e820.c: In function ‘clip_to_limit’:
.../xen/include/asm/string.h:10:26: error: ‘__builtin_memmove’ offset [-16, -36] is out of the bounds [0, 20484] of object ‘e820’ with type ‘struct e820map’ [-Werror=array-bounds]
10 | #define memmove(d, s, n) __builtin_memmove(d, s, n)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
e820.c:404:13: note: in expansion of macro ‘memmove’
404 | memmove(&e820.map[i], &e820.map[i+1],
| ^~~~~~~
e820.c:36:16: note: ‘e820’ declared here
36 | struct e820map e820;
| ^~~~
While I can't see where the negative offsets would come from, converting
the loop index to unsigned type helps. Take the opportunity and also
convert several other local variables and copy_e820_map()'s second
parameter to unsigned int (and bool in one case).
Reported-by: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 22e2f8dddf
master date: 2019-03-18 11:38:36 +0100
dom0_construct_pv() has logic to transition dom0 into a compat domain when
booting an ELF32 image.
One aspect which is missing is the CPUID policy recalculation, meaning that a
32bit dom0 sees a 64bit policy, which differ by the Long Mode feature flag in
particular. Another missing item is the x87_fip_width initialisation.
Update dom0_construct_pv() to use switch_compat(), rather than retaining the
opencoding. Position the call to switch_compat() such that the compat32 local
variable can disappear entirely.
The 32bit monitor table is now created by setup_compat_l4(), avoiding the need
to for manual creation later.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 356f437171
master date: 2019-03-15 14:59:27 +0000
The CPUID bit and MSR are deliberately not exposed to guests, because they
won't exist on newer processors. As vPMU isn't security supported, the
misbehaviour of PCR3 isn't expected to impact production deployments.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 6be613f29b
master date: 2019-03-12 17:05:21 +0000
iremap_maddr and qinval_maddr point to the base of a block of contiguous RAM,
allocated by the driver, holding the Interrupt Remapping table, and the Queued
Invalidation ring.
Despite their name, they are actually the values of the hardware register,
including control metadata in the lower 12 bits. While uses of these fields
do appear to correctly shift out the metadata, this is very subtle behaviour
and confusing to follow.
Nothing uses the metadata, so make the fields actually point at the base of
the relevant tables.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: a9a05aeee1
master date: 2019-03-12 13:57:13 +0000
Commit 35a61c05ea ("x86emul: adjust handling of AVX2 gathers") builds
upon the fact that the domain will actually survive running out of MMIO
result buffer space. Drop the domain_crash() invocation. Also delay
incrementing of the usage counter, such that the function can't possibly
use/return an out-of-bounds slot/pointer in case execution subsequently
makes it into the function again without a prior reset of state.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
master commit: a43c1dec24
master date: 2019-03-12 14:39:46 +0100
It's unsafe to disable IOMMU on a live system which is the case
if we're crashing since remapping hardware doesn't usually know what
to do with ongoing bus transactions and frequently raises NMI/MCE/SMI,
etc. (depends on the firmware configuration) to signal these abnormalities.
This, in turn, doesn't play well with kexec transition process as there is
no handling available at the moment for this kind of events resulting
in failures to enter the kernel.
Modern Linux kernels taught to copy all the necessary DMAR/IR tables
following kexec from the previous kernel (Xen in our case) - so it's
currently normal to keep IOMMU enabled. It might require minor changes to
kdump command line that enables IOMMU drivers (e.g. intel_iommu=on /
intremap=on) but recent kernels don't require any additional changes for
the transition to be transparent.
A fallback option is still left for compatibility with ancient crash
kernels which didn't like to have IOMMU active under their feet on boot.
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 12c36f577d
master date: 2019-03-12 14:38:12 +0100
Modifications to an altp2m mark the p2m as needing flushing, but this was
never wired up in the return-to-guest path. As a result, stale TLB entries
can remain after resuming the guest.
In practice, this manifests as a missing EPT_VIOLATION or #VE exception when
the guest subsequently accesses a page which has had its permissions reduced.
vmx_vmenter_helper() now has 11 p2ms to potentially invalidate, but issuing 11
INVEPT instructions isn't clever. Instead, count how many contexts need
invalidating, and use INVEPT_ALL_CONTEXT if two or more are in need of
flushing.
This doesn't have an XSA because altp2m is not yet a security-supported
feature.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 69f7643df6
master date: 2019-02-28 11:16:27 +0000
Since we can't seem to be able to settle our discussion for the wider
adjustment previously posted, let's at least add the missing dependency
for 4.12. I'm not convinced though that attaching it to SSE is correct.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: eeb31ee522
master date: 2019-03-05 18:04:23 +0100
With "pcid=no-xpti" and opposite XPTI settings in two 64-bit PV domains
(achievable with one of "xpti=no-dom0" or "xpti=no-domu"), switching
from a PCID-disabled to a PCID-enabled 64-bit PV domain fails to set
CR4.PCIDE in time, as CR4.PGE would not be set in either (see
pv_fixup_guest_cr4(), in particular as used by write_ptbase()), and
hence the early CR4 write would be skipped.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: fdc2056767
master date: 2019-03-05 17:02:36 +0100
These were missed as a consequence of being rebased over other cmdline
cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
[ This is two commits from master aka staging-4.12: ]
OVMF has become dependent on OpenSSL, which is included as a
submodule. Initialise submodules before building.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit b16281870e)
tools: only call git when necessary in OVMF Makefile
Users may choose to export a snapshot of OVMF and build it
with xen.git supplied ovmf-makefile. In that case we don't
need to call `git submodule`.
Fixes b16281870e.
Reported-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 68292c94a6)
(cherry picked from commit e983e8ae84)
The memory operand is an in/out one, and the auxiliary register gets
written to early.
Take the opportunity and also drop the redundant cast (the inline
functions' parameters are already of the casted-to type).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 51ceb1623b)
For shadow mode guests (e.g. PV ones forced into that mode as L1TF
mitigation, or during migration) update_cr3() -> sh_update_cr3() may
result in a change to the (shadow) root page table (compared to the
previous one when running the same vCPU with the same PCID). This can,
first and foremost, be a result of memory pressure on the shadow memory
pool of the domain. Shadow code legitimately relies on the original
(prior to commit 5c81d260c2 ["xen/x86: use PCID feature"]) behavior of
the subsequent CR3 write to flush the TLB of entries still left from
walks with an earlier, different (shadow) root page table.
Restore the flushing behavior, also for the second CR3 write on the exit
path to guest context when XPTI is active. For the moment accept that
this will introduce more flushes than are strictly necessary - no flush
would be needed when the (shadow) root page table doesn't actually
change, but this information isn't readily (i.e. without introducing a
layering violation) available here.
This is XSA-294.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 329b00e4d4
master date: 2019-03-05 13:54:42 +0100
Currently, a 64bit PV guest can appear to set and clear FSGSBASE in %cr4, but
the bit remains set in hardware. Therefore, the {RD,WR}{FS,GS}BASE are usable
even when the guest kernel believes that they are disabled.
The FSGSBASE feature isn't currently supported in Linux, and its context
switch path has some optimisations which rely on userspace being unable to use
the WR{FS,GS}BASE instructions. Xen's current behaviour undermines this
expectation.
In 64bit PV guest context, always load the guest kernels setting of FSGSBASE
into %cr4. This requires adjusting how Xen uses the {RD,WR}{FS,GS}BASE
instructions.
* Delete the cpu_has_fsgsbase helper. It is no longer safe, as users need to
check %cr4 directly.
* The raw __rd{fs,gs}base() helpers are only safe to use when %cr4.fsgsbase
is set. Comment this property.
* The {rd,wr}{fs,gs}{base,shadow}() and read_msr() helpers are updated to use
the current %cr4 value to determine which mechanism to use.
* toggle_guest_mode() and save_segments() are update to avoid reading
fs/gsbase if the values in hardware cannot be stale WRT struct vcpu. A
consequence of this is that the write_cr() path needs to cache the current
bases, as subsequent context switches will skip saving the values.
* write_cr4() is updated to ensure that the shadow %cr4.fsgsbase value is
observed in a safe way WRT the hardware setting, if an interrupt happens to
hit in the middle.
* load_segments() is updated to use the VMLOAD optimisation if FSGSBASE is
unavailable, even if only gs_shadow needs updating. As a minor perf
improvement, check cpu_has_svm first to short circuit a context-dependent
conditional on Intel hardware.
* pv_make_cr4() is updated for 64bit PV guests to use the guest kernels
choice of FSGSBASE.
This is part of XSA-293.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: eccc170053
master date: 2019-03-05 13:54:05 +0100
The PV cr4 logic is almost impossible to follow, and leaks bits into guest
context which definitely shouldn't be visible (in particular, VMXE).
The biggest problem however, and source of the complexity, is that it derives
new real and guest cr4 values from the current value in hardware - this is
context dependent and an inappropriate source of information.
Rewrite the cr4 logic to be invariant of the current value in hardware.
First of all, modify write_ptbase() to always use mmu_cr4_features for IDLE
and HVM contexts. mmu_cr4_features *is* the correct value to use, and makes
the ASSERT() obviously redundant.
For PV guests, curr->arch.pv.ctrlreg[4] remains the guests view of cr4, but
all logic gets reworked in terms of this and mmu_cr4_features only.
Two masks are introduced; bits which the guest has control over, and bits
which are forwarded from Xen's settings. One guest-visible change here is
that Xen's VMXE setting is no longer visible at all.
pv_make_cr4() follows fairly closely from pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4(), but
deliberately starts with mmu_cr4_features, and only alters the minimal subset
of bits.
The boot-time {compat_,}pv_cr4_mask variables are removed, as they are a
remnant of the pre-CPUID policy days. pv_fixup_guest_cr4() gains a related
derivation from the policy.
Another guest visible change here is that a 32bit PV guest can now flip
FSGSBASE in its view of CR4. While the {RD,WR}{FS,GS}BASE instructions are
unusable outside of a 64bit code segment, the ability to modify FSGSBASE
matches real hardware behaviour, and avoids the need for any 32bit/64bit
differences in the logic.
Overall, this patch shouldn't have a practical change in guest behaviour.
VMXE will disappear from view, and an inquisitive 32bit kernel can now see
FSGSBASE changing, but this new logic is otherwise bug-compatible with before.
This is part of XSA-293.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: b2dd00574a
master date: 2019-03-05 13:53:32 +0100
The CR3 values used for contexts run with PCID enabled uniformly have
CR3.NOFLUSH set, resulting in the CR3 write itself to not cause any
flushing at all. When the second CR4 write is skipped or doesn't do any
flushing, there's nothing so far which would purge TLB entries which may
have accumulated again if the PCID doesn't change; the "just in case"
flush only affects the case where the PCID actually changes. (There may
be particularly many TLB entries re-accumulated in case of a watchdog
NMI kicking in during the critical time window.)
Suppress the no-flush behavior of the CR3 write in this particular case.
Similarly the second CR4 write may not cause any flushing of TLB entries
established again while the original PCID was still in use - it may get
performed because of unrelated bits changing. The flush of the old PCID
needs to happen nevertheless.
At the same time also eliminate a possible race with lazy context
switch: Just like for CR4, CR3 may change at any time while interrupts
are enabled, due to the __sync_local_execstate() invocation from the
flush IPI handler. It is for that reason that the CR3 read, just like
the CR4 one, must happen only after interrupts have been turned off.
This is XSA-292.
Reported-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
master commit: 6e5f22ba43
master date: 2019-03-05 13:52:44 +0100
The IOMMU update in _get_page_type() happens between recording of the
new reference and validation of the page for its new type (if
necessary). If the IOMMU operation fails, there's no point in actually
carrying out validation. Furthermore, with this resulting in failure
getting indicated to the caller, the recorded type reference also needs
to be dropped again.
Note that in case of failure of alloc_page_type() there's no need to
undo the IOMMU operation: Only special types get handed to the function.
The function, upon failure, clears ->u.inuse.type_info, effectively
converting the page to PGT_none. The IOMMU mapping, however, solely
depends on whether the type is PGT_writable_page.
This is XSA-291.
Reported-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: fad0de9862
master date: 2019-03-05 13:52:15 +0100
When recursive page tables are used at the L3 level, unvalidation of a
single L4 table may incur unvalidation of two levels of L3 tables, i.e.
a maximum iteration count of 512^3 for unvalidating an L4 table. The
preemption check in free_l2_table() as well as the one in
_put_page_type() may never be reached, so explicit checking is needed in
free_l3_table().
When recursive page tables are used at the L4 level, the iteration count
at L4 alone is capped at 512^2. As soon as a present L3 entry is hit
which itself needs unvalidation (and hence requiring another nested loop
with 512 iterations), the preemption checks added here kick in, so no
further preemption checking is needed at L4 (until we decide to permit
5-level paging for PV guests).
The validation side additions are done just for symmetry.
This is part of XSA-290.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: bac4567a67
master date: 2019-03-05 13:51:46 +0100
Commit c612481d1c ("x86/mm: Plumbing to allow any PTE update to fail
with -ERESTART") added assertions next to the {alloc,free}_l2_table()
invocations to document (and validate in debug builds) that L2
(un)validations are always preemptible.
The assertion in free_page_type() was now observed to trigger when
recursive L2 page tables get cleaned up.
In particular put_page_from_l2e()'s assumption that _put_page_type()
would always succeed is now wrong, resulting in a partially un-validated
page left in a domain, which has no other means of getting cleaned up
later on. If not causing any problems earlier, this would ultimately
trigger the check for ->u.inuse.type_info having a zero count when
freeing the page during cleanup after the domain has died.
As a result it should be considered a mistake to not have extended
preemption fully to L2 when it was added to L3/L4 table handling, which
this change aims to correct.
The validation side additions are done just for symmetry.
This is part of XSA-290.
Reported-by: Manuel Bouyer <bouyer@antioche.eu.org>
Tested-by: Manuel Bouyer <bouyer@antioche.eu.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 176ebf9c8b
master date: 2019-03-05 13:51:18 +0100
In order for a PV domain to set up DMA from a passed-through device to
one of its pages, the page must be mapped in the IOMMU. On the other
hand, before a PV page may be used as a "special" page type (such as a
pagetable or descriptor table), it _must not_ be writable in the IOMMU
(otherwise a malicious guest could DMA arbitrary page tables into the
memory, bypassing Xen's safety checks); and Xen's current rule is to
have such pages not in the IOMMU at all.
At the moment, in order to accomplish this, the code borrows HVM
domain's "physmap" concept: When a page is assigned to a guest,
guess_physmap_add_entry() is called, which for PV guests, will create
a writable IOMMU mapping; and when a page is removed,
guest_physmap_remove_entry() is called, which will remove the mapping.
Additionally, when a page gains the PGT_writable page type, the page
will be added into the IOMMU; and when the page changes away from a
PGT_writable type, the page will be removed from the IOMMU.
Unfortunately, borrowing the "physmap" concept from HVM domains is
problematic. HVM domains have a lock on their p2m tables, ensuring
synchronization between modifications to the p2m; and all hypercall
parameters must first be translated through the p2m before being used.
Trying to mix this locked-and-gated approach with PV's lock-free
approach leads to several races and inconsistencies:
* A race between a page being assigned and it being put into the
physmap; for example:
- P1: call populate_physmap() { A = allocate_domheap_pages() }
- P2: Guess page A's mfn, and call decrease_reservation(A). A is owned by the domain,
and so Xen will clear the PGC_allocated bit and free the page
- P1: finishes populate_physmap() { guest_physmap_add_entry() }
Now the domain has a writable IOMMU mapping to a page it no longer owns.
* Pages start out as type PGT_none, but with a writable IOMMU mapping.
If a guest uses a page as a page table without ever having created a
writable mapping, the IOMMU mapping will not be removed; the guest
will have a writable IOMMU mapping to a page it is currently using
as a page table.
* A newly-allocated page can be DMA'd into with no special actions on
the part of the guest; However, if a page is promoted to a
non-writable type, the page must be mapped with a writable type before
DMA'ing to it again, or the transaction will fail.
To fix this, do away with the "PV physmap" concept entirely, and
replace it with the following IOMMU discipline for PV guests:
- (type == PGT_writable) <=> in iommu (even if type_count == 0)
- Upon a final put_page(), check to see if type is PGT_writable; if so,
iommu_unmap.
In order to achieve that:
- Remove PV IOMMU related code from guest_physmap_*
- Repurpose cleanup_page_cacheattr() into a general
cleanup_page_mappings() function, which will both fix up Xen
mappings for pages with special cache attributes, and also check for
a PGT_writable type and remove pages if appropriate.
- For compatibility with current guests, grab-and-release a
PGT_writable_page type for PV guests in guest_physmap_add_entry().
This will cause most "normal" guest pages to start out life with
PGT_writable_page type (and thus an IOMMU mapping), but no type
count (so that they can be used as special cases at will).
Also, note that there is one exception to to the "PGT_writable => in
iommu" rule: xenheap pages shared with guests may be given a
PGT_writable type with one type reference. This reference prevents
the type from changing, which in turn prevents page from gaining an
IOMMU mapping in get_page_type(). It's not clear whether this was
intentional or not, but it's not something to change in a security
update.
This is XSA-288.
Reported-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: fe21b78ef9
master date: 2019-03-05 13:48:32 +0100
The original rules for `struct page` required the following invariants
at all times:
- refcount > 0 implies owner != NULL
- PGC_allocated implies refcount > 0
steal_page, in a misguided attempt to protect against unknown races,
violates both of these rules, thus introducing other races:
- Temporarily, the count_info has the refcount go to 0 while
PGC_allocated is set
- It explicitly returns the page PGC_allocated set, but owner == NULL
and page not on the page_list.
The second one meant that page_get_owner_and_reference() could return
NULL even after having successfully grabbed a reference on the page,
leading the caller to leak the reference (since "couldn't get ref" and
"got ref but no owner" look the same).
Furthermore, rather than grabbing a page reference to ensure that the
owner doesn't change under its feet, it appears to rely on holding
d->page_alloc lock to prevent this.
Unfortunately, this is ineffective: page->owner remains non-NULL for
some time after the count has been set to 0; meaning that it would be
entirely possible for the page to be freed and re-allocated to a
different domain between the page_get_owner() check and the count_info
check.
Modify steal_page to instead follow the appropriate access discipline,
taking the page through series of states similar to being freed and
then re-allocated with MEMF_no_owner:
- Grab an extra reference to make sure we don't race with anyone else
freeing the page
- Drop both references and PGC_allocated atomically, so that (if
successful), anyone else trying to grab a reference will fail
- Attempt to reset Xen's mappings
- Reset the rest of the state.
Then, modify the two callers appropriately:
- Leave count_info alone (it's already been cleared)
- Call free_domheap_page() directly if appropriate
- Call assign_pages() rather than open-coding a partial assign
With all callers to assign_pages() now passing in pages with the
type_info field clear, tighten the respective assertion there.
This is XSA-287.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 3d4868a481
master date: 2019-03-05 13:48:08 +0100
When arch_iommu_populate_page_table() gets invoked for an already
running guest, simply looking at page types once isn't enough, as they
may change at any time. Add logic to re-check the type after having
mapped the page, unmapping it again if needed.
This is XSA-285.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tentatively-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 1f0b0bb777
master date: 2019-03-05 13:47:36 +0100
Commit 5cc77f9098 ("32-on-64: Fix domain address-size clamping,
implement"), which introduced this functionality, took care of clearing
the old page's PGC_allocated, but failed to set the bit (and install the
associated reference) on the newly allocated one. Furthermore the "mfn"
local variable was never updated, and hence the wrong MFN was passed to
guest_physmap_add_page() (and back to the destination domain) in this
case, leading to an IOMMU mapping into an unowned page.
Ideally the code would use assign_pages(), but the call to
gnttab_prepare_for_transfer() sits in the middle of the actions
mirroring that function.
This is XSA-284.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 6d4f36c3fe
master date: 2019-03-05 13:45:58 +0100
In case of soft reset the gnttab limit setting will fail, so omit it.
Setting of max vcpu count is pointless in this case, too, so we can
drop that as well.
Without this patch soft reset will fail with:
libxl: error: libxl_dom.c:363:libxl__build_pre: Couldn't set grant table limits
Reported-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit dd492b8f64)
Before the cpuid_policy logic came along, %cr4/EFER auditing on migrate-in was
complicated, because at that point no CPUID information had been set for the
guest. Auditing against the host CPUID was better than nothing, but not
ideal.
Similarly at the time, PVHv1 lacked the "CPUID passed through from hardware"
behaviour with PV guests had, and PVH dom0 had to be special-cased to be able
to boot.
Order of information in the migration stream is still an issue (hence we still
need to keep the restore parameter to cope with a nested virt corner case for
%cr4), but since Xen 4.9, all domains start with a suitable CPUID policy,
which is a more appropriate upper bound than host_cpuid_policy.
Finally, reposition the UMIP logic as it is the only row out of order.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
master commit: 9d8c1d1814
master date: 2019-01-29 11:28:11 +0000
The increased number of messages (spec_ctrl.c:print_details()) within a
certain time window made me notice some slowness of boot time screen
output. Experimentally I've narrowed the time window to be from
immediately after the early ucode update on the BSP to the PAT write in
cpu_init(), which upon further investigation has an effect because of
the full TLB flush that's implied by that write.
For that reason, as a workaround, flush the TLB of the mapping of the
page that holds the blob. Note that flushing just a single page is
sufficient: As per verify_patch_size() patch size can't exceed 4k, and
the way xmalloc() works the blob can't be crossing a page boundary.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@amd.com>
master commit: f19a199281
master date: 2019-01-28 17:40:39 +0100
When the command line parsing was updated to use const strings and no longer
tokenise with NUL characters, string matches could no longer be made with
strcmp().
Unfortunately, the replacement was buggy. strncmp(s, "opt", ss - s) matches
"o", "op" and "opt" on the command line, as ss - s may be shorter than the
passed literal. Furthermore, parse_bool() is affected by this, so substrings
such as "d", "e" and "o" are considered valid, with the latter being ambiguous
between "on" and "off".
Introduce a new strcmp-like function for the task, which looks for exact
string matches, but declares success when the NUL of the literal matches a
comma, colon or semicolon in the command line fragment.
No change to the intended parsing functionality, but fixes cases where a
partial string on the command line will inadvertently trigger options.
A few areas were more than just a trivial change:
* parse_irq_vector_map_param() gained some style corrections.
* parse_vpmu_params() was rewritten to use the normal list-of-options form,
rather than just fixing up parse_vpmu_param() and leaving the parsing being
hard to follow.
* Instead of making the trivial fix of adding an explicit length check in
parse_bool(), use the length to select which token to we search for, which
is more efficient than the previous linear search over all possible tokens.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
master commit: 2ddf7e3e34
master date: 2019-01-15 12:58:34 +0000
Currently dma_bitsize is zero by default on single NUMA node machines.
This makes all alloc_domheap_pages() calls with MEMF_no_dma return NULL.
There is only 1 user of MEMF_no_dma: dom0_memflags, which are used
during memory allocation for Dom0. Failing allocation with default
dom0_memflags is especially severe for the PV Dom0 case: it makes
alloc_chunk() to use suboptimal 2MB allocation algorithm with a search
for higher memory addresses.
This can lead to the NMI watchdog timeout during PV Dom0 construction
on some machines, which can be worked around by specifying "dma_bits"
in Xen's cmdline manually.
Fix the issue by ignoring MEMF_no_dma in cases when dma_bitsize is zero,
which means there is no DMA zone. This shouldn't cause any issues for
Dom0 because alloc_heap_pages() will first use higher memory addresses
for satisfying memory allocation requests.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 5ac2dddb17
master date: 2019-01-09 15:45:14 +0100
There are a number of exception condition related errata on SandyBridge
CPUs, some of which are unexpected #UD (others, of no interest here, are
lack of mandated exceptions, or exceptions of unexpected type). Annotate
the one workaround we already have, and add two more.
Due to the exception recovery we have in place for stub invocations
these aren't security issues.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 0d4d9e8f55
master date: 2018-12-18 15:19:47 +0100
While commit 75066cd4ea ("x86emul: fix {,i}mul and {,i}div") indeed did
as its title says, it broke the 3-operand form by uniformly using AL/AX/
EAX/RAX as second source operand. Fix this and add tests covering both
cases.
Reported-by: Andrei Lutas <vlutas@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 19232b378f
master date: 2018-12-18 14:27:09 +0100
For both VT-x and SVM, the RDTSCP intercept will trigger if the pipeline
supports the instruction, but the guest may not have RDTSCP in its featureset.
Bring the vmexit handlers in line with the main emulator behaviour by
optionally handing back #UD.
Next on the AMD side, if RDTSCP actually ends up being intercepted on a debug
build or first-gen SVM hardware which lacks NRIP, we first update regs->rcx,
then call __get_instruction_length() asking for RDTSC. As the two
instructions are different (and indeed, different lengths!),
__get_instruction_length_from_list() fails and hands back a #GP fault.
This can demonstrated by putting a guest into tsc_mode="always emulate" and
executing an RDTSCP instruction:
(d1) --- Xen Test Framework ---
(d1) Environment: HVM 64bit (Long mode 4 levels)
(d1) Test rdtscp
(d1) TSC mode 1
(XEN) emulate.c:147:d1v0 __get_instruction_length: Mismatch between expected and actual instruction:
(XEN) emulate.c:152:d1v0 insn_index 8, opcode 0xf0031 modrm 0
(XEN) emulate.c:154:d1v0 rip 0x10475f, nextrip 0x104762, len 3
(XEN) SVM insn len emulation failed (1): d1v0 64bit @ 0008:0010475f -> 0f 01 f9 0f 31 5b 31 ff 31 c0 e9 c2 db ff ff 00
(d1) ******************************
(d1) PANIC: Unhandled exception at 0008:000000000010475f
(d1) Vec 13 #GP[0000]
(d1) ******************************
First, teach __get_instruction_length() to cope with RDTSCP, and improve
svm_vmexit_do_rdtsc() to ask for the correct instruction. Move the regs->rcx
adjustment into this function to ensure it gets done after we are done
potentially raising faults.
Reported-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 3fd3fda9c2
master date: 2018-12-17 16:28:03 +0000
By default on capable hardware, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMCS_SHADOWING is
activated unilaterally. The VMCS Link pointer is initialised to ~0, but the
VMREAD/VMWRITE bitmap pointers are not.
This causes the 16bit IVT and Bios Data Area get interpreted as the read/write
permission bitmap for guests which blindly execute VMREAD/VMWRITE
instructions.
This is not a security issue because the VMCS Link pointer being ~0 causes
VMREAD/VMWRITE to complete with VMFailInvalid (rather than modifying a
potential shadow VMCS), and the contents of MFN 0 has already been determined
not to contain any interesting data because of L1TF's ability to read that 4k
frame.
Leave VMCS Shadowing disabled by default, and toggle it in
nvmx_{set,clear}_vmcs_pointer(). This isn't the most efficient course of
action, but it is the most simple way of leaving nested-virt working as it did
before.
While editing construct_vmcs(), collect all default secondary_exec_control
modifications together. The disabling of PML is latently buggy because it
happens after secondary_exec_control are written into the VMCS, although there
is an unconditional update later which writes the correct value into hardware.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 75ce36eb72
master date: 2018-12-10 16:24:08 +0000
We've had more than one report of host crashes after failed migration,
and in at least one case we've had a hint towards a too far shrunk
shadow allocation pool. Instead of just checking the pool for being
empty, check whether the pool is smaller than what
shadow_set_allocation() would minimally bump it to if it was invoked in
the first place.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master commit: 2634b997af
master date: 2018-11-30 12:10:39 +0100
Selecting between single/multiple BAR mode should happen after checking
whether to skip the present device, or else multi-BAR devices won't be
skipped correctly, due to port_idx getting set to zero in that case.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
master commit: c34fe0468a
master date: 2018-11-30 12:07:33 +0100
get_gfn_query() internally takes the p2m lock, and this error path leaves it
locked.
This wasn't included in XSA-277 because the error path can only be triggered
by a carefully timed phymap operation concurrent with the domain being paused
and the toolstack issuing DOMCTL_soft_reset.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: e7969e917c
master date: 2018-11-22 17:58:46 +0000
get_gfn_type_access() internally takes the p2m lock, and nothing ever unlocks
it. Switch to using the unlocked accessor instead.
This wasn't included in XSA-277 because neither mem-sharing nor altp2m are
supported.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: d6e02850d3
master date: 2018-11-22 17:58:46 +0000
Commit 3bdec530a5 ("x86/HVM: split page straddling emulated accesses in
more cases") introduced a hvm_copy_to_guest_linear() attempt before
falling back to hvmemul_linear_mmio_write(). This is wrong for the
p2m_ioreq_server special case. That change widened a pre-existing issue
though: Other writes to such pages also need to be failed (or forced
through emulation), in particular hypercall buffer writes.
Reported-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: d7bff2bc00
master date: 2018-11-15 16:42:25 +0100
In commit 303066fdb1 ("VMX: fix interaction of APIC-V and Viridian
emulation") I screwed up: Instead of clearing SVI, other ISR bits
should be taken into account.
Introduce a new helper set_svi(), split out of vmx_process_isr(), and
use it also from vmx_handle_eoi().
Following the problems in vmx_intr_assist() (see the still present big
block of debugging code there) also warn (once) if EOI'd vector and
original SVI don't match.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 45cb9a4123
master date: 2018-11-02 12:15:33 +0100
At the moment, Xen is assuming the hardware domain will have the same
number of re-distributor regions as the host. However, as the
number of CPUs or the stride (e.g on GICv4) may be different we end up
exposing regions which does not contain any re-distributors.
When booting, Linux will go through all the re-distributor region to
check whether a property (e.g vPLIs) is available accross all the
re-distributors. This will result to a data abort on empty regions
because there are no underlying re-distributor.
So we need to limit the number of regions exposed to the hardware
domain. The code reworked to only expose the minimun number of regions
required by the hardware domain. It is assumed the regions will be
populated starting from the first one.
Lastly, rename vgic_v3_rdist_count to reflect the value return by the
helper.
Reported-by: Shameerali Kolothum Thodi <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Tested-by: Shameer Kolothum <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 54ec59f6b0)
A follow-up patch will require to know the number of vCPUs when
initializating the vGICv3 domain structure. However this information is
not available at domain creation. This is only known once
XEN_DOMCTL_max_vpus is called for that domain.
In order to get the max vCPUs around, delay the domain part of the vGIC
v3 initialization until the first vCPU of the domain is initialized.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Tested-by: Shameer Kolothum <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com>
Acked-but-disliked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 703d9d5ec1)
(cherry picked from commit 015b00ff35)
Make sure to only look for multiboot compatible nodes only under
/chosen, not under any other paths (depth <= 3).
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefanos@xilinx.com>
[julien: Use sizeof(path) instead of len ]
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
(cherry picked from commit c32e3689c5)
(cherry picked from commit 02fd1ee8ce)
When an IPI is generated by a CPU, the pattern looks roughly like:
<write shared data>
dsb(sy);
<write to GIC to signal SGI>
On the receiving CPU we rely on the fact that, once we've taken the
interrupt, then the freshly written shared data must be visible to us.
Put another way, the CPU isn't going to speculate taking an interrupt.
Unfortunately, this assumption turns out to be broken.
Consider that CPUx wants to send an IPI to CPUy, which will cause CPUy
to read some shared_data. Before CPUx has done anything, a random
peripheral raises an IRQ to the GIC and the IRQ line on CPUy is raised.
CPUy then takes the IRQ and starts executing the entry code, heading
towards gic_handle_irq. Furthermore, let's assume that a bunch of the
previous interrupts handled by CPUy were SGIs, so the branch predictor
kicks in and speculates that irqnr will be <16 and we're likely to
head into handle_IPI. The prefetcher then grabs a speculative copy of
shared_data which contains a stale value.
Meanwhile, CPUx gets round to updating shared_data and asking the GIC
to send an SGI to CPUy. Internally, the GIC decides that the SGI is
more important than the peripheral interrupt (which hasn't yet been
ACKed) but doesn't need to do anything to CPUy, because the IRQ line
is already raised.
CPUy then reads the ACK register on the GIC, sees the SGI value which
confirms the branch prediction and we end up with a stale shared_data
value.
This patch fixes the problem by adding an smp_rmb() to the IPI entry
code in do_SGI.
At the same time document the write barrier.
Based on Linux commit f86c4fbd930ff6fecf3d8a1c313182bd0f49f496
"irqchip/gic: Ensure ordering between read of INTACK and shared data".
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrii Anisov<andrii_anisov@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 555e5f1bd2)
(cherry picked from commit dd1c98afc6)
Devices that expose their interrupt status registers via system
registers (e.g. Statistical profiling, CPU PMU, DynamIQ PMU, arch timer,
vgic (although unused by Linux), ...) rely on a context synchronising
operation on the CPU to ensure that the updated status register is
visible to the CPU when handling the interrupt. This usually happens as
a result of taking the IRQ exception in the first place, but there are
two race scenarios where this isn't the case.
For example, let's say we have two peripherals (X and Y), where Y uses a
system register for its interrupt status.
Case 1:
1. CPU takes an IRQ exception as a result of X raising an interrupt
2. Y then raises its interrupt line, but the update to its system
register is not yet visible to the CPU
3. The GIC decides to expose Y's interrupt number first in the Ack
register
4. The CPU runs the IRQ handler for Y, but the status register is stale
Case 2:
1. CPU takes an IRQ exception as a result of X raising an interrupt
2. CPU reads the interrupt number for X from the Ack register and runs
its IRQ handler
3. Y raises its interrupt line and the Ack register is updated, but
again, the update to its system register is not yet visible to the
CPU.
4. Since the GIC drivers poll the Ack register, we read Y's interrupt
number and run its handler without a context synchronisation
operation, therefore seeing the stale register value.
In either case, we run the risk of missing an IRQ. This patch solves the
problem by ensuring that we execute an ISB in the GIC drivers prior
to invoking the interrupt handler.
Based on Linux commit 39a06b67c2c1256bcf2361a1f67d2529f70ab206
"irqchip/gic: Ensure we have an ISB between ack and ->handle_irq".
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrii Anisov<andrii_anisov@epam.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 177afec455)
(cherry picked from commit 28f380fbde)
An unfortunate consequence of having a strong typing for the input
values to the SMC call is that it also affects the type of the
return values, limiting r0 to 32 bits and r{1,2,3} to whatever
was passed as an input.
Let's turn everything into "unsigned long", which satisfies the
requirements of both architectures, and allows for the full
range of return values.
Reported-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefanos@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 35fc608612)
(cherry picked from commit ad8875c8a7)
Jan Beulich
Andrew Cooper
Igor Druzhinin
Wei Liu
George Dunlap
Juergen Gross
Sergey Dyasli
Julien Grall
Stefano Stabellini
Marc Zyngier