The DOMCTLs {,un}bind_pt_irq are using uint32_t for the machine_irq
while the helper is using uint8_t.
Currently on ARM, we are supporting SPIs whose irq number can go up to
1019 which doesn't fit in an uint8_t. The helpers xc_domain_bind_pt_spi
and xc_domain_unbint_pt_spi are correctly taking an uint16_t so the
libxc was truncating without noticing the user which may end up to
route the wrong IRQ.
Fix the problem by widening the machine_irq parameter in
xc_domain_*bind_pt_irq_int.
Note that XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission has the same problem but it's not
used at the moment on ARM. So we can defer the changes after the release
of Xen 4.7.
Reported-by: Iurii Konovalenko <iurii.konovalenko@globallogic.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
In setup_mm(), the value passed as xenheap_megabytes gets
converted to pages and passed to setup_xenheap_mappings(),
which in turn passes it to create_32mb_mappings(), which
contains an ASSERT that the value passed is a multiple of
32MB. So specifying any value that is not an integer multiple
of 32 will cause Xen to hit this assert and fail to boot.
Signed-off-by: Chris Brand <chris.brand@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
If systemd is configured for use AND you are building oxenstored, the C
systemd library must be linked in to the systemd.cxma library.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Creekmore <jonathan.creekmore@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
And this time, do it right. In fact, a similar change was
attempted in 93be8285a7 ("cpupools: update domU's node-affinity
on the cpupool_unassign_cpu() path"). But that was buggy, and got
reverted with 8395b67ab0.
However, even though reverting was the right thing to do, it
remains true that:
- calling the function is better done in the cpupool cpu removal
code, even if just for simmetry with the cpupool cpu adding path;
- it is not necessary to call it during cpu teardown (for suspend
or shutdown) code as we either are going down and will never
come up (shutdown) or, when coming up, we want everything to be
as before the tearing down process started, and so we would just
undo any update made during the process.
- calling it from the teardown path is not only unnecessary, but
it can trigger an ASSERT(), in case we get, during the process,
to remove the last online pcpu of a domain's node affinity:
(XEN) Assertion '!cpumask_empty(dom_cpumask)' failed at domain.c:466
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
... ... ...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801055b9>] domain_update_node_affinity+0x113/0x240
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012e676>] cpu_disable_scheduler+0x334/0x3f2
(XEN) [<ffff82d08018bb8d>] __cpu_disable+0x313/0x36e
(XEN) [<ffff82d080101424>] take_cpu_down+0x34/0x3b
(XEN) [<ffff82d080130ad9>] stopmachine_action+0x70/0x99
(XEN) [<ffff82d08013274f>] do_tasklet_work+0x78/0xab
(XEN) [<ffff82d080132a85>] do_tasklet+0x5e/0x8a
(XEN) [<ffff82d08016478c>] idle_loop+0x56/0x6b
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 12:
(XEN) Assertion '!cpumask_empty(dom_cpumask)' failed at domain.c:466
(XEN) ****************************************
Therefore, for all these reasons, move the call from
cpu_disable_schedule() to cpupool_unassign_cpu_helper().
While there, add some sanity checking (in the latter function), and
make sure that scanning the domain list is done with domlist_read_lock
held, at least when the system is 'live'.
I re-tested the scenario described in here:
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.emulators.xen.devel/235310
which is what led to the revert of 93be8285a7, and that is
working ok after this commit.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The function is called both when we want to remove a cpu
from a cpupool, and during cpu teardown, for suspend or
shutdown. If, however, the boot cpu (cpu 0, most of the
times) is not present in the default cpupool, during
suspend or shutdown, Xen crashes like this:
root@Zhaman:~# xl cpupool-cpu-remove Pool-0 0
root@Zhaman:~# shutdown -h now
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801238de>] _csched_cpu_pick+0x156/0x61f
(XEN) [<ffff82d080123db5>] csched_cpu_pick+0xe/0x10
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012de3c>] vcpu_migrate+0x18e/0x321
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012e4f8>] cpu_disable_scheduler+0x1cf/0x2ac
(XEN) [<ffff82d08018bb8d>] __cpu_disable+0x313/0x36e
(XEN) [<ffff82d080101424>] take_cpu_down+0x34/0x3b
(XEN) [<ffff82d08013097a>] stopmachine_action+0x70/0x99
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801325f0>] do_tasklet_work+0x78/0xab
(XEN) [<ffff82d080132926>] do_tasklet+0x5e/0x8a
(XEN) [<ffff82d08016478c>] idle_loop+0x56/0x6b
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 15:
(XEN) Assertion 'cpu < nr_cpu_ids' failed at ...URCES/xen/xen/xen.git/xen/include/xen/cpumask.h:97
(XEN) ****************************************
There also are problems when we try to suspend or shutdown
with a cpupool configured with just one cpu (no matter, in
this case, whether that is the boot cpu or not):
root@Zhaman:~# xl create /etc/xen/test.cfg
root@Zhaman:~# xl cpupool-migrate test Pool-1
root@Zhaman:~# xl cpupool-list -c
Name CPU list
Pool-0 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15
Pool-1 12
root@Zhaman:~# shutdown -h now
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
(XEN) CPU: 12
...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d08018bb91>] __cpu_disable+0x317/0x36e
(XEN) [<ffff82d080101424>] take_cpu_down+0x34/0x3b
(XEN) [<ffff82d08013097a>] stopmachine_action+0x70/0x99
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801325f0>] do_tasklet_work+0x78/0xab
(XEN) [<ffff82d080132926>] do_tasklet+0x5e/0x8a
(XEN) [<ffff82d08016478c>] idle_loop+0x56/0x6b
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 12:
(XEN) Xen BUG at smpboot.c:895
(XEN) ****************************************
In both cases, the problem is the scheduler not being able
to:
- move all the vcpus to the boot cpu (as the boot cpu is
not in the cpupool), in the former;
- move the vcpus away from a cpu at all (as that is the
only one cpu in the cpupool), in the latter.
Solution is to distinguish, inside cpu_disable_scheduler(),
the two cases of cpupool manipulation and teardown. For
cpupool manipulation, it is correct to ask the scheduler to
take an action, as pathological situation (like there not
being any cpu in the pool where to send vcpus) are taken
care of (i.e., forbidden!) already. For suspend and shutdown,
we don't want the scheduler to be involved at all, as the
final goal is pretty simple: "send all the vcpus to the
boot cpu ASAP", so we just go for it.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This patch parses to enable user configurable parameters to specify
RDM resource and according policies which are defined previously,
Global RDM parameter:
rdm = "strategy=host,policy=strict/relaxed"
Per-device RDM parameter:
pci = [ 'sbdf, rdm_policy=strict/relaxed' ]
Default per-device RDM policy is same as default global RDM policy as being
'relaxed'. And the per-device policy would override the global policy like
others.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Currently we're intending to cover this kind of devices
with shared RMRR simply since the case of shared RMRR is
a rare case according to our previous experiences. But
late we can group these devices which shared rmrr, and
then allow all devices within a group to be assigned to
same domain.
CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
USB RMRR may conflict with guest BIOS region. In such case, identity
mapping setup is simply skipped in previous implementation. Now we
can handle this scenario cleanly with new policy mechanism so previous
hack code can be removed now.
CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
While building a VM, HVM domain builder provides struct hvm_info_table{}
to help hvmloader. Currently it includes two fields to construct guest
e820 table by hvmloader, low_mem_pgend and high_mem_pgend. So we should
check them to fix any conflict with RDM.
RMRR can reside in address space beyond 4G theoretically, but we never
see this in real world. So in order to avoid breaking highmem layout
we don't solve highmem conflict. Note this means highmem rmrr could still
be supported if no conflict.
But in the case of lowmem, RMRR probably scatter the whole RAM space.
Especially multiple RMRR entries would worsen this to lead a complicated
memory layout. And then its hard to extend hvm_info_table{} to work
hvmloader out. So here we're trying to figure out a simple solution to
avoid breaking existing layout. So when a conflict occurs,
#1. Above a predefined boundary (2G)
- move lowmem_end below reserved region to solve conflict;
#2. Below a predefined boundary (2G)
- Check strict/relaxed policy.
"strict" policy leads to fail libxl. Note when both policies
are specified on a given region, 'strict' is always preferred.
"relaxed" policy issue a warning message and also mask this entry INVALID
to indicate we shouldn't expose this entry to hvmloader.
Note later we need to provide a parameter to set that predefined boundary
dynamically.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
---
v13a: Change `flag' to `flags' in libxl__xc_device_get_rdm.
No functional change. [ Suggested by Tiejun Chen. ]
v13: Mechanical changes to deal with changes to patch 01/
XENMEM_reserved_device_memory_map.
This patch introduces user configurable parameters to specify RDM
resource and according policies,
Global RDM parameter:
rdm = "strategy=host,policy=strict/relaxed"
Per-device RDM parameter:
pci = [ 'sbdf, rdm_policy=strict/relaxed' ]
Global RDM parameter, "strategy", allows user to specify reserved regions
explicitly, Currently, using 'host' to include all reserved regions reported
on this platform which is good to handle hotplug scenario. In the future
this parameter may be further extended to allow specifying random regions,
e.g. even those belonging to another platform as a preparation for live
migration with passthrough devices. By default this isn't set so we don't
check all rdms. Instead, we just check rdm specific to a given device if
you're assigning this kind of device. Note this option is not recommended
unless you can make sure any conflict does exist.
'strict/relaxed' policy decides how to handle conflict when reserving RDM
regions in pfn space. If conflict exists, 'strict' means an immediate error
so VM can't keep running, while 'relaxed' allows moving forward with a
warning message thrown out.
Default per-device RDM policy is same as default global RDM policy as being
'relaxed'. And the per-device policy would override the global policy like
others.
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Checked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Try to avoid placing PCI BARs over RMRRs:
- If mmio_hole_size is not specified, and the existing MMIO range has
RMRRs in it, and there is space to expand the hole in lowmem without
moving more memory, then make the MMIO hole as large as possible.
- When placing RMRRs, find the next RMRR higher than the current base
in the lowmem mmio hole. If it overlaps, skip ahead of it and find
the next one.
This certainly won't work in all cases, but it should work in a
significant number of cases. Additionally, users should be able to
work around problems by setting mmio_hole_size larger in the guest
config.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Now we get this map layout by call XENMEM_memory_map then
save them into one global variable memory_map[]. It should
include lowmem range, rdm range and highmem range. Note
rdm range and highmem range may not exist in some cases.
And here we need to check if any reserved memory conflicts with
[RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_START, RESERVED_MEMORY_DYNAMIC_END).
This range is used to allocate memory in hvmloder level, and
we would lead hvmloader failed in case of conflict since its
another rare possibility in real world.
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
RMRR reserved regions must be setup in the pfn space with an identity
mapping to reported mfn. However existing code has problem to setup
correct mapping when VT-d shares EPT page table, so lead to problem
when assigning devices (e.g GPU) with RMRR reported. So instead, this
patch aims to setup identity mapping in p2m layer, regardless of
whether EPT is shared or not. And we still keep creating VT-d table.
And we also need to introduce a pair of helper to create/clear this
sort of identity mapping as follows:
set_identity_p2m_entry():
If the gfn space is unoccupied, we just set the mapping. If space
is already occupied by desired identity mapping, do nothing.
Otherwise, failure is returned.
clear_identity_p2m_entry():
We just define macro to wrapper guest_physmap_remove_page() with
a returning value as necessary.
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
RMRRs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
v12a: Move interface structure union member to the end, while moving
the whole public header block into a __XEN__ / __XEN_TOOLS__
conditional block.
v12: Restore changes as much as possible to my original version, fixing
a few issues that got introduced after handing it over. Unionize
new public memop interface structure to allow for non-PCI to be
supported later on. Check flags to have all currently undefined
flags clear. Refine adjustments to xen/pci.h.
Commit 372900faf8 ("x86/MSI-X: reduce fiddling with control register
during restore") introduced de-references of pdev before it gets
checked against NULL. Instead of deferring the de-references, drop
the pointless check - both call sites do that check already.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This being an in-guest component, it shouldn't get to see (and even
less so use) tools-only public interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
... to hook up pci_conf_write_intercept() even for Dom0 not using
method 1 accesses for the base part of PCI device config space.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
... by monitoring writes to the mask register.
This allows reverting the main effect of the XSA-129 patches in qemu.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Rather than disabling and enabling MSI-X once per vector, do it just
once per device.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
As done in Linux by f598282f51 ("PCI: Fix the NIU MSI-X problem in a
better way") and its broken predecessor, make sure we don't access the
MSI-X table without having enabled MSI-X first, using the mask-all flag
instead to prevent interrupts from occurring.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
When a device gets detached from a guest, pciback will clear its
command register, thus disabling both memory and I/O decoding. The
disabled memory decoding, however, has an effect on the MSI-X table
accesses the hypervisor does: These won't have the intended effect
anymore. Even worse, for PCIe devices (but not SR-IOV virtual
functions) such accesses may (will?) be treated as Unsupported
Requests, causing respective errors to be surfaced, potentially in the
form of NMIs that may be fatal to the hypervisor or Dom0 is different
ways. Hence rather than carrying out these accesses, we should avoid
them where we can, and use alternative (e.g. PCI config space based)
mechanisms to achieve at least the same effect.
At this time it continues to be unclear whether this is fixing an
actual bug or is rather just working around bogus (but apparently
common) system behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Host uses of the bits will be added subsequently, and must not be
overridden by guests (including Dom0, namely when acting on behalf of
a guest).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This is to be used by MSI code, and later to also be hooked up to
MMCFG accesses by Dom0.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Some DOMCTLs returned non-POSIX error codes, replace them with POSIX
compilant values instead. EBADRQC and EBADSLT are replaced by EDOM, while
EUSERS is replaced with EOVERFLOW.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Replace two EDOM uses.
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
PSR was using EBADSLT and EUSERS which are not POSIX error codes, replace
them with ENOTSOCK and EOVERFLOW respectively.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
In fact, right now, the following (legitimate)
configuration:
vcpus = '4'
vnuma = [ [ "pnode=0","size=512","vcpus=0,1","vdistances=10,20" ],
[ "pnode=1","size=512","vcpus=2,3","vdistances=20,10" ] ]
Produces the following error:
# xl create /etc/xen/test.cfg
Parsing config from /etc/xen/test.cfg
xl: maxvcpus < vcpu
That is because, we only process the first element of the
"vcpus=" list (of each vnode specification). Therefore,
in the above case, we only see 2 vcpus, out of 4, being
assigned to the vnodes, and hence the error.
What we need is either a multidimentional array, or a
bitmap, to temporary store the vcpus of a vnode, while
parsing the vnuma config entry. Let's use the latter,
which happens to also make it easier to copy the outcome
of the parsing to its final destination in b_info, if
everything goes ok.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
cpu_to_socket() can't give correct socket value in CPU_PREPARE notifier
as at that time phys_proc_id has not yet been initialized (the value is
its default 0 in this case) which is incorrect for sockets other than
socket 0.
cos_to_cbm now is pre-allocated in CPU_PREPARE notifier and then consumed
in CPU_STARTING notifier.
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
htobe*() and be*toh() don't exist there. While replacing the 32-bit
ones with hton() and ntoh() would be possible, there wouldn't be an
obvious replacement for the 64-bit ones. Hence just take what current
glibc (2.21) has (assuming __bswap_*() exists, which it does back to
at least 2.4 according to my checking).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xl subcommands ought all to take -h. def_getopt and hence
SWITCH_FOREACH_OPT already handles 'h' by calling helpstr. None of
the call sites see the 'h'.
In this patch:
* Change SWITCH_FOREACH_OPT to always add a "h" to the short opts
string, using string concatenation.
* Remove the now-redundant h's from some existing option strings.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This limit of 11 has been in this function since it was written, but
serves no purpose. The extra arguments are fed one by one to
parse_nic_config, and it is possible to have as many as you like.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This adjust commit a49077e5 "Fix segfaults from `xl psr-cat-cbm-set`
command line handling":
* Do not use the constant `required_argument' here (we simply use 1
everywhere else).
* Fix the minimum required arguments argument to SWITCH_FOREACH_OPT.
Leave the separate check on optind, because it checks for too many as
well as too few arguments.
(There are many things in xl which fail to check for too many
arguments. I do not intend to drain that swamp now: I started but
decided a complete overhaul of most of xl's command line argument
processing would be best.)
This is just a code cleanup with no ultimate functional change.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Applying the series out of order led to d72befc35f "tools/libxl:
Identify copywhat in stream v2 datacopiers" unintentionally reverting
part of 21d9b079e5 "tools/libxl: Initialise the fd of the unused
half of a datacopier".
Put this back.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Call libxl_cpupoolinfo_init at the beginning. Change two returns to
goto out so that libxl_cpupoolinfo_dispose is called in failure path.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Wei Liu
Ian Jackson
Julien Grall
Chris (Christopher) Brand
Jonathan Creekmore
Dario Faggioli
Tiejun Chen
George Dunlap
Jan Beulich
Ian Campbell
Roger Pau Monné
Chao Peng
Andrew Cooper