Adds XSM hooks for the recently introduced XENMEM_claim_pages and
XENMEM_get_outstanding_pages operations, and adds FLASK access vectors
for them. This makes the access control decisions for these operations
match those in the rest of the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> (for 4.3 release)
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This adds an XSM hook for enabling nested HVM support, replacing an
IS_PRIV check. This hook is a partial duplicate with the xsm_hvm_param
hook, but using the existing hook would require adding the index to the
hook and would require the use of a custom hook for the xsm-disabled
case (using XSM_OTHER, which is less immediately readable) - whereas
adding a new hook retains the clarity of the existing code.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> (release perspective)
Make it possible to pass the node-affinity of a domain to the hypervisor
from the upper layers, instead of always being computed automatically.
Note that this also required generalizing the Flask hooks for setting
and getting the affinity, so that they now deal with both vcpu and
node affinity.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This patch enables the compilation of the FLASK policy as part of the
tools build if the needed prerequisites are present.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
This adds the ability to define security classes and access vectors in
FLASK policy not defined by the hypervisor, for the use of stub domains
or applications without their own security policies.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
For the example policy shipped with Xen, it makes sense to allow dom0
access to all system calls so that policy does not need to be updated
for each new hypervisor or toolstack feature used.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add getscheduler and setscheduler permissions to replace the
monolithic scheduler permission in the scheduler_op domctl and sysctl.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This adds a pair of XSM hooks for tmem operations: xsm_tmem_op which
controls any use of tmem, and xsm_tmem_control which allows use of the
TMEM_CONTROL operations. By default, all domains can use tmem while
only IS_PRIV domains can use control operations.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
There are three callers of get_pg_owner:
* do_mmuext_op, which does not have XSM hooks on all subfunctions
* do_mmu_update, which has hooks that are inefficient
* do_update_va_mapping_otherdomain, which has a simple XSM hook
In order to preserve return values for the do_mmuext_op hypercall, an
additional XSM hook is required to check the operation even for those
subfunctions that do not use the pg_owner field. This also covers the
MMUEXT_UNPIN_TABLE operation which did previously have an XSM hook.
The XSM hooks in do_mmu_update were capable of replacing the checks in
get_pg_owner; however, the hooks are buried in the inner loop of the
function - not very good for performance when XSM is enabled and these
turn in to indirect function calls. This patch removes the PTE from
the hooks and replaces it with a bitfield describing what accesses are
being requested. The XSM hook can then be called only when additional
bits are set instead of once per iteration of the loop.
This patch results in a change in the FLASK permissions used for
mapping an MMIO page: the target for the permisison check on the
memory mapping is no longer resolved to the device-specific type, and
is instead either the domain's own type or domio_t (depending on if
the domain uses DOMID_SELF or DOMID_IO in the map
command). Device-specific access is still controlled via the "resource
use" permisison checked at domain creation (or device hotplug).
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Because the FLASK XSM module no longer checks IS_PRIV for remote
domain accesses covered by XSM permissions, domains now have the
ability to perform memory management and other functions on all
domains that have the same type. While it is possible to prevent this
by only creating one domain per type, this solution significantly
limits the flexibility of the type system.
This patch introduces a domain type transition to represent a domain
that is operating on itself. In the example policy, this is
demonstrated by creating a type with _self appended when declaring a
domain type which will be used for reflexive operations. AVCs for a
domain of type domU_t will look like the following:
scontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t
tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t_self
This change also allows policy to distinguish between event channels a
domain creates to itself and event channels created between domains of
the same type.
The IS_PRIV_FOR check used for device model domains is also no longer
checked by FLASK; a similar transition is performed when the target is
set and used when the device model accesses its target domain.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The FLASK module was missing implementations of some hooks and did not
have access vectors defined for 10 domctls; define these now.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Rather than keeping around headers that are autogenerated in order to
avoid adding build dependencies from xen/ to files in tools/, move the
relevant parts of the FLASK policy into the hypervisor tree and
generate the headers as part of the hypervisor's build.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Allow a domain to be built under one security label and run using a
different label. This can be used to prevent the domain builder or
control domain from having the ability to access a guest domain's memory
via map_foreign_range except during the build process where this is
required.
Example domain configuration snippet:
seclabel='customer_1:vm_r:nomigrate_t'
init_seclabel='customer_1:vm_r:nomigrate_t_building'
Note: this does not provide complete protection from a malicious dom0;
mappings created during the build process may persist after the relabel,
and could be used to indirectly access the guest's memory. However, if
dom0 correctly unmaps the domain upon building, a the domU is protected
against dom0 becoming malicious in the future.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This adds the ability to change a domain's XSM label after creation.
The new label will be used for all future access checks; however,
existing event channels and memory mappings will remain valid even if
their creation would be denied by the new label.
With appropriate security policy and hooks in the domain builder, this
can be used to create domains that the domain builder does not have
access to after building. It can also be used to allow a domain to
drop privileges - for example, prior to launching a user-supplied
kernel loaded by a pv-grub stubdom.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This field was only used to populate the ssid of dom0, which can be
handled explicitly in the domain creation hook. This also removes the
unnecessary permission check on the creation of dom0.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The ability to declare common permission blocks shared across multiple
classes is not currently used in Xen. Currently, support for this
feature is broken in the header generation scripts, and it is not
expected that this feature will be used in the future, so remove the
dead code.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This library has been deprecated since July 2010; remove the in-tree
users and library.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This shows an example boolean (prot_doms_locked) which can be set at
runtime to prevent dom0 from mapping memory of domains of type
prot_domU_t.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
These utilities can be used to modify policy booleans, which allow
minor policy changes without reloading the security policy. This can
be used to make security policy change based on external information
such as time of day, user physical presence, completion of system
boot, or other relevant variables.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Add wrappers for getting and setting policy booleans by name or ID.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
These examples show how to use constraints and the user field of the
security label to prevent communication between virtual machines of
different customers in a multi-tenant environment.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Eliminate temporary files used in creating FLASK policy to improve
error reporting during policy build. Syntax errors now point to the
file and line number visible to the user, not the intermediate
temporary file.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This patch sends global VIRQs to a domain designated as the VIRQ
handler
instead of sending all global VIRQ events to dom0. This is required in
order to run xenstored in a stubdom, because VIRQ_DOM_EXC must be sent
to xenstored for domain destruction to work properly.
This patch was inspired by the xenstored stubdomain patch series sent
to xen-devel by Alex Zeffertt in 2009.
Signed-off-by: Diego Ongaro <diego.ongaro@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Zeffertt <alex.zeffertt@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The updated example policy did not include rules to allow managing the
created domains (pause, unpause, destroy); allow these actions.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
Rewrite the example policy to make it easier to understand and
demonstrate some of the security goals that FLASK can enforce.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
Actions requiring IS_PRIV should also require some XSM access control
in order for XSM to be useful in confining multiple privileged
domains. Add XSM hooks for new hypercalls and sub-commands that are
under IS_PRIV but not currently under any access checks.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
The mmu_update hypercall can be used to manipulate the page tables of
a remote domain. Add a check for this in the XSM hook in addition to
the existing check on mapping pages of a remote domain.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
The 32-bit tools need to support 64-bit addresses, so use the correct
printf/scanf formats. Also, some systems declare fscanf with attribute
warn_unused_result, so check the result instead of relying on the
value of start being unmodified across a failed call.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This allows a PCI device and its associated resources to be labeled
without hardcoding addresses (which may change from system to system)
in the security policy.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The domU SID is never used before a policy load, and so does not
belong in the initial_sids list.
The PIRQ SID is now incorrectly named; it should simply be called IRQ.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The PHYSDEVOP_alloc_irq_vector hypercall is a noop, so its XSM check
is not useful. Remove it and the "event vector" FLASK permission.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Version 26 of checkpolicy (shipped with Fedora 16) now requires that
roles be declared prior to setting types for a role. Add a declaration
of the system_r role to fix the build of default XSM/FLASK policy.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Xen try to inforce the xsm policy when a HVMOP_track_dirty_vram
is received (xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c:3637). It was failing because
in flask_hvmcontext, xsm didn't have any case for this operation.
Signed-off-by: Jean Guyader <jean.guyader@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
19025:bd78714b8594 switched to "-MMD -MF" in preference, adding the
correct runes to tools/Rules.mk but appears to have missed some other
uses of -Wp,...
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
It's not needed unless you are including headers in the current
directory _and_ you can't use "" instead of <> because the headers are
to be installed.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Several places include it in CFLAGS even though it is never defined. A
few others use it as nothing more than a gathering point for
CFLAGS. Get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Otherwise make can search the path relative to certain standard paths
such as /usr/include (e.g., the line '-include $(XEN_ROOT)/.config' in
Config.mk suffers from this).
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Daniel De Graaf
Dario Faggioli
Keir Fraser
Jean Guyader
Ian Campbell