Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
The function typecheck in switch_stack_and_jump() is incompatible with control
flow typechecking. It's ok for reset_stack_and_jump_ind(), but for
reset_stack_and_jump(), it would force us to endbr64 the targets which are
branched to directly.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
cpufreq_governor_dbs() has no external callers so make it static.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
pv_emul_is_mem_write() is only used in a single file. Move it out of its
header file, so it doesn't risk being duplicated in multiple translation
units.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
In svm.c, make a few rearrangements. svm_update_guest_cr() has no external
callers so can become static, but needs moving along with svm_fpu_enter() to
avoid a forward declaration. Move svm_fpu_leave() too, to match. Also move
svm_update_guest_efer() to drop its forward declaration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
... and friends; alloc_direct_apic_vector() and set_direct_apic_vector().
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
AMD's parse_ppr_log_entry() has no external callers, so becomes static.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Tweak {IRQ_,}KEYHANDLER() to use a named initialiser instead of requiring a
pointer cast to compile in the IRQ case.
Reposition iommu_dump_page_tables() to avoid a forward declaration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
The function pointer cast in hvm_vcpu_initialise() is undefined behaviour.
While it happens to function correctly, it is not compatible with control flow
typechecking, so introduce a new hvm_assert_evtchn_irq_tasklet() to handle the
parameter type conversion in a legal way.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.
Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.
The "watchdog_timeout" and "cpu_type" handlers were missing __init.
The "numa", "acpi", "irq_vector_map" and "flask" handlers can skip forward
declarations by altering the custom_param() position.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Andrew Cooper