All changes in writeability and cacheability must go through full
re-validation.
Rework the logic as a whitelist, to make it clearer to follow.
This is XSA-182
Reported-by: Jérémie Boutoille <jboutoille@ext.quarkslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
XSA-180 provides a patch to QEMU to bodge QEMU logging issue. We
explicitly set the limit in libxl for 4.7.
Introduce a function for setting the environment variable and call it in
the right places.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit b0d409d9c4)
(cherry picked from commit fe82a96a65)
Conflicts:
tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
This version of libxl does not pass a dm_envs to the
*build_device_model_args* functions. Instead, call
libxl__set_qemu_env_for_xsa_180 in libxl__spawn_local_dm.
The other call ultimate site of *build_device_model_args* (ie of
libxl__build_device_model_args) is in libxl__spawn_stub_dm, where we
don't need to set the env var.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 44a703dfbe)
(cherry picked from commit 27f0143ef5)
Conflicts:
tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
In "libxl: Do not trust backend for disk eject vdev" (c69871a2fb on
xen.git#staging) we changed libxl_evenable_disk_eject to read the
device vdev out of xenstore from the /libxl path, rather than the
backend path, and to read it during setup rather than on each event.
However, the patch has a mistake:
- GCSPRINTF("%s/dev", backend), NULL);
+ GCSPRINTF("%s/vdev", libxl_path), &configured_vdev);
^
Spot the extra "v". This causes configured_vdev always to be NULL.
configured_vdev is passed to [libxl__]strdup.
In Xen 4.6 and later libxl__strdup is used and tolerates NULL.
evg->vdev is set to NULL. This propagates to the `vdev' field in the
generated event. This may or may not cause further trouble, depending
on the calling application. In our osstest test cases it does not
cause any trouble, so the bug goes undetected.
In Xen 4.5 and earlier, the strdup does not tolerate NULL, and libxl
crashes immediately. This has been detected by osstest as a
regression in Xen 4.5.
IMO this patch should be applied immediately to
xen.git#staging-4.5 (to check that it fixes the osstest regression)
xen.git#staging (to check that it does not break master
Subject to passes, it should then be propagated to all supported
stable trees and also be mentioned in an update to XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: security@xenproject.org
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 62b4d4769c)
(cherry picked from commit 8b7a356409)
(cherry picked from commit 6d272988fb)
(cherry picked from commit ec5925c72c)
xenstore-paths.markdown talked about ~/device/serial/, but that's not
used.
(It is very wrong for this value, which contains a driver domain
filesystem path, to be in the guest's area of xenstore. However, it
is only ever created by libxl and ready by xenconsoled. When it is
created, it inherits the read-only permissions of /local/domain/DOMID.
So there is no security bug.)
This is a followup to XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
When allocating a vdev for a new disk, look in /libxl/device, rather
than the frontends directory in xenstore.
This is more in line with the other parts of libxl, which ought not to
trust frontends. In this case, though, there is no security bug prior
to this patch because the frontend is the toolstack domain itself.
If libxl__alloc_vdev were ever changed to take a frontend domain
argument, this patch will fix a latent security bug.
This is a followup to XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
libxl_device_nic_list should use the /libxl path to search for
devices, and for obtaining the device information.
The "type" parameter was always "vif". Abolish it. (In any case,
paths in /libxl/device are named after the frontend type which is
constant, not the backend type which might in future vary.)
Abolish a redundant store to pnic->backend_domid. Before this commit,
that store was not needed because libxl_device_nic_init (called by
libxl__device_nic_from_xenstore) would zero it. Now it overwrites the
correct backend domid with zero; so remove it.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
libxl_devid_to_device_nic should read the information it needs from
the /libxl/device path, not the backend.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Fix the just-introduced bug in this macro: now it reads the
trustworthy libxl_path. Change the variable name in the two functions
(nic and channel) which use it.
Shuffling the bump in the carpet along, we now introduce three new
bugs: the three call sites pass a backend path where a frontend path
is expected.
No functional change.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
We are going to change these functions to expect, and be passed, a
/libxl path. So it is wrong that they are called _from_xs_be.
Neither function reads anything which isn't found in both places, so
we can and will change the call sites later.
The only remaining function in libxl called *_from_xs_be relates to
PCI devices, for which the backend domain is hardcoded to 0 throughout
the libxl_pci.c.
No functional change.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Use the /libxl path where appropriate. Rename `path' variable to
`be_path' to make sure we caught all the occurrences.
Specifically, when checking that the device still exists, check the
`frontend' value in /libxl, rather than anything in the backend
directory.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Do not read the frontend path out of the backend. We have it in our
hand. Likewise the guest (frontend) domid was one of our parameters (!)
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Rework libxl__device_disk_from_xs_be (which takes a backend path) into
to libxl__device_disk_from_xenstore (which takes a libxl path).
libxl__device_disk_from_xenstore now finds the backend path itself,
although it doesn't use it any more for most of its functions. We
rename the variable from be_path to backend_path to make sure we
didn't miss any cases.
All the data collection is now done by reading from the copy in
/libxl.
libxl_device_disk_list and its helper libxl__append_disk_list (which
used to be libxl__append_disk_list_of_type) need extensive rework,
because they now need to specify the /libxl path rather than the
backend path.
To do that they enumerate disks by looking in the appropriate area in
/libxl. Previously they scanned various of the backend directories in
dom0 (which was broken for driver domains). It is no longer necessary
to enumerate the various disk backends, because they all use the same
paths in /devices. libxl__device_disk_from_xenstore will parse the
type out of the backend path, for itself. (Indeed, it did so before -
the now-gone type parameter to libxl__append_disk_list_of_type wasn't
used other than to construct the directory to list.)
Finally, remove a redundant store to pdisk->backend_domid in
libxl__append_disk_list[_of_type]. Even before this commit, that
store was not needed because libxl_device_disk_init (called by
libxl__device_disk_from_xenstore) would zero it. Now it overwrites
the correct backend domid with zero; so remove it.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
---
v2: Also fix up COLO reads, following rebase
For disk eject, use configured vdev from /libxl, not backend.
The backend directory is writeable by driver domains. This means that
a malicious driver domain could cause libxl to see a wrong vdev,
confusing the user or the toolstack.
Use the vdev from the /libxl space, rather than the backend.
For convenience, we read the vdev from the /libxl space into the evg
during setup and copy it on each event, rather than reading it afresh
each time (which would in any case involve generating or saving a copy
of the relevant /libxl path).
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Copy the new type and params values to /libxl, so that the information
in /libxl is kept up to date.
This is needed so that we can return this trustworthy information,
rather than trusting the backend-writeable parts of xenstore.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Use uuid from /libxl, rather than from backend. I think the backend
is not supposed to change the uuid, since it seems to be set by libxl
during setup.
If in fact the backend is supposed to be able to change the uuid, this
patch needs to be dropped and replaced by a patch which makes the vtpm
uuid lookup tolerate bad or missing data.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
* Do not check the backend for existence. We have already read the
/libxl path so know that the vtpm exists (or is supposed to); if the
backend doesn't exist then that must be the backend's doing.
* Get the frontend path from the /libxl directory.
* The frontend domid is the guest domid, and does not need to be read
from xenstore (!)
We still attempt to read the uuid from the backend. This will be
fixed in the next patch.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
We want to stop libxl trustingly reading information from the backend
directory (since this is, of course, writeable by the backend, which
might be a semi-trusted driver domain).
In principle it is wrong in current libxl for anything to try to
divine virtual device configuration from xenstore: the JSON domain
config ought to supply that, and xenstore should only tell us which
devices actually exist.
However:
Firstly, there are several existing places where configuration
information is retrieved from xenstore rather than JSON. We do not
want to reen gineer this in a security patch.
Secondly, we want to make a security patch which can be backported to
versions of libxl without the JSON configuration machinery.
So we take the expedient approach of keeping a copy of the
configuration somewhere we trust, namely /libxl. This is obviously
fairly low-risk, although it does write significantly more keys in
xenstore.
In this patch we make this change in libxl__device_generic_add. This
is responsible for actually writing the vast majority of device
information to xenstore. There are a few loose ends which will be
dealt with in a moment.
Likewise, changes to readers to use the new location will appear in
further patches.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
libxl_device_nic_getinfo needs to examine devices without trusting
frontend-controlled data. So:
* Use /libxl to find the backend path.
* Parse the backend path to find the backend domid, rather than
reading it from the frontend.
This is part of XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Find the backend by reading the pointer in /libxl rather than in the
guest's frontend area.
This is part of XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
libxl_device_vtpm_getinfo needs to examine devices without trusting
frontend-controlled data. So:
* Use /libxl to find the backend path.
* Parse the backend path to find the backend domid, rather than
reading it from the frontend.
This is part of XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
libxl_device_vtpm_list needs to enumerate and identify devices without
trusting frontend-controlled data. So
* Use the /libxl path to enumerate vtpms.
* Use the /libxl path to find the corresponding backends.
* Parse the backend path to find the backend domid.
This is part of XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
* Rename the frontend variable to `fe_path' to check we caught them all
* Read the backend path from /libxl, rather than from the frontend
* Parse the backend domid from the backend path, rather than reading it
from the frontend (and add the appropriate error path and initialisation)
This is part of XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Use the /libxl path for interpreting disk eject watch events: do not
read the backend path out of the frontend. Instead, use the version
in /libxl. That avoids us relying on the guest-modifiable
$frontend/backend pointer.
To implement this we store the path
/libxl/$guest/device/vbd/$devid/backend
in the evgen structure.
This is part of XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
When selecting the devid for a new device, we should look in
/libxl/device for existing devices, not in the frontend area.
This is part of XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
We need to enumerate the devices we have provided to a domain, without
trusting the guest-writeable (or, at least, guest-deletable) frontend
paths.
Instead, enumerate via, and read the backend path from, /libxl.
The console /libxl path is regular, so the special case for console 0
is not relevant any more: /libxl/GUEST/device/console/0 will be found,
and then libxl__device_destroy will DTRT to the right frontend path.
This is part of XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Multiple places in libxl need to figure out the backend domid of a
device. This can be discovered easily by looking at the backend path,
which always starts /local/domain/$backend_domid/.
There are no call sites yet.
This is part of XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This gives us a record of all the backends we have set up for a
domain, which is separate from the frontends in
/local/domain/$DOMID/device.
In particular:
1. A guest has write permission for the frontend path:
/local/domain/$DOMID/device/$KIND/$DEVID
which means that the guest can completely delete the frontend.
(They can't recreate it because they don't have write permission
on the containing directory.)
2. A guest has write permission for the backend path recorded in the
frontend, ie, it can write to
/local/domain/$DOMID/device/$KIND/$DEVID/backend
which means that the guest can break the association between
frontend and backend.
So we can't rely on iterating over the frontends to find all the
backends, or examining a frontend to discover how a device is
configured.
So, have libxl__device_generic_add record the frontend and backend
paths in /libxl/$DOMID/device, and have libxl__device_destroy remove
them again.
Create the containing directory /libxl/GUEST/device in
libxl__domain_make. The already existing xs_rm in devices_destroy_cb
will take care of removing it.
This is part of XSA-175.
Backport note: Backported over 7472ced, which fixes a bug in driver
domain teardown.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
In L4 entries it is currently unconditionally reserved (and hence
should, when set, always result in a reserved bit page fault), and is
reserved on hardware not supporting 1Gb pages (and hence should, when
set, similarly cause a reserved bit page fault on such hardware).
This is CVE-2016-4480 / XSA-176.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 46699c7393
master date: 2016-05-17 14:41:14 +0200
Superpage shadows store the shadowed GFN in the backpointer field,
which for non-BIGMEM builds is 32 bits wide. Shadowing a superpage
mapping of a guest-physical address above 2^44 would lead to the GFN
being truncated there, and a crash when we come to remove the shadow
from the hash table.
Track the valid width of a GFN for each guest, including reporting it
through CPUID, and enforce it in the shadow pagetables. Set the
maximum witth to 32 for guests where this truncation could occur.
This is XSA-173.
Reported-by: Ling Liu <liuling-it@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The fix for XSA-52 was wrong, and so was the change synchronizing that
new behavior to the FXRSTOR logic: AMD's manuals explictly state that
writes to the ES bit are ignored, and it instead gets calculated from
the exception and mask bits (it gets set whenever there is an unmasked
exception, and cleared otherwise). Hence we need to follow that model
in our workaround.
This is CVE-2016-3158 / XSA-172.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 7bd9dc3adf
master date: 2016-03-29 14:24:26 +0200
We must ensure that the prod/cons are only read once and that
the compiler won't try to optimize the reads. That is split
the read of these in multiple instructions influencing later
branch code. As such insert barriers when fetching the cons
and prod index.
This is part of XSA155.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
master commit: 7d66a4ba69
master date: 2015-12-18 09:50:02 -0500
pygrub (in identify_disk_image()) detects a DOS style partition table
via the presence of the 0xaa55 signature at the end of the first
sector of the disk.
However this signature is also present in whole-disk configurations
when there is an MBR on the disk. Many filesystems (e.g. ext[234])
include leading padding in their on disk format specifically to enable
this.
So if we think we have a DOS partition table but do not find any
actual partition table entries we may as well try looking at it as a
whole disk image. Worst case is we probe and find there isn't anything
there.
This was reported by Sjors Gielen in Debian bug #745419. The fix was
inspired by a patch by Adi Kriegisch in
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=745419#27
Tested by genext2fs'ing my /boot into a new raw image (works) and
then:
dd if=/usr/lib/grub/i386-pc/g2ldr.mbr of=img conv=notrunc bs=512 count=1
to add an MBR (with 0xaa55 signature) to it, which after this patch
also works.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: 745419-forwarded@bugs.debian.org
(cherry picked from commit fb31b1475f)
(cherry picked from commit 6c9b1bcce4)
(cherry picked from commit 812406cf2b)
(cherry picked from commit 83c5e46c5d)
... and annotate the other deliberate one: Coverity objects otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
One of the two instances was actually a bug.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 8dd6d1c099
master date: 2016-02-18 15:10:07 +0100
... to prevent guest user mode arranging for a guest crash (due to
failed VM entry). (On the AMD system I checked, hardware is doing
exactly the canonicalization being added here.)
Note that fixing this in an architecturally correct way would be quite
a bit more involved: Making the x86 instruction emulator check all
branch targets for validity, plus dealing with invalid rIP resulting
from update_guest_eip() or incoming directly during a VM exit. The only
way to get the latter right would be by not having hardware do the
injection.
Note further that there are a two early returns from
vmx_vmexit_handler(): One (through vmx_failed_vmentry()) leads to
domain_crash() anyway, and the other covers real mode only and can
neither occur with a non-canonical rIP nor result in an altered rIP,
so we don't need to force those paths through the checking logic.
This is CVE-2016-2271 / XSA-170.
Reported-by: 刘令 <liuling-it@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ffbbfda377
master date: 2016-02-17 16:18:08 +0100
We've been told by Intel that inconsistent cachability between
multiple mappings of the same page can affect system stability only
when the affected page is an MMIO one. Since the stale data issue is
of no relevance to the hypervisor (since all guest memory accesses go
through proper accessors and validation), handling of RAM pages
remains unchanged here. Any MMIO mapped by domains however needs to be
done consistently (all cachable mappings or all uncachable ones), in
order to avoid Machine Check exceptions. Since converting existing
cachable mappings to uncachable (at the time an uncachable mapping
gets established) would in the PV case require tracking all mappings,
allow MMIO to only get mapped uncachable (UC, UC-, or WC).
This also implies that in the PV case we mustn't use the L1 PTE update
fast path when cachability flags get altered.
Since in the HVM case at least for now we want to continue honoring
pinned cachability attributes for pages not mapped by the hypervisor,
special case handling of r/o MMIO pages (forcing UC) gets added there.
Arguably the counterpart change to p2m-pt.c may not be necessary, since
UC- (which already gets enforced there) is probably strict enough.
Note that the shadow code changes include fixing the write protection
of r/o MMIO ranges: shadow_l1e_remove_flags() and its siblings, other
than l1e_remove_flags() and alike, return the new PTE (and hence
ignoring their return values makes them no-ops).
This is CVE-2016-2270 / XSA-154.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: c61a6f74f8
master date: 2016-02-17 16:16:53 +0100
Most #DB exceptions are traps rather than faults, meaning that the instruction
pointer in the exception frame points after the instruction rather than at it.
However, VMX intercepts all have fault semantics, even when intercepting a
trap. Re-injecting an intercepted trap as a fault causes an infinite loop in
the guest, by re-executing the same trapping instruction repeatedly. This
breaks debugging inside the guest.
Introduce a helper which copies VM_EXIT_INTR_INTO to VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, and
use it to mirror the intercepted interrupt back to the guest.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 0747bc8b4d
master date: 2016-01-05 11:28:56 +0000
While INVLPG (and on SVM INVLPGA) don't fault on non-canonical
addresses, INVVPID fails (in the "individual address" case) when passed
such an address.
Since such intercepted INVLPG are effectively no-ops anyway, don't fix
this in vmx_invlpg_intercept(), but instead have paging_invlpg() never
return true in such a case.
This is CVE-2016-1571 / XSA-168.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: bf05e88ed7
master date: 2016-01-20 13:50:10 +0100
MMUEXT_{,UN}MARK_SUPER fail to check the input MFN for validity before
dereferencing pointers into the superpage frame table.
Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
get_superpage() has a similar issue.
This is CVE-2016-1570 / XSA-167.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 47abf29a92
master date: 2016-01-20 13:49:23 +0100
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commits 04c5efb0a1
and f046e501bb)
Apropos of discussion in
"OVMF related osstest failures on multiple branches"
http://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-01/msg00442.html
We believe the older ovmf.git does not work when built with the gcc in
Debian jessie. We do not know where this bug lies but we are fixing
it by updating ovmf.
We have decided that we are not in a position to review the changes to
OVMF upstream, and ourselves decide what to cherry pick. Instead we
will update the revision wholesale and use the xen.git stable
branches' push gate.
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commits 6c3c6ff9ec
and 1d3cc6e62c)
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit ee576d7110)
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6d2c41d676)
In 4.3, old OVMF_UPSTREAM_REVISION was b0855f92 rather than cb9a7eba.
I have pulled in the additional changes, willy-nilly.
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
[ Cross-ported to blktap1 from 345e44a85d
"blktap2: Fix two 'maybe uninitialized' variables" -iwj;
Remainder of commit message is from blktap2's version. ]
for which gcc 4.9.0 complains about, like this:
block-qcow.c: In function `get_cluster_offset':
block-qcow.c:431:3: error: `tmp_ptr' may be used uninitialized in this function
[-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
memcpy(tmp_ptr, l1_ptr, 4096);
^
block-qcow.c:606:7: error: `tmp_ptr2' may be used uninitialized in this
function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
if (write(s->fd, tmp_ptr2, 4096) != 4096) {
^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
/home/dario/Sources/xen/xen/xen.git/tools/blktap2/drivers/../../../tools/Rules.mk:89:
recipe for target 'block-qcow.o' failed
make[5]: *** [block-qcow.o] Error 1
The proper behavior is to return upon allocation failure.
About what to return, 0 seems the best option, looking
at both the function and the call sites.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 845e8c1653)
(cherry picked from commit e003d429d8)
Otherwise, especially when the compiler chooses to translate the
switch() to a jump table, unpredictable behavior (and in the jump table
case arbitrary code execution) can result.
This is XSA-166.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: b452430a4c
master date: 2015-12-17 14:22:46 +0100
FNINIT doesn't alter these registers, and hence using it is
insufficient to initialize a guest's initial state.
This is CVE-2015-8555 / XSA-165.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 81818b3f27
master date: 2015-12-17 14:22:13 +0100
Andrew Cooper