x86/msr: Fix migration compatibility issue with MSR_SPEC_CTRL

This bug existed in early in 2018 between MSR_SPEC_CTRL arriving in microcode,
and SSBD arriving a few months later.  It went unnoticed presumably because
everyone was busy rebooting everything.

The same bug will reappear when adding PSFD support.

Clamp the guest MSR_SPEC_CTRL value to that permitted by CPUID on migrate.
The guest is already playing with reserved bits at this point, and clamping
the value will prevent a migration to a less capable host from failing.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 969a57f73f)
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Cooper committed 2022-02-04 16:29:40 +00:00
1 parent 2c234462f3
commit ae0cdc8fac
3 files changed
+46 -14

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+23 -2
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@@ -1370,6 +1370,7 @@ static const uint32_t msrs_to_send[] = {
static int hvm_save_cpu_msrs(struct vcpu *v, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
{
const struct domain *d = v->domain;
struct hvm_save_descriptor *desc = _p(&h->data[h->cur]);
struct hvm_msr *ctxt;
unsigned int i;
@@ -1385,7 +1386,8 @@ static int hvm_save_cpu_msrs(struct vcpu *v, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_send); ++i )
{
uint64_t val;
int rc = guest_rdmsr(v, msrs_to_send[i], &val);
unsigned int msr = msrs_to_send[i];
int rc = guest_rdmsr(v, msr, &val);
/*
* It is the programmers responsibility to ensure that
@@ -1405,7 +1407,26 @@ static int hvm_save_cpu_msrs(struct vcpu *v, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
if ( !val )
continue; /* Skip empty MSRs. */
ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].index = msrs_to_send[i];
/*
* Guests are given full access to certain MSRs for performance
* reasons. A consequence is that Xen is unable to enforce that all
* bits disallowed by the CPUID policy yield #GP, and an enterprising
* guest may be able to set and use a bit it ought to leave alone.
*
* When migrating from a more capable host to a less capable one, such
* bits may be rejected by the destination, and the migration failed.
*
* Discard such bits here on the source side. Such bits have reserved
* behaviour, and the guest has only itself to blame.
*/
switch ( msr )
{
case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
val &= msr_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(d->arch.cpuid);
break;
}
ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].index = msr;
ctxt->msr[ctxt->count++].val = val;
}
+21 -12
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@@ -360,6 +360,24 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
}
/*
* Caller to confirm that MSR_SPEC_CTRL is available. Intel and AMD have
* separate CPUID features for this functionality, but only set will be
* active.
*/
uint64_t msr_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(const struct cpuid_policy *cp)
{
bool ssbd = cp->feat.ssbd;
/*
* Note: SPEC_CTRL_STIBP is specified as safe to use (i.e. ignored)
* when STIBP isn't enumerated in hardware.
*/
return (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP |
(ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0) |
0);
}
int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
{
const struct vcpu *curr = current;
@@ -442,18 +460,9 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
break;
case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb )
goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
/*
* Note: SPEC_CTRL_STIBP is specified as safe to use (i.e. ignored)
* when STIBP isn't enumerated in hardware.
*/
rsvd = ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP |
(cp->feat.ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0));
if ( val & rsvd )
goto gp_fault; /* Rsvd bit set? */
if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb ||
(val & ~msr_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(cp)) )
goto gp_fault;
goto set_reg;
case MSR_PRED_CMD:
+2
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@@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ static inline void wrmsr_tsc_aux(uint32_t val)
}
}
uint64_t msr_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(const struct cpuid_policy *cp);
extern struct msr_policy raw_msr_policy,
host_msr_policy,
pv_max_msr_policy,
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