When reinstating some of systemd.m4 between v1 and v2, I reintroduced a little
too much. While {c,o}xenstored are indeed no longer linked against
libsystemd, ./configure still looks for it.
Drop this too.
Fixes: ae26101f6b ("tools: Drop libsystemd as a dependency")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Iterate over the p2m up to the maximum recorded gfn and remove any foreign
mappings, in order to drop the underlying page references and thus don't keep
extra page references if a domain is destroyed while still having foreign
mappings on it's p2m.
The logic is similar to the one used on Arm.
Note that foreign mappings cannot be created by guests that have altp2m or
nested HVM enabled, as p2ms different than the host one are not currently
scrubbed when destroyed in order to drop references to any foreign maps.
It's unclear whether the right solution is to take an extra reference when
foreign maps are added to p2ms different than the host one, or just rely on the
host p2m already having a reference. The mapping being removed from the host
p2m should cause it to be dropped on all domain p2ms.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Enabling it using an HVM param is fragile, and complicates the logic when
deciding whether options that interact with altp2m can also be enabled.
Leave the HVM param value for consumption by the guest, but prevent it from
being set. Enabling is now done using and additional altp2m specific field in
xen_domctl_createdomain.
Note that albeit only currently implemented in x86, altp2m could be implemented
in other architectures, hence why the field is added to xen_domctl_createdomain
instead of xen_arch_domainconfig.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@cloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> # hypervisor
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> # tools/libs/
Release-acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Such information will be needed in order to remove foreign mappings during
teardown for HVM guests.
Right now the introduced counter is not consumed.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
... and move x86's stub_selftest() under this new option.
There is value in having these tests included in release builds too.
It will shortly be used to gate the bitops unit tests on all architectures.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Rule 8.4 states: "A compatible declaration shall be visible when an
object or function with external linkage is defined."
These variables are only referenced from assembly code, so they need to
be extern and there is negligible risk of them being used improperly
without noticing.
As a result, they can be exempted using a comment-based deviation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Separate Intel/AMD-specific MCE code using CONFIG_{INTEL,AMD} config options.
Now we can avoid build of mcheck code if support for specific platform is
intentionally disabled by configuration.
Also global variables lmce_support & cmci_support from Intel-specific
mce_intel.c have to moved to common mce.c, as they get checked in common code.
Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The default switch case block is wanted here, to handle situation
e.g. of unexpected c->x86_vendor value -- then no mcheck init is done, but
misleading message still gets logged anyway.
Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Moving this function out of mce_intel.c will make it possible to disable
build of Intel MCE code later on, because the function gets called from
common x86 code.
Also replace boilerplate code that checks for MCG_LMCE_P flag with
vmce_has_lmce(), which might contribute to readability a bit.
Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This is simpler and easier for both humans and compilers to read.
It also addresses 6 instances of MISRA R5.3 violation (shadowing of the ptr_
local variable inside both {put,get}_unaligned()).
No change, not even in the compiled binary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Release-acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Rule 8.4 states: "A compatible declaration shall be visible when
an object or function with external linkage is defined".
The function do_general_protection is either used is asm code
or only within this unit, so there is no risk of this getting
out of sync with its definition, but the function must remain
extern.
Therefore, this function is deviated using a comment-based deviation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The parentheses in this regular expression should be doubly
escaped because they undergo expansion twice.
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
[stefano: fix commit message]
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
These files are used when debugging Xen, and are not meant to comply
with MISRA rules at the moment.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Some MISRA C rules already have no violations in Xen, so they can be
set as clean.
Reorder the rules in tagging.ecl according to version ordering
(i.e. sort -V) and split the configuration on multiple lines for
readability.
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
This rule has no more violations in the codebase, so it can be
set as clean.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
With the XEN_DOMCTL_dt_overlay DOMCTL added, users should be able to
attach (in the future also detach) devices from the provided DT overlay
to domains. Support this by introducing a new "xl dt-overlay" command
and related documentation, i.e. "xl dt-overlay attach. Slightly rework
the command option parsing logic.
Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <xin.wang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
In order to support the dynamic dtbo device assignment to a running
VM, the add/remove of the DT overlay and the attach/detach of the
device from the DT overlay should happen separately. Therefore,
repurpose the existing XEN_SYSCTL_dt_overlay to only add the DT
overlay to Xen device tree, instead of assigning the device to the
hardware domain at the same time. It is OK to change the sysctl behavior
as this feature is experimental so changing sysctl behavior and breaking
compatibility is OK.
Add the XEN_DOMCTL_dt_overlay with operations
XEN_DOMCTL_DT_OVERLAY_ATTACH to do the device assignment to the domain.
The hypervisor firstly checks the DT overlay passed from the toolstack
is valid. Then the device nodes are retrieved from the overlay tracker
based on the DT overlay. The attach of the device is implemented by
mapping the IRQ and IOMMU resources. All devices in the overlay are
assigned to a single domain.
Also take the opportunity to make one coding style fix in sysctl.h.
Introduce DT_OVERLAY_MAX_SIZE and use it to avoid repetitions of
KB(500).
xen,reg is to be used to handle non-1:1 mappings but it is currently
unsupported. For now return errors for not-1:1 mapped domains.
Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <xin.wang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Vikram Garhwal <fnu.vikram@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Currently, adding physical interrupts are only allowed at
the domain creation time. For use cases such as dynamic device
tree overlay addition, the adding of physical IRQ to
running domains should be allowed.
Drop the above-mentioned domain creation check. Since this
will introduce interrupt state unsync issues for cases when the
interrupt is active or pending in the guest, therefore for these
cases we simply reject the operation. Do it for both new and old
vGIC implementations.
Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <xin.wang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Currently, the number of SPIs allocated to the domain is only
configurable for Dom0less DomUs. Xen domains are supposed to be
platform agnostics and therefore the numbers of SPIs for libxl
guests should not be based on the hardware.
Introduce a new xl config entry for Arm to provide a method for
user to decide the number of SPIs. This would help to avoid
bumping the `config->arch.nr_spis` in libxl everytime there is a
new platform with increased SPI numbers.
Update the doc and the golang bindings accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <xin.wang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@amd.com>
There are some use cases in which the dom0less domUs need to have
the XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_iommu set at the domain construction time. For
example, the dynamic dtbo feature allows the domain to be assigned
a device that is behind the IOMMU at runtime. For these use cases,
we need to have a way to specify the domain will need the IOMMU
mapping at domain construction time.
Introduce a "passthrough" DT property for Dom0less DomUs following
the same entry as the xl.cfg. Currently only provide two options,
i.e. "enable" and "disable". Set the XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_iommu at domain
construction time based on the property.
Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <xin.wang2@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Fix the name mismatch in the xl dt-overlay command, the
command name should be "dt-overlay" instead of "dt_overlay".
Add the missing "," in the cmdtable.
Fix the exit code of the dt-overlay command, use EXIT_FAILURE
instead of ERROR_FAIL.
Fixes: 61765a07e3 ("tools/xl: Add new xl command overlay for device tree overlay support")
Suggested-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony@xenproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <xin.wang2@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
To unify certain common sanity checks, checks are done very early in
processing based only on the top-level type.
Unfortunately, when TRC_HVM_EMUL was introduced, it broke some of the
assumptions about how the top-level types worked. Namely, traces of
this type will show up outside of HVM contexts: in idle domains and in
PV domains.
Make an explicit exception for TRC_HVM_EMUL types in a number of places:
- Pass the record info pointer to toplevel_assert_check, so that it
can exclude TRC_HVM_EMUL records from idle and vcpu data_mode
checks
- Don't attempt to set the vcpu data_type in hvm_process for
TRC_HVM_EMUL records.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@cloud.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
A long-standing usability sub-optimality with xenalyze is the
necessity to specify `--svm-mode` when analyzing AMD processors. This
fundamentally comes about because the same trace event ID is used for
both VMX and SVM, but the contents of the trace must be interpreted
differently.
Instead, allocate separate trace events for VMX and SVM vmexits in
Xen; this will allow all readers to properly interpret the meaning of
the vmexit reason.
In xenalyze, first remove the redundant call to init_hvm_data();
there's no way to get to hvm_vmexit_process() without it being already
initialized by the set_vcpu_type call in hvm_process().
Replace this with set_hvm_exit_reson_data(), and move setting of
hvm->exit_reason_* into that function.
Modify hvm_process and hvm_vmexit_process to handle all four potential
values appropriately.
If SVM entries are encountered, set opt.svm_mode so that other
SVM-specific functionality is triggered.
Remove the `--svm-mode` command-line option, since it's now redundant.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@cloud.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
In the common sysctl command XEN_SYSCTL_physinfo, the value of
cores_per_socket is calculated based on the cpu_core_mask of CPU0.
Currently on Arm this is a fixed value 1 (can be checked via xl info),
which is not correct. This is because during the Arm CPU online
process at boot time, setup_cpu_sibling_map() only sets the per-cpu
cpu_core_mask for itself.
cores_per_socket refers to the number of cores that belong to the same
socket (NUMA node). Currently Xen on Arm does not support physical
CPU hotplug and NUMA, also we assume there is no multithread. Therefore
cores_per_socket means all possible CPUs detected from the device
tree. Setting the per-cpu cpu_core_mask in setup_cpu_sibling_map()
accordingly. Modify the in-code comment which seems to be outdated. Add
a warning to users if Xen is running on processors with multithread
support.
Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <xin.wang2@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
xentrace_format was always of limited utility, since trace records
across pcpus were processed out of order; it was superseded by xenalyze
over a decade ago.
But for several releases, the `formats` file it has depended on for
proper operation has not even been included in `make install` (which
generally means it doesn't get picked up by distros either); yet
nobody has seemed to complain.
Simple remove xentrace_format, and point people to xenalyze instead.
NB that there is no man page for xenalyze, so the "see also" on the
xentrace man page is simply removed for now.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@cloud.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
There are no more users, and we want to disuade people from introducing new
users just for sd_notify() and friends. Drop the dependency.
We still want the overall --with{,out}-systemd to gate the generation of the
service/unit/mount/etc files.
Rerun autogen.sh, and mark the dependency as removed in the build containers.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@cloud.com>
... in order to avoid linking against the whole of libsystemd.
Only minimal changes to the upstream copy, to function as a drop-in
replacement for sd_notify() and as a header-only library.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@cloud.com>
Commit 634cfc8beb ("Make MEM_ACCESS configurable") intended to make
MEM_ACCESS configurable on Arm to reduce the code size when the user
doesn't need it.
However, this didn't cover the arch specific code. None of the code
in arm/mem_access.c is necessary when MEM_ACCESS=n, so it can be
compiled out. This will require to provide some stub for functions
called by the common code.
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Zucchelli <alessandro.zucchelli@bugseng.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Release-acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Assign SBDF to the PCI devices being passed through with bus 0.
The resulting topology is where PCIe devices reside on the bus 0 of the
root complex itself (embedded endpoints).
This implementation is limited to 32 devices which are allowed on
a single PCI bus.
Please note, that at the moment only function 0 of a multifunction
device can be passed through.
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@amd.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Xen and/or Dom0 may have put values in PCI_COMMAND which they expect
to remain unaltered. PCI_COMMAND_SERR bit is a good example: while the
guest's (domU) view of this will want to be zero (for now), the host
having set it to 1 should be preserved, or else we'd effectively be
giving the domU control of the bit. Thus, PCI_COMMAND register needs
proper emulation in order to honor host's settings.
According to "PCI LOCAL BUS SPECIFICATION, REV. 3.0", section "6.2.2
Device Control" the reset state of the command register is typically 0,
so when assigning a PCI device use 0 as the initial state for the
guest's (domU) view of the command register.
Here is the full list of command register bits with notes about
PCI/PCIe specification, and how Xen handles the bit. QEMU's behavior is
also documented here since that is our current reference implementation
for PCI passthrough.
PCI_COMMAND_IO (bit 0)
PCIe 6.1: RW
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: (emu_mask) QEMU provides an emulated view of this bit. Guest
writes do not propagate to hardware. QEMU sets this bit to 1 in
hardware if an I/O BAR is exposed to the guest.
Xen domU: (rsvdp_mask) We treat this bit as RsvdP for now since we
don't yet support I/O BARs for domUs.
Xen dom0: We allow dom0 to control this bit freely.
PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY (bit 1)
PCIe 6.1: RW
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: (emu_mask) QEMU provides an emulated view of this bit. Guest
writes do not propagate to hardware. QEMU sets this bit to 1 in
hardware if a Memory BAR is exposed to the guest.
Xen domU/dom0: We handle writes to this bit by mapping/unmapping BAR
regions.
Xen domU: For devices assigned to DomUs, memory decoding will be
disabled at the time of initialization.
PCI_COMMAND_MASTER (bit 2)
PCIe 6.1: RW
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: Pass through writes to hardware.
Xen domU/dom0: Pass through writes to hardware.
PCI_COMMAND_SPECIAL (bit 3)
PCIe 6.1: RO, hardwire to 0
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: Pass through writes to hardware.
Xen domU/dom0: Pass through writes to hardware.
PCI_COMMAND_INVALIDATE (bit 4)
PCIe 6.1: RO, hardwire to 0
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: Pass through writes to hardware.
Xen domU/dom0: Pass through writes to hardware.
PCI_COMMAND_VGA_PALETTE (bit 5)
PCIe 6.1: RO, hardwire to 0
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: Pass through writes to hardware.
Xen domU/dom0: Pass through writes to hardware.
PCI_COMMAND_PARITY (bit 6)
PCIe 6.1: RW
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: (emu_mask) QEMU provides an emulated view of this bit. Guest
writes do not propagate to hardware.
Xen domU: (rsvdp_mask) We treat this bit as RsvdP.
Xen dom0: We allow dom0 to control this bit freely.
PCI_COMMAND_WAIT (bit 7)
PCIe 6.1: RO, hardwire to 0
PCI LB 3.0: hardwire to 0
QEMU: res_mask
Xen domU: (rsvdp_mask) We treat this bit as RsvdP.
Xen dom0: We allow dom0 to control this bit freely.
PCI_COMMAND_SERR (bit 8)
PCIe 6.1: RW
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: (emu_mask) QEMU provides an emulated view of this bit. Guest
writes do not propagate to hardware.
Xen domU: (rsvdp_mask) We treat this bit as RsvdP.
Xen dom0: We allow dom0 to control this bit freely.
PCI_COMMAND_FAST_BACK (bit 9)
PCIe 6.1: RO, hardwire to 0
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: (emu_mask) QEMU provides an emulated view of this bit. Guest
writes do not propagate to hardware.
Xen domU: (rsvdp_mask) We treat this bit as RsvdP.
Xen dom0: We allow dom0 to control this bit freely.
PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE (bit 10)
PCIe 6.1: RW
PCI LB 3.0: RW
QEMU: (emu_mask) QEMU provides an emulated view of this bit. Guest
writes do not propagate to hardware. QEMU checks if INTx was mapped
for a device. If it is not, then guest can't control
PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE bit.
Xen domU: We prohibit a guest from enabling INTx if MSI(X) is enabled.
Xen dom0: We allow dom0 to control this bit freely.
Bits 11-15
PCIe 6.1: RsvdP
PCI LB 3.0: Reserved
QEMU: res_mask
Xen domU: rsvdp_mask
Xen dom0: We allow dom0 to control these bits freely.
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Guest can try to read config space using different access sizes: 8,
16, 32, 64 bits. We need to take this into account when we are
returning an error back to MMIO handler, otherwise it is possible to
provide more data than requested: i.e. guest issues LDRB instruction
to read one byte, but we are writing 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF in the target
register.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@amd.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
... in order to also deny Dom0 access through the alias ports (commonly
observed on Intel chipsets). Without this it is only giving the
impression of denying access to PIT. Unlike for CMOS/RTC, do detection
pretty early, to avoid disturbing normal operation later on (even if
typically we won't use much of the PIT).
Like for CMOS/RTC a fundamental assumption of the probing is that reads
from the probed alias port won't have side effects (beyond such that PIT
reads have anyway) in case it does not alias the PIT's.
As to the port 0x61 accesses: Unlike other accesses we do, this masks
off the top four bits (in addition to the bottom two ones), following
Intel chipset documentation saying that these (read-only) bits should
only be written with zero.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@amd.com>
Help reading of code programming the PIT by introducing constants for
control word, read back and latch commands, as well as status.
Requested-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@amd.com>
Initially the patch was introduced by Bobby, who takes the header from
Linux kernel.
The following changes were done on top of Bobby's changes:
- atomic##prefix##_*xchg_*(atomic##prefix##_t *v, c_t n) were updated
to use__*xchg_generic()
- drop casts in write_atomic() as they are unnecessary
- drop introduction of WRITE_ONCE() and READ_ONCE().
Xen provides ACCESS_ONCE()
- remove zero-length array access in read_atomic()
- drop defines similar to pattern:
#define atomic_add_return_relaxed atomic_add_return_relaxed
- move not RISC-V specific functions to asm-generic/atomics-ops.h
- drop atomic##prefix##_{cmp}xchg_{release, aquire, release}() as they
are not used in Xen.
- update the defintion of atomic##prefix##_{cmp}xchg according to
{cmp}xchg() implementation in Xen.
- some ATOMIC_OP() macros were updated:
- drop size argument for ATOMIC_OP which defines atomic##prefix##_xchg()
and atomic##prefix##_cmpxchg().
- drop c_op argument for ATOMIC_OPS which defines ATOMIC_OPS(and, and),
ATOMIC_OPS( or, or), ATOMIC_OPS(xor, xor), ATOMIC_OPS(add, add, +),
ATOMIC_OPS(sub, add, -) as c_op is always "+" for them.
- drop "" from definition of __atomic_{acquire/release"}_fence.
The current implementation is the same with 8e86f0b409a4
("arm64: atomics: fix use of acquire + release for full barrier
semantics") [1].
RISC-V could combine acquire and release into the SC
instructions and it could reduce a fence instruction to gain better
performance. Here is related description from RISC-V ISA 10.2
Load-Reserved/Store-Conditional Instructions:
- .aq: The LR/SC sequence can be given acquire semantics by
setting the aq bit on the LR instruction.
- .rl: The LR/SC sequence can be given release semantics by
setting the rl bit on the SC instruction.
- .aqrl: Setting the aq bit on the LR instruction, and setting
both the aq and the rl bit on the SC instruction makes
the LR/SC sequence sequentially consistent, meaning that
it cannot be reordered with earlier or later memory
operations from the same hart.
Software should not set the rl bit on an LR instruction unless
the aq bit is also set, nor should software set the aq bit on an
SC instruction unless the rl bit is also set. LR.rl and SC.aq
instructions are not guaranteed to provide any stronger ordering
than those with both bits clear, but may result in lower
performance.
Also, I way of transforming ".rl + full barrier" to ".aqrl" was approved
by (the author of the RVWMO spec) [2]
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-arm-kernel/patch/1391516953-14541-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/41e01514-74ca-84f2-f5cc-2645c444fd8e@nvidia.com/
Signed-off-by: Bobby Eshleman <bobbyeshleman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The header was taken from Linux kernl 6.4.0-rc1.
Addionally, were updated:
* add emulation of {cmp}xchg for 1/2 byte types using 32-bit atomic
access.
* replace tabs with spaces
* replace __* variale with *__
* introduce generic version of xchg_* and cmpxchg_*.
* drop {cmp}xchg{release,relaxed,acquire} as Xen doesn't use them
* drop barries and use instruction suffixices instead ( .aq, .rl, .aqrl )
Implementation of 4- and 8-byte cases were updated according to the spec:
```
....
Linux Construct RVWMO AMO Mapping
...
atomic <op> amo<op>.{w|d}.aqrl
Linux Construct RVWMO LR/SC Mapping
...
atomic <op> loop: lr.{w|d}.aq; <op>; sc.{w|d}.aqrl; bnez loop
Table A.5: Mappings from Linux memory primitives to RISC-V primitives
```
The current implementation is the same with 8e86f0b409a4
("arm64: atomics: fix use of acquire + release for full barrier
semantics") [1].
RISC-V could combine acquire and release into the SC
instructions and it could reduce a fence instruction to gain better
performance. Here is related description from RISC-V ISA 10.2
Load-Reserved/Store-Conditional Instructions:
- .aq: The LR/SC sequence can be given acquire semantics by
setting the aq bit on the LR instruction.
- .rl: The LR/SC sequence can be given release semantics by
setting the rl bit on the SC instruction.
- .aqrl: Setting the aq bit on the LR instruction, and setting
both the aq and the rl bit on the SC instruction makes
the LR/SC sequence sequentially consistent, meaning that
it cannot be reordered with earlier or later memory
operations from the same hart.
Software should not set the rl bit on an LR instruction unless
the aq bit is also set, nor should software set the aq bit on an
SC instruction unless the rl bit is also set. LR.rl and SC.aq
instructions are not guaranteed to provide any stronger ordering
than those with both bits clear, but may result in lower
performance.
Also, I way of transforming ".rl + full barrier" to ".aqrl" was approved
by (the author of the RVWMO spec) [2]
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-arm-kernel/patch/1391516953-14541-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/41e01514-74ca-84f2-f5cc-2645c444fd8e@nvidia.com/
Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Otherwise it's not possible to call functions described in hvm/vlapic.h from the
inline functions of hvm/hvm.h.
This is because a static inline in vlapic.h depends on hvm.h, and pulls it
transitively through vpt.h. The ultimate cause is having hvm.h included in any
of the "v*.h" headers, so break the cycle moving the guilty inline into hvm.h.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Vallejo <alejandro.vallejo@cloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
It's easier to correlate with the physical memory map if the addresses are
fully printed, instead of using frame numbers.
Requested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This matches the flags of the .livepatch.funcs section when generated using
livepatch-build-tools, which only sets the SHT_ALLOC flag.
Also constify the definitions of the livepatch_func variables in the tests
themselves, in order to better match the resulting output. Note that just
making those variables constant is not enough to force the generated sections
to be read-only.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
MISRA C Rule 20.7 states: "Expressions resulting from the expansion
of macro parameters shall be enclosed in parentheses". Therefore, some
macro definitions should gain additional parentheses to ensure that all
current and future users will be safe with respect to expansions that
can possibly alter the semantics of the passed-in macro parameter.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
MISRA C Rule 20.7 states: "Expressions resulting from the expansion
of macro parameters shall be enclosed in parentheses". Therefore, some
macro definitions should gain additional parentheses to ensure that all
current and future users will be safe with respect to expansions that
can possibly alter the semantics of the passed-in macro parameter.
xlat_malloc_init is touched for consistency, despite the construct
being already deviated.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
MISRA C Rule 20.7 states: "Expressions resulting from the expansion
of macro parameters shall be enclosed in parentheses". Therefore, some
macro definitions should gain additional parentheses to ensure that all
current and future users will be safe with respect to expansions that
can possibly alter the semantics of the passed-in macro parameter.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>