Now that XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain handles the grant table limits, remove
XEN_DOMCTL_set_gnttab_limits (including XSM hooks and libxc wrappers).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
set_max_evtchn is somewhat weird. It was introduced with the event_fifo work,
but has never been used. Still, it is a bounding on resources consumed by the
event channel infrastructure, and should be part of createdomain, rather than
editable after the fact.
Drop XEN_DOMCTL_set_max_evtchn completely (including XSM hooks and libxc
wrappers), and retain the functionality in XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Certain memory resources associated with a guest are not necessarily
present in the guest P2M.
This patch adds the boilerplate for new memory op to allow such a resource
to be priv-mapped directly, by either a PV or HVM tools domain.
NOTE: Whilst the new op is not intrinsically specific to the x86 architecture,
I have no means to test it on an ARM platform and so cannot verify
that it functions correctly.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Remove the implementation of XEN_DOMCTL_pin_mem_cacheattr since it has
been replaced by a dmop. Change xc_domain_pin_memory_cacheattr() so
that it is only defined when XC_WANT_COMPAT_DEVICEMODEL_API is set and
have it call the new dmop. Leave the definitions of
XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_CACHEATTR_* since they are still used by QEMU.
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This patch renames PSR sysctl/domctl interfaces and related xsm policy to
make them be general for all resource allocation features but not only
for CAT. Then, we can resuse the interfaces for all allocation features.
Basically, it changes 'psr_cat_op' to 'psr_alloc', and remove 'CAT_' from some
macros. E.g.:
1. psr_cat_op -> psr_alloc
2. XEN_DOMCTL_psr_cat_op -> XEN_DOMCTL_psr_alloc
3. XEN_SYSCTL_psr_cat_op -> XEN_SYSCTL_psr_alloc
4. XEN_DOMCTL_PSR_CAT_SET_L3_CBM -> XEN_DOMCTL_PSR_SET_L3_CBM
5. XEN_SYSCTL_PSR_CAT_get_l3_info -> XEN_SYSCTL_PSR_get_l3_info
Signed-off-by: Yi Sun <yi.y.sun@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
DEPS_INCLUDE is currently the same as DEPS, so no functional change.
This patch is the result of this perl rune:
git-grep -l 'include.*DEPS' | xargs perl -i -pe 'next unless m/^-?include/; s/\bDEPS\b/DEPS_INCLUDE/'
I have verified that I haven't missed anything, with this rune:
git-grep '\bDEPS\b'
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
DEPS_RM is currently the same as DEPS, so no functional change.
This patch is the result of two perl runes:
git-grep -l 'rm.*DEPS' | xargs perl -i~ -pe 'next unless m/^\t+rm\b/; s/\bDEPS\b/DEPS_RM/;'
git-grep -l 'RM.*DEPS' | xargs perl -i~ -pe 'next unless m/^\t+\$\(RM\)/; s/\bDEPS\b/DEPS_RM/;'
And editing tools/xenstat/libxenstat/Makefile by hand.
I verified that I didn't miss anything with this rune:
git-grep '\bDEPS\b' | grep -v include |less
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Add a sysctl hypercall to support setting parameters similar to
command line parameters, but at runtime. The parameters to set are
specified as a string, just like the boot parameters.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Isolation of devices passed through to domains usually requires an
active IOMMU. The existing method of requiring an IOMMU is via a Xen
boot parameter ("iommu=force") which will abort boot if an IOMMU is not
available.
More graceful degradation of behaviour when an IOMMU is absent can be
achieved by enabling XSM to perform enforcement of IOMMU requirement.
This patch enables an enforceable XSM policy to specify that an IOMMU is
required for particular domains to access devices and how capable that
IOMMU must be. This allows a Xen system to boot whilst still
ensuring that an IOMMU is active before permitting device use.
Using a XSM policy ensures that the isolation properties remain enforced
even when the large, complex toolstack software changes.
For some hardware platforms interrupt remapping is a strict requirement
for secure isolation. Not all IOMMUs provide interrupt remapping.
The XSM policy can now optionally require interrupt remapping.
The device use hooks now check whether an IOMMU is:
* Active and securely isolating:
-- current criteria for this is that interrupt remapping is ok
* Active but interrupt remapping is not available
* Not active
This patch also updates the reference XSM policy to use the new
primitives, with policy entries that do not require an active IOMMU.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
Running "make uninstall" does not remove all installed files, a
situation which might cause link related issues if xen is re-installed
in a different location.
In order to make uninstall correctly remove the files it is best
the process should be done recursively by mirroring each "install"
target with an "uninstall" who removes the installed files.
An exception to this rule is uninstalling the files produced by
"qemu-xen-dir-remote" and "qemu-xen-traditional-dir", which are external
to the project. These projects do not implement an "uninstall" target so
the files have to be removed manually.
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
c/s 524a98c2ac "public / x86: introduce __HYPERCALL_dm_op" gave flask
permisisons for a stubdomain to use dmops, but omitted the case of a device
model running in dom0.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
In 58cbc034 send_irq permission was removed but there was still
reference to it in policy file. Remove the stale reference.
And now we also need dm permission. Add that.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
xsm/build: Further build fixes following the DMop series
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
NOTE: This patch also modifies the types of the 'vector', 'type' and
'insn_len' arguments of xc_hvm_inject_trap() from uint32_t to
uint8_t. In practice the values passed were always truncated to
8 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
... HVMOP_set_pci_link_route
These HVMOPs were exposed to guests so their definitions need to be
preserved for compatibility. This patch therefore updates
__XEN_LATEST_INTERFACE_VERSION__ to 0x00040900 and makes the HVMOP
defintions conditional on __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ less than that value.
NOTE: This patch also widens the 'domain' parameter of
xc_hvm_set_pci_intx_level() from a uint8_t to a uint16_t.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The handle type passed to the underlying shadow and hap functions is
changed for compatibility with the new hypercall buffer.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' parameter of
xc_hvm_track_dirty_vram() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice
the value passed was always truncated to 32 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
...as a set of hypercalls to be used by a device model.
As stated in the new docs/designs/dm_op.markdown:
"The aim of DMOP is to prevent a compromised device model from
compromising domains other then the one it is associated with. (And is
therefore likely already compromised)."
See that file for further information.
This patch simply adds the boilerplate for the hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Jennifer Herbert <jennifer.herbert@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Add two missing allow rules:
1. Device model domain construction uses getvcpucontext, discovered by
Andrew Cooper while chasing an unrelated issue.
2. When a domain is destroyed with a device passthrough active, the
calls to remove_{irq,ioport,iomem} can be made by the hypervisor itself
(which results in an XSM check with the source xen_t). It does not make
sense to deny these permissions; no domain should be using xen_t, and
forbidding the hypervisor from performing cleanup is not useful.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The flask policy can be build twice -- one for hypervisor and one for
tools.
Before this patch, everything is built inside tools/flask/policy
directory. It is possible to have a race to write to the same output
file when running parallel builds.
Prepend output file names with FLASK_BUILD_DIR. Hypervisor and tools
build will set that variable to different directories, so that we can
be safe from races.
Adjust other bits of the build system as needed.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Qemu needs access to this for the domain it controls, both due to it
being used by xc_domain_memory_mapping() (which qemu calls) and the
explicit use in hw/xenpv/xen_domainbuild.c:xen_domain_poll(). Extend
permissions to that of any "ordinary" domctl: A domain controlling the
targeted domain can invoke this operation for that target domain (which
is being achieved by no longer passing NULL to xsm_domctl()).
This at once avoids a for_each_domain() loop when the ID of an
existing domain gets passed in.
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Starting from 08cffe66 ("xsm: add a default policy to .init.data") we
can attach a xsm policy blob to hypervisor. To build that policy blob
now hypervisor build system needs to enter tools directory.
The expectation for hypervisor and tools build systems is different. We
don't want xen build system to depend on configure but we want tools
build system to. That commit broke this expectation because it required
users to run configure before building hypervisor. This broke ARM build
because ARM developers normally build hypervisor and tools separately
(and possibly on different platforms). It can also break x86 if
developers don't run configure before building hypervisor with XSM on.
To fix it, move major part of tools/flask/policy/Makefile into
Makefile.common and create tools only Makefile to include that common
Makefile. Hypervisor Makefile will use Makefile.common to build xsm
policy.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Access to setpodtarget and getpodtarget is required by dom0 to set the balloon
targets for domU. The patch gives source domain (dom0) access to set
this target for domU and resolve the following permission denied erro
message during ballooning :
avc: denied { setpodtarget } for domid=0 target=9
scontext=system_u:system_r:dom0_t
tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t tclass=domain
Signed-off-by: Anshul Makkar <anshul.makkar@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
This patch resolves the following permission denied scenarios while creating
new domU :
avc: denied { setdomainhandle } for domid=0 target=1
scontext=system_u:system_r:dom0_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t tclass=domain
avc: denied { settime } for domid=0 target=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:dom0_t
tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t tclass=domain
Signed-off-by: Anshul Makkar <anshul.makkar@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
This operation has no known users, and is primarily useful when an MLS
policy is in use (which has never been shipped with Xen). In addition,
the information it provides does not actually depend on hypervisor
state (only on the XSM policy), so an application that needs it could
compute the results without needing to involve the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
These permissions were initially split because they were in separate
domctls, but this split is very unlikely to actually provide security
benefits: it would require a carefully contrived situation for a domain
to both need access to one type of CPU register and also need to be
prohibited from accessing another type.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This adds the xenstore_t type to the example policy for use by a
xenstore stub domain; see the init-xenstore-domain tool for how this
type needs to be used.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
This also renames the example users created by vm_role.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
When the all_system_role module is enabled, any domain type can be
created using the system_r role, which was the default. When it is
disabled, domains not using the default types (dom0_t and domU_t) must
use another role such as vm_r.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Specifically:
s/\.xsplice/\.livepatch/
s/XSPLICE/LIVEPATCH/
s/xsplice/livepatch/
s/livepatch_patch_func/livepatch_func/
s/xSplice/Xen Live Patch/
s/livepatching/livepatch/
s/arch_livepatch_enter/arch_livepatch_quiesce/
s/arch_livepatch_exit/arch_livepatch_revive/
And then modify some of the function arguments
to have two more characters.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
If the hypervisor was built with build-ids we can expose the
build-id value to the toolstack (if it is not built with
it will just return -ENODATA). This is a priviligied operation
so only the controlling stack is able to request this.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
The implementation does not actually do any patching.
It just adds the framework for doing the hypercalls,
keeping track of ELF payloads, and the basic operations:
- query which payloads exist,
- query for specific payloads,
- check*1, apply*1, replace*1, and unload payloads.
*1: Which of course in this patch are nops.
The functionality is disabled on ARM until all arch
components are implemented.
Also by default it is disabled until the implementation
is in place.
We also use recursive spinlocks to so that the find_payload
function does not need to have a 'lock' and 'non-lock' variant.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
This reverts commit 2716d87537.
As it was decided that the existing XENVER hypercall - while having
grown organically over the years can still be expanded.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Requested-and-acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
A toolstack needs to know how much control Xen has over the visible cpuid
values in PV guests. Provide an explicit mechanism to query what Xen is
capable of.
This interface will currently report no capabilities. This change is
scaffolding for future patches, which will introduce detection and switching
logic, after which the interface will report hardware capabilities correctly.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
This hypercall mirrors the XENVER_ in that it has similar functionality.
However it is designed differently:
- No compat layer. The data structures are the same size on 32
as on 64-bit.
- The hypercall accepts three arguments - the command, pointer to
an buffer, and the length of the buffer.
- Each sub-ops can be "probed" for size by returning the size of
buffer that will be needed - if the buffer is NULL.
- Subops can complete even if the buffer is too small - truncated
data will be filled and hypercall will return -ENOBUFS.
- VERSION_commandline, VERSION_changeset are privileged.
- There is no XENVER_compile_info equivalent.
- The hypercall can return -EPERM and toolstack/OSes are expected
to deal with. However there are three subops: XEN_VERSION_version,
XEN_VERSION_platform_parameters and XEN_VERSION_get_features
that will always return an value as guests cannot survive without them.
While we combine some of the common code between XENVER_ and VERSION_
take the liberty of moving pae_extended_cr3 in x86 area.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> [XSM bits]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Most of XENVER_* have now an XSM check for their sub-ops.
The subop for XENVER_commandline is now a priviliged operation.
To not break guests we still return an string - but it is
just '<denied>\0'.
The XENVER_[version|platform_parameters|get_features] - will
always return an value to the guest.
The rest: XENVER_[extraversion|capabilities|page_size|
guest_handle|changeset| compile_info] behave as before -
allowed by default for all guests if using the XSM default
policy or with the dummy one. And if the system admin
wants to curtail access to some of them - they can do
that now with a non-default XSM policy.
Also we add a local variable block.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
v2: Do XSM check for all the XENVER_ ops.
- Add empty data conditions.
- Return <denied> for priv subops.
- Move extraversion from priv to normal. Drop the XSM check
for the non-priv subops.
v3:
- Add +1 for strlen(xen_deny()) to include NULL. Move changeset,
compile_info to non-priv subops.
- Remove the \0 on xen_deny()
- Add new XSM domain for xenver hypercall. Add all subops to it.
- Remove the extra line, Add Ack from Daniel
v4:
- Rename the XSM from xen_version_op to xsm_xen_version.
Prefix the types with 'xen' to distinguish it from another
hypercall performing similar operation. Removed Ack from Daniel
as it was so large. Add local variable block.
v5:
- Make XENVER_platform_parameters,get_features,version be excluded
from the XSM check per Jans' review. Add BUILD_BUG_CHECK and fix
odd line removals. Remove stray changes and fix spelling.
Allows:
(XEN) avc: denied { pcilevel } for domid=2 target=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:dm_dom_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t_target tclass=hvm
Which otherwise leads to the following on resume after migrate (comparing
non-XSM to XSM):
ata2.00: configured for MWDMA2
usb 1-2: reset full-speed USB device number 2 using uhci_hcd
+PM: restore of devices complete after 3779.268 msecs
usb 1-2: USB disconnect, device number 2
-PM: restore of devices complete after 2342.528 msecs
usb 1-2: new full-speed USB device number 3 using uhci_hcd
usb 1-2: New USB device found, idVendor=0627, idProduct=0001
usb 1-2: New USB device strings: Mfr=3, Product=2, SerialNumber=1
usb 1-2: Product: QEMU USB Tablet
usb 1-2: Manufacturer: QEMU 0.10.2
usb 1-2: SerialNumber: 1
input: QEMU 0.10.2 QEMU USB Tablet as /devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:01.2/usb1/1-2/1-2:1.0/input/input8
generic-usb 0003:0627:0001.0002: input,hidraw0: USB HID v0.01 Pointer [QEMU 0.10.2 QEMU USB Tablet] on usb-0000:00:01.2-2/input0
Restarting tasks ... done.
Setting capacity to 20480000
Setting capacity to 20480000
+uhci_hcd 0000:00:01.2: Unlink after no-IRQ? Controller is probably using the wrong IRQ.
And a glitch in the domU which is sufficient to disrupt the post migration
checks done by osstest.
This has been through a test run on merlot1 and resolved the migration
issues with the test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm
osstest test case.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
It looks to be missing in the policy file for the initial
domain. Eventually we may want to extend this access to
non-dom0 domains but for now it certainly dom0-only.
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Add new soft_reset vector to domain2 class, add it to create_domain
in the default policy.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add runtime interface for setting PMU mode and flags. Three main modes are
provided:
* XENPMU_MODE_OFF: PMU is not virtualized
* XENPMU_MODE_SELF: Guests can access PMU MSRs and receive PMU interrupts.
* XENPMU_MODE_HV: Same as XENPMU_MODE_SELF for non-proviledged guests, dom0
can profile itself and the hypervisor.
Note that PMU modes are different from what can be provided at Xen's boot line
with 'vpmu' argument. An 'off' (or '0') value is equivalent to XENPMU_MODE_OFF.
Any other value, on the other hand, will cause VPMU mode to be set to
XENPMU_MODE_SELF during boot.
For feature flags only Intel's BTS is currently supported.
Mode and flags are set via HYPERVISOR_xenpmu_op hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Andrew Cooper