x86: calculate maximum host and guest featuresets

All of this information will be used by the toolstack to make informed
levelling decisions for VMs, and by Xen to sanity check toolstack-provided
information.

The split between the shadow and hap HVM masks is necessary due to the lack of
a "get cpuid policy" hypercall.  Multi-host toolstacks (i.e. not libxl)
dealing with hap and non-hap capable hosts need to be able to calculate that
migrating a shadow guest is safe.

Future planned development work will implement proper cpuid policy handing in
Xen, including a "get policy" hypercall, but until then, the difference is
made available for toolstack use via a non-stable interface.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Cooper authored and Jan Beulich committed 2016-04-08 22:30:44 +02:00
1 parent 78803f9719
commit ac2628ebaa
3 files changed
+182

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@@ -1,14 +1,176 @@
#include <xen/init.h>
#include <xen/lib.h>
#include <asm/cpuid.h>
#include <asm/hvm/hvm.h>
#include <asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
const uint32_t known_features[] = INIT_KNOWN_FEATURES;
const uint32_t special_features[] = INIT_SPECIAL_FEATURES;
static const uint32_t __initconst pv_featuremask[] = INIT_PV_FEATURES;
static const uint32_t __initconst hvm_shadow_featuremask[] = INIT_HVM_SHADOW_FEATURES;
static const uint32_t __initconst hvm_hap_featuremask[] = INIT_HVM_HAP_FEATURES;
uint32_t __read_mostly raw_featureset[FSCAPINTS];
uint32_t __read_mostly pv_featureset[FSCAPINTS];
uint32_t __read_mostly hvm_featureset[FSCAPINTS];
static void __init sanitise_featureset(uint32_t *fs)
{
unsigned int i;
for ( i = 0; i < FSCAPINTS; ++i )
{
/* Clamp to known mask. */
fs[i] &= known_features[i];
}
/*
* Sort out shared bits. We are constructing a featureset which needs to
* be applicable to a cross-vendor case. Intel strictly clears the common
* bits in e1d, while AMD strictly duplicates them.
*
* We duplicate them here to be compatible with AMD while on Intel, and
* rely on logic closer to the guest to make the featureset stricter if
* emulating Intel.
*/
fs[FEATURESET_e1d] = ((fs[FEATURESET_1d] & CPUID_COMMON_1D_FEATURES) |
(fs[FEATURESET_e1d] & ~CPUID_COMMON_1D_FEATURES));
}
static void __init calculate_raw_featureset(void)
{
unsigned int max, tmp;
max = cpuid_eax(0);
if ( max >= 1 )
cpuid(0x1, &tmp, &tmp,
&raw_featureset[FEATURESET_1c],
&raw_featureset[FEATURESET_1d]);
if ( max >= 7 )
cpuid_count(0x7, 0, &tmp,
&raw_featureset[FEATURESET_7b0],
&raw_featureset[FEATURESET_7c0],
&tmp);
if ( max >= 0xd )
cpuid_count(0xd, 1,
&raw_featureset[FEATURESET_Da1],
&tmp, &tmp, &tmp);
max = cpuid_eax(0x80000000);
if ( (max >> 16) != 0x8000 )
return;
if ( max >= 0x80000001 )
cpuid(0x80000001, &tmp, &tmp,
&raw_featureset[FEATURESET_e1c],
&raw_featureset[FEATURESET_e1d]);
if ( max >= 0x80000007 )
cpuid(0x80000007, &tmp, &tmp, &tmp,
&raw_featureset[FEATURESET_e7d]);
if ( max >= 0x80000008 )
cpuid(0x80000008, &tmp,
&raw_featureset[FEATURESET_e8b],
&tmp, &tmp);
}
static void __init calculate_pv_featureset(void)
{
unsigned int i;
for ( i = 0; i < FSCAPINTS; ++i )
pv_featureset[i] = host_featureset[i] & pv_featuremask[i];
/* Unconditionally claim to be able to set the hypervisor bit. */
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR, pv_featureset);
/*
* Allow the toolstack to set HTT, X2APIC and CMP_LEGACY. These bits
* affect how to interpret topology information in other cpuid leaves.
*/
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_HTT, pv_featureset);
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_X2APIC, pv_featureset);
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY, pv_featureset);
sanitise_featureset(pv_featureset);
}
static void __init calculate_hvm_featureset(void)
{
unsigned int i;
const uint32_t *hvm_featuremask;
if ( !hvm_enabled )
return;
hvm_featuremask = hvm_funcs.hap_supported ?
hvm_hap_featuremask : hvm_shadow_featuremask;
for ( i = 0; i < FSCAPINTS; ++i )
hvm_featureset[i] = host_featureset[i] & hvm_featuremask[i];
/* Unconditionally claim to be able to set the hypervisor bit. */
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR, hvm_featureset);
/*
* Allow the toolstack to set HTT, X2APIC and CMP_LEGACY. These bits
* affect how to interpret topology information in other cpuid leaves.
*/
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_HTT, hvm_featureset);
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_X2APIC, hvm_featureset);
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY, hvm_featureset);
/*
* Xen can provide an APIC emulation to HVM guests even if the host's APIC
* isn't enabled.
*/
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_APIC, hvm_featureset);
/*
* On AMD, PV guests are entirely unable to use SYSENTER as Xen runs in
* long mode (and init_amd() has cleared it out of host capabilities), but
* HVM guests are able if running in protected mode.
*/
if ( (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) &&
test_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, raw_featureset) )
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, hvm_featureset);
/*
* With VT-x, some features are only supported by Xen if dedicated
* hardware support is also available.
*/
if ( cpu_has_vmx )
{
if ( !(vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) ||
!(vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS) )
__clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_MPX, hvm_featureset);
if ( !cpu_has_vmx_xsaves )
__clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES, hvm_featureset);
if ( !cpu_has_vmx_pcommit )
__clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PCOMMIT, hvm_featureset);
}
sanitise_featureset(hvm_featureset);
}
void __init calculate_featuresets(void)
{
calculate_raw_featureset();
calculate_pv_featureset();
calculate_hvm_featureset();
}
static void __init __maybe_unused build_assertions(void)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(known_features) != FSCAPINTS);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(special_features) != FSCAPINTS);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(pv_featuremask) != FSCAPINTS);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(hvm_shadow_featuremask) != FSCAPINTS);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(hvm_hap_featuremask) != FSCAPINTS);
}
/*
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@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <asm/nmi.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/mc146818rtc.h>
#include <asm/cpuid.h>
/* opt_nosmp: If true, secondary processors are ignored. */
static bool_t __initdata opt_nosmp;
@@ -1525,6 +1526,8 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
"Multiple initrd candidates, picking module #%u\n",
initrdidx);
calculate_featuresets();
/*
* Temporarily clear SMAP in CR4 to allow user-accesses in construct_dom0().
* This saves a large number of corner cases interactions with
+17
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@@ -6,12 +6,29 @@
#define FSCAPINTS FEATURESET_NR_ENTRIES
#define FEATURESET_1d 0 /* 0x00000001.edx */
#define FEATURESET_1c 1 /* 0x00000001.ecx */
#define FEATURESET_e1d 2 /* 0x80000001.edx */
#define FEATURESET_e1c 3 /* 0x80000001.ecx */
#define FEATURESET_Da1 4 /* 0x0000000d:1.eax */
#define FEATURESET_7b0 5 /* 0x00000007:0.ebx */
#define FEATURESET_7c0 6 /* 0x00000007:0.ecx */
#define FEATURESET_e7d 7 /* 0x80000007.edx */
#define FEATURESET_e8b 8 /* 0x80000008.ebx */
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <xen/types.h>
extern const uint32_t known_features[FSCAPINTS];
extern const uint32_t special_features[FSCAPINTS];
extern uint32_t raw_featureset[FSCAPINTS];
#define host_featureset boot_cpu_data.x86_capability
extern uint32_t pv_featureset[FSCAPINTS];
extern uint32_t hvm_featureset[FSCAPINTS];
void calculate_featuresets(void);
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* !__X86_CPUID_H__ */
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