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domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission without acquiring domctl lock
With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore. Move the re-purposed (XSM_HOOK -> XSM_PRIV, as xsm_domctl() is now bypassed) dedicated XSM checks as early as possible. This is part of XSA-492. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
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3 files changed
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@@ -450,6 +450,36 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
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goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
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}
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case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
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{
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unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
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bool allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
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ret = -EINVAL;
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if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
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goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
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irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(current->domain, pirq);
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ret = -EPERM;
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if ( irq )
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ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, allow);
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if ( ret )
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goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
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iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
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if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
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ret = -EPERM;
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else if ( allow )
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ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
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else
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ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
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iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
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goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
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}
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case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
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@@ -783,31 +813,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
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}
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break;
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case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
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{
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unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
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int allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
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if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
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{
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ret = -EINVAL;
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break;
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}
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iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
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irq = pirq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq);
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if ( !irq || xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) )
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ret = -EPERM;
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else if ( allow )
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ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
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else
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ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
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iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
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break;
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}
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case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
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domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
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break;
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@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domctl(
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case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
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ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
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@@ -561,7 +562,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unmap_domain_irq(
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static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_irq_permission(
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XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int pirq, uint8_t allow)
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{
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XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
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XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
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return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
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}
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@@ -684,6 +684,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd,
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case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
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ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
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@@ -691,7 +692,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd,
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/* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
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case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
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case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
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