x86 shadow: fix race when domain is dying

There are some cases that shadow_write_p2m_entry() is called after
the domain is killed. It causes Xen to crash.

- Race between xc_map_foreign_batch from qemu-dm and "xm destroy"
  command.
- The hypervisor calls domain_crash when PoD fails.

Signed-off-by: Kouya Shimura <kouya@jp.fujitsu.com>
This commit is contained in:
Keir Fraser committed 2009-11-26 11:02:30 +00:00
1 parent 8978cc08d9
commit 833cce002f
2 files changed
+13

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+6
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@@ -1221,6 +1221,12 @@ p2m_gfn_to_mfn(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, p2m_type_t *t,
ASSERT(paging_mode_translate(d));
if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
{
*t = p2m_invalid;
return _mfn(INVALID_MFN);
}
/* XXX This is for compatibility with the old model, where anything not
* XXX marked as RAM was considered to be emulated MMIO space.
* XXX Once we start explicitly registering MMIO regions in the p2m
+7
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@@ -2171,6 +2171,7 @@ static void hash_foreach(struct vcpu *v,
/* Say we're here, to stop hash-lookups reordering the chains */
ASSERT(shadow_locked_by_me(d));
ASSERT(d->arch.paging.shadow.hash_table);
ASSERT(d->arch.paging.shadow.hash_walking == 0);
d->arch.paging.shadow.hash_walking = 1;
@@ -3449,6 +3450,12 @@ shadow_write_p2m_entry(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long gfn,
shadow_lock(d);
if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
{
shadow_unlock(d);
return;
}
/* If we're removing an MFN from the p2m, remove it from the shadows too */
if ( level == 1 )
{
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