for firmware rr6 is used for uncacned region
and rr7 is used for cachable region.
So rid must be different.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <yamahata@valinux.co.jp>
Now xen/arch/ia64/linux-xen/pal.S is the same as
arch/ia64/kernel/pal.S from linux 2.6.21.
So move it back into xen/arch/ia64/linux.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <yamahata@valinux.co.jp>
Now firmware code is mapped at its own virtual address space
which is same to Linux. So the calculation from virutal
address to physical address should be same to the linux one.
In practice firmware is located in low physical address area
so that masking 60 bit instead of 61 bits doesn't make difference.
I just checked and with the patch below,
xen/arch/ia64/linux-xen/pal.S becomes the same as
arch/ia64/kernel/pal.S from linux 2.6.21.
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
add one BUG_ON() to allocate_metaphysical_rr() to make sure
that rid for metaphysical address isn't collided.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <yamahata@valinux.co.jp>
pass for the HVM guest to successfully boot.
Currently only one test (REP INS across page boundaries) but more will
be added in future.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
PAGE_SIZE - (x & ~PAGE_MASK) is not equivalent to -x & ~PAGE_MASK
Also the early goto could be removed.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
The ssidref in getdomaininfo() is not initialized when XSM_ENABLE is
not defined. So, xentop might display a wrong value of ssid.
Signed-off-by: Kazuhiro Suzuki <kaz@jp.fujitsu.com>
point at which the index register (SI/DI) wraps. This can cause a
discontinuity in the address range accessed by the repeated
instruction.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
VT-d hot-plug is done in such a way: 1) xend sends 'pci-ins' command
to ioemu via xenstore; 2) ioemu creates pass-through device and raises
SCI to guest OS; guest OS loads device driver, and device driver
initializes the hot-plugged device; 3) xend does FLR. There is a race
condition about 2) and 3). If 3) runs slow, we have troubles. Thanks
for Yuji Shimada's locating the issues.
We can work around the issues by not doing FLR when we create domain
or hotplug device into guest, namely, we only do FLR when we destroy
domain or hotplug device from guest.
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <dexuan.cui@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
The softtsc code for AMD does not update the ip; enabling it on AMD-V
results in the domain spinning on the RDTSC instruction. The patch is
against xen-unstable 18331.
Signed-off-by: John Byrne <john.l.byrne@hp.com>
This fixes a crash when restoring guests with certain memory sizes (eg
223MB). The ROUNDUP in the call to memcpy, was the main offender, but
I didn't care for the inplace resizing of the p2m entries either.
Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@novell.com>
I couldn't reproduce the Nevada crash on my testbox, but this should
fix the first Xen crash that was seen in the Nevada HVM (bugzilla
#1322).
What I think most probably happened there is that the set_l2e call in
shadow_get_and_create_l1e() has tried to resync a page, but somehow we
weren't unable to remove the shadow (the real bug we should actually
look after). sh_resync() then removes the page from the OOS hash and
later in the page fault path we find the gw.l1mfn to be still OOS, so
we try to update the snapshot and the bug happens.
This should fix this and other unlikely (like sh_unsync() failing to
remove for hash collision the current gw.l1mfn) cases.
Signed-off-by: Gianluca Guida <gianluca.guida@eu.citrix.com>
remove the runtime warning when HVMOP_set_mem_type is used.
But the hypercall just returns -ENOSYS. It isn't implemented yet.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <yamahata@valinux.co.jp>
Attached patch allows to pass arguments to xenconsoled
via XENCONSOLED_TRACE env. variable analogous to xenstored.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Egger <Christoph.Egger@amd.com>
When a p2m superpage entry is shattered, it's important not to
unshadow any parts of the 2MB region that are still there afterwards.
Otherwise shattering a superpage that contains the guest's top-level
pagetable will cause the guest to be killed.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@citrix.com>
This ensures correct actions will be taken if init_vtd_hw()
fails. Especially, when 'iommu=force' is used, Xen should not
boot if init_vtd_hw() fails.
Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
Isaku Yamahata
Keir Fraser