For CET-IBT, we will need to optionally insert an endbr64 instruction at the
start of the stub. Don't hardcode the jmp displacement assuming that it
starts at byte 24 of the stub.
Also add extra comments describing what is going on. The mix of %rax and %rsp
is far from trivial to follow.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This is necessary for read_cr4() to function correctly. Move the EFER caching
at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
An interesting corner case occurs when the byte sequence making up endbr64
ends up on a non-instruction boundary. Such embedded instructions mark legal
indirect branch targets as far as the CPU is concerned, which aren't legal as
far as the logic is concerned.
When CET-IBT is active, check for embedded byte sequences. Example failures
look like:
check-endbr.sh xen-syms Fail: Found 2 embedded endbr64 instructions
0xffff82d040325677: test_endbr64 at /local/xen.git/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S:28
0xffff82d040352da6: init_done at /local/xen.git/xen/arch/x86/setup.c:675
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Now all indirect branch targets have been annotated, turn on typechecking to
catch issues in the future.
This extension isn't in a released version of GCC yet, so provide a container
to use with the extension included, and add it to CI. RANDCONFIG is necessary
because some stubs for compiled-out subsystems are used as function pointer
targets.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
run_in_exception_handler() managed to escape typechecking, as the compiler
can't see where function pointer gets called. After adding some ad-hoc
typechecking, it turns out that dump_execution_state() alone differs in
const-ness from the other users of run_in_exception_handler().
Introduce a new show_execution_state_nonconst() to make the typechecking
happy.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
The function typecheck in switch_stack_and_jump() is incompatible with control
flow typechecking. It's ok for reset_stack_and_jump_ind(), but for
reset_stack_and_jump(), it would force us to endbr64 the targets which are
branched to directly.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
cpufreq_governor_dbs() has no external callers so make it static.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
pv_emul_is_mem_write() is only used in a single file. Move it out of its
header file, so it doesn't risk being duplicated in multiple translation
units.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
In svm.c, make a few rearrangements. svm_update_guest_cr() has no external
callers so can become static, but needs moving along with svm_fpu_enter() to
avoid a forward declaration. Move svm_fpu_leave() too, to match. Also move
svm_update_guest_efer() to drop its forward declaration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
... and friends; alloc_direct_apic_vector() and set_direct_apic_vector().
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
AMD's parse_ppr_log_entry() has no external callers, so becomes static.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Tweak {IRQ_,}KEYHANDLER() to use a named initialiser instead of requiring a
pointer cast to compile in the IRQ case.
Reposition iommu_dump_page_tables() to avoid a forward declaration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
The function pointer cast in hvm_vcpu_initialise() is undefined behaviour.
While it happens to function correctly, it is not compatible with control flow
typechecking, so introduce a new hvm_assert_evtchn_irq_tasklet() to handle the
parameter type conversion in a legal way.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Andrew Cooper
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki