The SDM states that data size must be a multiple of 4, but Xen doesn't check
this propery.
This is liable to cause a later failures, but should be checked explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The AMD container format has no formal spec. It is, at best, precision
guesswork based on AMD's prior contributions to open source projects. The
Equivalence Table has both an explicit length, and an expectation of having a
NULL entry at the end.
Xen was sanity checking the NULL entry, but without confirming that an entry
was present, resulting in a read off the front of the buffer. With some
manual debugging/annotations this manifests as:
(XEN) *** Buf ffff83204c00b19c, eq ffff83204c00b194
(XEN) *** eq: 0c 00 00 00 44 4d 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 aa aa aa aa
^-Actual buffer-------------------^
(XEN) *** installed_cpu: 000c
(XEN) microcode: Bad equivalent cpu table
(XEN) Parsing microcode blob error -22
When loaded by hypercall, the 4 bytes interpreted as installed_cpu happen to
be the containing struct ucode_buf's len field, and luckily will be nonzero.
When loaded at boot, it's possible for the access to #PF if the module happens
to have been placed on a 2M boundary by the bootloader. Under Linux, it will
commonly be the end of the CPIO header.
Drop the probe of the NULL entry; Nothing else cares. A container without one
is well formed, insofar that we can still parse it correctly. With this
dropped, the same container results in:
(XEN) microcode: couldn't find any matching ucode in the provided blob!
Fixes: 4de936a38a ("x86/ucode/amd: Rework parsing logic in cpu_request_microcode()")
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
If xenstored runs out of memory it is possible for it to fail operations
that should succeed. libxl wasn't robust against this, and could fail
to ensure that the TTY path of a non-initial console was created and
read-only for guests. This doesn't qualify for an XSA because guests
should not be able to run xenstored out of memory, but it still needs to
be fixed.
Add the missing error checks to ensure that all errors are properly
handled and that at no point can a guest make the TTY path of its
frontend directory writable.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Obtaining code over an insecure transport is a terrible idea for
blatently obvious reasons. Even for non-executable data, insecure
transports are considered deprecated.
This patch enforces the use of secure transports in misc places.
All URLs are known to work.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Obtaining code over an insecure transport is a terrible idea for
blatently obvious reasons. Even for non-executable data, insecure
transports are considered deprecated.
This patch enforces the use of secure transports in the build system.
Some URLs returned 301 or 302 redirects, so I replaced them with the
URLs that were redirected to.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The upstream URLs for zlib, PolarSSL, and the TPM emulator do not work
anymore, so do not attempt to use them.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Obtaining code over an insecure transport is a terrible idea for
blatently obvious reasons. Even for non-executable data, insecure
transports are considered deprecated.
This patch enforces the use of secure transports for all xenbits.xen.org
URLs. All altered links have been tested and are known to work.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Obtaining code over an insecure transport is a terrible idea for
blatently obvious reasons. Even for non-executable data, insecure
transports are considered deprecated.
This patch enforces the use of secure transports for all xenbits git
repositories. It was generated with the following shell script:
git ls-files -z |
xargs -0 -- sed -Ei -- 's@(git://xenbits\.xen\.org|http://xenbits\.xen\.org/git-http)/@https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/@g'
All altered links have been tested and are known to work.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
get_page_from_l1e() relied on Xen's choice of PAT, which is brittle in
the face of future PAT changes. Instead, compute the actual cacheability
used by the CPU and switch on that, as this will work no matter what PAT
Xen uses.
No functional change intended. This code is itself questionable and may
be removed in the future, but removing it would be an observable
behavior change and so is out of scope for this patch series.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This avoids it being a magic constant that is difficult for humans to
decode. Use BUILD_BUG_ON to check that the old and new values are
identical.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This allows eliminating of the former, with the exception of
MTRR_NUM_TYPES. MTRR_NUM_TYPES is kept, as due to a quirk of the x86
architecture X86_MT_UCM (7) is not valid in an MTRR.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This makes the code much easier to understand, and avoids problems if
Xen's PAT ever changes in the future.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This makes the code much easier to understand. No functional change
intended. As per Andrew Cooper, the existing logic is questionable, but
this does not make it any worse.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This was missed in the initial patchset.
Move efi_relocate_esrt() up to avoid adding a forward declaration.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
A previous patch tried to get Linux to use the ESRT under Xen if it is
in memory of type EfiRuntimeServicesData. However, this turns out to be
a bad idea. Ard Biesheuvel pointed out that EfiRuntimeServices* memory
winds up fragmenting both the EFI page tables and the direct map, and
that EfiACPIReclaimMemory is a much better choice for this purpose.
Link: https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2022-09/msg01365.html
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-acked-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The EFI System Resource Table (ESRT) is necessary for fwupd to identify
firmware updates to install. According to the UEFI specification §23.4,
the ESRT shall be stored in memory of type EfiBootServicesData. However,
memory of type EfiBootServicesData is considered general-purpose memory
by Xen, so the ESRT needs to be moved somewhere where Xen will not
overwrite it. Copy the ESRT to memory of type EfiRuntimeServicesData,
which Xen will not reuse. dom0 can use the ESRT if (and only if) it is
in memory of type EfiRuntimeServicesData.
Earlier versions of this patch reserved the memory in which the ESRT was
located. This created awkward alignment problems, and required either
splitting the E820 table or wasting memory. It also would have required
a new platform op for dom0 to use to indicate if the ESRT is reserved.
By copying the ESRT into EfiRuntimeServicesData memory, the E820 table
does not need to be modified, and dom0 can just check the type of the
memory region containing the ESRT. The copy is only done if the ESRT is
not already in EfiRuntimeServicesData memory, avoiding memory leaks on
repeated kexec.
See https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20200818184018.GN1679@mail-itl/T/
for details.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Tested-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The EFI System Resource Table (ESRT) is necessary for fwupd to identify
firmware updates to install. According to the UEFI specification §23.4,
the ESRT shall be stored in memory of type EfiBootServicesData. However,
memory of type EfiBootServicesData is considered general-purpose memory
by Xen, so the ESRT needs to be moved somewhere where Xen will not
overwrite it. Copy the ESRT to memory of type EfiRuntimeServicesData,
which Xen will not reuse. dom0 can use the ESRT if (and only if) it is
in memory of type EfiRuntimeServicesData.
Earlier versions of this patch reserved the memory in which the ESRT was
located. This created awkward alignment problems, and required either
splitting the E820 table or wasting memory. It also would have required
a new platform op for dom0 to use to indicate if the ESRT is reserved.
By copying the ESRT into EfiRuntimeServicesData memory, the E820 table
does not need to be modified, and dom0 can just check the type of the
memory region containing the ESRT. The copy is only done if the ESRT is
not already in EfiRuntimeServicesData memory, avoiding memory leaks on
repeated kexec.
See https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20200818184018.GN1679@mail-itl/T/
for details.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Demi Marie Obenour