c/s bac6334b5 "move domain to cpupool0 before destroying it" introduced a
problem when destroying a HVM domain with PCI passthrough enabled. The
moving of the domain to cpupool0 includes moving the pirqs to the cpupool0
cpus, but the event channel infrastructure already is unusable for the
domain. So just avoid moving pirqs for dying domains.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Do not clobber errors from certain codepaths. Clobbering of -EINVAL from
failing "evc->size <= PV_XSAVE_SIZE(_xcr0_accum)" was a pre-existing bug.
However, clobbering -EINVAL/-EFAULT from the get codepath was a bug
unintentionally introduced by 090ca8c1 "x86/domctl: two functional fixes to
XEN_DOMCTL_[gs]etvcpuextstate".
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Virtual environments such as Xen HVM containers and VirtualBox do not
necessarily provide support for feature masking MSRs.
As their presence is detected by model numbers alone, and their use predicated
on command line parameters, use the safe() variants of {wr,rd}msr() to avoid
dying with an early #GP fault.
In fact, use the password variants in all cases because:
a) they are safe to use even if not strictly required
b) have a more useful function prototype for this purposes
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Interacting with the vcpu itself should be protected by vcpu_pause().
Buggy/naive toolstacks might encounter adverse interaction with a vcpu context
switch, or increase of xcr0_accum. There are no much problems with current
in-tree code.
Explicitly permit a NULL guest handle as being a request for size. It is the
prevailing Xen style, and without it, valgrind's ioctl handler is unable to
determine whether evc->buffer actually got written to.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xstate_ctxt_size(xfeature_mask) is runtime constant after boot, and for bounds
checking when handling xsave state. Avoid reloading xcr0 twice to obtain a
number which has already been calculated.
Also annotate xfeature_mask as __read_mostly as it is only ever written once.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
When firmware-first mode is being indicated by firmware, we shouldn't
be modifying AER registers - these are considered to be owned by
firmware in that case. Violating this is being reported to result in
SMI storms. While circumventing the workaround means re-exposing
affected hosts to the XSA-59 issues, this in any event seems better
than not booting at all. Respective messages are being issued to the
log, so the situation can be diagnosed.
The basic building blocks were taken from Linux 3.15-rc. Note that
this includes a block of code enclosed in #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE - we
don't define that symbol, and that code also wouldn't build without
suitable machine check side code added; that should happen eventually,
but isn't subject of this change.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reported-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
... and propagate this from hvm_inject_msi(). In the course of this I
spotted further room for cleanup:
- vmsi_inj_irq()'s struct domain * parameter was unused
- vmsi_deliver() pointlessly passed on dest_ExtINT to vmsi_inj_irq()
(which that one validly refused to handle)
- vmsi_inj_irq()'s sole caller guarantees a proper delivery mode (i.e.
rather than printing an obscure message we can just BUG())
- some formatting and log message quirks
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
There are a number of ways this operation can go wrong, all of which
got ignored so far.
In the context of this I wonder whether map_domain_emuirq_pirq()
returning 0 in the "already mapped" case is really intended to be that
way (this is why the subsequent NULL check here can't be an ASSERT()).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Coverity-ID: 1220092 "Unsigned compare against 0"
Coverity-ID: 1220093 "Out-of-bounds read"
Both of these are cased by the the while() loop in the fail path, which
results in an infinite loop and memory corruption from rangeset_destroy().
Move hvm_ioreq_server_free_rangesets() up and use it for cleanup on the
failure path.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
If the memory map is not shared between HAP and IOMMU we fail to set
correct IOMMU mappings for memory types other than p2m_ram_rw.
This patchs adds IOMMU support for the following memory types:
p2m_grant_map_rw, p2m_map_foreign, p2m_ram_ro, p2m_grant_map_ro and
p2m_ram_logdirty.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Tested-by: David Zhuang <david.zhuang@oracle.com>
Prevent the usage of global logdirty if the domain is using the IOMMU,
and also prevent passthrough of devices if logdirty is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
This at once:
- prevents the page from being reassigned under our feet
- ensures that the domain owns the page, which stops a domain from giving a
grant mapping, MMIO region, other non-RAM as a hypercall input/output.
We need to hold the p2m lock while doing the lookup until we have the
reference.
This also requires that during domain 0 building current is set to an actual
dom0 vcpu, so take care of this at the same time as the p2m is temporarily
loaded.
Lastly when dumping the guest stack we need to make sure that the guest hasn't
pointed its sp off into the weeds and/or misaligned it, which could lead to
hypervisor traps. Solve this by using the new function and checking alignment
first.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
In particular we need to make sure the guest has write permissions to buffers
which it passes as output buffers for hypercalls, otherwise the guest can
overwrite memory which it shouldn't be able to write (like r/o grant table
mappings).
This is XSA-98.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
handle_mmio() is currently unsafe for pvh guests. A call to it would
result in call to vioapic_range that will crash xen since the vioapic
ptr in struct hvm_domain is not initialized for pvh guests.
However, one path exists for such a call. If a pvh guest, dom0 or domU,
unintentionally touches non-existing memory, an EPT violation would occur.
This would result in unconditional call to hvm_hap_nested_page_fault. In
that function, because get_gfn_type_access returns p2m_mmio_dm for non
existing mfns by default, handle_mmio() will get called. This would result
in xen crash instead of the guest crash. This patch addresses that.
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
If a buggy BIOS programs an ACPI table with to small an entry length
then acpi_table_entries gets stuck in an infinite loop.
To aid debugging, report the error and exit the loop.
Based on Linux kernel commit 369d913b242cae2205471b11b6e33ac368ed33ec
Signed-off-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
Use < instead of <= (which I wrongly suggested), return -ENODATA
instead of -EINVAL, and make description match code.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
... making the code more generic and limiting address space consumption
(however small it might be) to just those machines that need this
mapping (this is an erratum workaround after all).
At the same time properly map the full needed range from the base
address instead of just the third page and fix some formatting.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
- pirq_info() returns NULL for a non-allocated pIRQ, and hence we
mustn't unconditionally de-reference it, and we need to invoke it
another time after having called map_domain_emuirq_pirq()
- don't use printk(), namely without XENLOG_GUEST, for error reporting
This is XSA-96.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
With all AMD mcheck initialization unified now after
commit 518576c, these two function definitions can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <aravind.gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
validate_xsave() is called codepaths which load new vcpu xsave state from
XEN_DOMCTL_{setvcpuextstate,sethvmcontext}, usually as part of migration. In
both cases, this is the xfeature_mask of the saving Xen rather than the
restoring Xen.
Given that the xsave state itself is checked for consistency and validity on
the current cpu, checking whether it was valid for the cpu before migration is
not interesting (or indeed relevant, as the error can't be distinguished from
the other validity checking).
This change removes the need to pass the saving Xen's xfeature_mask,
simplifying the toolstack code and migration stream format in this area.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This patch ports the basic alternative mechanism from Linux to Xen.
With this mechanism, we can patch code based on the CPU features.
Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This patch makes set_nmi_callback return the old nmi callback, so
we can set it back later.
Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Grant mappings can be used for DMA requests. Currently the dev_bus_addr returned
by the hypercall is the MFN (not the IPA). Guest expects to be able the returned
address for DMA. When the device is protected by IOMMU the request will fail.
Therefore, we have to add 1:1 mapping in the domain p2m to allow DMA request
to work.
This is valid because DOM0 has its memory mapped 1:1 and therefore we know
that RAM and devices cannot clash.
If the guest only owns protected device, the return dev_bus_addr should be an
IPA. This will allow us to remove safely the 1:1 mapping and make grant mapping
works correctly in the guest. For now, this is not addressed by this patch.
The grant mapping code does the reference counting on every MFN and will
call iommu_{map,unmap}_page when necessary. This was already handle for x86
PV guests, so we can reuse the same code path for ARM guest.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
[ ijc s/ld/d/ in both arch's gnttab_need_iommu_mapping() ]
This patch add support for ARM architected SMMU driver. It's based on the
linux drivers (drivers/iommu/arm-smmu) commit 89ac23cd.
The major differences with the Linux driver are:
- Fault by default if the SMMU is enabled to translate an
address (Linux is bypassing the SMMU)
- Using P2M page table instead of creating new one
- Dropped stage-1 support
- Dropped chained SMMUs support for now
- Reworking device assignment and the different structures
Xen is programming each IOMMU by:
- Using stage-2 mode translation
- Sharing the page table with the processor
- Injecting a fault if the device has made a wrong translation
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall<julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The current size is sufficient for the default maximum grant table size
(32-frames), but increase the reserved region to 16M/4096 pages to allow for
the use of the gnttab_max_nr_frames command line option.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
This creates a second bank of RAM starting at 8GB and potentially
extending to the 1TB boundary, which is the limit imposed by our
current use of a 3 level p2m with 2 pages at level 0 (2^40 bits).
I've deliberately left a gap between the two banks just to
exercise those code paths.
The second bank is 1016GB in size which plus the 3GB below 4GB is
1019GB maximum guest RAM. At the point where the fact that this
is slightly less than a full TB starts to become an issue for
people then we can switch to a 4 level p2m, which would be needed
to support guests larger than 1TB anyhow.
Tested on 32-bit with 1, 4 and 6GB guests. Anything more than
~3GB requires an LPAE enabled kernel, or a 64-bit guest.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
This required exposing the sizes of the banks determined by the domain builder
up to libxl via xc_dom_image.
Since the domain build needs to know the size of the DTB we create placeholder
nodes for each possible bank and when we finalise the DTB we fill in the ones
which are actually populated and NOP out the rest.
Note that the number of guest RAM banks is still 1 after this change.
Also fixes a coding style violation in
libxl__arch_domain_finalise_hw_description while there.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
[ ijc -- minor coding style fix ]
Prepare for adding more banks of guest RAM by renaming a bunch of defines
as RAM0 and replacing variables with arrays and introducing loops.
Also in preparation switch to using GUEST_RAM0_BASE explicitly instead of
implicitly via dom->rambase_pfn (while asserting that they must be the same).
This makes the multiple bank case cleaner (although it looks a bit odd for
now).
GUEST_RAM_BASE is defined as the address of the lowest RAM bank, it is used in
tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c to call xc_dom_rambase_init().
Lastly for now ramsize (total size) and rambank_size[0] (size of first bank)
are the same, but use the appropriate one for each context.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
This will help when we have more guest RAM banks.
Mostly code motion of the p2m_host initialisation and allocation loop into the
new function populate_guest_memory, but in addition in the caller we now
initialise the p2m all the INVALID_MFN to handle any holes, although in this
patch we still fill in the entire allocated region.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
By switching things around we can manage to expose up to 3GB of RAM to guests.
I deliberately didn't place the RAM at address 0 to avoid coming to rely on
this, so the various peripherals, MMIO and magic pages etc all live in the
lower 1GB leaving the upper 3GB available for RAM.
It would likely have been possible to reduce the space used by the peripherals
etc and allow for 3.5 or 3.75GB but I decided to keep things simple and will
handle >3GB memory in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Because toolstacks (at least libxl) only allow RAM to be specified in 1M
increments these two pages were effectively costing 1M of guest RAM space.
Since these pages don't actually need to live in RAM just move them out.
With this a guest can now use the full 768M of the address space reserved
for RAM. (ok, not that impressive, but it simplifies things later)
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
--
v3: make the size of the region explicit.
v2: remove spurious w/s change
tools: arm: make the size of the magic page region explicit
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Due to the layout of the guest physical address space we cannot support more
than 768M of RAM before overrunning the area set aside for the grant table. Due
to the presence of the magic pages at the end of the RAM region guests are
actually limited to 767M.
Catch this case during domain build and fail gracefully instead of obscurely
later on.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
While I was adding new failing code at the end of the function, I noticed
that the vtimers are not freed which messes up all the timers and will crash
Xen quickly when the page s reused.
Currently neither vcpu_vgic_init nor vcpu_vtimer_init fails, so we
are safe for now. With the new GICv3 code, the former function will be able
to fail. This will result in a memory leak.
Call vcpu_destroy if the initialization has failed. We also need to add a
boolean to know if the vtimers are correctly setup as the timer common code
doesn't have any safeguard against removing a non-initialized timer.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Before trying to parse network interface name as 'vif*.*'
try to get the domid and network number from sysfs.
Fixes xentop output for domains with VIF renamed through the
'vifname' xl option.
Signed-off-by: Jacek Konieczny <jajcus@jajcus.net>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
For writing into a vchan, raw_get_buffer_space used >, allowing the full
ring size to be written. On the read side, raw_get_data_ready compared
the ring size with >=. This mismatch means a completely filled buffer
cannot be read. Fix this by making the size checks identical.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <andryuk@aero.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
1.introduce asynchronous execution API:
libxl__async_exec_init
libxl__async_exec_start
libxl__async_exec_inuse
2.use the async exec API to execute device hotplug scripts
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <yanghy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Finally last patch in the series to enable creation of pvh dom0.
A pvh dom0 is created by adding dom0pvh to grub xen command line.
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Juergen Gross
Andrew Cooper
Roger Pau Monné
Jan Beulich
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Christian Wolter
Ian Campbell
Mukesh Rathor
Malcolm Crossley
Aravind Gopalakrishnan
Feng Wu
Julien Grall
Zhigang Wang
Jacek Konieczny
Jason Andryuk
Yang Hongyang