It's used twice in entirely different situations. The use in do_domctl()
wants to become an ordinary XSM_DM_PRIV invocation, while the one in vPCI
code need to remain XSM_HOOK (it may plausibly become XSM_TARGET). For
Flask, the same backing function will continue to be used for the time
being.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6bb83b1aa0)
In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}bind_pt_irq
handling out of the domctl-locked region, a separate (per-domain) lock is
needed to synchronize in particular with XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission.
Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
limited to non-__init code).
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 329edc090d)
In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping
handling out of the domctl-locked region, the new separate (per-domain)
lock is used to synchronize in particular with
XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission.
Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
limited to non-__init code).
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit c9f4586766)
In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_mapping handling
out of the domctl-locked region, a separate (per-domain) lock is needed to
synchronize in particular with XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission.
Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
limited to non-__init code).
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 960713dfd4)
getdomaininfo() is not called under consistently the same lock. Thus,
with caller side locking irrelevant, it can as well be called with the
domctl lock not held. (Callers not pausing the domain they want to
retrieve information for already need to be aware that not all of the
data returned can be relied on as being consistent; most data will also
be stale by the time the caller gets to look at it.)
Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
While moving, convert an assignment to an assertion: The domain in
question was determined from the field which previously was "updated".
This is part of XSA-492.
Fixes: 5513bd0b46 ("add xenstore domain flag to hypervisor")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
(cherry picked from commit 784bd4dc0b)
Subsequently XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo will want to invoke the function
without holding a lock, thus allowing parallel execution of potentially
many instances. As was learned from 228ab9992f ("domctl: improve
locking during domain destruction"), reverted by d0887cc6b1, such
parallelism can result in severe lock contention on any (previously)
inner lock. To avoid taking that risk replace the use of the scheduler
lock in vcpu_runstate_get() by a newly introduced sequence counter.
Convert the "no lock if current" property to "use a local counter
instance", thus guaranteeing the loop to exit after the first iteration.
Skeleton and commentary of the seqcount implementation based on /
derived from Linux 6.11-rc.
To have runstate_seq placed next to runstate in struct vcpu, without
introducing a new obvious padding hole, yet while keeping the latter
adjacent to runstate_guest{,_area} as well, move runstate down a little.
This is part of XSA-492.
Requested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1dc4d5d818)
Today the dummy XSM privilege checks for getdomaininfo are less
stringent than possible: they basically rely on the general
sysctl/domctl entry check to do all tests and then do the test with
the XSM_HOOK privilege, which is an "allow all" default.
Instead of XSM_HOOK use XSM_XS_PRIV, which is the privilege really
wanted. Note that this test is still wider than the sysctl entry test,
but there is no easy way to make both domctl and sysctl happy at the
same time.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
master commit: 5793b84c5e
master date: 2024-12-16 13:06:55 +0100
XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping is usable by DM stubdoms, and hence we can't
assume the list to be left unaltered while the guest (really: the
hypervisor on behalf of the guest) is accessing it.
This is XSA-491 / CVE-2026-42487.
Fixes: 192c4dabc3 ("domctl and p2m changes for PCI passthru")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7787f8e939)
If a domain tries to map status frames in parallel to switching grant
table version from 2 to 1, the mapping operation may put in place P2M
entries referencing MFNs which gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is in the
process of freeing.
Ideally we would refcount pages when entered into P2M tables, but that's a
significant change. Extend the grant-table-locked region instead in
xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() (being the sole caller of gnttab_map_frame()),
such that a race with gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is no longer
possible.
This is XSA-486 / CVE-2026-23558.
Fixes: 5ce8fafa94 ("Dynamic grant-table sizing")
Fixes: a98dc13703 ("Introduce a grant_entry_v2 structure")
Reported-by: Rafal Wojtczuk <rafal.wojtczuk@7bulls.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 02708d3b51)
conn_delete_all_transactions() should be callable in any context,
resetting ALL transaction related data.
This includes number of active transactions and the transaction
pointer in struct connection.
So reset conn->trans to NULL in conn_delete_all_transactions() and
do the cleanup for each transaction in destroy_transaction().
This avoids triggering the assert() in conn_delete_all_transactions()
in case e.g. ignore_connection() was called while an operation inside
a transaction was performed, or XS_RESET_WATCHES was called in a
transaction.
This is XSA-484 / CVE-2026-23557.
Reported-by: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
Fixes: 1f9d04fb02 ("xenstored: allow guest to shutdown all its watches/transactions")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit e88031d1fe)
The quota object contains both limits and the current node usage counts.
When a domain is torn down, the node data itself is cleaned up but the node
usage counts are not. A later domain reusing the same domid can create fewer
nodes before being deemed to be over quota.
Reset the count when the node permissions are cleaned up.
This is XSA-483 / CVE-2026-23556.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit af9e77f5ff)
Archlinux just updated glibc to 2.43+r5+g856c426a7534-1 and that
causes libxl build failure:
libxl_cpuid.c: In function ‘libxl_cpuid_parse_config_xend’:
libxl_cpuid.c:447:16: error: assignment discards ‘const’ qualifier from pointer target type [-Werror=discarded-qualifiers]
447 | endptr = strchr(str, '=');
| ^
libxl_cpuid.c:452:16: error: assignment discards ‘const’ qualifier from pointer target type [-Werror=discarded-qualifiers]
452 | endptr = strchr(str, ',');
| ^
libxl_cpuid.c:454:20: error: assignment discards ‘const’ qualifier from pointer target type [-Werror=discarded-qualifiers]
454 | endptr = strchr(str, 0);
| ^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Add missing consts. Note in libxl_cpuid_parse_config_xend() non-const
endptr still is needed, to be compatible with the second argument to
strtoul(). Add second variable for this reason.
And while at it, move semicolon to its own line
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
(cherry picked from commit 44da0e3b4f)
The setting of errno in canonicalize() is rather fragile and seems to
be even wrong in one corner case: when the invalid path "/local/domain/"
is passed, sscanf() will set errno to 0, resulting in canonicalize() to
return NULL with errno being 0. This can result in triggering the
assert(conn->in == NULL) in consider_message().
Don't assume the initial setting of errno to "EINVAL" will stay valid
in all cases and set it to EINVAL only when returning NULL due to an
invalid path.
This is XSA-481/CVE-2026-23555
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4c61822b04)
In the EPT implementation, the defer flushing logic is used
unconditionally, and that would lead to paging memory being returned to the
paging pool before its references had been flushed.
Issue any pending flushes before freeing the paging memory back to the
pool.
Note AMD (NPT) and Shadow paging are not affected, as they don't implement
the deferred flushing logic.
This is XSA-480 / CVE-2026-23554
Fixes: 4a59e6bb3a ("x86/EPT: squash meaningless TLB flush")
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4bc2e5333a)
The previous logic attempted to skip an IBPB in the case of vCPU returning to
a CPU on which it was the previous vCPU to run. While safe for Xen's
isolation between vCPUs, this prevents the guest kernel correctly isolation
between tasks. Consider:
1) vCPU runs on CPU A, running task 1.
2) vCPU moves to CPU B, idle gets scheduled on A. Xen skips IBPB.
3) On CPU B, guest kernel switches from task 1 to 2, issuing IBPB.
4) vCPU moves back to CPU A. Xen skips IBPB again.
Now, task 2 is running on CPU A with task 1's training still in the BTB.
Do the flush unconditionally when switching to a vCPU different than the
idle one. Note there's no need to explicitly gate the IBPB to next domain
!= idle, as the context where the IBPB is issued is subject to that
condition already unless the pCPU is going offline, at which point we don't
really care to issue an extra IBPB.
Also add a comment with the reasoning why the IBPB needs to be in
context_switch() rather than __context_switch().
This is XSA-479 / CVE-2026-23553.
Fixes: a2ed643ed7 ("x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts")
Reported-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 7beadd6119
master date: 2026-01-27 13:55:27 +0100
Guests can do wider-than-PTE-size writes on page tables. The tracing
helper variable, however, only offers space for a single PTE (and it is
being switched to the more correct type right here). Therefore bound
incoming write sizes to the amount of space available.
To not leave dead code (which is a Misra concern), drop the now unused
guest_pa_t as well.
Also move and adjust GUEST_PTE_SIZE: Derive it rather than using hard-
coded numbers, and put it in the sole source file where it's actually
needed. This then also addresses a Misra rule 20.9 ("All identifiers
used in the controlling expression of #if or #elif preprocessing
directives shall be #define'd before evaluation") violation:
GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS is #define'd only in multi.c.
This is XSA-477 / CVE-2025-58150.
Fixes: 9a86ac1aa3 ("xentrace 5/7: Additional tracing for the shadow code")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: a6626b613a
master date: 2026-01-27 13:55:01 +0100
The default terminal settings in Linux will enable echo which interferes with
these tests. Set the value in the script to avoid failure caused by a settings
reset.
Signed-off-by: Victor Lira <victorm.lira@amd.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2f73ef4bd7)
When Entrysign has been mitigated in firwmare, it is believed to be safe to
rely on the CPU patchloader again. This avoids us needing to maintain the
digest table for all new microcode indefinitely.
Relax the digest check when firmware looks to be up to date, and leave behind
a clear message when not.
When the Zen6 (also Fam1ah processors) model numbers are known, they'll want
excluding from the range.
This is best-effort only. If a malicious microcode has been loaded prior to
Xen running, then all bets are off.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-Acked-By: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit ff8228ab46)
After initial publication, the SB-7033 / CVE-2024-36347 bulletin was updated
to list Zen5 CPUs as vulnerable. Use Fam1ah as an upper bound, and adjust the
command line documentation.
When the Zen6 (also Fam1ah processors) model numbers are known, they'll want
excluding from the range.
Fixes: 630e8875ab ("x86/ucode: Perform extra SHA2 checks on AMD Fam17h/19h microcode")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-Acked-By: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit c2529496d0)
For Zen3-5 microcode blobs signed with the updated signature scheme, the
checksum field has been reused to be a min_revision field, referring to the
microcode revision which fixed Entrysign (SB-7033, CVE-2024-36347).
Cross-check this when trying to load microcode, but allow --force to override
it. If the signature scheme is genuinely different, a #GP will occur.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-Acked-By: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit b3f015b8ba)
[Note: --force doesn't exist in this version of Xen]
EIO is not the only error that ucode_ops.apply_microcode() can produce.
EINVAL, EEXISTS and ENXIO can be generated too, each of which mean that Xen is
unhappy in some way with the proposed blob.
Some of these can be bypassed with --force, which will cause the parallel load
to be attempted.
Fixes: 5ed12565aa ("microcode: rendezvous CPUs in NMI handler and load ucode")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-Acked-By: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit e0bb712a28)
[Note: --force doesn't exist in this version of Xen]
Currently, the URL where the ECLAIR MISRA C scan reports are saved
is hardcoded; making it configurable allows multiple runners and storage
servers to be used without resorting to publishing all artifacts
to the same report server.
Additionally, reports will be accessed publicly by using a proxy,
therefore the address that needs to be printed in GitLab analysis logs
is that of the public url, rather than the location where they are stored.
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Zucchelli <alessandro.zucchelli@bugseng.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
[stefano: remove unneeded exports]
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
(cherry picked from commit bea38de1bd)
64-bit BAR memory address is truncated when removing a passthrough
pci device from guest since it uses "unsigned int".
So, change to use 64-bit type to fix this problem.
This is XSA-476 / CVE-2025-58149.
Fixes: b0a1af6167 ("libxenlight: implement pci passthrough")
Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@amd.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
(cherry picked from commit 421432b822)
Callers can pass in a vpmask which exceeds d->max_vcpus. Prevent out-of-bound
reads of d->vcpu[].
This is XSA-475 / CVE-2025-58148.
Fixes: 728acba1ba ("viridian: use hypercall_vpmask in hvcall_ipi()")
Signed-off-by: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@vates.tech>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: cc64c24502
master date: 2025-10-21 14:10:13 +0200
Callers can pass vp/mask values which exceed the size of vpmask->mask. Ensure
we only set bits which are within bounds.
This is XSA-475 / CVE-2025-58147.
Fixes: b4124682db ("viridian: add ExProcessorMasks variants of the flush hypercalls")
Signed-off-by: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@vates.tech>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 36e90c4ef1
master date: 2025-10-21 14:09:37 +0200
In order to safely acquire a reference for a foreign page mapping, the
P2M lock needs to be held until we have the reference in hand (or
getting one failed). Otherwise the page can change P2M type and
ownership in between.
This is CVE-2025-58145 / part of XSA-473.
Fixes: 9486a8d07b ("xen/arm: Handle remove foreign mapping")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
master commit: 2275bf83a1
master date: 2025-09-09 14:12:57 +0200
I can't see what would make the 1st of the assertions safe: For example,
the P2M lock not being held, the foreign page may disappear before we
get to call page_get_owner_and_reference(), which hence may return NULL.
Even the 2nd, which appears to be safe safe, is lacking proper release
build fallbacks.
Drop the former in favor of an if(), and convert the latter to the
equivalent of what x86 uses: ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() plus putting of the
obtained page.
This is CVE-2025-58144 / part of XSA-473.
Fixes: 9486a8d07b ("xen/arm: Handle remove foreign mapping")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
master commit: c5a6dd6850
master date: 2025-09-09 14:12:13 +0200
The reference TSC page is shared between all vCPUs, and the data stored in
the domain struct. However the handlers to set and clear it are not safe
against concurrent accesses. It's possible for two (or more) vCPUs to call
HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC at the same time and cause the in-use reference
TSC page to be freed, while still being on the p2m. This creates a use-
after-free bug, where the page can end up mapped in another domain or used
by Xen while still being part of the original domain's p2m.
It's also possible to underflow the reference counter, as multiple
concurrent writes to HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC can create an imbalance on
the number of put_page_and_type() calls.
Introduce a lock to protect the reference TSC domain field, thus
serializing concurrent vCPU accesses.
This is CVE-2025-58143 / part of XSA-472.
Fixes: 386b336522 ('viridian: use viridian_map/unmap_guest_page() for reference tsc page')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 45729a510a
master date: 2025-09-09 14:12:00 +0200
The function is called unconditionally, regardless of whether the SIM page
is mapped. Avoid a NULL pointer dereference in
viridian_synic_deliver_timer_msg() by checking whether the SIM page is
mapped.
This is CVE-2025-58142 / part of XSA-472.
Fixes: 26fba3c855 ('viridian: add implementation of synthetic timers')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 3a7b4f2897
master date: 2025-09-09 14:11:34 +0200
The function is only called when the MSR has the enabled bit set, but even
then the page might not be mapped because the guest provided gfn is not
suitable.
Prevent a NULL pointer dereference in update_reference_tsc() by checking
whether the page is mapped.
This is CVE-2025-27466 / part of XSA-472.
Fixes: 386b336522 ('viridian: use viridian_map/unmap_guest_page() for reference tsc page')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 5776a2e9db
master date: 2025-09-09 14:11:09 +0200
The current code to restore the timer state on resume is incomplete. While
the local APIC Initial Count Register is saved and restored across
suspension (even if possibly no longer accurate since it's not adjusted to
account for the time spent in suspension), the TSC deadline MSR is not
saved and restored, hence hosts using the TSC deadline timer will likely
get stuck when resuming from suspension.
The lack of restoring of the TSC deadline MSR was mitigated by the raising
of a timer softirq in mwait_idle_with_hints() if the timer had expired,
previous to commit 3faf0866a3, which removed
that logic.
This patch fixes the usage of the TSC deadline timer with suspension, by
unconditionally raising a timer softirq on resume, that will take care of
rearming the hardware timer. Given that a timer softirq will be
unconditionally risen, there's no need to save and restore the APIC Initial
Count Register anymore either.
Note that secondary processors don't need this special treatment when
resuming, since they are offlined before suspension and brought back up
during resume, the first timer that gets setup will trigger a timer softirq
unconditionally, for example from sched_migrate_timers() that gets called
for each secondary processor.
Link: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/10110
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Fixes: fd1291a826 ('X86: Prefer TSC-deadline timer in Xen')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
master commit: 757abedabb
master date: 2025-08-27 09:33:12 +0200
While the change is fine on staging, where the toolchain baseline was
moved, we need to remain compatible with older gas on stable branches
for now.
Fixes: fa254938f0 ("x86/idle: Move monitor()/mwait() wrappers into cpu-idle.c")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
TSA affects AMD Fam19h CPUs (Zen3 and 4 microarchitectures).
Three new CPUID bits have been defined. Two (TSA_SQ_NO and TSA_L1_NO)
indicate that the system is unaffected, and must be synthesised by Xen on
unaffected parts to date.
A third new bit indicates that VERW now has a flushing side effect. Xen must
synthesise this bit on affected systems based on microcode version. As with
other VERW-based flushing features, VERW_CLEAR needs OR-ing across a resource
pool, and guests which have seen it can safely migrate in.
This is part of XSA-471 / CVE-2024-36350 / CVE-2024-36357.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 578b34adb1)
In order to mitigate TSA, Xen will need to issue VERW before going idle.
On AMD CPUs, the VERW scrubbing side effects cancel an active MONITOR, causing
the MWAIT to exit without entering an idle state. Therefore the VERW must be
ahead of MONITOR.
Split spec_ctrl_enter_idle() in two and allow the VERW aspect to be handled
separately. While adjusting, update a stale comment concerning MSBDS; more
issues have been mitigated using VERW since it was written.
By moving VERW earlier, it is ahead of the determination of whether to go
idle. We can't move the check on softirq_pending (for correctness reasons),
but we can duplicate it earlier as a best effort attempt to skip the
speculative overhead.
This is part of XSA-471 / CVE-2024-36350 / CVE-2024-36357.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 01429bbb0a)
AMD are releasing microcode for TSA, so extend the known-provenance list with
their hashes. These were produced before the remediation of the microcode
signature issues (the entrysign vulnerability), so can be OS-loaded on
out-of-date firmware.
Include an off-by-default check for the sorted-ness of patch_digests[]. It's
not worth running generally under SELF_TESTS, but is useful when editing the
digest list.
This is part of XSA-471 / CVE-2024-36350 / CVE-2024-36357.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit a8708ea8bd)
Turn the if()s into switch()es, as we're going to need AMD sections.
Move the RTM adjustments into the Intel section, where they ought to live.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7c5025394d)
Xen 4.18 doesn't automatically generate feature names like Xen 4.19 does, and
these hunks were missed on prior security fixes.
Fixes: 8bced9a15c ("x86/spec-ctrl: Support for SRSO_U/S_NO and SRSO_MSR_FIX")
Fixes: f132c82fa6 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Synthesise ITS_NO to guests on unaffected hardware")
Fixes: dba0556612 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Support Intel's new PB-OPT")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The check of this_softirq_pending must be performed with irqs disabled, but
this property was broken by an attempt to optimise entry/exit latency.
Commit c227233ad64c in Linux (which we copied into Xen) was fixed up by
edc8fc01f608 in Linux, which we have so far missed.
Going to sleep without waking on interrupts is nonsensical outside of
play_dead(), so overload this to select between two possible MWAITs, the
second using the STI shadow to cover MWAIT for exactly the same reason as we
do in safe_halt().
Fixes: b17e0ec72e ("x86/mwait-idle: enable interrupts before C1 on Xeons")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9b0f0f6e23)
In order elide IPIs, we must be able to identify whether a target CPU is in
MWAIT at the point it is woken up. i.e. the store to wake it up must also
identify the state.
Create a new in_mwait variable beside __softirq_pending, so we can use a
CMPXCHG to set the softirq while also observing the status safely. Implement
an x86 version of arch_pend_softirq() which does this.
In mwait_idle_with_hints(), advertise in_mwait, with an explanation of
precisely what it means. X86_BUG_MONITOR can be accounted for simply by not
advertising in_mwait.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3e0bc4b503)
x86 is the only architecture wanting an optimisation here, but the
test_and_set_bit() is a store into the monitored line (i.e. will wake up the
target) and, prior to the removal of the broken IPI-elision algorithm, was
racy, causing unnecessary IPIs to be sent.
To do this in a race-free way, the store to the monited line needs to also
sample the status of the target in one atomic action. Implement a new arch
helper with different semantics; to make the softirq pending and decide about
IPIs together. For now, implement the default helper. It will be overridden
by x86 in a subsequent change.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit b473e5e212)
With the recent simplifications, it becomes obvious that smp_mb() isn't the
right barrier. Strictly speaking, MONITOR is ordered as a load, but smp_rmb()
isn't correct either, as this only pertains to local ordering. All we need is
a compiler barrier().
Merge the barier() into the monitor() itself, along with an explantion.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit e7710dd843)
Jan Beulich