The device parameter of libxl_device_<type>_add is an in/out parameter.
Unspecified fields are filled in with appropriate values for the created
device when the function returns. Document this behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Euan Harris <euan.harris@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The existence check is to make sure a device is not added to a guest
multiple times.
PCI device backend path has different rules from vif, disk etc. For
example:
/local/domain/0/backend/pci/9/0/dev-1/0000:03:10.1
/local/domain/0/backend/pci/9/0/key-1/0000:03:10.1
/local/domain/0/backend/pci/9/0/dev-2/0000:03:10.2
/local/domain/0/backend/pci/9/0/key-2/0000:03:10.2
The devid for PCI devices is hardcoded 0. libxl__device_exists only
checks up to /local/.../9/0 so it always returns true even the device is
assignable.
Remove invocation of libxl__device_exists. We're sure at this point that
the PCI device is assignable (hence no xenstore entry or JSON entry).
The check is done before hand. For HVM guest it's done by calling
xc_test_assign_device and for PV guest it's done by calling
pciback_dev_is_assigned.
Reported-by: Li, Liang Z <liang.z.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Document that:
- the existing code is not all confirming yet
- code should conform
- we will sometimes accept patches with nonconforming elements if
they don't make matters worse.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Privilege level checks were basically missing for the CS case, the
only check that was done (RPL == DPL for nonconforming segments)
was solely covering a single special case (return to non-conforming
segment).
Additionally in long mode the L bit set requires the D bit to be clear,
as was recently pointed out for KVM by Nadav Amit
<namit@cs.technion.ac.il>.
Finally we also need to force the loaded selector's RPL to CPL (at
least as long as lret/retf emulation doesn't support privilege level
changes).
This is CVE-2014-8595 / XSA-110.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
paging_write_guest_entry() and paging_cmpxchg_guest_entry() aren't
consistently supported for non-PV guests (they'd deref NULL for PVH or
non-HAP HVM ones). Don't allow respective MMU_* operations on the
page tables of such domains.
This is CVE-2014-8594 / XSA-109.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
The specification is kind of vague under what conditions
ExitBootServices() may legitimately fail, requiring the OS loader to
retry:
"If MapKey value is incorrect, ExitBootServices() returns
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER and GetMemoryMap() with ExitBootServices() must
be called again. Firmware implementation may choose to do a partial
shutdown of the boot services during the first call to
ExitBootServices(). EFI OS loader should not make calls to any boot
service function other then GetMemoryMap() after the first call to
ExitBootServices()."
While our code guarantees the map key to be valid, there are systems
where a firmware internal notification sent while processing
ExitBootServices() reportedly results in changes to the memory map.
In that case, make a best effort second try: Avoid any boot service
calls other than the two named above, with the possible exception of
error paths. Those aren't a problem, since if we end up needing to
retry, we're hosed when something goes wrong as much as if we didn't
make the retry attempt.
For x86, a minimal adjustment to efi_arch_process_memory_map() is
needed for it to cope with potentially being called a second time.
For arm64, while efi_process_memory_map_bootinfo() is easy to verify
that it can safely be called more than once without violating spec
constraints, it's not so obvious for fdt_add_uefi_nodes(), hence a
step by step approach:
- deletion of memory nodes and memory reserve map entries: the 2nd pass
shouldn't find any as the 1st one deleted them all,
- a "chosen" node should be found as it got added in the 1st pass,
- the various "linux,uefi-*" nodes all got added during the 1st pass
and hence only their contents may get updated.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Release-acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Having these point into space not controlled by the hypervisor provides
an unnecessary attack surface. Allow architectures to override them and
utilize that override to make them non-canonical addresses (thus
causing #GP rather than #PF when dereferenced).
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
... otherwise when device add operation fails, the error message looks
like "libxl: error: libxl.c:1897:device_addrm_aocomplete: unable to (null)
device", which is not very helpful.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Some versions of Atmel TPMs provide invalid values for TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT query.
Because timeouts are invalid, every other command after tpm_get_timeouts will fail.
It is a known issue and it was fixed recently in linux kernel tpm_tis.c on 2014-07-29.
This patch does not allow timeouts to be less than standard values.
I tested it on a Dell Latitude E5520 and after making the changes I was able to start vtpmmgr-stubdom.
Signed-off-by: Emil Condrea <emilcondrea@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Commit bac6334b51 (move domain to
cpupool0 before destroying it) introduced an error in the accounting
of cpupools regarding the number of domains. The number of domains
is nor adjusted when a domain is moved to cpupool0 in kill_domain().
Correct this by introducing a cpupool function doing the move
instead of open coding it by calling sched_move_domain().
Reported-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
The existing tasklet mechanism has a single global spinlock that is
taken every-time the global list is touched. And we use this lock quite
a lot - when we call do_tasklet_work which is called via an softirq and
from the idle loop. We take the lock on any operation on the
tasklet_list.
The problem we are facing is that there are quite a lot of tasklets
scheduled. The most common one that is invoked is the one injecting the
VIRQ_TIMER in the guest. Guests are not insane and don't set the
one-shot or periodic clocks to be in sub 1ms intervals (causing said
tasklet to be scheduled for such small intervalls).
The problem appears when PCI passthrough devices are used over many
sockets and we have an mix of heavy-interrupt guests and idle guests.
The idle guests end up seeing 1/10 of its RUNNING timeslice eaten by
the hypervisor (and 40% steal time).
The mechanism by which we inject PCI interrupts is by hvm_do_IRQ_dpci
which schedules the hvm_dirq_assist tasklet every time an interrupt is
received. The callchain is:
_asm_vmexit_handler
-> vmx_vmexit_handler
->vmx_do_extint
-> do_IRQ
-> __do_IRQ_guest
-> hvm_do_IRQ_dpci
tasklet_schedule(&dpci->dirq_tasklet);
[takes lock to put the tasklet on]
[later on the schedule_tail is invoked which is 'vmx_do_resume']
vmx_do_resume
-> vmx_asm_do_vmentry
-> call vmx_intr_assist
-> vmx_process_softirqs
-> do_softirq
[executes the tasklet function, takes the
lock again]
While on other CPUs they might be sitting in a idle loop and invoked to
deliver an VIRQ_TIMER, which also ends up taking the lock twice: first
to schedule the v->arch.hvm_vcpu.assert_evtchn_irq_tasklet (accounted
to the guests' BLOCKED_state); then to execute it - which is accounted
for in the guest's RUNTIME_state.
The end result is that on a 8 socket machine with PCI passthrough,
where four sockets are busy with interrupts, and the other sockets have
idle guests - we end up with the idle guests having around 40% steal
time and 1/10 of its timeslice (3ms out of 30 ms) being tied up taking
the lock. The latency of the PCI interrupts delieved to guest is also
hindered.
With this patch the problem disappears completly. That is removing the
lock for the PCI passthrough use-case (the 'hvm_dirq_assist' case) by
not using tasklets at all.
The patch is simple - instead of scheduling an tasklet we schedule our
own softirq - HVM_DPCI_SOFTIRQ, which will take care of running
'hvm_dirq_assist'. The information we need on each CPU is which
'struct hvm_pirq_dpci' structure the 'hvm_dirq_assist' needs to run on.
That is simple solved by threading the 'struct hvm_pirq_dpci' through a
linked list. The rule of only running one 'hvm_dirq_assist' for only
one 'hvm_pirq_dpci' is also preserved by having 'schedule_dpci_for'
ignore any subsequent calls for an domain which has already been
scheduled.
== Code details ==
Most of the code complexity comes from the '->dom' field in the
'hvm_pirq_dpci' structure. We use it for ref-counting and as such it
MUST be valid as long as STATE_SCHED bit is set. Whoever clears the
STATE_SCHED bit does the ref-counting and can also reset the '->dom'
field.
To compound the complexity, there are multiple points where the
'hvm_pirq_dpci' structure is reset or re-used. Initially (first time
the domain uses the pirq), the 'hvm_pirq_dpci->dom' field is set to
NULL as it is allocated. On subsequent calls in to 'pt_irq_create_bind'
the ->dom is whatever it had last time.
As this is the initial call (which QEMU ends up calling when the guest
writes an vector value in the MSI field) we MUST set the '->dom' to a
the proper structure (otherwise we cannot do proper ref-counting).
The mechanism to tear it down is more complex as there are three ways
it can be executed. To make it simpler everything revolves around
'pt_pirq_softirq_active'. If it returns -EAGAIN that means there is an
outstanding softirq that needs to finish running before we can continue
tearing down. With that in mind:
a) pci_clean_dpci_irq. This gets called when the guest is being
destroyed. We end up calling 'pt_pirq_softirq_active' to see if it
is OK to continue the destruction.
The scenarios in which the 'struct pirq' (and subsequently the
'hvm_pirq_dpci') gets destroyed is when:
- guest did not use the pirq at all after setup.
- guest did use pirq, but decided to mask and left it in that state.
- guest did use pirq, but crashed.
In all of those scenarios we end up calling 'pt_pirq_softirq_active'
to check if the softirq is still active. Read below on the
'pt_pirq_softirq_active' loop.
b) pt_irq_destroy_bind (guest disables the MSI). We double-check that
the softirq has run by piggy-backing on the existing
'pirq_cleanup_check' mechanism which calls 'pt_pirq_cleanup_check'.
We add the extra call to 'pt_pirq_softirq_active' in
'pt_pirq_cleanup_check'.
NOTE: Guests that use event channels unbind first the event channel
from PIRQs, so the 'pt_pirq_cleanup_check' won't be called as 'event'
is set to zero. In that case we either clean it up via the a) or c)
mechanism.
There is an extra scenario regardless of 'event' being set or not:
the guest did 'pt_irq_destroy_bind' while an interrupt was triggered
and softirq was scheduled (but had not been run). It is OK to still
run the softirq as hvm_dirq_assist won't do anything (as the flags
are set to zero). However we will try to deschedule the softirq if
we can (by clearing the STATE_SCHED bit and us doing the
ref-counting).
c) pt_irq_create_bind (not a typo). The scenarios are:
- guest disables the MSI and then enables it (rmmod and modprobe in
a loop). We call 'pt_pirq_reset' which checks to see if the
softirq has been scheduled. Imagine the 'b)' with interrupts in
flight and c) getting called in a loop.
We will spin up on 'pt_pirq_is_active' (at the start of the
'pt_irq_create_bind') with the event_lock spinlock dropped and waiting
(cpu_relax). We cannot call 'process_pending_softirqs' as it might
result in a dead-lock. hvm_dirq_assist will be executed and then the
softirq will clear 'state' which signals that that we can re-use the
'hvm_pirq_dpci' structure. In case this softirq is scheduled on a
remote CPU the softirq will run on it as the semantics behind an
softirq is that it will execute within the guest interruption.
- we hit once the error paths in 'pt_irq_create_bind' while an
interrupt was triggered and softirq was scheduled.
If the softirq is in STATE_RUN that means it is executing and we should
let it continue on. We can clear the '->dom' field as the softirq has
stashed it beforehand. If the softirq is STATE_SCHED and we are
successful in clearing it, we do the ref-counting and clear the '->dom'
field. Otherwise we let the softirq continue on and the '->dom' field
is left intact. The clearing of the '->dom' is left to a), b) or again
c) case.
Note that in both cases the 'flags' variable is cleared so
hvm_dirq_assist won't actually do anything.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
When an interrupt for an PCI (or PCIe) passthrough device is to be sent
to a guest, we find the appropiate 'hvm_dirq_dpci' structure for the
interrupt (PIRQ), set a bit (masked), and schedule an tasklet.
Then the 'hvm_dirq_assist' tasklet gets called with the 'struct domain'
from where it iterates over the the radix-tree of 'hvm_dirq_dpci' (from
zero to the number of PIRQs allocated) which are masked to the guest
and calls each 'hvm_pirq_assist'. If the PIRQ has a bit set (masked) it
figures out how to inject the PIRQ to the guest.
This is inefficient and not fair as:
- We iterate starting at PIRQ 0 and up every time. That means the PCIe
devices that have lower PIRQs get to be called first.
- If we have many PCIe devices passed in with many PIRQs and if most
of the time only the highest numbered PIRQ get an interrupt (as the
initial ones are for control) we end up iterating over many PIRQs.
But we could do beter - the 'hvm_dirq_dpci' has the field for
'struct domain', which we can use instead of having to pass in the
'struct domain'.
As such this patch moves the tasklet to the 'struct hvm_dirq_dpci' and
sets the 'dom' field to the domain. We also double-check that the
'->dom' is not reset before using it.
We have to be careful with this as that means we MUST have 'dom' set
before pirq_guest_bind() is called. As such we add the
'pirq_dpci->dom = d;' to cover for such cases.
The mechanism to tear it down is more complex as there are two ways it
can be executed:
a) pci_clean_dpci_irq. This gets called when the guest is being
destroyed. We end up calling 'tasklet_kill'.
The scenarios in which the 'struct pirq' (and subsequently the
'hvm_pirq_dpci') gets destroyed is when:
- guest did not use the pirq at all after setup.
- guest did use pirq, but decided to mask and left it in that
state.
- guest did use pirq, but crashed.
In all of those scenarios we end up calling 'tasklet_kill' which
will spin on the tasklet if it is running.
b) pt_irq_destroy_bind (guest disables the MSI). We double-check that
the softirq has run by piggy-backing on the existing
'pirq_cleanup_check' mechanism which calls 'pt_pirq_cleanup_check'.
We add the extra call to 'pt_pirq_softirq_active' in
'pt_pirq_cleanup_check'.
NOTE: Guests that use event channels unbind first the event channel
from PIRQs, so the 'pt_pirq_cleanup_check' won't be called as event
is set to zero. In that case we either clean it up via the a)
mechanism. It is OK to re-use the tasklet when 'pt_irq_create_bind'
is called afterwards.
There is an extra scenario regardless of event being set or not:
the guest did 'pt_irq_destroy_bind' while an interrupt was
triggered and tasklet was scheduled (but had not been run). It is
OK to still run the tasklet as hvm_dirq_assist won't do anything
(as the flags are set to zero). As such we can exit out of
hvm_dirq_assist without doing anything.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Fix the following two issues in rtds scheduler:
1) The runq queue lock is not grabbed when rt_update_deadline is
called in rt_alloc_vdata function, which may cause race condition;
Solution: Move call to rt_update_deadline from _alloc to _insert;
Note: rt_alloc_vdata does not need grab the runq lock, because only one
cpu will allocate the rt_vcpu; before the rt_vcpu is inserted into the
runq, no more than one cpu operates on the rt_vcpu.
2) rt_vcpu_remove should grab the runq lock before remove the vcpu
from runq; otherwise, race condition may happen.
Solution: Add lock in rt_vcpu_remove().
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Meng Xu <mengxu@cis.upenn.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The build of xen-4.5.0-rc2 fails if XSM_ENABLE=y due to an inconsistency
in commit fda1614 "xen/arm: Add support for GICv3 for domU" which uses
XEN_DOMCTL_configure_domain in xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c and
xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors but XEN_DOMCTL_arm_configure_domain
elsewhere.
Michael Young
In fda1614 ("xen/arm: Add support for GICv3 for domU")
XEN_DOMCTL_configure_domain is used in xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c and
xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors but XEN_DOMCTL_arm_configure_domain
is used elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
When using pvgrub in graphical mode with vnc, the grub timeout doesn't
work: the countdown doesn't even start. With a serial terminal the
problem doesn't occur and the countdown works as expected.
It turns out that the problem is that when using a graphical terminal,
checkkey () returns 0 instead of -1 when there is no activity on the
mouse or keyboard. As a consequence grub thinks that the user typed
something and interrupts the count down.
To fix the issue simply ignore keystrokes returning 0, that is the NUL
character anyway. Add a patch to grub.patches to do that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Tested-by: Steven Haigh <netwiz@crc.id.au>
Acked-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
The vGIC will emulate the same version as the hardware. The toolstack has
to retrieve the version of the vGIC in order to be able to create the
corresponding device tree node.
A new DOMCTL has been introduced for ARM to configure the domain. For now
it only allow the toolstack to retrieve the version of vGIC.
This DOMCTL will be extend later to let the user choose the version of the
emulated GIC.
Signed-off-by: Vijaya Kumar K <Vijaya.Kumar@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Valgrind reports:
==7971== Invalid read of size 1
==7971== at 0x40877BE: libxl__parse_mac (libxl_internal.c:288)
==7971== by 0x405C5F8: libxl__device_nic_from_xs_be (libxl.c:3405)
==7971== by 0x4065542: libxl__append_nic_list_of_type (libxl.c:3484)
==7971== by 0x4065542: libxl_device_nic_list (libxl.c:3504)
==7971== by 0x406F561: libxl_retrieve_domain_configuration (libxl.c:6661)
==7971== by 0x805671C: reload_domain_config (xl_cmdimpl.c:2037)
==7971== by 0x8057F30: handle_domain_death (xl_cmdimpl.c:2116)
==7971== by 0x8057F30: create_domain (xl_cmdimpl.c:2580)
==7971== by 0x805B4B2: main_create (xl_cmdimpl.c:4652)
==7971== by 0x804EAB2: main (xl.c:378)
This is because on the final iteration the tok += 3 skips over the terminating
NUL to the next byte, and then *tok reads it. Fix this by using endptr as the
iterator.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_attach is assigning dls->diskpath with a
strdup of the device path. This is then passed to the callback, e.g.
parse_bootloader_result but bootloader_cleanup will not free it.
Since the callback is within the scope of the (e)gc and therefore doesn't need
to be malloc'd, a gc'd alloc will do. All other assignments to this field use
the gc.
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=767295
Reported-by: Gedalya <gedalya@gedalya.net>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The interrupt-map property requires that the interrupt-parent node
must have both #address-cells and #interrupt-cells properties (see
ePAPR 2.4.3.1). Therefore propagate the property if it is present.
We must propagate (rather than invent our own value) since this value
is used to size fields within other properties within the tree.
ePAPR strictly speaking requires that the interrupt-parent node
always has these properties. However reality has diverged from this
and implementations will recursively search parents for #*-cells
properties. Hence we only copy if it is present.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Vexpress is currently failing to boot for me with:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/arm/mm/ioremap.c:301 __arm_ioremap_pfn_caller+0x118/0x1a4()
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Tainted: G W 3.16.0-arm-native+ #276
[<c0011e9c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0010758>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c0010758>] (show_stack) from [<c001a3ec>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x5c/0x7c)
[<c001a3ec>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c001a4c8>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x18/0x20)
[<c001a4c8>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<c001488c>] (__arm_ioremap_pfn_caller+0x118/0x1a4)
[<c001488c>] (__arm_ioremap_pfn_caller) from [<c00149a0>] (__arm_ioremap+0x14/0x20)
[<c00149a0>] (__arm_ioremap) from [<c01d103c>] (gnttab_setup_auto_xlat_frames+0x30/0xdc)
[<c01d103c>] (gnttab_setup_auto_xlat_frames) from [<c0495324>] (xen_guest_init+0x19c/0x2d4)
[<c0495324>] (xen_guest_init) from [<c0492c6c>] (do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x1a4)
[<c0492c6c>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c0492d6c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x58/0x1b4)
[<c0492d6c>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c039611c>] (kernel_init+0x8/0xe4)
[<c039611c>] (kernel_init) from [<c000de58>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
---[ end trace 3406ff24bd97382f ]---
xen:grant_table: Failed to ioremap gnttab share frames (addr=0x00000000b0000000)!
which is:
/*
* Don't allow RAM to be mapped - this causes problems with ARMv6+
*/
if (WARN_ON(pfn_valid(pfn)))
return NULL;
This makes sense since the gnttab defaults to 0xb000000 and my dom0
is being allocated a 1:1 mapping at 0xa0000000-0xc0000000.
I suspect this broke around the time we stopped forcing dom0 memory to be
allocated as low as possible which happened to prevent the default dom0_gnttab
region overlapping RAM.
This patch specifies an explicit dom0_gnttab base which is explicitly unused
according to the FVP model docs (although it corresponds to CS5 this isn't
wired up to anything).
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Allow certain xentop columns to automatically expand as the amount
of data reported gets larger. The columns allowed to auto expand are:
NETTX(k), NETRX(k), VBD_RD, VBD_WR, VBD_RSECT, VBD_WSECT
If the -f option is used to allow full length VM names, those names will
also be aligned based on the longest name in the NAME column.
The default minimum width of all columns remains unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Markus Hauschild <Markus.Hauschild@rz.uni-regensburg.de>
Signed-off-by: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Emulation for REP instructions is optimized to perform a single
write for all repeats in the current page if possible. However,
this interferes with a memory introspection application's ability
to detect suspect behaviour, since it will cause only one
mem_event to be sent per page touched.
This patch disables the optimization, gated on introspection
being active for the domain.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Update EFI code to completely ignore the EFI comnandline when booted from GRUB.
Previusly it was parsed of EFI boot specific options, but these aren't used
when booted from GRUB.
Don't do EFI console or video configuration when booted by GRUB. The EFI boot
code does some console and video initialization to support native EFI boot from
the EFI boot manager or EFI shell. This initlization should not be done when
booted using GRUB.
Update EFI documentation to indicate that it describes EFI native boot, and
does not apply at all when Xen is booted using GRUB.
Signed-off-by: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
This fix ensures that we never meet an integer overflow while adding
255 while parsing a variable length encoding. It works differently from
commit 504f70b6 ("lzo: properly check for overruns") because instead of
ensuring that we don't overrun the input, which is tricky to guarantee
due to many assumptions in the code, it simply checks that the cumulated
number of 255 read cannot overflow by bounding this number.
The MAX_255_COUNT is the maximum number of times we can add 255 to a base
count without overflowing an integer. The multiply will overflow when
multiplying 255 by more than MAXINT/255. The sum will overflow earlier
depending on the base count. Since the base count is taken from a u8
and a few bits, it is safe to assume that it will always be lower than
or equal to 2*255, thus we can always prevent any overflow by accepting
two less 255 steps.
This patch also reduces the CPU overhead and actually increases performance
by 1.1% compared to the initial code, while the previous fix costs 3.1%
(measured on x86_64).
The fix needs to be backported to all currently supported stable kernels.
Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers <willem@lekkertech.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
[original Linux commit: 72cf9012]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This reverts commit 504f70b6 ("lzo: properly check for overruns").
As analysed by Willem Pinckaers, this fix is still incomplete on
certain rare corner cases, and it is easier to restart from the
original code.
Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers <willem@lekkertech.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
[original Linux commit: af958a38]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
While PVH guests currently have to start in 64-bit mode, nothing keeps
them from entering compatibility mode via a suitable ring-0 code
selector and making a hypercall from there. Fail such attempts rather
than asserting they won't happen.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The shutdown code is only present if the domain is shutdown.
If we attempt to extract it from the flags from a dying but not
shutdown domain then we get values like '255' which is not a
valid LIBXL_SHUTDOWN_REASON_. We should use LIBXL_SHUTDOWN_UNKNOWN
in this case.
Signed-off-by: David Scott <dave.scott@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- updated comment in libxl_types.idl to match ]
Changes to handle non-numeric default attributes for grub2 caused run_grub()
to attempt to index into the images list using a string. Pull out the code
that handles submenus into a new function and use that to ensure sel is
numeric.
Reported-by: David Scott <dave.scott@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon Rowe <simon.rowe@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
A recent KVM change by Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> pointed out
that unconditional VM exits (like VMX'es ones for the INVEPT, INVVPID,
and XSETBV instructions) may result from guest user mode activity (in
the example cases, e.g. prior to a privilege level check being done).
Consequently convert the unconditional domain_crash() to a conditional
one (when guest is in kernel mode) with the alternative of injecting
#UD (when in user mode).
This is meant to be a precaution against in-guest security issues
introduced when any such VM exit becomes possible (on newer hardware)
without the hypervisor immediately being aware of it. There are no such
unhandled VM exits currently (and hence this is not an active security
issue), but old (no longer security maintained) versions exhibit issues
in the cases given as examples above.
Suggested-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Process softirqs once per domain, and once every 64 vcpus in a guest to avoid
being hit by the NMI watchdog. Discovered against a VM which had accidentally
been assigned 8192 vcpus.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Xen 4.3.0, 4.2.3 and older transferred a maximum sized xsave area (as
if all the available XCR0 bits were set); the new version only
transfers based on the actual XCR0 bits. This may result in a smaller
area if the last sections were missing (e.g., the LWP area from an AMD
machine). If the size doesn't match the XCR0 derived size, the size is
checked against the maximum size and the part of the xsave area
between the actual and maximum used size is checked for zero data. If
either the max size check or any part of the overflow area is
non-zero, we return with an error.
Signed-off-by: Don Koch <dkoch@verizon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
On certain systems some of the memory map entries designated for use by
runtime services cannot be mapped (frequently due to firmware bugs). On
others, some of the memory map entries aren't even marked for runtime
services use, yet are being used by them. For both cases give people a
way to suppress use of runtime services altogether.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
In the event of a #PF while in an EFI runtime service function we
otherwise can't dump the page tables, making the analysis of the
problem more cumbersome.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
In the case that Xen is attempting to load a zeroextended HVM record where the
difference needing extending would overflow the data blob, _hvm_check_entry()
will incorrectly fail before working out that it would have been safe.
The "len + sizeof(*d)" check is wrong. Consider zeroextending a 16 byte
record into a 32 byte structure. "32 + hdr" will fail the overall context
length check even though the pre-extended record in the stream is 16 bytes.
The first condition is reduced to just a length check for hvm save header,
while the second condition is extended to include a check that the record in
the stream not exceeding the stream length.
The error messages are extended to include further useful information.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This patch fixes two issues:
1. Interrupts on PIR are lost during save/restore. Syncing the PIR
into IRR during save will fix it.
2. EOI exit bitmap doesn't set up correctly after restore. Here we
will construct the eoi exit bitmap via (IRR | ISR). Though it may cause
unnecessary eoi exit of the interrupts that pending in IRR or ISR during
save/restore, each pending interrupt only causes one vmexit. The
subsequent interrupts will adjust the eoi exit bitmap correctly. So
the performance hurt can be ignored.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
If show_guest_stack was called from Xen context (for instance hitting
'0' key on Xen console) get_page_from_gva was not able to get the
page returning NULL.
Detecting different domain and changing VTTBR register make
get_page_from_gva works for different domains.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Document how to use configure and what to pass to make(1).
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- fix a few typos ]
Euan Harris
Wei Liu
Ian Jackson
Jan Beulich
Emil Condrea
Olaf Hering
Juergen Gross
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Meng Xu
M A Young
Stefano Stabellini
Julien Grall
Ian Campbell
Markus Hauschild
Razvan Cojocaru
Roy Franz
Willy Tarreau
David Scott
Martin Pohlack
Andrew Cooper
Simon Rowe
Tiejun Chen
Don Koch
Yang Zhang
Frediano Ziglio