x86/spec-ctrl: Disable retpolines with CET-IBT

CET-IBT depend on executing indirect branches for protections to apply.
Extend the clobber for CET-SS to all of CET.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6e3f36387d)
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Andrew Cooper committed 2022-03-25 17:11:55 +00:00
1 parent 1bb2a88f0c
commit 631d8408bb
1 file changed
+4 -3
+4 -3
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@@ -919,13 +919,14 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS));
/*
* First, disable the use of retpolines if Xen is using shadow stacks, as
* they are incompatible.
* First, disable the use of retpolines if Xen is using CET. Retpolines
* are a ROP gadget so incompatbile with Shadow Stacks, while IBT depends
* on executing indirect branches for the safety properties to apply.
*
* In the absence of retpolines, IBRS needs to be used for speculative
* safety. All CET-capable hardware has efficient IBRS.
*/
if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk )
if ( read_cr4() & X86_CR4_CET )
{
if ( !has_spec_ctrl )
printk(XENLOG_WARNING "?!? CET active, but no MSR_SPEC_CTRL?\n");
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