Currently xc_translate_foreign_address() only checks for the PSE bit on
level 2 entries (that's 2 MB pages on x64 and 32-bit with PAE, and 4 MB
pages on 32-bit). But the Linux kernel sometimes uses 1 GB pages. This
patch fixes that, by checking the PSE bit on level 3 entries if the guest
has 4 translation levels (that means 64-bit guests only).
Signed-off-by: Cristian-Bogdan Sirb <csirb@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
which surprisingly (or maybe not) looks like
XEN_SYSCTL_TMEM_OP_SET_POOLS.
This hypercall came about, as explained in docs/misc/tmem-internals.html:
When tmem was first proposed to the linux kernel mailing list
(LKML), there was concern expressed about security of shared ephemeral
pools. The initial tmem implementation only
required a client to provide a 128-bit UUID to identify a shared pool, and the
linux-side tmem implementation obtained this UUID from the superblock of the
shared filesystem (in ocfs2). It was
pointed out on LKML that the UUID was essentially a security key and any
malicious domain that guessed it would have access to any data from the shared
filesystem that found its way into tmem.
..
As a result, a Xen boot option -- tmem_shared_auth; -- was
added. The option defaults to disabled,
but when it is enabled, management tools must explicitly authenticate (or may
explicitly deny) shared pool access to any client.
On Xen, this is done with the xm tmem-shared-auth command.
"
However the implementation has some rather large holes:
a) The hypercall was accessed from any guest.
b) If the ->domain id value is 0xFFFF then one can toggle the
tmem_global.shared_auth knob on/off. That with a)
made it pretty bad.
c) If one toggles the tmem_global.shared_auth off, then the
'tmem_shared_auth=1' bootup parameter is ignored and
one can join any shared pool (if UUID is known)!
d) If the 'tmem_shared_auth=1' and tmem_global.shared_auth is
set to 1, then one can only join an shared pool if the
UUID has been set by 'xl tmem-shared-auth'. Otherwise
the joining of a pool fails and a non-shared pool is
created (without errors to guest). Not exactly sure if
the shared pool creation at that point should error out
or not.
e) If a guest is migrated, the policy values (which UUID
can be shared, whether tmem_global.shared_auth is set, etc)
are completely ignored.
This patch only fixes a) and only allows the hypercall to
be called by the control domain. Subsequent patches will
fix the remaining issues.
We also have to call client_create as the guest at this
point may not have done any tmem hypercalls - and hence
the '->tmem' from 'struct domain' is still NULL. Us calling
client_create fixes this.
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> [libxc changes]
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> [hypervisor changes]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
c/s 4045953 "x86/paging: Enforce PG_external == PG_translate == PG_refcounts"
in the hypervisor finally prevented the construction of PV autotranslate
guests.
Remove support for such guests in the domain builder, bailing out with an
obvious "no longer supported" message, rather than a more obscure
"SHADOW_OP_ENABLED failed".
As a piece of cleanup, rename xc_dom_feature_translated() to
xc_dom_translated() to match its actual semantics.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
It's useful for an introspection tool to be able to inspect
XSAVE states. Xen already has a DOMCTL that can be used for this
purpose, but it had no public libxc wrapper. This patch adds
xc_vcpu_get_extstate().
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This patch extracts all functions resulting in a dm_op hypercall from
libxenctrl and moves them into libxendevicemodel. It also adds a compat
layer into libxenctrl, which can be selected by defining
XC_WANT_COMPAT_DEVICEMODEL_API to 1 before including xenctrl.h.
With this patch the core of libxendevicemodel still uses libxencall to
issue the dm_op hypercalls, but this is done by calling through code that
can be modified on a per-OS basis. A subsequent patch will add a Linux-
specific variant.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Callers to xc_cpupool_create() can either request a specific pool id,
or request that Xen do it for them. But at the moment, the
"automatic" selection is indicated by using a magic value, 0. This is
undesirable both because it doesn't obviously have meaning, but also
because '0' is a valid cpupool (albeit one which at the moment can't
be changed).
Introduce a constant, XC_CPUPOOL_POOLID_ANY, to indicate this instead.
Have it be the default for the python bindings.
Manually translate it, even though it's the same underlying value,
because we don't yet have a relaible way of enforcing that these
values are the same.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
When the toolstack modifies memory of a running ARM VM it may happen
that the underlying memory of a current vCPU PC is changed. Without
flushing the icache the vCPU may continue executing stale instructions.
Also expose the xc_domain_cacheflush through xenctrl.h.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
NOTE: This patch also modifies the types of the 'vector', 'type' and
'insn_len' arguments of xc_hvm_inject_trap() from uint32_t to
uint8_t. In practice the values passed were always truncated to
8 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This patch removes the need for handling HVMOP restarts, so that
infrastructure is removed.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' argument of
xc_hvm_set_mem_type() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice the
value passed was always truncated to 32 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This patch introduces code to handle DMOP continuations.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' argument of
xc_hvm_modified_memory() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice the
value passed was always truncated to 32 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
... HVMOP_set_pci_link_route
These HVMOPs were exposed to guests so their definitions need to be
preserved for compatibility. This patch therefore updates
__XEN_LATEST_INTERFACE_VERSION__ to 0x00040900 and makes the HVMOP
defintions conditional on __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ less than that value.
NOTE: This patch also widens the 'domain' parameter of
xc_hvm_set_pci_intx_level() from a uint8_t to a uint16_t.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The handle type passed to the underlying shadow and hap functions is
changed for compatibility with the new hypercall buffer.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' parameter of
xc_hvm_track_dirty_vram() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice
the value passed was always truncated to 32 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
...as a set of hypercalls to be used by a device model.
As stated in the new docs/designs/dm_op.markdown:
"The aim of DMOP is to prevent a compromised device model from
compromising domains other then the one it is associated with. (And is
therefore likely already compromised)."
See that file for further information.
This patch simply adds the boilerplate for the hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Jennifer Herbert <jennifer.herbert@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The tools that use kexec are asynchronous in nature and do not keep
state changes. As such provide an hypercall to find out whether an
image has been loaded for either type.
Note: No need to modify XSM as it has one size fits all check and
does not check for subcommands.
Note: No need to check KEXEC_FLAG_IN_PROGRESS (and error out of
kexec_status()) as this flag is set only once by the first/only
cpu on the crash path.
Note: This is just the Xen side of the hypercall, kexec-tools patch
to come separately.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The hypervisor expects the timeout from the hypercall to be in
nanoseconds, so document this correctly. Also correctly document
what happens when timeout is set to zero.
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
That is what they are used for. Lets make it more clear.
Of all the various sub-commands, the only one that needed
semantic change is XEN_SYSCTL_TMEM_OP_SAVE_BEGIN. That in the
past used 'arg1', and now we are moving it to use 'arg'.
Since that code is only used during migration which is tied
to the toolstack it is OK to change it.
We should increment the XEN_SYSCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION because
of this, and that was fortunatly done in the patch titled:
"tmem/libxc: Squash XEN_SYSCTL_TMEM_OP_[SET|SAVE].."
While at it, also fix xc_tmem_control_oid to properly handle
the 'buf' and bounce it as appropiate.
Acked-by: Andrew cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The ARM SMC instructions are already configured to trap to Xen by default. In
this patch we allow a user-space process in a privileged domain to receive
notification of when such event happens through the vm_event subsystem by
introducing the PRIVILEGED_CALL type.
The intended use-case for this feature is for a monitor application to be able
insert tap-points into the domU kernel-code. For this task only unconditional
SMC instruction should be used.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
The main purpose of the patch is to provide the xen-libxc
plumbing necessary to be able to change the value of the
ratelimit_us parameter online, for Credit2 (like it is
already for Credit1).
While there:
- mention in the Xen logs when rate limiting was enables
and is being disabled (and vice-versa);
- fix csched2_sys_cntl() which was always returning
-EINVAL in the XEN_SYSCTL_SCHEDOP_putinfo case.
And also:
- fix style of an if in csched_sys_cntl();
- fix the style of the switch in csched2_sys_cntl();
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Provide ability to load multiple ACPI modules. Thie feature is needed
by PVHv2 guests and will be used in subsequent patches.
We assume that PVHv2 guests do not load their ACPI modules specified
in the configuration file. We can extend support for that in the future
if desired.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
... and load BIOS/UEFI firmware into guest memory.
This adds a new firmware module, system_firmware_module. It is loaded in
the guest memory and final location is provided to hvmloader via the
hvm_start_info struct.
This patch create the hvm_start_info struct for HVM guest that have a
device model, so this is now common code with HVM guest without device
model.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Instead of having several representation of hvm_start_info in C, define
it in public/arch-x86/hvm/start_info.h so both libxc and hvmloader can
use it.
Also move the comment describing the binary format to be alongside the
C struct.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Currently mem-sharing can be performed on a page-by-page basis from the control
domain. However, this process is quite wasteful when a range of pages have to
be deduplicated.
This patch introduces a new mem_sharing memop for range sharing where
the user doesn't have to separately nominate each page in both the source and
destination domain, and the looping over all pages happen in the hypervisor.
This significantly reduces the overhead of sharing a range of memory.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This allows a toolstack to identify whether a running domain is using hardware
assisted paging or not.
The appropriate tests differ by architecture, so introduce
arch_get_domain_info(). ARM unconditionally sets the new flag, while x86
checks with the paging subsystem first.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Since in-guest debug exceptions are now unconditionally trapped to Xen, adding
a hook for vm_event subscribers to tap into this new always-on guest event. We
rename along the way hvm_event_breakpoint_type to hvm_event_type to better
match the various events that can be passed with it. We also introduce the
necessary monitor_op domctl's to enable subscribing to the events.
This patch also provides monitor subscribers to int3 events proper access
to the instruction length necessary for accurate event-reinjection. Without
this subscribers manually have to evaluate if the int3 instruction has any
prefix attached which would change the instruction length.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Previously, subscribing to MSR write events was an all-or-none
approach, with special cases for introspection MSR-s. This patch
allows the vm_event consumer to specify exactly what MSR-s it is
interested in, and as a side-effect gets rid of the
vmx_introspection_force_enabled_msrs[] special case.
The patch also introduces arch_monitor_init_domain() and
arch_monitor_cleanup_domain(), to do monitor-specific work
(as opposed to the previous way of doing all the setup in
vm_event_init_domain() / vm_event_cleanup_domain()).
This replaces the previously posted "xen: Filter out MSR write
events" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Specifically:
s/\.xsplice/\.livepatch/
s/XSPLICE/LIVEPATCH/
s/xsplice/livepatch/
s/livepatch_patch_func/livepatch_func/
s/xSplice/Xen Live Patch/
s/livepatching/livepatch/
s/arch_livepatch_enter/arch_livepatch_quiesce/
s/arch_livepatch_exit/arch_livepatch_revive/
And then modify some of the function arguments
to have two more characters.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The underlaying toolstack code to do the basic
operations when using the XEN_XSPLICE_op syscalls:
- upload the payload,
- get status of an payload,
- list all the payloads,
- apply, check, replace, and revert the payload.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
At the moment the only consumer of this structure is x86, but other arches
might also use it, so make all the fields 64bits. On x86 Xen will still try
to place everything below the 4GiB boundary, but that might not be feasible
in other arches.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Later changes (Patch titled "tools/libxc: Use featuresets rather than
guesswork") will cause the cpuid generation logic to seed their
information from a featureset. This patch adds the infrastructure to
specify a featureset, and will obtain the appropriate defaults from Xen
if omitted.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This reverts commit 1aee836fe2.
This patch was nacked after commit. Jan writes:
And already applied as I see. I think rushing things in like this is
not a solution, no matter that we want to freeze the tree today.
Changes like this should be free to go in as de-facto bug fixes
after the freeze date.
At the moment the only consumer of this structure is x86, but other arches
might also use it, so make all the fields 64bits. On x86 Xen will still try
to place everything below the 4GiB boundary, but that might not be feasible
in other arches.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
a. call callbacks resume/checkpoint/suspend while secondary vm
status is consistent with primary
b. send dirty pfn list to primary when checkpoint under colo
c. send store gfn and console gfn to xl before resuming secondary vm
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <hongyang.yang@easystack.cn>
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Changlong Xie <xiecl.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
We will do the following things again and again:
1. Suspend primary vm
a. Suspend primary vm
b. do postsuspend
c. Read CHECKPOINT_SVM_SUSPENDED sent by secondary
2. Checkpoint
a. Write emulator xenstore data and emulator context
b. Write checkpoint end record
3. Resume primary vm
a. Read CHECKPOINT_SVM_READY from slave
b. Do presume
c. Resume primary vm
d. Read CHECKPOINT_SVM_RESUMED from slave
4. Wait a new checkpoint
a. Wait a new checkpoint(not implemented)
b. Send CHECKPOINT_NEW to slave
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <hongyang.yang@easystack.cn>
Signed-off-by: Changlong Xie <xiecl.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Secondary vm is running in colo mode. So we will do
the following things again and again:
1. Resume secondary vm
a. Send CHECKPOINT_SVM_READY to master.
b. If it is not the first resume, call libxl__checkpoint_devices_preresume().
c. If it is the first resume(resume right after live migration),
- call libxl__xc_domain_restore_done() to build the secondary vm.
- enable secondary vm's logdirty.
- call libxl__domain_resume() to resume secondary vm.
- call libxl__checkpoint_devices_setup() to setup checkpoint devices.
d. Send CHECKPOINT_SVM_RESUMED to master.
2. Wait a new checkpoint
a. Call libxl__checkpoint_devices_commit().
b. Read CHECKPOINT_NEW from master.
3. Suspend secondary vm
a. Suspend secondary vm.
b. Call libxl__checkpoint_devices_postsuspend().
c. Send CHECKPOINT_SVM_SUSPENDED to master.
4. Checkpoint
a. Read emulator xenstore data and emulator context
b. REC_TYPE_CHECKPOINT_END
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <hongyang.yang@easystack.cn>
Signed-off-by: Changlong Xie <xiecl.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
In COLO mode, both VMs are running, and are considered in sync if the
visible network traffic is identical. After some time, they fall out of
sync.
At this point, the two VMs have definitely diverged. Lets call the
primary dirty bitmap set A, while the secondary dirty bitmap set B.
Sets A and B are different.
Under normal migration, the page data for set A will be sent from the
primary to the secondary.
However, the set difference B - A (the one in B but not in A, lets
call this C) is out-of-date on the secondary (with respect to the
primary) and will not be sent by the primary (to secondary), as it
was not memory dirtied by the primary. The secondary needs C page data
to reconstruct an exact copy of the primary at the checkpoint.
The secondary cannot calculate C as it doesn't know A. Instead, the
secondary must send B to the primary, at which point the primary
calculates the union of A and B (lets call this D) which is all the
pages dirtied by both the primary and the secondary, and sends all page
data covered by D.
In the general case, D is a superset of both A and B. Without the
backchannel dirty bitmap, a COLO checkpoint can't reconstruct a valid
copy of the primary.
We transfer the dirty bitmap on libxc side, so we need to introduce back
channel to libxc.
Note: it is different from the paper. We change the original design to
the current one, according to our following concerns:
1. The original design needs extra memory on Secondary host. When there's
multiple backups on one host, the memory cost is high.
2. The memory cache code will be another 1k+, it will make the review
more time consuming.
Note: this patch merely adds new parameters to various prototypes and
functions. The new parameters are used in later patch called
"libxc/restore: send dirty pfn list to primary when checkpoint under
COLO".
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <hongyang.yang@easystack.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Changlong Xie <xiecl.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Commit d275ec9c introduce ssize_t but not include relevant header,
it will cause compile errors just like below:
./include/xenctrl.h:1485: error: expected '=', ',', ';', 'asm' or
'__attribute__' before 'xc_version_len'
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Changlong Xie <xiecl.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
We change the xen_version libxc code to use the new hypercall.
Which of course means every user in the code base has to
be changed over.
It is important to note that the xc_version_op has a different
return semantic than the previous one. It returns negative
values on error (like the old one), but it also returns
an positive value on success (unlike the old one). The positive
value is the number of bytes copied in.
Note that both Ocaml and xenstat use tabs instead of four
spaces so they look quite odd.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> [for the Ocaml stubs]
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> [xenctx bits]
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
xc_domain_save() and xc_domain_restore's parameter will use this type,
so it should be public.
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cristian-Bogdan Sirb
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Andrew Cooper
Roger Pau Monne
Razvan Cojocaru
Paul Durrant
George Dunlap
Tamas K Lengyel
Eric DeVolder
Ross Lagerwall
Dario Faggioli
Boris Ostrovsky
Anthony PERARD
Juergen Gross
Tamas K Lengyel
Ian Jackson
Chong Li
Wei Liu
Olaf Hering
Wen Congyang
Changlong Xie