val |= (1 << 9); /* Disable hw prefetching */
wrmsrns(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, val);
}
}
if (c->x86 == 6 && cpu_has_clflush &&
(c->x86_model == 29 || c->x86_model == 46 || c->x86_model == 47))
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR);
probe_c3_errata(c);
if (system_state < SYS_STATE_smp_boot)
probe_mwait_errata();
}
/*
* find out the number of processor cores on the die
*/
static int num_cpu_cores(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
if (c->cpuid_level < 4)
return 1;
/* Intel has a non-standard dependency on %ecx for this CPUID level. */
cpuid_count(4, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
if (eax & 0x1f)
return ((eax >> 26) + 1);
else
return 1;
}
static void intel_log_freq(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, factor;
uint64_t msrval;
uint8_t max_ratio, min_ratio;
if ( c->cpuid_level >= 0x15 )
{
cpuid(0x15, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
if ( ecx && ebx && eax )
{
unsigned long long val = ecx;
val *= ebx;
printk("CPU%u: TSC: %u Hz * %u / %u = %Lu Hz\n",
smp_processor_id(), ecx, ebx, eax, val / eax);
}
else if ( ecx | eax | ebx )
{
printk("CPU%u: TSC:", smp_processor_id());
if ( ecx )
printk(" core: %u Hz", ecx);
if ( ebx && eax )
printk(" ratio: %u / %u", ebx, eax);
printk("\n");
}
}
if ( c->cpuid_level >= 0x16 )
{
cpuid(0x16, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
if ( ecx | eax | ebx )
{
printk("CPU%u:", smp_processor_id());
if ( ecx )
printk(" bus: %u MHz", ecx);
if ( eax )
printk(" base: %u MHz", eax);
if ( ebx )
printk(" max: %u MHz", ebx);
printk("\n");
}
}
switch ( c->x86 )
{
static const unsigned short core_factors[] =
{ 26667, 13333, 20000, 16667, 33333, 10000, 40000 };
case 6:
if ( rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO, &msrval) )
return;
max_ratio = msrval >> 8;
min_ratio = msrval >> 40;
if ( !max_ratio )
return;
switch ( c->x86_model )
{
case 0x0e: /* Core */
case 0x0f: case 0x16: case 0x17: case 0x1d: /* Core2 */
/*
* PLATFORM_INFO, while not documented for these, appears to exist
* in at least some cases, but what it holds doesn't match the
* scheme used by newer CPUs. At a guess, the min and max fields
* look to be reversed, while the scaling factor is encoded in
* FSB_FREQ.
*/
if ( min_ratio > max_ratio )
SWAP(min_ratio, max_ratio);
if ( rdmsr_safe(MSR_FSB_FREQ, &msrval) ||
(msrval &= 7) >= ARRAY_SIZE(core_factors) )
return;
factor = core_factors[msrval];
break;
case 0x1a: case 0x1e: case 0x1f: case 0x2e: /* Nehalem */
case 0x25: case 0x2c: case 0x2f: /* Westmere */
factor = 13333;
break;
default:
factor = 10000;
break;
}
break;
case 0xf:
if ( rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID, &msrval) )
return;
max_ratio = msrval >> 24;
min_ratio = 0;
msrval >>= 16;
if ( (msrval &= 7) > 4 )
return;
factor = core_factors[msrval];
break;
default:
return;
}
printk("CPU%u: ", smp_processor_id());
if ( min_ratio )
printk("%u ... ", (factor * min_ratio + 50) / 100);
printk("%u MHz\n", (factor * max_ratio + 50) / 100);
}
static void init_intel_perf(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
uint64_t val;
unsigned int eax, ver, nr_cnt;
if ( c->cpuid_level <= 9 ||
({ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, val);
!(val & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PERF_AVAIL); }) )
return;
eax = cpuid_eax(10);
ver = eax & 0xff;
nr_cnt = (eax >> 8) & 0xff;
if ( ver && nr_cnt > 1 && nr_cnt <= 32 )
{
unsigned int cnt_mask = (1UL << nr_cnt) - 1;
/*
* On (some?) Sapphire/Emerald Rapids platforms each package-BSP
* starts with all the enable bits for the general-purpose PMCs
* cleared. Adjust so counters can be enabled from EVNTSEL.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, val);
if ( (val & cnt_mask) != cnt_mask )
{
printk("FIRMWARE BUG: CPU%u invalid PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL: %#"PRIx64" adjusting to %#"PRIx64"\n",
smp_processor_id(), val, val | cnt_mask);
wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, val | cnt_mask);
}
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON, c->x86_capability);
}
}
static void cf_check init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/* Detect the extended topology information if available */
detect_extended_topology(c);
init_intel_cacheinfo(c);
init_intel_perf(c);
if ( !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY) )
{
c->x86_max_cores = num_cpu_cores(c);
detect_ht(c);
}
/* Work around errata */
Intel_errata_workarounds(c);
if ((c->x86 == 0xf && c->x86_model >= 0x03) ||
(c->x86 == 0x6 && c->x86_model >= 0x0e))
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC, c->x86_capability);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ITSC)) {
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC, c->x86_capability);
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC, c->x86_capability);
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE, c->x86_capability);
}
if ((opt_cpu_info && !(c->apicid & (c->x86_num_siblings - 1))) ||
c == &boot_cpu_data )
intel_log_freq(c);
/*
* The Gather Data Sampling microcode mitigation (August 2023) has an
* adverse performance impact on the CLWB instruction on SKX/CLX/CPX.
*
* On this model, CLWB has equivalent behaviour to CLFLUSHOPT but the
* latter is not impacted. Hide CLWB to cause Xen to fall back to
* using CLFLUSHOPT instead.
*/
if (c == &boot_cpu_data && c->vfm == INTEL_SKYLAKE_X)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLWB);
if (c == &boot_cpu_data && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ERMS))
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XEN_REP_MOVSB);
}
const struct cpu_dev __initconst_cf_clobber intel_cpu_dev = {
.c_early_init = early_init_intel,
.c_init = init_intel,
};
void __init intel_init_arat(void)
{
if ( opt_arat && cpu_has_arat )
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XEN_ARAT);
}