x86/domctl: don't imply I/O port permissions from I/O port mapping

Rather than granting permissions when mapping (an operation that DM-s are
allowed to carry out, while they can't invoke ioport-permission), check
whether permissions actually were granted when adding a mapping. This then
also allows relaxing the necessary locking.

While no longer granting permissions upon mapping is "only" at risk of
breaking guests, no longer revoking permissions upon unmapping strictly
requires callers to additionally invoke XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission. Or
else a security issue would arise. In-tree code already does so.

While there switch to using %pd in the two log messages.

Fixes: 192c4dabc3 ("domctl and p2m changes for PCI passthru")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger@xenproject.org>
Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jan Beulich committed 2026-07-22 09:29:09 +02:00
1 parent 388497e5f9
commit 3845d3854d
2 files changed
+31 -35

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+5
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/)
### Changed
- XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT's, FLASK_[GS]ETBOOL's, and FLASK_DEVICETREE_LABEL's input
string sizes need to include the nul terminator.
- On x86:
- XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping no longer implicitly grants or revokes
permissions for the port range in question.
XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission now needs invoking up front /
afterwards.
### Added
+26 -35
View File
@@ -714,15 +714,35 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
break;
hvm = &d->arch.hvm;
iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
/*
* NB: The double lock isn't really needed when !add, but is used anyway
* to keep things simple.
*/
iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) )
ret = -EPERM;
else if ( add )
else if ( !add )
{
printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
"ioport_map:add: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
d->domain_id, fgp, fmp, np);
"ioport_map:remove: %pd gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
d, fgp, fmp, np);
write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
list_for_each_entry(g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list)
if ( g2m_ioport->mport == fmp )
{
list_del(&g2m_ioport->list);
xfree(g2m_ioport);
break;
}
write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
}
else if ( ioports_access_permitted(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1) )
{
printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
"ioport_map:add: %pd gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
d, fgp, fmp, np);
write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
list_for_each_entry(g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list)
@@ -747,40 +767,11 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
list_add_tail(&g2m_ioport->list, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list);
}
write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
if ( !ret )
ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
if ( ret && !found && g2m_ioport )
{
write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
list_del(&g2m_ioport->list);
write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
xfree(g2m_ioport);
}
}
else
{
printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
"ioport_map:remove: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
d->domain_id, fgp, fmp, np);
ret = -EPERM;
write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
list_for_each_entry(g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list)
if ( g2m_ioport->mport == fmp )
{
list_del(&g2m_ioport->list);
xfree(g2m_ioport);
break;
}
write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
if ( ret && is_hardware_domain(currd) )
printk(XENLOG_ERR
"ioport_map: error %ld denying dom%d access to [%x,%x]\n",
ret, d->domain_id, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
}
iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
break;
}
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