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x86-64: don't allow non-canonical addresses to be set for any callback
Rather than deferring the detection of these to the point where they get actually used (the fix for XSA-7, 25480:76eaf5966c05, causing a #GP to be raised by IRET, which invokes the guest's [fragile] fail-safe callback), don't even allow such to be set. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
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5f4acea2ce
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3 files changed
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@@ -736,6 +736,14 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
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{
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if ( !compat )
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{
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#ifdef __x86_64__
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if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.eip) ||
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!is_canonical_address(c.nat->event_callback_eip) ||
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!is_canonical_address(c.nat->syscall_callback_eip) ||
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!is_canonical_address(c.nat->failsafe_callback_eip) )
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return -EINVAL;
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#endif
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fixup_guest_stack_selector(d, c.nat->user_regs.ss);
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fixup_guest_stack_selector(d, c.nat->kernel_ss);
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fixup_guest_code_selector(d, c.nat->user_regs.cs);
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@@ -745,7 +753,11 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
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#endif
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for ( i = 0; i < 256; i++ )
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{
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if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->trap_ctxt[i].address) )
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return -EINVAL;
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fixup_guest_code_selector(d, c.nat->trap_ctxt[i].cs);
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}
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/* LDT safety checks. */
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if ( ((c.nat->ldt_base & (PAGE_SIZE-1)) != 0) ||
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@@ -1033,6 +1033,9 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
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#ifdef __x86_64__
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if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
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{
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if ( !is_canonical_address(evc->sysenter_callback_eip) ||
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!is_canonical_address(evc->syscall32_callback_eip) )
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goto ext_vcpucontext_out;
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fixup_guest_code_selector(d, evc->sysenter_callback_cs);
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v->arch.pv_vcpu.sysenter_callback_cs =
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evc->sysenter_callback_cs;
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@@ -3581,6 +3581,9 @@ long register_guest_nmi_callback(unsigned long address)
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struct domain *d = v->domain;
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struct trap_info *t = &v->arch.pv_vcpu.trap_ctxt[TRAP_nmi];
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if ( !is_canonical_address(address) )
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return -EINVAL;
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t->vector = TRAP_nmi;
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t->flags = 0;
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t->cs = (is_pv_32on64_domain(d) ?
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@@ -3708,6 +3711,9 @@ long do_set_trap_table(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_trap_info_t) traps)
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if ( cur.address == 0 )
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break;
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if ( !is_canonical_address(cur.address) )
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return -EINVAL;
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fixup_guest_code_selector(curr->domain, cur.cs);
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memcpy(&dst[cur.vector], &cur, sizeof(cur));
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