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VMX: disable EPT when !cpu_has_vmx_pat
Recently Oracle developers found a Xen security issue as DOS affecting,
named as XSA-60. Please refer http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-60.html
Basically it involves how to handle guest cr0.cd setting, which under
some environment it consumes much time resulting in DOS-like behavior.
This is a preparing patch for fixing XSA-60. Later patch will fix XSA-60
via PAT under Intel EPT case, which depends on cpu_has_vmx_pat.
This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
master commit: c13b0d65dd
master date: 2013-11-06 10:11:18 +0100
This commit is contained in:
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5891e7c154
commit
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2 files changed
+9
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@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
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vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS);
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vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP);
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vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP);
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if ( cpu_has_vmx_pat && paging_mode_hap(d) )
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if ( paging_mode_hap(d) )
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vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT);
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}
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@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
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if ( cpu_has_vmx_vpid )
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__vmwrite(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.asid);
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if ( cpu_has_vmx_pat && paging_mode_hap(d) )
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if ( paging_mode_hap(d) )
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{
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u64 host_pat, guest_pat;
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@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static void vmx_set_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
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static int vmx_set_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u64 gpat)
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{
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if ( !cpu_has_vmx_pat || !paging_mode_hap(v->domain) )
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if ( !paging_mode_hap(v->domain) )
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return 0;
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vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
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@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ static int vmx_set_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u64 gpat)
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static int vmx_get_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u64 *gpat)
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{
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if ( !cpu_has_vmx_pat || !paging_mode_hap(v->domain) )
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if ( !paging_mode_hap(v->domain) )
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return 0;
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vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
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@@ -1450,7 +1450,11 @@ struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void)
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return NULL;
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}
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if ( cpu_has_vmx_ept )
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/*
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* Do not enable EPT when (!cpu_has_vmx_pat), to prevent security hole
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* (refer to http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-60.html).
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*/
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if ( cpu_has_vmx_ept && cpu_has_vmx_pat )
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{
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vmx_function_table.hap_supported = 1;
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