Remove the 2 part comment on top of map_grant_ref:
- The first part mention the return value which has been void since
2006!
- The second part mention a local variable 'addr' which does not
exist anymore.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Initialize variable *access before returning it back to the caller.
It makes the code a bit nicer and it is a safety certification
requirement.
M3CM Rule-9.1: The value of an object with automatic storage duration
shall not be read before it has been set
QAVerify: 2962
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefanos@xilinx.com>
Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
CC: rcojocaru@bitdefender.com
CC: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Initialize variable target before passing it as a parameter.
It makes the code a bit nicer and it is a safety certification
requirement.
M3CM Rule-9.1: The value of an object with automatic storage duration
shall not be read before it has been set
QAVerify: 2972
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefanos@xilinx.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
This reduces the post-init memory footprint, eliminates a pointless
level of indirection at the use sites, and allows for subsequent
alternatives call patching.
Take the opportunity and also add a name to the PowerNow! instance.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Filling dummy module's hook to null value of xsm_operations structure
will generate debug message. This becomes boot time spew for module
like silo, which only sets a few hooks of itself. So remove the printing
to avoid boot time spew.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin.li@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
The 'vp_assist' page is currently an example of a guest page which needs to
be kept mapped throughout the life-time of a guest, but there are other
such examples in the specifiction [1]. This patch therefore introduces a
generic 'viridian_page' type and converts the current vp_assist/apic_assist
related code to use it. Subsequent patches implementing other enlightments
can then also make use of it.
This patch also renames the 'vp_assist_pending' field in struct
hvm_viridian_vcpu_context to 'apic_assist_pending' to more accurately
reflect its meaning. The term 'vp_assist' applies to the whole page rather
than just the EOI-avoidance enlightenment. New versons of the specification
have defined data structures for other enlightenments within the same page.
No functional change.
[1] https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/Virtualization-Documentation/raw/live/tlfs/Hypervisor%20Top%20Level%20Functional%20Specification%20v5.0C.pdf
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
...into new 'time' module.
This patch reduces the size of the main viridian source module by
moving time related enlightenments into their own source module. This is
done in anticipation of implementation of more such enightenments and
a desire to not further lengthen the main source module when this work
is done.
While moving the code:
- Move the declaration of HV_REFERENCE_TSC_PAGE from the header file into
the new source module, since it is only used there.
- Clean up a bool_t.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
...into new 'synic' module.
The SynIC (synthetic interrupt controller) is specified [1] to be a super-
set of a virtualized LAPIC, and its definition encompasses all
enlightenments related to virtual interrupt control.
This patch reduces the size of the main viridian source module by giving
these enlightenments their own module. This is done in anticipation of
implementation of more such enlightenments and a desire not to further
lengthen then main source module when this work is done.
Whilst moving the code:
- Fix various style issues.
- Move the MSR definitions into the header (since they are now needed in
more than one source module).
[1] https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/Virtualization-Documentation/raw/live/tlfs/Hypervisor%20Top%20Level%20Functional%20Specification%20v5.0C.pdf
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Introduce a new directory to put in configs we care about. Modify
build script to build with those configs.
While we only introduce x86 configs initially, provision for non-x86
configs.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
We want Xen to crash if we hit these paths when PV is disabled.
For syscall, we provide stubs for {l,c}star_enter which end up calling
panic. For sysenter, we initialise CS to 0 so that #GP can be raised.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
PV Dom0 has a quirk for some AMD processors, where enabling ACPI can
also enable C1E mode. Apply the same workaround as done on PV for a
PVH Dom0, which consist on trapping accesses to the SMI command IO
port and disabling C1E if ACPI is enabled.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This patch adds a couple of regs to the vm_event that are used by
the introspection. The base, limit and ar
bits are compressed into a uint64_t union so as not to enlarge the
vm_event.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Instead of loading a pointer at each use site, have a single runtime
instance of struct genapic, copying into it from the individual
instances. The individual instances can this way also be moved to .init
(also adjust apic_probe[] at this occasion).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Also add emacs boilerplate to avoid future problems.
Purely cosmetic. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Clang reports:
xen-cpuid.c:307:29: error: format specifies type 'unsigned long' but the
argument has type 'uint64_t' (aka 'unsigned long long') [-Werror,-Wformat]
msrs[l].idx, msrs[l].val);
^~~~~~~~~~~
Use PRIx64 instead.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The header is (hence its name) supposed to be a helper for the per-arch
p2m.h files. It was never supposed to be included directly, and for the
purpose of putting common function declarations into the common header
it is more helpful if things like p2m_t are already available at the
inclusion point.
This also undoes parts of 02ede7dc03 ("memory: add
check_get_page_from_gfn() as a wrapper..."), which had been there just
because of the unhelpful original way of including p2m-common.h.
Take the opportunity and also ditch a duplicate public/memory.h from the
ARM header.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Scrubbing RAM during boot may take a long time on machines with lots
of RAM. Add 'idle' option to bootscrub which marks all pages dirty
initially so they will eventually be scrubbed in idle-loop on every
online CPU.
It's guaranteed that the allocator will return scrubbed pages by doing
eager scrubbing during allocation (unless MEMF_no_scrub was provided).
Use the new 'idle' option as the default one.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
XACQUIRE prefixed accesses to the 4Mb range of memory starting at 1Gb
are liable to lock up the processor. Disallow use of this memory range.
Unfortunately the available Core Gen7 and Gen8 spec updates are pretty
old, so I can only guess that they're similarly affected when Core Gen6
is and the Xeon counterparts are, too.
This is part of XSA-282.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Use a structure so along with an address (now frame number) an order can
also be specified.
This is part of XSA-282.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This finally (after literally years of work!) marks the point where the
toolstack can ask the hypervisor for the current CPUID configuration of a
specific domain.
Introduce a new flask access vector and update the default policies.
Also extend xen-cpuid's --policy mode to be able to take a domid and dump a
specific domains CPUID and MSR policy.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Provide a SYSCTL for the toolstack to obtain complete system CPUID and MSR
policy information.
For the flask side of things, this subop is closely related to
{phys,cputopo,numa}info, so shares the physinfo access vector.
Extend the xen-cpuid utility to be able to dump the system policies. An
example output is:
Xen reports there are maximum 113 leaves and 3 MSRs
Raw policy: 93 leaves, 3 MSRs
CPUID:
leaf subleaf -> eax ebx ecx edx
00000000:ffffffff -> 0000000d:756e6547:6c65746e:49656e69
00000001:ffffffff -> 000306c3:00100800:7ffafbff:bfebfbff
00000002:ffffffff -> 76036301:00f0b5ff:00000000:00c10000
00000004:00000000 -> 1c004121:01c0003f:0000003f:00000000
00000004:00000001 -> 1c004122:01c0003f:0000003f:00000000
00000004:00000002 -> 1c004143:01c0003f:000001ff:00000000
00000004:00000003 -> 1c03c163:03c0003f:00001fff:00000006
00000005:ffffffff -> 00000040:00000040:00000003:00042120
00000006:ffffffff -> 00000077:00000002:00000009:00000000
00000007:00000000 -> 00000000:000027ab:00000000:9c000000
0000000a:ffffffff -> 07300403:00000000:00000000:00000603
0000000b:00000000 -> 00000001:00000002:00000100:00000000
0000000b:00000001 -> 00000004:00000008:00000201:00000000
0000000d:00000000 -> 00000007:00000340:00000340:00000000
0000000d:00000001 -> 00000001:00000000:00000000:00000000
0000000d:00000002 -> 00000100:00000240:00000000:00000000
80000000:ffffffff -> 80000008:00000000:00000000:00000000
80000001:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000021:2c100800
80000002:ffffffff -> 65746e49:2952286c:6f655820:2952286e
80000003:ffffffff -> 55504320:2d334520:30343231:20337620
80000004:ffffffff -> 2e332040:48473034:0000007a:00000000
80000006:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:01006040:00000000
80000007:ffffffff -> 00000000:00000000:00000000:00000100
80000008:ffffffff -> 00003027:00000000:00000000:00000000
MSRs:
index -> value
000000ce -> 0000000080000000
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This is prep work for the following patch - please refer to it as well.
When auditing and manipulating policies, it is necessary to do so with a
complete set of policies, due to the interdependences of the contents. A
containing structure like this will allow for clearer APIs and code.
As a first user, this structure is convenient for the mapping used by
XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_policy (implemented in the next patch), and for auditing
(later when XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpu_policy is implemented).
At this point, the distinction between *_max and *_default is introduced into
the ABI. For now, *_default is mapped to *_max, but future development work
will result in *_default being a logical subset of *_max.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
As with CPUID, an architectural form is used for representing the MSR data.
It is expected not to change moving forwards, but does have a 32 bit field
(currently reserved) which can be used compatibly if needs be.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The serialised form is made up of the leaf, subleaf and data tuple. As this
is the architectural form, it is expected not to change going forwards.
The serialisation of the Xen/Viridian leaves isn't fully implemented yet. It
is just enough to be bug-compatible with the current DOMCTL_set_cpuid
behaviour, but needs further hypervisor work before the toolstack can sensibly
control these values.
x86_cpuid_copy_to_buffer() is implemented using Xen's regular copy_to_guest
primitives, with an API-compatible memcpy() is used for the libxc half of the
build.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Limit the ability of a potentially compromised QEMU to consume system
resources. Key limits:
- RLIMIT_FSIZE (file size): 256KiB
- RLIMIT_NPROC (after uid changes to a unique uid)
Probably unnecessary limits but why not:
- RLIMIT_CORE: 0
- RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE: 0
- RLIMIT_LOCKS: 0
- RLIMIT_MEMLOCK: 0
NB that we do not yet set RLIMIT_AS (total virtual memory) or
RLIMIT_NOFILES (number of open files), since these require more care
and/or more coordination with QEMU to implement.
Suggested-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
---
Changes since v4:
- Put global headers before local headers (sugg by Paul)
- Move #undif inside the braces (sugg by Paul)
Changes since v3:
- Align RLIMIT_ENTRY list for easier reading
- Fix wrong format string specifier
- Get rid of some trailing whitespace
Changes since v2:
- Use a macro to define rlimit entries
- Use RLIMIT_NLIMITS as an end-of-list marker, rather than -1
- Various style clean-ups
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
QEMU running under Xen doesn't need mount or IPC functionality.
Create and enter separate namespaces for each of these before
executing QEMU, so that in the event that other restrictions fail, the
process won't be able to even name system mount points or exsting
non-file-based IPC descriptors to attempt to attack them.
Unsharing is something a process can only do to itself (it would
seem); so add an os-specific "dm_preexec_restrict()" hook just before
we exec() the device model.
Also add checks to depriv-process-checker.sh to verify that dm is
running in a new namespace (or at least, a different one than the
caller).
Suggested-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
---
Changes since v4:
- Fix function prototype for netbsd code
Changes since v3:
- Fix some more style issues
Changes since v2:
- Return an error rather than calling exit()
- Use LOGE() and print to the current stderr fd, rather than
printing to the new stderr fd via write()
- Use r for external return values rather than rc.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
When dm_restrict is enabled, ask QEMU to chroot into an empty directory.
* Create $XEN_RUN_DIR/qemu-root-<domid> (deleting the old one if it's there)
* Pass the -chroot option to QEMU
Rather than running `rm -rf` on the directory before creating it
(since there is no library function to do this), simply rmdir the
directory, relying on the fact that the previous QEMU instance, if
properly restricted, shouldn't have been able to write anything
anyway.
Suggested-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
---
Changes since v4:
- Minor change to comment
- Update stale directory name in commit message
Changes since v2:
- Style fixes
- Testing moved to a different patch
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
docs/qemu-deprivilege.txt had some basic instructions for using
dm_restrict, but it was incomplete, misleading, and stale.
Update the docs in a number of ways.
First, separate user-facing documentation and technical description
into docs/features and docs/design, respectively.
In the feature doc:
* Introduce a section mentioning minimim versions of Linux, Xen, and
qemu required (TBD)
* Fix the discussion of qemu userid. Mention xen-qemuuser-range-base,
and provide example shell code that actually has some hope of working
(instead of failing out after creating 900 userids).
* Describe how to enable restrictions, as well as features which
probably don't or definitely don't work.
In the design doc, introduce a "Technical Details" section which
describes specifically what restrictions are currently done, and also
what restrictions we are looking at doing in the future.
The idea here is that as we implement the various items for the
future, we move them from "Restrictions still to do" to "Restrictions
done". This can also act as a design document -- a place for public
discussion of what can or should be done and how.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
---
Changes since v4:
- Remove unnecessary FIXME
- Remove stale "Add SUPPORT.md"
Changes since v3:
- Fix typo (32->16)
- Use an example value not close to the `nobody` uids, but still a
multiple of 2^16.
- Mention that using a multiple of 2^16 may have advantages.
- Have the example create a group as well
- Reorganize two comments on the "range-base" method for clarity
Changes since v2:
- Extraneous privcmd / evtchn instances aren't closed
- Expand description of how to test fd deprivileging
- Rework and clarify two namespace sections, give reference for QEMU NAK
- Add more information about migration technical challenges
- In UID section, mention possibility of container ID collisions.
- Fix name of design document.
- Add SUPPORT.md statement. Specify Linux, to make sure that FreeBSD is
evaluated separately.
- Mention that `-sandbox` is a blacklist and why
Changes since v1:
- Break into two, and move into appropriate directories (rather than 'misc')
- Updated version requirements
- Distinguish between features which "don't yet work" and features which we never expect to work
- Update description of xen-restrict functionality
- Reorder and expand further restrictions
- Make it more clear which restrictions are available on Linux only
- Include detailed description of how to kill a process
- Add RLIMIT_NPROC as something we can do without further changes to qemu
- Document the need to check for the sandbox feature before using it
Thank you to Ross Lagerwall, whose description of what XenServer is
doing formed much of the basis for the text here.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
CC: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
CC: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
CC: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
CC: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
In "build: add autoconf to replace custom checks in tools/check"
--enable-githttp was introduced. But we missed this comment where it
was advertised.
Also, that commit had the effect of uncondtionally setting GIT_HTTP
from the configure variable. But the env var has been advertised in
some places as the way to specify this behaviour, and overriding it is
just unfriendly.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Right now, if either an hard or soft-affinity are explicitly specified
in a domain's config file, automatic NUMA placement is skipped. However,
automatic NUMA placement affects only the soft-affinity of the domain
which is being created.
Therefore, it is ok to let it run if an hard-affinity is specified. The
semantics will be that the best placement candidate would be found,
respecting the specified hard-affinity, i.e., using only the nodes that
contain the pcpus in the hard-affinity mask.
This is particularly helpful if global xl pinning masks are defined, as
made possible by commit aa67b97ed3 ("xl.conf: Add global affinity
masks"). In fact, without this commit, defining a global affinity mask
would also mean disabling automatic placement, but that does not
necessarily have to be the case (especially in large systems).
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
A build breakage is discovered by a non-debug build. Debug build
worked because the ASSERT made the compiler eliminate the rest of the
functions.
Currently they are PV only. There are comments alluding to possible
future HVM support but we can cross the bridge when we get there.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
In order to have a link to the release notes in the feature list
generated from SUPPORT.md add that link in the "Release Support"
section of that file.
The real link needs to be adapted when the version is being released.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
docs/ChangeLog has been updated for Xen 3.3 last time. It seems to be
interesting for archaeologists only today.
Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
... rather than implementing them separately for libxc and libxl. They will
shortly be wanted in libx86 as well.
Fix up the style/consistency in the declaration, but no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
There is no need for struct vcpu to live below the 4G boundary for PV guests,
or for HVM vcpus using HAP.
Plumb struct domain into alloc_vcpu_struct() so the x86 version can query the
domain's type and paging settings.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Update text. Change "guest" to "domain" where appropriate because
"guest" doesn't include Domain 0.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Split the file into two halves. The first half pertains to PV guest
code while the second half is mostly used by the hypervisor itself to
handle interrupts and exceptions.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Going through toolstack code, they are used for PV guests only.
Tighten their access to PV only. Return -EOPNOTSUPP if they are called
on HVM guests. Rewrite the code in a pattern that makes DCE work.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Provide a stub for pv_inject_event. Put code that accesses PV fields
and GDT / LDT fault handling code under CONFIG_PV. Move set_debugreg
to pv/misc-hypercalls.c.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Julien Grall
Stefano Stabellini
Wei Liu
Jan Beulich
Xin Li
Paul Durrant
Roger Pau Monne
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Andrew Cooper
Sergey Dyasli
George Dunlap
Ian Jackson
Dario Faggioli
Juergen Gross