x86: Common cpuid faulting support

With CPUID Faulting offered to SVM guests, move Xen's faulting code to being
common rather than Intel specific.

This is necessary for nested Xen (inc. pv-shim mode) to prevent PV guests from
finding the outer HVM Xen leaves via native cpuid.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Cooper authored and Wei Liu committed 2018-01-16 18:34:04 +00:00
1 parent aca7d2a72e
commit 6e2fdc0f89
5 files changed
+98 -83

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+10 -6
View File
@@ -198,11 +198,12 @@ static void __init noinline probe_masking_msrs(void)
}
/*
* Context switch levelling state to the next domain. A parameter of NULL is
* used to context switch to the default host state (by the cpu bringup-code,
* crash path, etc).
* Context switch CPUID masking state to the next domain. Only called if
* CPUID Faulting isn't available, but masking MSRs have been detected. A
* parameter of NULL is used to context switch to the default host state (by
* the cpu bringup-code, crash path, etc).
*/
static void amd_ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct vcpu *next)
static void amd_ctxt_switch_masking(const struct vcpu *next)
{
struct cpuidmasks *these_masks = &this_cpu(cpuidmasks);
const struct domain *nextd = next ? next->domain : NULL;
@@ -263,6 +264,9 @@ static void __init noinline amd_init_levelling(void)
{
const struct cpuidmask *m = NULL;
if (probe_cpuid_faulting())
return;
probe_masking_msrs();
if (*opt_famrev != '\0') {
@@ -352,7 +356,7 @@ static void __init noinline amd_init_levelling(void)
}
if (levelling_caps)
ctxt_switch_levelling = amd_ctxt_switch_levelling;
ctxt_switch_masking = amd_ctxt_switch_masking;
}
/*
@@ -518,7 +522,7 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
amd_init_levelling();
amd_ctxt_switch_levelling(NULL);
ctxt_switch_levelling(NULL);
}
static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+72 -4
View File
@@ -113,12 +113,80 @@ static const struct cpu_dev default_cpu = {
};
static const struct cpu_dev *this_cpu = &default_cpu;
static void default_ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct vcpu *next)
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(uint64_t, msr_misc_features);
void (* __read_mostly ctxt_switch_masking)(const struct vcpu *next);
bool __init probe_cpuid_faulting(void)
{
/* Nop */
uint64_t val;
if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO, val) ||
!(val & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULTING) ||
rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES,
this_cpu(msr_misc_features)))
{
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING);
return false;
}
expected_levelling_cap |= LCAP_faulting;
levelling_caps |= LCAP_faulting;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING);
return true;
}
static void set_cpuid_faulting(bool enable)
{
uint64_t *this_misc_features = &this_cpu(msr_misc_features);
uint64_t val = *this_misc_features;
if (!!(val & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING) == enable)
return;
val ^= MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING;
wrmsrl(MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, val);
*this_misc_features = val;
}
void ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct vcpu *next)
{
const struct domain *nextd = next ? next->domain : NULL;
if (cpu_has_cpuid_faulting) {
/*
* No need to alter the faulting setting if we are switching
* to idle; it won't affect any code running in idle context.
*/
if (nextd && is_idle_domain(nextd))
return;
/*
* We *should* be enabling faulting for the control domain.
*
* Unfortunately, the domain builder (having only ever been a
* PV guest) expects to be able to see host cpuid state in a
* native CPUID instruction, to correctly build a CPUID policy
* for HVM guests (notably the xstate leaves).
*
* This logic is fundimentally broken for HVM toolstack
* domains, and faulting causes PV guests to behave like HVM
* guests from their point of view.
*
* Future development plans will move responsibility for
* generating the maximum full cpuid policy into Xen, at which
* this problem will disappear.
*/
set_cpuid_faulting(nextd && !is_control_domain(nextd) &&
(is_pv_domain(nextd) ||
next->arch.msr->
misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting));
return;
}
if (ctxt_switch_masking)
ctxt_switch_masking(next);
}
void (* __read_mostly ctxt_switch_levelling)(const struct vcpu *next) =
default_ctxt_switch_levelling;
bool_t opt_cpu_info;
boolean_param("cpuinfo", opt_cpu_info);
+13 -69
View File
@@ -15,41 +15,6 @@
#include "cpu.h"
static bool __init probe_intel_cpuid_faulting(void)
{
uint64_t x;
if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO, x) ||
!(x & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULTING))
return 0;
expected_levelling_cap |= LCAP_faulting;
levelling_caps |= LCAP_faulting;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING);
return 1;
}
DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, cpuid_faulting_enabled);
static void set_cpuid_faulting(bool enable)
{
bool *this_enabled = &this_cpu(cpuid_faulting_enabled);
uint32_t hi, lo;
ASSERT(cpu_has_cpuid_faulting);
if (*this_enabled == enable)
return;
rdmsr(MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, lo, hi);
lo &= ~MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING;
if (enable)
lo |= MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING;
wrmsr(MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, lo, hi);
*this_enabled = enable;
}
/*
* Set caps in expected_levelling_cap, probe a specific masking MSR, and set
* caps in levelling_caps if it is found, or clobber the MSR index if missing.
@@ -145,40 +110,17 @@ static void __init probe_masking_msrs(void)
}
/*
* Context switch levelling state to the next domain. A parameter of NULL is
* used to context switch to the default host state (by the cpu bringup-code,
* crash path, etc).
* Context switch CPUID masking state to the next domain. Only called if
* CPUID Faulting isn't available, but masking MSRs have been detected. A
* parameter of NULL is used to context switch to the default host state (by
* the cpu bringup-code, crash path, etc).
*/
static void intel_ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct vcpu *next)
static void intel_ctxt_switch_masking(const struct vcpu *next)
{
struct cpuidmasks *these_masks = &this_cpu(cpuidmasks);
const struct domain *nextd = next ? next->domain : NULL;
const struct cpuidmasks *masks;
if (cpu_has_cpuid_faulting) {
/*
* We *should* be enabling faulting for the control domain.
*
* Unfortunately, the domain builder (having only ever been a
* PV guest) expects to be able to see host cpuid state in a
* native CPUID instruction, to correctly build a CPUID policy
* for HVM guests (notably the xstate leaves).
*
* This logic is fundimentally broken for HVM toolstack
* domains, and faulting causes PV guests to behave like HVM
* guests from their point of view.
*
* Future development plans will move responsibility for
* generating the maximum full cpuid policy into Xen, at which
* this problem will disappear.
*/
set_cpuid_faulting(nextd && !is_control_domain(nextd) &&
(is_pv_domain(nextd) ||
next->arch.msr->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting));
return;
}
masks = (nextd && is_pv_domain(nextd) && nextd->arch.pv_domain.cpuidmasks)
const struct cpuidmasks *masks =
(nextd && is_pv_domain(nextd) && nextd->arch.pv_domain.cpuidmasks)
? nextd->arch.pv_domain.cpuidmasks : &cpuidmask_defaults;
if (msr_basic) {
@@ -223,8 +165,10 @@ static void intel_ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct vcpu *next)
*/
static void __init noinline intel_init_levelling(void)
{
if (!probe_intel_cpuid_faulting())
probe_masking_msrs();
if (probe_cpuid_faulting())
return;
probe_masking_msrs();
if (msr_basic) {
uint32_t ecx, edx, tmp;
@@ -278,7 +222,7 @@ static void __init noinline intel_init_levelling(void)
}
if (levelling_caps)
ctxt_switch_levelling = intel_ctxt_switch_levelling;
ctxt_switch_masking = intel_ctxt_switch_masking;
}
static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -316,7 +260,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
intel_init_levelling();
intel_ctxt_switch_levelling(NULL);
ctxt_switch_levelling(NULL);
}
/*
-3
View File
@@ -58,9 +58,6 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct cpuidmasks, cpuidmasks);
/* Default masking MSR values, calculated at boot. */
extern struct cpuidmasks cpuidmask_defaults;
/* Whether or not cpuid faulting is available for the current domain. */
DECLARE_PER_CPU(bool, cpuid_faulting_enabled);
#define CPUID_GUEST_NR_BASIC (0xdu + 1)
#define CPUID_GUEST_NR_FEAT (0u + 1)
#define CPUID_GUEST_NR_CACHE (5u + 1)
+3 -1
View File
@@ -151,7 +151,9 @@ extern struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data;
extern struct cpuinfo_x86 cpu_data[];
#define current_cpu_data cpu_data[smp_processor_id()]
extern void (*ctxt_switch_levelling)(const struct vcpu *next);
extern bool probe_cpuid_faulting(void);
extern void ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct vcpu *next);
extern void (*ctxt_switch_masking)(const struct vcpu *next);
extern u64 host_pat;
extern bool_t opt_cpu_info;
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