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Edwin Török
13268c50c0
Otherwise we can give quota away to another domain, either causing it to run out of quota, or in case of Dom0 use unbounded amounts of memory and bypass the quota system entirely. This was fixed in the C version of xenstored in 2006 (c/sdb34d2aaa5, predating the XSA process by 5 years). It was also fixed in the mirage version of xenstore in 2012, with a unit test demonstrating the vulnerability: https://github.com/mirage/ocaml-xenstore/commit/6b91f3ac46b885d0530a51d57a9b3a57d64923a7 https://github.com/mirage/ocaml-xenstore/commit/22ee5417c90b8fda905c38de0d534506152eace6 but possibly without realising that the vulnerability still affected the in-tree oxenstored (added c/sf44af66041in 2010). This is XSA-352. Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com> Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>